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Abstract 
The liberalisation of telecommunications market in Africa, which was propelled by a 
sector-wide reform at the turn of the millennium, has led to an unprecedented level of 
mobile penetration. Despite the progress that has been achieved, evidence also 
indicates that the market has failed to address the widespread provision of 
telecommunications, with pockets of digital divides of uneven mobile coverage 
existing across the continent albeit to varying degrees. The efforts of governments in 
Africa to close this digital divide have given rise to a range of universal access and 
service (UAS) policies.  
The thesis investigates the interplay between market liberalisation, market 
failure and UAS to understand why digital divide persists across Africa and how this 
problem could be mitigated. Adopting a qualitative multi-case study approach, the 
thesis finds that a set of complex issues interact to impede the widespread provision 
of telecommunications services. Drawing on the public interest and economic 
efficiency perspectives of market failure, regulatory capacity and transaction costs 
emerged as the two key underpinning issues on which a model for closing the digital 
divide in Africa was then developed.  
We find that since regulators across Africa are largely faced with limited 
human and financial resources, they tend to lack the capacity to formulate robust UAS 
policies, implement and effectively monitor UAS activities. On the other hand, since 
mobile network operators (MNO) are profit driven, the transaction costs of network 
deployment and maintenance is critical in shaping investment decision so much so that 
they tend to concentrate on commercially viable areas. 
The model argues that UAS policy should be formulated in a manner that 
empowers regulatory authorities with adequate resources to promote widespread 
access to telecommunication services and, at the same time, facilitate economic 
efficiency in order to make it feasible for MNO to economically provide infrastructure 
and services. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background to the thesis 
Before the turn of the millennium, the telecommunications sector across Africa was 
run by state monopolies who mainly provided fixed services (Berg & Hamilton, 2002; 
Chavula, 2013; ITU, 2009). The performance of these state monopolies was 
unsatisfactory, as evident in the low penetration of fixed-line due in part to the lack of 
investment and technical capacity in the industry (Ibrahim, 2012; ITU, 1999; Minges, 
1998; Williams & Kwofie, 2014). For example, the highest penetration for continental 
Africa prior to 2000/2001, was 1.74 fixed lines per 100 inhabitants while other regions 
such as East Asia had 8.23 and Latin America and the Caribbean had 13.21 fixed lines 
for the same period (Gebreab 2002; Minges 1998). The situation was worse in Sub-
Saharan Africa which had 0.48 fixed lines penetration per 100 persons (Minges, 1998). 
Access to mobile lines was also not different as only 4%, around 30 million of over 
760 million people in Africa, had access to mobile lines before 2000/2001 (GSMA, 
2011; ITU, 1999; UN, 1998). Overall, the levels of telecommunications coverage 
provided were largely concentrated as state monopolies barely deployed network 
outside their capital cities, which also had long waiting lists for fixed connection 
(Gebreab, 2002). For example, the waiting list in Sub-Saharan Africa at the end of 
1995 stood at about 1.5 million households, an equivalent of a quarter of the 6 million 
fixed lines in operation for the same period (IFC, 2016). 
This indicated that a considerable number of people were unserved, which led 
to growing pressure on governments to expand telecommunications coverage 
(Gebreab, 2002; Hudson, 2006; Williams & Kwofie, 2014). There was thus a 
compelling case to extend telecommunications coverage to unserved (areas with no 
telecommunication infrastructure [Hudson, 2010]) and underserved (areas with 
unreliable telecommunication infrastructure or in some cases, where infrastructure exit 
but there is low levels of service adoption due to the unaffordability of tariffs and 
mobile devices to a large number residents [Hudson, 2010]) locations, hereafter called 
disadvantaged areas. The definition of underserved areas by Hudson (2010) suggests 
that the expansion of telecommunications goes beyond promoting a first-level issue 
related to physical access to infrastructure to second-level issues connected to 
stimulating adoption and usage, which is partly underlined by unaffordability 
(Campos-Castillo, 2014; Hargittai, 2002; van Deursen & Helsper, 2015). Issues 
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connected to unaffordability indicate that if people cannot afford mobile devices 
and/or tariff plans even when there is a network, a complementary segment of the 
market could be said to be missing, which could then lead to market failure (see 
Sections 3.2.1 and 5.3.4). This indicates that the supply of the network and the demand 
for services are complementary - as one cannot succeed without the other otherwise it 
results in a missing market1 (Beare & Newby, 2005; Dollery, 2001). Issues relating to 
service demand can be better explained from a demand-side perspective that explores 
barriers such as unaffordability of mobile devices (including smartphones), low-
incomes and a lack of digital education, which reflects in the inability of consumers to 
use mobile devices and optimally engage with the Internet (Gillwald, 2017; Gillwald, 
Mothobi, & Rademan, 2018). 
Evidence of this is highlighted in Chair and De Lannoy (2018), which drew 
from the 2017 RIA2 After Access Survey (a study that explored beyond access issues 
in countries like Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and South Africa). 
Chair and De Lannoy (2018) highlighted that the unaffordability of mobile devices, 
particularly mobile phones, restricts access to mobile telecommunications for over 
60% of 15-25 years in Nigeria and over 70% of the same age bracket in Tanzania 
(Chair & De Lannoy, 2018). Meanwhile, over 13% of this age bracket in Nigeria and 
35% in Tanzania say they do not own a mobile phone, not necessarily because of 
unaffordability but due to the lack of knowledge on how to use it, highlighting the 
issue of a lack of digital education (Chair & De Lannoy, 2018). 
The implications of these findings are far-reaching given that such an age 
bracket constitutes more than half of the over one billion people living across Africa 
(World Bank, 2017). That said, these demand-side issues are largely not covered in 
this study given that the main focus here is to explore the first-level digital divide issue 
of physical access to telecommunications infrastructure and not second-level issues 
related to skills and usage or a third-level that explores tangible outcomes in terms of 
the type of people most likely to benefit from digital inclusion (Campos-Castillo, 
2015; Hagittai, 2002; van Deursen & Helsper, 2015). Hence it is useful to 
                                                 
1 See Section 3.2.1 for the definition of a missing market.  
2 Research ICT Africa – a public interest ICT policy and regulation think tank based in Cape Town, 
South Africa (Research ICT Africa, 2017). 
3 
 
acknowledge upfront that though demand-side barriers exit, this is a very supply-side 
focused study. However, since both the supply-and-demand-sides of the divide are 
equally important and complementary (Mohamed Nour 2017), the demand-side issues 
could be further explored in a separate complementary study. 
Having made the above clarification, this study proceeds with the 
understanding that the investigation of telecommunications is compounded not just by 
the fast and frequent evolution of information and communication technology (ICT) 
but also changing market conditions (Batura, 2016, pp. 12), it is useful at this point to 
state what telecommunication services mean in this study. Telecommunication 
services in this study refer to mobile telecommunications deployed to end-users, 
including voice and data services. Although state monopolies focused more on the 
deployment of fixed-line, one of the justifications for focusing on mobile 
telecommunications in this study is that market liberalisation resulted in a switch to 
mobile, which is more cost-effective to deploy compared to fixed network as examined 
in Section 2.2. Mobile telephony has thus facilitated an unprecedented level of access3 
to telecommunications for millions across Africa (Esselaar, Gillwald, & Stork, 2007; 
ITU, 2016). Unlike in advanced economies in North America and Europe4 where 
investment was first made in fixed network before moving to mobile network, mobile 
telephony has effectively helped Africa to leapfrog many years of government neglect 
and plug the gaps in fixed network (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Haftu, 2018; Manson, 2013). 
Additionally, mobile telephony is driving the convergence of telecommunications by 
enabling the combination of multiple services like voice, data and images over a single 
network (Cramer, 2015; Hudson, 2006). Consequently, end-users can now access a 
plethora of ICT services on their mobile phones, which is fast becoming a critical 
socio-economic enabler across Africa (Collett, 2016; Jagun, Heeks, & Whalley, 2008). 
Having clarified what telecommunications mean in this study, its expansion 
requires a large investment in infrastructure (Hudson, 2010; ITU, 2015; World Bank, 
2018a). Since this was generally lacking across Africa, albeit in varying proportions 
between countries and regions, governments turned to the World Bank and its 
                                                 
3 See Section 3.3.1 for the definition of access in the context of this study. 
4 This excludes Eastern Europe, which moved like Africa from a limited fixed infrastructure to extensive 
mobile networks (Armstrong & Vickers, 1996; Welfens, 1995). 
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associated bodies for financial and technical support (Haftu, 2018; Irwin & Brook, 
2003; Sutherland, 2014). Prime among the conditions for obtaining such support was 
the need to introduce reforms, including the 1997 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
Basic Telecommunications Agreement and the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (Ojo, 2016; WTO, 1997). The negotiations of the aforementioned reforms 
were concluded on February 15, 1997, with the signature of 69 countries, including 
Ghana, South Africa and Tunisia (WTO, 1997). One of the central commitments made 
at this meeting was the need to liberalise trade in general and minimise government 
involvement in the telecommunications sector in order to make the industry more 
effective and efficient, attract more investment and facilitate growth (Sutherland, 
2014; WTO, 1997; Wanjiku 2014). In the words of the Director-General of WTO at 
that time, Mr. Renato Ruggiero, “… the telecommunications deal will contribute to 
lower costs for consumers, and the price reductions will be very significant… 
Information and knowledge, after all, are the raw material of growth and development 
in our globalised world” (WTO, 1997, p.1). This commitment did not only cover 
cross-country supply of telecommunications infrastructure but also services such as 
fixed and mobile telecommunications (IFC, 2016; WTO, 1997). 
The implementation of these reforms was initiated through the Africa 
Information Society Initiative (AISI), a meeting sponsored by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 1996 & 2003). One of the main visions 
proposed by AISI was the need to encourage and build a sustainable digital society for 
Africa so that “… every man and woman, school child, village, government office and 
business can access information and knowledge resources through computers and 
telecommunications” (UNECA, 1996 & 2003). With these reforms came the 
liberalisation of the telecommunications industry across Africa, for example, the mid-
1990s in South Africa and 2001 in Nigeria (Gillwald, Moyo, & Stork, 2012; 
Onyeajuwa, 2017). 
The sector liberalisation has now created a complex and dynamic mobile 
telecommunications market populated with a mix of African and international mobile 
network operators (MNO) whose activities have not only contributed to an 
unprecedented level of investments but also the spread of mobile telephony and 
diffusion across Africa. For example, in contrast to the 4% mobile penetration prior to 
liberalisation, the continent now averages over 50% (GSMA, 2017b). The introduction 
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of liberalisation and competition have thus changed the telecommunications landscape 
and, by extension, the way people communicate. However, the current situation also 
provides evidence that reflects the fact that the vision of AISI in providing 
telecommunications for all across Africa is far from being realised nearly two decades 
after the introduction of liberalisation (GSMA, 2016b; ITU, 2016). Studies (for 
example, Foster & Briceno-Garmendia, 2010; Manimohan, 2013; GSMA, 2016a) 
have found that while market liberalisation has drastically reduced the gaps in 
telecommunications coverage in densely populated urban areas, the same cannot be 
said of under and unserved rural and suburban locations (hereafter called 
disadvantaged areas). This suggests that whilst the market has dramatically reduced 
coverage gaps in densely populated areas, it has failed to record the same level of 
success in suburban and rural areas where digital divide5 remains a challenge 
(UNCTAD, 2017; World Bank, 2018b). 
The effort of governments in Africa to address this market failure6 of 
inequitable distribution of mobile coverage resulted to universal access and services 
(UAS) – a policy targeted at ensuring no one is excluded from universal access to 
telecommunications (ITU, 2013b; Oestmann & Dymond, 2008; Souter, 2016). Over 
30 countries in Africa have established universal service funds (USF) as their UAS 
strategy of bridging coverage gaps (Arakpogun, Wanjiru, & Whalley, 2017). 
However, achieving widespread coverage has also proven to be difficult, as an 
estimated 500 million people remain unconnected to mobile telecommunications 
across Africa (Collins, 2015; GSMA, 2016b; 2017b; Manson, 2013). 
1.2 Thesis objectives and motivation 
The concluding part of Section 1.1 points to a research gap that both the market and 
UAS policy have failed to closed the digital divide in Africa, prompting two critical 
questions:  
RQ1 - with the introduction of market liberalisation and the establishment of UAS 
strategy like USF, why does the digital divide of uneven mobile coverage persists 
areas across Africa? 
RQ2 - how can the digital divide of uneven mobile coverage be mitigated? 
                                                 
5 See Section 2.4 for the definition of digital divide 
6 See Section 3.2 for the definition of market failure.  
6 
 
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to investigate and understand why UAS strategy 
like USF has failed to address the digital divide of uneven mobile coverage and 
develop a model that offers insights on how to mitigate identified challenges. The 
thesis will achieve this through a conceptual framework predicated upon the 
interaction of market liberalisation, market failure and UAS policy as illustrated in 
Figure 6 in Section 3.5. The investigation of market liberalisation is to highlight that 
competition, driven by the spread of foreign direct investment (FDI), is a key driver 
of the transformation of the sector. While such transformation has led to an increase 
in mobile penetration and adoption from 4% in 1999 to around 50% in 2016, over 500 
million people still lack access to mobile telecommunications (Collins, 2015; GSMA, 
2016b; Manson, 2013). The effort of governments in Africa to close this digital divide 
of uneven mobile coverage led to the issue of UAS policy (ITU, 2013b), which can be 
examined through the lens of market failure (Stiglitz, 2010; Trubnikov, 2017).  
While the details of these issues will become clearer as the thesis progresses, 
the argument above underlines why this thesis has chosen to address the research 
questions raised above by critically investigating the interplay between market 
liberalisation, market failure and UAS policy in Africa. Since the current study aims 
to explore and understand a social problem centred on mobile coverage, a multi-case 
study approach that draws on the insights of various relevant stakeholders within the 
sector is adopted (Creswell, 2009; Hughes & Sharrock, 1997). This will enable this 
thesis to offer practical solutions that will contribute to closing the digital divide of 
uneven mobile coverage in Africa. 
The motivation for such contribution derives from two rationales: the strategic 
importance of the telecommunications sector (ITU, 2016; UNCTAD, 2008; World 
Economic Forum, 2014) and the general dearth of research on telecommunications 
in Africa (Dike & Rose, 2018; Jagun, Heeks, & Whalley, 2008). The growing 
influence of the evolving digital economy is noticeable across the globe. This can be 
illustrated by its impact on international trade in terms of the cross-boundary 
movement of ICT equipment and services that increased by 40% from 2010 to 2015, 
amounting to over $400 billion in real terms and 6.5% of global GDP (UNCTAD, 
2017). In the same vein, the strategic importance of the telecommunications sector 
reflects in various spheres in Africa. For example, compared to a $100 million 
generated in the continent in 1995, mobile revenue increased to $40 billion at the end 
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of 2015, 85% of which comes from voice and 25% form data service (IFC, 2016). In 
terms of GDP, the ecosystem of mobile telecommunications contributed about 6.7% 
to continental Africa at the end of 2015, an equivalent of $153 billion, which is 
projected to increase to 7.6%, around $214 billion by 2020 (GSMA, 2016a). As such, 
government across Africa are becoming heavily dependent on revenues from duties 
and taxes on telecommunication services to fund national budgets (Curwen & 
Whalley, 2018; Hudson, 2006).  
Apart from the economic gains, many people across the continent are 
increasingly dependent on mobile telephony, not just for their basic communication 
but also for their daily activities (Donner, 2004; Molony, 2006). This is evident in the 
benefits people derive from the ICT ecosystem, which cut across sectors like 
education, banking, health, jobs and politics (ITU, 2017d; Reed, 2016). Take banking, 
for instance, it has long been established that the majority of Africans are unbanked, 
that is, those who do not have access to traditional financial services, which is 
estimated at two-thirds of the over 1 billion people in Africa (World Bank, 2015; 
2017). The introduction of mobile money platforms like M-PESA in March 2007 in 
Kenya has proven to be a ‘game changer’ (Banerjee, 2017; Telecompaper, 2017c). As 
at the end of 2016, M-PESA Kenya, operated by Safaricom, had over 29 million active 
users and 287,000 mobile money agents transacting over $30 billion - a figure that 
surpasses the country’s 2017/2018 total budget of $25 billion (Financial Technology, 
2017; KPMG, 2017). Mobile money is also becoming a useful tool for Zimbabweans 
to navigate the challenge of physical cash shortage in the country with 485 million 
transactions accounting for $11 billion worth of electronic money transfer in 2017 
(Kachembere, 2017; Karombo, 2017). Mobile money is now active in over 10 
countries including Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda (Abdella, 2017; Gilbert, 2017). In 
light of the strategic importance of the sector and the vital role of mobile telephony in 
terms of its enabling capacity and the opportunities it creates, closing the digital divide 
in Africa is critical for both economic growth and sustainable development (ITU, 
2017a).  
Despite the strategic importance of telecommunications, there is a general 
dearth of studies looking into this sector in Africa compared to advanced countries 
(Donner, 2004; Haftu, 2018; Jagun, Heeks, & Whalley, 2008; Symeou & Pollitt, 
2007). Whilst continental Africa introduced liberalisation and competition relatively 
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later than other parts of the world, the continent has embraced liberalisation on one 
hand and the evolution of mobile technologies on the other hand, attracting over $200 
billion worth of FDI between 1999 and 2015 (GSMA, 2016a; van-Huyssteen, 2012). 
Consequently, a complex and dynamic telecommunications market has emerged. In 
spite of this, very limited number of studies (for example, Aker & Mbiti, 2010; 
Chavula, 2013; Curwen & Whalley, 2014) have focused on telecommunications in 
Africa. This thesis is motivated by the desire to generate insights into the sector and 
extend the literature on telecommunications and UAS in Africa with the aim of 
contributing to bridging the knowledge gaps between the continent and other parts of 
the world. 
1. 3 Structure of the thesis 
The remaining part of the thesis is divided into eight chapters. Figure 1 depicts the 
ordering and linkages between the chapters. The literature review for this study is split 
into Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 examines the sector liberalisation, FDI and the spread 
of MNO across Africa. This is borne out of the desire to investigate the development 
and the impact of competition on the sector. The evidence that emerged from this 
process was used to compare and contrast the state monopolies regime and the market 
dominated era that followed from the introduction of liberalisation. Chapter 2 finds 
that although market liberalisation has improved mobile penetration and adoption 
from 4% in 1999 to a continental average of 50% between 2016 and 2017, the digital 
divide of uneven mobile coverage persists across Africa. A clear indication that the 
market has failed to address the telecommunication needs of the wider society. 
 Chapter 3 thus shifts the focus of the study to market failure and the effort of 
governments in Africa to address the imbalance of mobile coverage through the 
intervention of UAS policy. It begins by exploring the concept of market failure in 
order to provide a theoretical understanding as to why markets fail and the various 
instruments a government can employ to mitigate market failure. This was necessary 
to provide a theoretical guidance for the analysis of UAS policy and USF as a popular 
instrument for closing digital divide, which over 30 countries in Africa have adopted. 
To avoid ambiguity and ensure consistency, the chapter defines key terms such as 
market failure and transaction costs in the context of this study. The chapter concludes 
with a conceptual framework in Figure 6 (Section 3.5) that is predicated on three key 
9 
 
aspects: market liberalisation, market failure and UAS policy to show how all these 
issues fit together to inform the overall research direction.   
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Figure 1: Thesis structure 
Chapter 1 
Introduction
Chapter 2 
Literature review part I: Sector 
liberalisation, FDI and the 
spread of MNO
Chapter 3 
Literature review part II: Market 
failure and universal access and 
service
Chapter 4 
Methodology
RQ1 and RQ2
Chapter 5 
Findings on issues limiting 
coverage: RQ1
Chapter 7 
Findings on how to improve 
coverage part II: RQ2
Chapter 8 
Discussion
Chapter 9 
Conclusion
Theoretical analysis
Empirical analysis
Chapter 6 
Findings on how to improve 
coverage part I: RQ2
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Chapter 4 presents the method and methodology for the current study by 
arguing that the adoption of a multi-case study approach was informed by the nature 
of the research problem - to explore and understand a social phenomenon focused on 
mobile coverage in the context of Africa. The multi-case study approach is supported 
by 28 semi-structured interviews from a variety of stakeholders with hands-on 
experience and key roles across different African countries. The chapter describes how 
data was collected using different methods, the procedure that was followed to execute 
coding and data analysis, and the need for data triangulation using evidence from 
multiple sources like country analysis and the literature recounted in Chapters 2 and 
3. This helped to strengthen the validity and reliability of the study. The chapter 
concludes with a causal map that highlights how the overall issues that emerged from 
the data connect and interact with each other. 
Subsequent discussion in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 cover the empirical domain of 
the thesis based on the evidence from the 28 interviews supported with country 
examples from across Africa as well as other parts of the world where the 
recommendations of interviewees have been implemented and Latin American 
countries where USF originated from. Chapter 5 addresses RQ1 by presenting the 
findings from the data using the iterative framework outlined in Section 4.6.5. This 
process resulted in three themes: lack of strong ICT leadership and commitment, lack 
of economic feasibility and UAS complexity. These themes are presented in details 
using interview extracts and causal maps detached from the overall data map in 
Chapter 4. 
Chapters 6 and 7 follows the same procedure laid out in Chapter 5, but with a 
particular focus on RQ2. The presentation for RQ2 was split into two chapters (6 and 
7) to make it easier for the reader to follow given the length of the findings from the 
data. Four themes emerged in the process: improving the current form of USF, indirect 
market interventions, collaboration and innovative solutions for UAS. Since these 
themes unfolded as a result of the issues identified in RQ1, emerging issues were 
examined and linked back to the findings in Chapter 5. This helped to maintain a 
smooth narrative of events illustrating the interaction between issues as highlighted 
through various causal maps. 
Drawing on the public interest and economic efficiency perspectives of market 
failure in Chapter 3 and the depth of the interaction between issues in the overall data 
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in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, Chapter 8 identifies two key underpinning issues – regulatory 
capacity and transaction costs of network deployment and maintenance – to develop a 
model for closing the digital divide. Regulatory capacity focuses on the need for 
regulatory authorities to have access to qualified staff, funding and skills to formulate 
robust UAS policies, implement and effectively monitor the operation of USF in order 
to ensure widespread mobile coverage. On the other hand, since MNO will typically 
base their decision to invest in network expansion on cost-benefit analysis, they often 
concentrate in the areas where returns are perceived to outweigh costs. This underlines 
the need to focus on how the transaction costs of network deployment and maintenance 
could be lowered so that it becomes feasible for MNO to provide services 
economically.  
Chapter 8 critically analyse and discuss these key issues by drawing from the 
literature and country examples. A causal map is also provided to show high-level 
interaction and links between issues. This map is further decomposed into two sub-
parts to help summarise emerging arguments as the discussion progresses. Drawing 
on the definition proposed for market failure in Chapter 3, this chapter argues that the 
issue of regulatory capacity and transaction costs should be viewed more as 
complementary issues. The key argument here is that in a liberalised 
telecommunications market, the effort of a government to achieve public interest 
objective of widespread coverage requires the cooperation and commitment of market 
actors like MNO. As such, a well-designed UAS policy should not only focus on 
equitable outcomes but also reflect (somewhat) market realities. This is to make 
network deployment more economically viable to encourage the participation of 
private investors. The chapter concludes that addressing these two fundamental issues 
is critical to mitigating market failure in telecommunications and closing the digital 
divide across Africa. 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. It begins by highlighting the events that have 
transpired in the industry and then moves to underline the fundamental underlining 
issues. The thesis then ends by explicitly indicating areas where the study has 
contributed to existing knowledge, limitations of the study and suggestions for further 
research.  
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Chapter 2: Sector liberalisation, FDI and the spread of MNO 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will explore the transformation of the telecommunications sector in 
Africa from 1999/2000 to the end of 2016, highlighting the differences between state 
ownership of telecommunications and that led by competition. To achieve this, the 
chapter begins with a brief analysis of the pre-liberalisation era of state monopolies. 
The focus will then shift to market liberalisation and the impact of local7 and 
multinational entities (MNE)8 focused MNO on the sector. Given that FDI flows have 
been integral to the transformation of the sector, this chapter will also briefly examine 
FDI and its implication on the development of the sector as evident in the spread of 
the mobile footprint of MNO across Africa. While this discourse takes a broad 
approach using country examples from across Africa, an in-depth analysis of the 16 
Eastern African countries will be explored to illustrate the problem of ‘digital divide’ 
in the continent. This decision was informed by the fact that despite having, on the 
average, more MNO than other regions in Africa, Eastern Africa has the lowest mobile 
penetration levels (see Figure 4 and Table 2). Moreover, it is impracticable for a single 
study such as this with its limited time frame to cover all the 55 countries in Africa in-
depth.  
Overall, the analysis in this chapter will provide evidence to compare sector 
performance between state monopoly and market-based model of telecommunications 
using mobile penetration rates (which is one way of measuring digital divide [Batura, 
2016; Nishijima, Ivanauskas, & Sarti, 2017]) to highlight the level of transformation 
that has occurred in the sector. The chapter concludes that while market liberalisation 
has brought an unprecedented level of transformation to the telecommunications 
sector compared to the era of state monopolies, a considerable number of people 
remain either underserved and/or unserved, allowing a ‘digital divide’ to emerge. 
 
                                                 
7 MNO that operate in a single country in Africa  
8 MNO (pan-African and international) that operate in more than one country in Africa 
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2.2 An overview of the telecommunications market in Africa 
Prior to the introduction of liberalisation at the turn of the millennium, the 
telecommunications sector in continental Africa was run by state monopolies largely 
providing fixed network and services (Chavula, 2013; ITU, 2009). The performance 
of these fixed incumbents was characterised by gross inefficiency in terms of their 
inability to provide widespread access to telecommunications due to limited 
investment and technical capacity (ITU, 1999; Okonjo-Iweala, 2012; Williams & 
Kwofie, 2014). The inefficiency of state monopolies can be demonstrated through the 
low levels of fixed-line penetration across the continent, albeit with varying degrees 
(GSMA, 2011; Minges, 1998). Take the cases of Nigeria and South Africa, two of the 
largest mobile markets in Africa in terms of subscribers and FDI flows (Curwen & 
Whalley, 2014; 2018; Dupasquier & Osakwe, 2006), for example. Prior to 2001, state-
owned Nigeria Telecommunications Limited (NITEL), which was formed in 1985, 
was the sole provider of telecommunication services in Nigeria (Ndukwe, 2003; 
Odufuwa, 2012). At the end of 1998, NITEL was only able to connect around 400,000 
out of over 100 million people in Nigeria, resulting in a penetration rate of 0.4% 
(Oyejide & Bankole, 2001). Majority of these lines were also concentrated in large 
urban areas like Abuja and Lagos (Ndukwe, 2003; 2005). With a long waiting list for 
services, NITEL was only able to provide 500,000 fixed lines in its 15 years of 
operation (1985 to 2000), representing 0.5% penetration or 5 lines per 1000 people 
(Ndukwe, 2005; World Bank, 2017). A considerable number of people living in 
Nigeria were, therefore, unserved (Ajayi, Salawu, & Raji, 1999; Ndukwe, 2005). 
Although the performance of South Africa’s state-owned Telkom, which was 
formed in 1990/1991 following the separation of telecommunications from the South 
African Posts & Telecommunications, surpassed that of Nigeria’s NITEL, the wider 
impact of Telkom’s performance also left much to be desired (Gillwald, Moyo, & 
Stork, 2012; Hodge, 2000). This is evident in the rather stagnant level of fixed-line 
penetration, which fluctuated between 4 to 5 million lines for a population of 40 
million from 1991 to 2000, representing 12.5 lines per 1000 people (Horwitz, 1999; 
World Bank, 2017). Unlike in Nigeria where the gap in fixed coverage was restricted 
by location, the case of South Africa was a bit more complicated as coverage was 
polarised by location – urban and rural, and race – ‘white’ and ‘black’ population - 
during the apartheid regime (Horwitz, 1999; Morris & Stavrou, 1993; Moyo, 2018).  
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The cases of Nigeria and South Africa largely reflected the trends in Africa as 
state monopolies failed to address the gaps in telecommunications coverage (Ibrahim, 
2012; ITU, 1999). Continental Africa averaged 1.5 fixed lines per 100 persons in 1994 
relative to 65 and 47 lines per 100 persons in the United States and OECD countries 
respectively for the same period (Alemu, 2018). The 1.5 fixed teledensity is even more 
discouraging when one considers that 40% of these fixed lines were concentrated in 
South Africa in 1994 (Alemu, 2018). Overall, the highest fixed penetration rate 
achieved in Africa during the era of the fixed incumbents averaged 1.74 lines per 100 
persons in 1996. This translates to about 4.3 million fixed lines for a continent that had 
over 760 million people in the same period (Minges, 1998). The situation was dire in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, which had 0.48 fixed lines penetration per 100 persons while 
other regions like East Asia had 8.23 and Latin America and the Caribbean had 13.21 
fixed lines in the same period (Gebreab 2002; Minges 1998). Recent statistic suggests 
a further decline across Africa to an average of 1% (ITU; 2017c; Sharma & Gillet, 
2014). Figure 2 helps to illustrate the trends of fixed-line penetration of selected 
countries from across the continent for a seventeen-year period. 
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Figure 2: A time series cross-country comparison of fixed penetration rate in Africa (1990-2006) 
 
Data sources: Index Mundi (2017); ITU (2017c); World Bank, 2017.  
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Both Figure 2 and the analysis that precedes further help to illustrate the inefficiency 
of state-owned monopolies across Africa, particularly for the countries highlighted and their 
inability to close the gaps in telecommunications coverage. Figure 2 also supports the argument 
that majority of the telephone lines in Africa (pre-liberalisation) were concentrated in South 
Africa with the highest rate of 12.4% in 1999. This was closely followed by Northern African 
countries as illustrated with the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, which had 8.3% and 10% fixed 
penetration respectively in 1999. Countries in Eastern and Western Africa struggled to attain 
1% fixed penetration for the period under review with Nigeria and the Central African Republic 
recording the lowest figures of 0.40% and 0.28% respectively. As illustrated previously with 
the cases of Nigeria and South Africa, the little coverage provided by state monopolies was 
largely concentrated in affluent and urban areas, which also had a long waiting list of unmet 
demand (Gebreab, 2002; Ndukwe, 2005). IFC (2016) stated that the number of people on the 
waiting list for Sub-Saharan Africa at the end of 1995 was about 1.5 million (IFC, 2016). 
With poorly developed infrastructure, lack of widespread (fixed) coverage and a 
considerable level of unmet demand, there was increasing pressure on governments to extend 
the coverage of telecommunications. To do this, Africa countries needed investment9 to finance 
the expansion of telecommunications infrastructure and technical capacity to manage and 
operate the process (Hudson, 2010; ITU, 2015). Since this was generally lacking across Africa, 
albeit in varying proportions between countries and regions, governments turned to the World 
Bank and its associated bodies for support (Irwin & Brook, 2003; Sutherland, 2014). Prime 
among the conditions for obtaining such support was the need to introduce wider sector reforms 
to attract private investment and restrict governments’ involvement in the sector to focus more 
on policy formulation and regulation (Moshi & Mwakatumbula, 2017; Ndukwe, 2005; 
Williams & Kwofie, 2014). 
The implementation of such reforms, specifically, the WTO Basic Telecommunications 
Agreement10, stirred the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector in Africa, which began 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Etzo & Collender 2010; Thomas, 2014; van-Huyssteen 
                                                 
9 While the exact amount of investment that is needed to close the digital divide in Africa remains elusive, it is 
estimated that between $100 to $120 billion is needed to close the digital divide across emerging markets in the 
next ten years (Zibi, 2018). 
10 See Section 1.1 
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2012). Governments across Africa gradually introduced liberalisation and embraced the use of 
mobile telecommunications with the understanding that it is more cost-effective to rollout and 
run mobile networks vis-à-vis fixed networks (Deloitte & GSMA, 2012; Souter, 2018a). 
Therefore, the switch from (expensive) fixed networks to (a more cost-effective) mobile 
solution was critical to the sector transformation (Andonova, 2006; Deloitte & GSMA, 2012; 
Economist, 2016). As such, the technological development offered by mobile has enabled 
countries across Africa to leapfrog years of neglect by fixed telecommunications (Economist, 
2008; World Bank, 2017). 
African countries, with the exception of four countries11, have now opened up their 
telecommunications market, introduced competition and issued over 186 GSM licences at the 
end of 2016, 70% of which are either jointly or wholly owned by FDI focused MNO 
(Arakpogun, Wanjiru, & Whalley, 2017). This has resulted in a shift from an industry 
characterised by government-owned monopolies to a liberalised and competitive market that 
is vibrant and dynamic with a mix of local and MNE MNO (Chavula 2013; Hodge 2000; Muriu 
2002). Unlike the unsatisfactory levels of performance witnessed during the era of state 
ownership, the activities of these MNO have not only contributed to an unprecedented level of 
investment but also the spread of mobile telephony and diffusion across Africa. Figure 3 helps 
to illustrate the trends of mobile penetration using the same countries and periods in Figure 2. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Namely, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Swaziland (recently renamed the Kingdom of eSwatini [BBC, 2018]) - 
all operating state monopolies bar Swaziland where MTN is the private monopoly. 
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Figure 3: A time series cross-country comparison of mobile penetration rate in Africa (2000-2016) 
 
Data source: ITU (2017b); World Bank (2017) 
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In contrast to the low levels of fixed line penetration pre-liberalisation (Figure 2), 
Figure 3 suggests that competition has led to an unprecedented level of widespread access to 
(mobile) telecommunications. Take the countries with better statistics in Figure 2 as examples 
- fixed line penetration for Egypt, South Africa and Tunisia culminated in 8.3, 12.4 and 10% 
compared to mobile penetration of 121, 159, and 129% respectively from Figure 3. The 
comparison between Figures 2 and 3 also indicates that while NITEL was only able to provide 
0.5% fixed-line penetration during its 15 years of operation, MNO provided 77% mobile 
penetration in Nigeria for the same period. South Africa’s Telkom, on the other hand, provided 
10.48% fixed-line penetration compared to 145% mobile penetration by MNO for the same 15 
years. This trend is a reflection of various countries when we compare the rates of fixed and 
mobile penetration across countries. Overall, the contrast between Figures 2 and 3 suggests 
that competition has transformed the telecommunications sector in terms of providing access 
to telecommunications for millions of people across Africa, a feat that state monopolies could 
not achieve. 
While the use of fixed line continues to decline, mobile adoption has increased 
significantly, fitting with the assertion that massive uptake of ‘modern technology’ leads to a 
sharp decrease in the usage of old ones (Hasbi, 2015). Apart from the legacy problem of a lack 
of fixed infrastructure, other reasons for the near demise of fixed-line are due to the high 
transaction costs for deploying fixed infrastructure, its limited functionality and lack of 
portability compared to a mobile phone (Curwen & Whalley, 2014; Deloitte & GSMA, 2012). 
Most people across Africa are increasingly opting for mobile phones instead of fixed lines, as 
the former does not depend constantly on electricity, which is largely unavailable in most 
countries (Economist, 2005; Tucker, 2017). There is also the issue of the unbanked now having 
access to some form of banking services through the use of mobile phones even when a physical 
banking structure is not available. In a country like Nigeria for example, which has over 170 
million people, the Central Bank of Nigeria stated that some 50% of adult have no access to 
the traditional banking system (Chima, 2016; Thomas, 2013). The introduction of mobile 
money is helping to bridge this gap. The mobile ecosystem has also extended to other value-
added services such as education, health, politics and social media (Layton and Elaluf-
Calderwood, 2016). This clearly signposts that mobile is at the centre of life in Africa. 
Therefore, in stark contrast to fixed-line, mobile penetration and diffusion across Africa are 
increasingly becoming a critical socio-economic enabler (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Haftu, 2018). 
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In contrast to the estimated 4% of mobile penetration prior to the sector liberalisation, 
the continent averaged over 50% at the end of 2016, an equivalent of ‘500 million’ mobile 
subscribers (GSMA, 2017b; ITU, 1999). However, while there is a considerable number of 
mobile phones than ever before, Figure 4 indicates that mobile penetration and adoption vary 
across Africa. Countries with fewer MNO (mainly) located in northern and southern Africa 
appear to have high mobile penetration rates while countries from other regions like Eastern 
Africa have more MNO, but lower mobile penetration levels – with almost half of the 16 
Eastern African countries, including Burundi and Malawi, recording below 50%. In contrast to 
other parts of the continent, the Central African Republic in Central Africa is the only country 
with a mobile penetration rate that is below 50% as shown in Figure 4.    
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Figure 4: Regional groupings and mobile penetration rates across Africa for year-end 2016 
Data source: GSMA (2017a)
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Before proceeding, it is necessary to state here that there is a lack of consensus when it 
comes the regional sub-division of Africa. This is particularly evident in the case of the Eastern 
Africa region. For example, while GSMA (2017) lists 9 countries (including Malawi and 
Tanzania) under Eastern Africa, Blycroft (2016) identifies 12 countries (including Zambia and 
Zimbabwe), AU (2018) presents 14 countries (including Sudan and South Sudan) and UNICEF 
(2008) defines the region as having 16 countries (see Appendix H for the full listing). While 
all the countries in AU (2018), Blycroft (2016) and GSMA (2017) intersect with the UN 
regional definition outlined in UNICEF (2008), the inclusion of Zambia and Zimbabwe in 
Eastern Africa by Blycroft (2016) appears odd given that these two countries are 
geographically located in the Southern Africa region (AU, 2018; CIA Factbook, 2018; GSMA, 
2017; UNICEF, 2008). Therefore, these countries are not identified as part of Eastern Africa 
in this study as illustrated in Figure 4. This study adopts the UN definition contained in 
UNICEF (2008)12 and argues that there are 16 countries in Eastern Africa as shown in Figure 
4. One of the advantages of adopting this position is that since it is based on the UN regional 
classifications, it is arguably more credible given that over 150 member states coalesce under 
the UN, including 54 of the 55 countries in the Africa Union (AU) with the exception of 
Western Sahara. One could also argue that such credibility makes the UN position far more 
popular and appealing. Furthermore, the UN classification of Eastern Africa is apposite 
because it provides an amalgamated view of the different positions in Appendix H and reflects 
a broader and more encompassing definition for the purpose of the analysis that follows, and 
given that it has 13 countries overlapping with the AU, Blycroft and GSMA positions as 
indicated in Appendix H.         
While the classification of the Northern African region is not as divisive as Eastern 
Africa, it is important to also highlight that countries in this region are sometimes classified as 
‘Arab States’ and/or the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (Blycroft, 2016; UNESCO, 
2017; UNICEF, 2017). The reason for this is that countries that are geographically located in 
Northern Africa like Egypt and Tunisia are grouped together with other Middle Eastern states 
like Qatar and Saudi Arabia, perhaps due to their shared Islamic religion and, to some extent, 
(Arab) culture. Since Africa is the ‘case’ and focus of this study, the Middle Eastern countries 
                                                 
12 https://www.unicef.org/wcaro/WCARO_SOAC08_Fig011.pdf 
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are not covered and, as such, Northern Africa is adopted as a more nuanced reference to focus 
on those countries geographically located in Africa (AU, 2018). 
That said, although Figure 4 clearly shows that Eastern African countries are worse off 
when it comes to uneven mobile coverage in Africa, the headline figures of the 55 countries in 
Africa also suggests that coverage gaps persist between countries and regions. Overall, Figure 
4 provides a mixed picture to suggest that countries across Africa have not benefited from 
market liberalisation and competition to the same degree. The position is further complicated 
when one considers the issue of multiple SIM13 usage and inactive lines, which combine to 
inflate mobile penetration rates (Curwen & Whalley, 2014; Sunderland, 2009). Evidence from 
the country analysis conducted in this study indicates that in Eastern Africa, only Madagascar 
reported a drop in the level of mobile subscription from 40% in 2012 to 30% in 2014 because 
of the disconnection of inactive SIM (BMI Research, 2015). This suggests that accurate and 
relevant data on mobile penetration is lacking. The case is not different for countries that have 
over 100% mobile penetration – an indication that there are more mobile phones in the country 
than there are people, which is not true in reality. 
Multiple SIM usage thus highlights the need for policymakers14 to differentiate 
subscribers from subscriptions as one subscriber may have more than one subscription or one 
subscription being used by several people, thereby “…bloating the total number of 
subscription” (Matinde, 2015). This suggests that multiple SIM usage complicate and, to some 
extent, underestimate the issue of digital divide as the headline figures of mobile penetration 
appear to be overstated across Africa. See Section 6.2.6 for the case of Umhlabuyalingana 
municipality in South Africa where over 150,000 people are unserved despite having a mobile 
penetration of over 100%. In view of this, this study proposes that instead of using the term 
‘mobile penetration rate’, a rather more appropriate term may be ‘sim card connection’ 
especially when it comes to a continent like Africa. It should, however, be mentioned here that 
this is not only applicable to Africa alone as Sutherland (2009) pointed out that even advanced 
countries are also involved in this practice with many people now owning multiple ICT devices 
like smartphones and tablets. While factors such as poor quality of service (QoS) and 
promotional offers from MNO are the main drivers of multiple SIM usage in Africa, the 
increasing ownership of multiple ICT devices appears to be the push factor for the advanced 
                                                 
13 Subscriber identity module 
14 Policymakers in this study include governments, regulators and USF managers 
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countries (Matinde, 2015; Sutherland, 2009). Having said that, regardless of the level of 
distortion that multiple SIM usage has on the measurement of digital divide in Africa, there is 
no denying the fact that market liberalisation and competition have transformed the 
telecommunications sector, providing an unprecedented level of mobile penetration and 
adoption. Key to this transformation is FDI flows, which is the main driver of the 
internationalisation of MNO and their mobile footprint across Africa. 
2.3 FDI and the spread of mobile network operators in Africa 
By comparing the performance of state monopolies with and market-oriented MNO, the 
proceeding section has illustrated that liberalisation and competition have transformed the 
telecommunications sector in Africa in terms of providing mobile coverage for millions of 
people across Africa. This transformation, stirred by a wider sector reform, has changed 
government participation from ownership to regulation, opening up markets to competition and 
FDI. This has led to the introduction of technological changes that are driving the improvement 
of telecommunication infrastructure and services.  
In contrast to the dearth level of investment during the fixed incumbent regime, the 
activities of local and MNE MNO have attracted over $78 billion of FDI for the deployment 
of telecommunications infrastructure in Africa (Haftu, 2018; van-Huyssteen, 2012). Nigeria, 
which is the continent’s largest market by subscriber with over 100 million mobile lines, 
attracted over $18 billion between 2001 and 2015 (Arowolo & Folarin, 2015; GSMA, 2017a). 
While the overall FDI flows for telecommunications in Africa doubled to $146 billion in 2015, 
$214 billion is projected for the continent by 2020 (GSMA, 2016a; van-Huyssteen, 2012). The 
telecommunications sector thus underpin and facilitate FDI flows in Africa (Arowolo & 
Folarin, 2015; GSMA, 2016a). However, such a projection may be hampered by the general 
16% fall in global FDI flows from about $1.8 trillion in 2016 to $1.5 trillion in 2017, as is the 
case with Africa, albeit a ‘marginal’ decline of -1% between 2016 and 2017 to about $49 billion 
(UNCTAD, 2018).  
The impact of this global decline varies across Africa with countries like Nigeria and 
Angola as the main losers owing to the volatility of crude oil price, which dropped FDI in 
Nigeria by -24% to about $3.4 billion and in Angola by -20% to around $3.3 billion in 2017 
(UNCTAD, 2018). In contrast, FDI increased in countries like DR Congo and South Africa by 
29% to about $1.6 billion and 43% to around $3.2 billion respectively in 2017 (UNCTAD, 
2018). Despite this general decline, FDI flows into telecommunications in Africa is generally 
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expected to increase year-on-year as global growth, currently at 4%, continues its upward trend 
in 2018 outlook (Alemu, 2018; Kennedy & Schneeweiss, 2017; UNCTAD, 2018). While the 
USA, the UK and France remain the largest sources of FDI into Africa with a combined stock 
of over $180 billion, increasing activities from China, India and South Africa has not gone 
unnoticed (UNCTAD, 2016). This is particularly significant for China whose FDI flows into 
Africa has increased over the years from $9 billion in 2009 to $22 billion in 2014 and over $60 
billion in 2017 (EY, 2017; UNCTAD, 2016). 
That being said, as telecommunications market was liberalised, FDI emerged as a key 
driver of the internationalisation of MNO as they spread their footprint across Africa (Curwen 
& Whalley, 2014; 2018; Dike & Rose, 2018). This is further illustrated by the examples in 
Table 1 using data that was tracked and generated over three years as the case study database 
for this study was amassed from multiple sources like online media reports, regulatory 
documents, electronic information from MNO as well as primary information from 
interviewees. 
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Table 1: Examples of FDI strategy and mobile footprint of MNO across Africa as at 2016 
Telco MNE Home country Country 
example 
Brand & 
year of 
entry 
FDI 
strategy 
 
 
Local partner Total number of 
footprint in 
Africa in terms 
of country 
Total number of 
subscribers in Africa 
(millions) 
Bharti Airtel India 
 
 
Ghana 
 
 
 
 
Rwanda 
 
Airtel 2010 
 
 
 
 
Airtel 2011 
 
 
M&A 
(75%) 
 
 
 
GI (100%) 
 
 
Entered Ghana following a 
$10.7 billion acquisition of 
Zain (Kuwait) Africa 
operation. The government 
owns 25% stake through 
Ghana National Petroleum 
Corporation 
Entered Rwanda after 
obtaining the third GSM 
licence for $30 million in 2011 
 
14  76 
Econet South 
Africa/Zimbabwe 
Burundi 
 
 
 
 
 
Lesotho 
Econet 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
Econet 2008 
JV 
(50.5%) 
 
 
 
 
M&A 
(70%) 
Entered Burundi via a JV 
arrangement with PME Africa 
Infrastructure Opportunities by 
acquiring Spacetel form ST 
Cellular SA. Later took full 
control of the business in 2010 
by buying PME’s 49.5% for 
$15 million 
Entered Lesotho via a merger 
with the incumbent, Telecom 
Lesotho. The government 
retained 30% ownership in the 
business 
7  9 
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Telco MNE Home country Country 
example 
Brand & 
year of 
entry 
FDI 
strategy 
 
 
Local partner Total number of 
footprint in 
Africa in terms 
of country 
Total number of 
subscribers in Africa 
(millions) 
Etisalat  UAE Egypt 
 
 
 
 
Mauritania 
Etisalat Misr 
 
 
 
 
Mauritel 
2014 
GI (66%) 
 
 
 
 
M&A 
(41%) 
Entered Egypt following the 
award of the third GSM 
licence for about $2.9 billion 
with local partners, Egypt Post 
and National Bank holding the 
remaining stake 
Entered Mauritania following 
the acquisition of Vivendi’s 
(France) 53% stake in Maroc 
Telecom for about $5.7 billion, 
who held 41% stake in 
Mauritel 
11  50 
Millicom Sweden Chad 
 
 
 
 
 
Tanzania 
Tigo 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
Tigo 2015  
JV 
(87.5%) 
 
 
 
 
M&A 
(85%) 
Entered Chad via a JV 
arrangement with the 
government, but following a 
$60 million full acquisition of 
its partner's stakes in 
Guatemala (Navega) and Chad 
in 2009, Millicom now owns 
100% of Tigo Chad  
Entered Tanzania via the 
acquisition of Etisalat’s 85% 
stake in Zantel in a cash and 
debt buyout: paid cash of $1 
and took over a debt of $74 
million. The government 
retained the remaining 15% 
stake 
5  20 
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Telco MNE Home country Country 
example 
Brand & 
year of 
entry 
FDI 
strategy 
 
 
Local partner Total number of 
footprint in 
Africa in terms 
of country 
Total number of 
subscribers in Africa 
(millions) 
MTN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South Africa Nigeria 
 
 
South Africa 
MTN 2001  
 
 
MTN 1994 
GI (76%) 
 
 
GI (70%) 
Entered Nigeria via a 15-year 
GSM licence for $285 million. 
It is not clear who owns the 
remaining 24%  
Began its operations in South 
Africa following the award of 
a GSM licence for an 
undisclosed fee. The Broad-
Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Group 
(BBBEE) owns the remaining 
30% 
17  148 
Ooredo Qatar Algeria 
 
 
 
 
Ooredoo 
2007 
 
 
 
 
M&A 
(51%) 
 
 
 
 
Entered Algeria via a 51% 
stake acquisition of Kuwait’s 
Wataniya share in existing 
Nedjma for $3.7 billion. The 
identity of the local investors 
who own the remaining stake 
appears unclear.   
2  22 
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Telco MNE Home country Country 
example 
Brand & 
year of 
entry 
FDI 
strategy 
 
 
Local partner Total number of 
footprint in 
Africa in terms 
of country 
Total number of 
subscribers in Africa 
(millions) 
Tunisia Ooredo 2012 M&A 
(90%) 
Entered Tunisia after the 
increasing its stake in 
Wataniya Group to 92.1% for 
$1.8 billion. The government 
of Tunisia holds the remaining 
10% 
Orange France Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo (DRC) 
 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Orange 2016 
 
 
Getasa-
Orange 2000 
M&A 
(100%) 
 
 
JV (40%) 
Entered DRC following the 
full acquisition of Millicom’s 
Tigo DRC operation for $160 
million 
Entered Equatorial Guinea via 
a JV arrangement with the 
incumbent Getesa while the 
government holds the 
remaining 60% stake   
 
19 85 
Viettel Vietnam Burundi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lumitel 
2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GI (95%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entered Burundi via the award 
of a fresh GSM licence for 
$10,000 with a commitment to 
expand rural coverage. Viettel 
holds a majority stake of 95% 
while a group of undisclosed 
‘local’ investors holds the 
remaining 5%  
 
 
4  10 
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Telco MNE Home country Country 
example 
Brand & 
year of 
entry 
FDI 
strategy 
 
 
Local partner Total number of 
footprint in 
Africa in terms 
of country 
Total number of 
subscribers in Africa 
(millions) 
Cameroon Nexttel 2012 JV (70%) Entered Cameroon via a 70:30 
JV arrangement with Bestinver 
Asset Management of 
Cameroon through the award 
of a fresh GSM licence for an 
undisclosed fee  
Vodafone/com The UK Ghana 
 
 
 
 
Kenya 
Vodafone 
2008 
 
 
 
Safaricom 
1999/2000 
M&A 
(70%) 
 
 
 
M&A 
(40%) 
Entered Ghana via a 70% stake 
acquisition from the 
incumbent, Ghana Telecom for 
$900 million while the 
government holds the 
remaining 30%.  
Entered Kenya following a 
40% stake acquisition from the 
incumbent, Telkom, for $42 
million. The government and 
the ‘public’ share the 
remaining stake: 35% and 25% 
respectively.  
10  118 
Zain Kuwait Morocco 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sudan 
Inwi 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zain 2006 
JV (31%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M&A 
(100%) 
Entered Morocco via a 50:50 
JV with Al Ajial Investment 
Holding of Morocco for $324 
million while the incumbent, 
Wana Corporate SA of 
Morocco holds the remaining 
69% 
Entered Sudan via the 
acquisition of Mobitel, which 
was jointly owned by Celtel, 
Sudatel and others 
3  12 
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It is pertinent to state here that the financial implications of the various transactions in 
Table 1 vary, depending on the level of ownership. For example, the deal between 
MTC of Kuwait in the sale of Zain to Bharti Airtel in 2010 for about $9 billion remains 
the biggest consolidation in the industry until now (Ibrahim, 2012; Manson, 2013). 
MTC operated its African operations under the brand name Zain for 5 years across 17 
countries before selling the business to Bharti Airtel for $9bn (Manson 2013). 
However, recent evidence suggests that Airtel has now scaled back its operations to 
14 countries by exiting, for example, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leon in 2016, selling 
both operations to Orange as part of an effort to reduce its $12 billion debt burden in 
Africa (Prinsloo & Bax, 2017; TeleGeography, 2017a). Other smaller transactions 
have also taken place in different countries like the sale of Orascom Telecom’s 100% 
stake of Telecel Globe operating both in Burundi as Leo and the Central African 
Republic as Telecel Centrafrique to Econet Wireless Group for $65 million in 2014. 
Additionally, in June 2015, Millicom acquired the 85% of Etisalat’s stake in Tanzania 
(Zantel) for $1 in cash and assumed a total debt obligation of $74 million as 
highlighted in Table 1. The financial transaction in some cases appears to lack clarity 
due to a dearth of public information on what has transpired and some of the ownership 
structures are shrouded in secrecy. 
Having said that, the evidence in Table 1 shows that while mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A)15 is the preferred strategy for FDI flows in ten circumstances, 
green-field investment (GI)16 and joint-venture (JV)17 were preferred in five countries 
apiece. This suggests that M&A is the most popular FDI strategy adopted by MNO as 
they spread their footprint across Africa. However, one can also see from Table 1 that 
as some MNO increased their footprint in Africa, they adopted GI and JV in the earlier 
stage of market liberalisation, but as the market evolved, M&A appears to be the most 
preferred FDI strategy. This trend can be illustrated with cases of Econet in Burundi 
and Millicom in Chad as indicated in Table 1.  
                                                 
15 With M&A, a firm can enter into a new market by an outright acquisition of a local firm, wholly or 
partially (Cross, 2000; Ho et al., 2015).   
16 GI involves building a new subsidiary from the bottom-up (Barkema et al., 1996; Blanc-Brude, 2014; 
Cavusgil & Knight, 2015). 
17 A JV can be defined as a partnership in which two or more parties create an enterprise through equity 
commitment – with parties undertaking an active role in both or either the decision-making process and 
operations (Harrigan; 1999; Hennart, Sheng, & Pimenta, 2015).    
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International business literature (for example, Barkema et al., 1996; Blanc-
Brude, 2014; Buckley & Casson, 1998; Buskley & Ghauri, 1999, Cavusgil & Knight, 
2015; Erramilli 1990; Gerrath & Leenders, 2013; Hennart & Slangen, 2015; Minbaeva 
et al., 2014; Shaver, 2013) highlights that the implications of adopting any of these 
FDI strategies can be explained by the interactions between factors such as resource 
commitment, control, risk and return on investment (ROI). Typically, when a firm 
commits more resources to a business, it gains more control and with this comes higher 
risk and ROI (Hollensen, Boyd, & Ulrich, 2011; Young et al. 1989). Therefore, 
depending on the type of the FDI strategy a firm decides to adopt, there would be a 
trade-off between the various factors. For example, a firm that adopts a GI strategy 
would have a higher degree of control for committing more resources than a JV where 
control ranges from high to intermediate and medium, depending on the ownership 
structure (Anderson & Gatignon 1999; Hollensen, Boyd, & Ulrich, 2011). This also 
implies that in a GI, a firm would have a higher risk (and ROI) compared to a JV where 
risk (and ROI) could be spread among various parties. Thus, an FDI strategy that 
requires a greater degree of resource commitment would result in more control, more 
risk and more ROI, and vice-versa. 
Drawing on this trade-off analysis, one can also argue that the various FDI 
strategies adopted by MNO in Africa have varied implications. For example, the case 
of Airtel entering the Rwandan market via GI would suggest that the Indian based 
MNO would commit more resources, in this case, 100% equity contribution, without 
diluting control and solely absorb the risk, and ROI from its business operation in 
Rwanda. In contrast, the case of Zain adopting a JV into the Moroccan market would 
suggest that the Kuwaiti based MNO with a 50% stake would assume the same level 
of control, risk and ROI while its local partner – Al Ajial investment Holding - would 
assume an equal share of control, risk and ROI. 
 Apart from the issues of control, risk and ROI, licence conditions with local 
and legal restrictions appears to have also influenced the FDI strategy adopted by 
MNO in Africa with the implication that foreign investors cannot fully own a mobile 
network unless they collaborate with a local partner(s) via M&A or JV. For example, 
in Kenya, the minimum threshold that must be made available to local investors is 
20%, 25% in Tanzania and the indigenisation law in Zimbabwe compel MNE to 
provide majority shares to local investors (Baily& Hoskins, 2015; TeleGeography, 
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2017g). The costs implications of deploying network for new entrants and the 
availability of critical infrastructure like frequency spectrum may also influence the 
choice of MNO.  An example of this is in Tanzania where Millicom acquired the 85% 
stake of Etisalat in Zantel for $1 in cash, assuming a total debt obligation of $74M, 
but now have access to spectrum in 850MHz, 900MHz, 1800MHz, and 2100MHz 
frequency bands (ITNews Africa 2015; TeleGeography, 2015b).  
Overall, Table 1 indicates that MTN, the pan-African MNO based in South 
Africa, is the continent’s market leader with over 148 million subscribers across 17 
countries including Cote D’Ivoire, Botswana, and Nigeria where the majority of its 
customers are located - 55 million mobile subscribers at the end of 2016. MTN is 
followed by Vodafone/com18, which has 118 million subscribers across ten countries 
including Egypt and South Africa. Vodafone/com second position is fuelled by its 
market dominance in Egypt and South Africa where it has over 40 million and 29 
million subscribers respectively in 2016. It is interesting to note that although both 
MTN and Vodafone/com are headquartered in South Africa, the majority of their 
subscribers are based in Nigeria and Egypt respectively. The last player in Table 1 is 
Econet, which has over 9 million users across seven countries including Zimbabwe 
the home country of its founder and chairman19 but headquartered in South Africa. 
Econet also has 5% stake in Airtel Nigeria (Mansfield 2012; TeleGeography, 2012b). 
Overall, Table 1 helps to strengthen the argument that the sector transformation has 
been underpinned and facilitated by FDI flows from the activities of MNO across 
Africa.  
Regardless of the level of industry success that has occurred from FDI flows 
as demonstrated by the spread of MNO and the number of mobile subscribers in Table 
1, Section 2.2 highlighted that the headline figures of mobile subscribers do not tell 
the full story as pockets of ‘digital divide’ persist across Africa. Since it is 
impracticable for a single study such as this with its limited time frame to assess the 
issue of ‘digital divide’ in all the 55 countries in Africa (AU, n.d.) in-depth, Eastern 
                                                 
18 Vodafone (UK) and Vodacom (SA) are considered as a single entity in this research for the sake of 
simplicity and considering the fact that the former has 65% stake in the later after increasing its 
ownership share of 50% by an additional 15% for $2.47bn in 2008 (Cellular News 2008; ITNews Africa 
2008b). 
19 Strive Masiyiwa (Mansfield 2012; Econet 2015). 
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Africa will be explored as indicated in Section 2.1. However, before going further on 
the analysis of Eastern Africa, it is useful to clarify what ‘digital divide’ means in this 
study. 
2.4 Digital divide 
 Although ‘digital divide’ has been a long-term topic of discussion in countries like 
the United States in the context of UAS, the debate became more critical and 
widespread around the world with the technological changes that began in the late 
1980s and early 1990s (James, 2007; van Dijk, 2005). Since this concept is driven by 
technological changes, the implication is that ‘digital divide’ has become a 
multifaceted concept that evolves with the fast-changing nature of technology (ITU & 
UNCTAD, 2007; Nsengimana, Kende, & Rose, 2015; van Dijk, 2005). This is 
reflected in the diverging definitions of digital divide.  
Some studies have defined digital divide as unequal access to ICT (computer 
and mobile) devices and the Internet (Bartikowski, et al., 2018; Dewan & Riggins, 
2005; ITU, 2017d; James, 2009; van Dijk, 2005; World Bank, 2016) while some see 
it as inequitable access to ICT and digital skills (Cullen, 2001; Light, 2001; van Dijk, 
1999). ITU and UNCTAD (2007) examined digital divide in terms of the gap in access 
to fixed and mobile lines, the Internet and broadband. Shenglin et al. (2017) defined 
digital divide as the gap in ‘usage’ and ‘access’ of infrastructure between various 
groups and across geographies. Other studies explored digital divide from the 
standpoint of unequal access to telecommunications infrastructure and a lack of 
affordability for services and mobile devices (Nsengimana, Kende, & Rose, 2015; 
Philip, et al., 2017; van Dijk, 1999). Digital divide has also been discussed from the 
perspective of gender, which typically describes a situation where a disproportionate 
number of women lack access to ICT (Bills, 2016; Chen & Wellman, 2007; GSMA, 
2015; Kiran, 2018; Majama, 2017; Willams, Millward, & Layton, 2019). This is 
problematic in any society, as digital gender parity is critical to the socio-economic 
development of any country, not least because wider access to ICT for women would 
trickle down to their families, communities, villages and the society at large (Chair, 
2017; Chair & De Lannoy, 2018; WEF, 2017). 
Existing studies (for example, Gillwald, 2017; Gillwald, Mothobi, & Radman, 
2018; Mohamed Nour 2017; Mottin-Sylla, 2006; van der Spuy & Souter, 2018)  
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largely suggests that although men are generally more likely to have access to the 
Internet globally, digital gender divide is more prevalent in Africa. For example, while 
over 200 million men are more connected to the Internet than women across the world, 
the connectivity gap between men and woman in Africa is the largest with an averaged 
of 23% compared to 4% in Europe and Central Asia, 5% in Latin America and 
Caribbean, and 3% in East Asia and Pacific (Broadband Commission, 2014; GSMA, 
2015; ITU, 2016; Mohamed Nour 2017). Notwithstanding the variations within 
countries, Mottin-Sylla (2006) further highlighted that only one woman is connected 
to the information society for every three men across Francophone African countries 
like Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal. 
Similar findings are presented in a relative recent ‘Gender Gap Audit’ carried 
out by the Web Foundation where none of the 10 African countries (including Egypt, 
Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda) surveyed are on track to meet the Sustainable 
Development Goal 5 target of 2030 that is aimed at achieving universal and gender-
equitable Internet access (UN, 2015; Brandusescu & Sambuli, 2016). At a micro level 
within a country, Gillwald (2018), drawing on data from 2017 RIA After Access 
survey, provides a mixed picture. For example, while 12% Internet usage gap exists 
between men and women in South Africa, Kenya has 31%, Tanzania has 32%, Ghana 
has 34%, Nigeria has 46% and Rwanda has over 60% (Gillwald, 2018). This goes to 
suggest that while South Africa appears to have the least digital gender gap among the 
countries covered by the 2017 RIA After Access survey, Rwanda seems to have the 
biggest gap.    
The digital gender divide in Africa can be linked to multiple reasons. These 
include unaffordability of mobile devices and tariff given that more women are on 
low-income jobs, social-cultural norms where men are favoured to women in terms 
of, for example, access to education, social interaction and household chores (A4AI, 
2017; GSMA, 2015; Hanna, 2017; Mottin-Sylla, 2006; Brandusescu & Sambuli, 
2016). A combination of these factors is referred to as ‘structural and cultural 
inequalities’ where the lack of income and education are arguably the major cause of 
digital gender divide (Mottin-Sylla, 2006; van der Spuy & Souter, 2018). The digital 
gender divide in Africa has also been linked to a poor governance framework where 
policy failure that excludes gender targets from UAS is prevalent in various countries 
(Mohamed Nour 2017; van der Spuy & Souter, 2018).  
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Digital gender divide thus reflects a much more complex problem of gender 
and other structural inequalities particularly across Africa where it is much more 
significant, and generally across the world. Kiran (2018) thus concludes that gender 
inequality transfers offline divides into the digital space. That said, digital gender 
divide will not be further covered in this study given the first-level digital divide focus 
of this study as indicated earlier in Section 1.1. 
The definitions discussed above suggest that digital divide is a dynamic 
concept that lacks a universal meaning as it is driven by different notions of ICT 
changes in terms of services, technologies and networks. However, for the purpose of 
consistency, digital divide (also called digital/coverage gap) in the context of this 
study, refers to inequitable access20 to mobile telecommunications. This definition is 
apposite because mobile has replaced fixed-line as a source of communication and 
end-users across Africa can now access a plethora of telecommunication services 
through mobile telephony (Collett, 2016; Curwen & Whalley, 2018; ITU & 
UNCTAD, 2007; World Economic Forum, 2014). 
Having established a clear definition, another interesting issue to address is the 
cause of digital divide. UNCTAD (2008) asserted that digital divide has various 
dimensions with a number of factors interacting to cause an uneven distribution of 
access to ICT (mobile telecommunications, in the case of this study). A synthesis from 
various studies (for example, Gillwald, 2010; James, 2009; Nsengimana, Kende, & 
Rose, 2015; Pick & Sarkar, 2015; Sciadas, 2005; van Dijk, 1999) presents wide-
ranging factors. This includes geographical conditions where landlocked countries 
may find it difficult to deploy vital infrastructure like undersea cables and internet 
exchange point due to a lack of access to the sea (Nsengimana, Kende, & Rose, 2015). 
Challenging topographies such as mountains and wide expanse of uninhabited lands 
dividing communities as well as disproportionate population distribution between 
urban and rural areas also fall under geographical conditions (Bagchi, 2005; Billon, 
Marco, & Lera-Lopez, 2009; Pick & Sarkar, 2015). In countries and regions where 
this applies, transaction costs of network deployment may increase significantly and 
                                                 
20 See Section 3.3.1 for the definition of access in the context of this study. 
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MNO may find it difficult to deploy telecommunications infrastructure (Pick & 
Sarkar, 2015; UNCTAD, 2008; van Dijk, 1999).  
The aformentioned studies argue that high transaction costs lead to two 
possible scenarios. Firstly, MNO may be discouraged from investing in the expansion 
of telecommunications network, which will then hamper the availability of critical 
infrastructure (James, 2007; Quibria, Ahmed, Tschang, & Reyes-Macasaquit, 2003). 
Secondly, in places where MNO decide to invest, they may end up transferring the 
costs to end-users, raising affordability issues in terms of the inability of users to pay 
for services (Dasgupta, Lall, & Wheeler, 2001; Gillwald, 2010; ITU, 2017d; ITU & 
UNCTAD, 2007; Shenglin et al., 2017). The issue of affordability is also extended to 
the costs of ICT devices, without which users cannot access services (Shenglin et al., 
2017; van Dijk and Hacker, 2011). Furthermore, there may be instances where the 
network is available but people may not use them due to a lack of awareness in terms 
of users knowledge of the various uses of technology in navigating their daily lives, 
and a lack of local content in terms having relevant services that users can relate with 
and are useful to encourage and drive mobile adoption and usage (Nsengimana, 
Kende, & Rose, 2015; UNCTAD, 2008).  
There is also the issue of a lack of digital skills to educate users and help them 
navigate the operation of (mobile) devices as technology continues to evolve (Dewan 
& Riggins, 2005; ITU & UNCTAD, 2007; UNCTAD, 2008; van Dijk & Hacker, 2011; 
World Bank, 2016). Other studies linked digital divide to telecommunications policy 
and regulation in terms of sector reform and the impact of regulation acting as a 
hindrance or a facilitator of competition and market growth (Dasgupta, Lall, & 
Wheeler, 2001; Gillwald, 2010; ITU & UNCTAD, 2007). For example, the role of 
policy in determining the market structure in terms of the number of MNO in the 
market to stimulate economies of scale (Nsengimana, Kende, & Rose, 2015; van Dijk, 
1999). Finally, digital divide can be explained by socio-economic factors accentuated 
by, for example, political instability, GDP, FDI flows and disposable income 
(Gillwald, 2010; Pick & Sarkar, 2015; Sciadas, 2005). It is also interesting to note that 
apart from high transaction costs, low disposable income (in terms of low income and 
cash to spend on things) between people also feeds into the affordability issue of 
mobile devices and services (ITU & UNCTAD, 2007; Quibria, Ahmed, Tschang, & 
Reyes-Macasaquit, 2003). 
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For example, Gilbert (2018b) highlighted the impact of low-disposable income 
on the digital divide by stating that low-income earners in South Africa tend to have 
limited access to mobile devices and services relative to high-income earners who 
have broader access in terms of mobile devices and network, fixed-line, fibre network 
and a swathe of ISPs. Gilbert (2018b) further indicated that MNO in South Africa 
appear to charge users (largely low-income earners) of small data bundles ‘11’ times 
higher than high-income earners who can afford larger data bundles - leading to a so-
called ‘poverty premium’ on mobile data. This supports the growing body of evidence 
(for example, Bezuidenhout, Leonelli, Kelly, & Rappert, 2017; Castells, 2002; Chen 
& Wellman, 2007; Fuchs & Horak, 2008) that argues that countries with higher 
structural inequalities21 tend to lag behind when it comes to digital inclusion. In other 
words, the gaps in digital divide appear to have a relationship with the overall level of 
economic development of a given country with the implication that the less developed 
a country is, the more the digital divide and vice-versa (Mothobi & Gillwald, 2018; 
Steyaert, 2002; van Dijk, 2006). For instance, UNHDR (2018) indicates that Africa is 
among the least developed continent in the world when it comes to issues like 
education, gender gap, health and income. Similarly, although the liberalisation of the 
telecommunications market in Africa has led to unprecedented levels of mobile 
phones, Africa still lags behind other parts of the world when it comes to ‘actual’ 
mobile penetration and adoption, notably the Internet – with 25% penetration in Africa 
compared to the world average of 54% (GSMA, 2016a; ITU, 2016).  
This pattern is also reflected between countries. For example, Ghana, Kenya 
and Nigeria, people with more education and higher income are ‘consistently’ more 
likely to afford and own smartphones, engage in social media and general internet 
usage than people who are less endowed with socio-economic and political capital 
(Chair & De Lannoy, 2018; Fuchs & Horak, 2008; Silver & Johnson, 2018). This is 
also prevalent in South Africa, the only country in the continent where 50% of the 
population is connected to the Internet (Gillwald, Mothobi & Rademan, 2018; 
Mothobi & Gillwald, 2018; Silver & Johnson, 2018). Drawing on evidence from RIA 
After Access Survey 2017, Gillwald (2018) indicates that South Africans with higher 
                                                 
21 Structural inequalities in this study refer to disproportionate levels of access to socio-economic and 
political resources like education, employment, income, information, healthcare, etc.  
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income brackets tend to have greater access to mobile phones in general, smartphones 
in particular and Internet usage – for example, while people on the income bracket of 
0-1, 583 South African Rand (ZAR) had penetration levels of 82%, 45% and 51% for 
mobile phone, smartphone and the Internet respectively, people on the income bracket 
of 57, 334-123, 417 ZAR had 100% penetration across the board. 
Although global Internet usage is generally higher among developed and 
wealthier countries, the proportion of people online correlate with socio-economic 
conditions like GDP per capita (Silver & Johnson, 2018). This partly explains why 
countries like the UK, the US and Germany which have over $30,000 GDP per capita 
have an average Internet usage of 80% while African countries like Senegal, Kenya 
and Nigeria with $10,000 GDP per capita have an average Internet usage of 40% 
(Silver & Johnson, 2018). Hence, while global inequalities could be linked to digital 
divide, Africa is worse-off as a continent considering its high levels of structural 
inequalities, which also reflects significantly in the levels of digital divide. 
The discussion above reflects the digital paradox given that: 
… as more people are connected and can access more information and 
services, at higher speeds than ever before, digital inequality is being amplified, not 
reduced (Gillwald, Mothobi, & Rademan, 2018, p. 5-6). 
This is due to the fact that in the current era of digitisation, Internet access (which is 
largely through mobile telecommunications in Africa as indicated in Section 2.2) is 
increasingly becoming significant, not least, in accessing general information, 
education, job search, civic engagement and business opportunities (Fuchs & Horak, 
2008; Gillwald, 2017; 2018; Heeks, Graham, & Kleine, 2018; Romero & Margolis, 
2005; van Dijk, 2006). It then follows that digital divide amplify and entrench existing 
structural inequalities in Africa because the lack of (or limited) access to mobile 
telecommunications would also impact negatively on access to general information, 
education, job, civic engagement and business opportunities (Heeks, Graham, & 
Keleine, 2018, Steyaert, 2001). Hence the consequences of ‘falling’ through the net 
are wide-reaching for individual countries and the continent as a whole (Chen & 
Wellman, 2007).       
That said, digital divide is multi-faceted as different factors interact to explain 
the concept (van Deursen & van Dijk, 2015). While the factors above underline that 
digital divide is a moving target that has various dimensions, one may ask if all these 
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factors are equally significant in terms of their propensity to push (improve) or pull 
(discourage) digital divide. The rather ambiguous nature of digital divide would mean 
that this may depend on the ‘kind’ of digital divide policymakers are trying to address. 
To this end, James (2007, p. 284) concluded that “…the topic [digital divide] is highly 
fragmented in the literature, with few attempts to put the parts into a coherent 
analytical framework. More precisely, there has been no specific attempt to pinpoint 
the main issues that influence one’s view of the importance of the digital divide and 
the policies demanded by the different points of view.” 
 When it comes to Africa, although Figure 4 helps to illustrate that digital divide 
of even mobile coverage persists across the continent, the specific factors responsible 
may become clearer with the analysis of various countries/regions. The next section 
explores Eastern Africa to illustrate the issues highlighted above. The reason is that 
although Eastern African countries have, on the average, more MNO than other 
regions, they also have the lowest mobile penetration levels in Africa as shown in 
Figure 4. 
2.5 Country mapping for Eastern Africa 
This section presents an in-depth country analysis of the telecommunications market 
of the 16 countries in Eastern Africa by drawing on data from multiple sources such 
as ITU, GSMA, the World Bank, TeleGeography and various regulatory websites. To 
gauge the reasons why these Eastern African countries have not benefited from market 
liberalisation and competition to the same degree, the various factors mentioned in 
Section 2.3 will be employed as a guide. For the purpose of simplicity, these factors 
will be deployed using ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors – where push factors encourage mobile 
growth and pull factors discourage mobile growth. The summary of this analysis is 
contained in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Summary of country mapping of Eastern Africa as at year-end 2016 
Country Market 
structure 
No. of 
operators 
Total 
population 
(millions) 
Rural 
population (as a 
% of total 
population) 
National 
mobile 
penetration 
(%) 
Burundi Liberalised 5 11,178,921 88 46 
Comoros Liberalised 2 788,474 72 39 
Djibouti Monopoly 1 887,861 23 35 
Eritrea Monopoly 1 6,537,000 78 7 
Ethiopia Monopoly 1 99,390,750 81 42 
Kenya Liberalised 3 46,050,302 75 78 
Madagascar Liberalised 3 24,235,390 66 31 
Malawi Liberalised 4 17,215,232 84 35 
Mauritius Liberalised 3 1,262,605 60 131 
Mozambique Liberalised 3 27,977,863 68 65 
Rwanda Liberalised 3 11,609,666 72 70 
Seychelles Liberalised 2 93,419 46 135 
Somalia Liberalised 8 10,787,104 61 52 
South Sudan Liberalised 4 12,339,812 81 31 
Tanzania Liberalised 7 53,470,420 69 71 
Uganda Liberalised 8 39,032,383 84 50 
The evidence presented in Table 2 indicates that half of the 16 countries in Eastern 
Africa have mobile penetration rate below 50%. Although over 50 countries have 
introduced competition across Africa, four countries still operate a monopoly, three of 
which are in Eastern Africa as shown in Table 2. Apart from Mauritius and Seychelles 
where the mobile penetration rate indicates ‘full’ coverage (assuming at least one 
mobile phone per person, which often is not the case due to multiple SIM usage), the 
other 14 countries still have a varied proportion of coverage gaps. One could argue 
that Mauritius and Seychelles may have achieved such result with push factors like 
small population size and geographical conditions with access to undersea cables. For 
example, Alcatel-Lucent was contracted by Seychelles Cable System to link the 
country to EASSy cables via Tanzania for $30M in 2010 (TeleGeography, 2010). 
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However, it raises the question if the success in Mauritius and Seychelles could be 
replicated in larger countries. Another striking contrast from Table 2 is Burundi. From 
a mobile penetration rate of 0.01% in 1997 to 46% in 2016, representing 619 and 4.7 
million mobile lines respectively (GSMA, 2017a; Index Mundi, 2017).  
 Although this could be seen as progress, but considering a market that was 
liberalised in 2003 (AfDB, 2011), this level of achievement is somewhat discouraging. 
This is more significant when we consider that a market once served by six (now four) 
MNO have only managed to deploy under 5 million mobile lines to over 11 million 
people. Although the country experienced a 13-year civil war and a series of military 
coups (UN, 2014), which may have limited the development of the needed 
infrastructure, but so have countries like Rwanda and Somalia, yet they have managed 
to achieve better results. Table 2 indicates that at the end of 2016, the mobile 
penetration rates for Rwanda and Somalia were 70% and 52% compared to 46% in 
Burundi. Nonetheless, from the analysis carried out for Burundi, it appears that one of 
the pull factors limiting mobile growth can be linked to socio-economic factors like 
civil war and political instability. Geographical conditions, in terms of urban-rural 
population, could be another pull factor behind this seemingly snail-paced growth as 
nearly 90% of the people live in the villages while MNO cluster in and around the 
capital city and environs (World Bank, 2017). This is highlighted by the fact that 
although Burundi has 17 provinces, telecommunications is only available in seven 
provinces (BMI Research, 2014). 
 The state of the telecommunications market in Somalia tends to be an oddity 
in the Horn of Africa owing to the fact that the market started and evolved in the midst 
of a civil war complicated with the activities and extortion of Al-Shabab terrorist group 
and Somalia pirates (BBC Africa, 2014). For more than two decades, the market has 
been unregulated as it is only recently in May 2017 that the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications began a public consultation on a ‘Draft Communications Law’ 
(TeleGeography, 2017e). Although the Al-Shabab led extortion still prevails until now 
even with the presence of a recognised government at the centre, the progress made in 
the unregulated era in Somalia raises a critical question: are government regulations a 
push or a pull factor for the development of telecommunications in the Horn of Africa? 
Bearing in mind that apart from Somalia, state monopolies control 
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telecommunications in the other three countries22 in the Horn of Africa. Although 
Somalia was also a monopoly until the fall of the central government in 1991 (BBC 
Africa, 2014), following the breakout of the civil war, “…there is no state-run 
monopoly which prevents new competitors being established” (Winter, 2004).  
One could then argue that an ‘unregulated’ market and competition appears to 
have acted as a push factor for mobile growth in Somalia as accentuated by a 
widespread network coverage, encouraged by regional proliferation of MNO, to the 
extent that farmers in the village can talk with their relatives even while working in 
the fields (Baidoamedia, 2013). Another push factor in Somalia’s unregulated market 
was the prevalence of affordable mobile and fixed tariffs relative to its peers in the 
Horn of Africa. The average monthly tariff for fixed line subscription was $10 with 
unlimited local calls while it cost between $0.30 to $0.05 per minute for mobile call 
and Internet usage (Economist, 2005). Comparing these rates with those of other 
African countries during the period of the unregulated market, Somalia was found to 
have one of the lowest telecommunications tariffs in Africa (Mohamed & Childress, 
2010; Osman, 2012; Winter, 2004). This appears to be a surprise considering there 
was no regulator to protect the consumers in this once ‘free-for-all’ market, neither 
was there a government to protect MNO from Al-Shabab extortion and service 
disruption (TeleGeography, 2011). It will be interesting to see how regulation will 
affect tariff when the government finally introduces, for example, sector-specific tax 
and licence fee for frequency spectrum, which will undoubtedly be part of the agenda 
of the new ‘Draft Communications Law’ undergoing public consultation 
(TeleGeography, 2017e).  
Rwanda is another interesting case considering its history of political tension 
that led to a civil war between the Hutus and Tutsis culminating in a genocide that saw 
the death of over 1 million people and the destruction of infrastructure (BBC, 2014; 
KPMG, 2012). Consequently, telecommunications liberalisation and competition 
were introduced relatively late in 2006 as part of the government effort to rebuild the 
economy (BuddeComm, 2015). Over ten years, Rwanda has achieved a better mobile 
penetration rate as indicated in Table 2 relative to early liberalisation countries like 
Burundi in 2003 and Kenya in 1999 (AfDB, 2011). Evidence from the analysis 
                                                 
22 Eritrea, Djibouti and Ethiopia.  
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indicates that a key push factor for mobile growth in Rwanda can be linked to an 
effective telecommunications policy and regulation encourage by a strong leadership 
from the government of  President Paul Kagame (Gilbert, 2016a). This is reflective in 
the formulation and implementation of a robust regulatory framework by Rwanda 
Utilities Regulatory Authority (RURA). For example, poor QoS is an inherent issue 
across most African countries and MNO appear not to pay much attention to the 
complaint of end-users with respective regulators failing to hold MNO to account 
(Onyeajuwa, 2017).  
However, RURA is among the few regulators at the forefront of addressing 
this issue dating back to 2008 when MTN Rwanda was fined $130,000 and $150,000 
in 2012 for poor QoS (TeleGeography, 2008b; 2012). RURA also revoked the licence 
of RwandaTel in 2011 after multiple failings to meet QoS and coverage obligation 
even though this was the country’s incumbent with government ownership (Balancing 
Act, 2011). It is only recently that the Communications Authority of Kenya (CA) 
began to act in this regard having fined the country’s three MNO a combined $3 
million for failing to meet 80% of QoS threshold for 2015/2016 (TeleGeography, 
2018b).  
The government of Rwanda has also implemented several infrastructure 
development policies and the proliferation of ICT devices. For example, although a 
landlocked country, the government has partnered with the World Bank to construct 
2,300km of national fibre backbone across the 30 districts in the country for $40 
million (TeleGeography, 2008a). This was subsequently followed by linking the 
national backbone to TEAMS submarine cable via Kenya, funded with $60 million 
infrastructure project, a link that now provides Burundi and the Central African 
Republic with undersea cable access (Balancing Act, 2009). The government also 
launched a credit scheme called ‘one mobile per household’ in 2008 to improve mobile 
coverage in the rural areas (Telegeography, 2008a). The initiative subsidised the cost 
of mobile phone to RWF13000, spreading the payment over 13 months with 
RWF1000 monthly. In the process, over 53,000 mobile phones were distributed to 15 
districts across Rwanda (Balancing Act, 2008). These efforts have been critical to the 
spread of telecommunication network and services in Rwanda. Although some end-
users in rural areas have benefited from initiatives like ‘one mobile per household’, 
affordability of data tariff and smartphones is among the pull factors restricting mobile 
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coverage for Rwanda’s last mile (Nsengimana, Kende, & Rose, 2015). Other pull 
factors evident within a survey on Rwanda include a lack of awareness of the Internet 
and the availability of local content to drive mobile adoption and usage (Nsengimana, 
Kende, & Rose, 2015). 
 Another issue worth highlighting from Table 2 is that more MNO have not 
necessarily resulted in better mobile penetration considering countries like Burundi, 
Tanzania, and Uganda with four, seven, and eight MNO respectively, but have a lower 
mobile penetration rate. When compared with countries such as Mauritius, Rwanda, 
and Mozambique, which have three MNO apiece, it appears that countries tend to have 
better mobile penetration with a fewer number of MNO. While one may argue that a 
small island nation like Mauritius may not be a good comparison, all the countries in 
North Africa (excluding Western Sahara where data is not accessible) also have three 
MNO each with over 100% mobile penetration besides Sudan with 68% as indicated 
in Figure 4. Hence, the fact that countries like Tanzania and Uganda are performing 
below expectation with multiple MNO cannot be overlooked. The willingness of 
policymakers to continue to issue licences appears discouraging to the market with 
some MNO divesting their investments from such countries. For example, the 
Ugandan market has become so crowded that MNO like Airtel has voiced concerns 
over the issue stating that it is impossible for such number of MNO to serve a small 
market like Uganda profitably (Biryabarema, 2014; TeleGeography, 2014). The 
situation prompted Orange to partially divest 65.93% of its operations in Uganda to 
Africell Holdings of Beirut in November 2014 for $12 million (Linington, 2014; 
Olouch, 2014; TeleGeography, 2014). 
Prior to this sale, Orange managed a rather insignificant market share of 3.3% 
of Uganda’s 25.3 million total mobile subscribers. The situation is also not different 
in Tanzania where Millicom (the third largest MNO in Tanzania) acquired 85% stake 
of Etisalat (fourth largest MNO in Tanzania with a meagre 5% market share), held in 
Zantel for $1 in cash, assuming a debt liability of $74 million in June 2015 (Cellular 
News 2015b; ITNews Africa 2015; TeleGeography, 2015b). Curwen and Whalley 
(2014) thus asserted that this trend of overcrowding the market has given rise to ‘a tail 
of small and weak operators. Policymakers will argue that the presence of more MNO 
in the market allows for better competition and mobile diffusion (Ombok, 2014), but 
evidence from this analysis proves otherwise. There seems to be no positive 
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relationship between a crowded market, such as, for example, Tanzania and Uganda, 
and an increase in mobile penetration. With a larger market like Kenya, which had 
four MNO now served with three following the acquisition of YuMobile by Safaricom 
and Airtel in December 2014 (TeleGeography, 2015b), Tanzania and Uganda may 
want to reconsider their licencing policy. This analysis thus indicates that market 
structure, in terms of the number of MNO vis-à-vis population size, could also be a 
pull factor limiting widespread mobile coverage in Eastern Africa. Furthermore, the 
analysis also suggests that both small operators and late entrants would find it difficult 
to grow in a congested market like Tanzania and Uganda. 
Although liberalisation and competition were introduced to allow the market 
to provide widespread access to telecommunications, the country analysis in this 
section highlights some specific reasons why countries in Eastern Africa have not 
benefited from competition to the same degree as their northern, southern and western 
counterparts. This is not to say that digital divide does not exist in other regions in 
Africa as evident in Figure 4, including a mix of countries with mobile penetration 
rates above and below 100%. For example, ARPT23 awarded the first UTS24 project 
to the three25 MNO in Algeria26 in 2016 to deploy basic telecommunication services 
to 97 underserved locations across the country with a population ranging between 500-
2000 people (TeleGeography, 2016b). This came eight years after the country first 
opened the tender for UTS in January 2008 with a request fee of 50000 Algerian Dinar 
(Telecompaper, 2008). In 2016, Chinguitel, the Mauritanian27 fixed and mobile 
operator, completed phase one of the $1.7 million ‘Northern Telecoms’ scheme 
funded through APAUS28 by deploying 11 BTS29 in communities such as Bentili Ain 
and Bir Moghrein with phase two scheduled for 2017 (TeleGeography, 2016b). NCC30 
announced plans to extend mobile coverage to 40 million people across 207 unserved 
                                                 
23 Algeria Regulatory Authority for Post and Telecommunications 
24 Universal Telecoms Service 
25 Djezzy, Mobili and Ooredoo 
26 Algeria has a mobile penetration rate of over 100% 
27 Mauritania also has a mobile penetration rate of over 100%  
28 L'Agence de Promotion de l'Accès Universel aux Services 
29 Base Transceiver Stations 
30 Nigerian Communications Commission 
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communities in Nigeria31 in 2017 (Adepoju, 2017b). Part of the proposed solution is 
to allocate more spectrum in the 38GHz and 42GHz bands with the understanding that 
such frequency bands enable ‘short hop’, point-to-point terrestrial links and support 
multiple technologies like 3G, 4G, etc. (Adepoju, 2017b). 
Therefore, although Eastern Africa appears to be more disproportionate, a 
varied degree of digital divide persists across Africa with the most disadvantaged 
people residing in suburban and rural areas (GSMA, 2013; World Bank, 2017). Hence, 
while market liberalisation has transformed the sector and enabled access to mobile 
phones more than ever before, mobile penetration and adoption varies between 
African countries so much so that nearly ‘half’ of the 1.2 billion people in Africa still 
lack a mobile subscription (A4AI, 2017a; GSMA, 2016b; Manson, 2013). 
2.6 Conclusion  
Telecommunications in Africa have witnessed an unprecedented level of 
transformation in terms of a shift from fixed to mobile telecommunications providing 
mobile coverage for millions of people across Africa. The key driver that shaped this 
transformation is FDI flows from local and MNE MNO. At the end of 2016, over 186 
MNO were operating across Africa, 70% of which were either jointly or wholly owned 
by MNE (Arakpogun, Wanjiru, & Whalley, 2017). Table 1 indicates that MTN of 
South Africa is the overall market leader with over 148 million mobile subscribers. 
While the activities of these MNO have rapidly extended mobile telecommunications 
to millions of subscribers more than ever before, mobile penetration and adoption vary 
across Africa (GSMA, 2017a; ITU, 1999). Countries located in northern and southern 
Africa appear to have high mobile penetration rates while other regions like Eastern 
Africa lag behind. The mixed picture indicates that countries across Africa have not 
benefited from market liberalisation and competition to the same degree. The position 
is further complicated when one considers the issue of multiple SIM usage and inactive 
lines, which combines to inflate mobile penetration rates for both better-performing 
regions in northern and southern Africa and less performing regions like Eastern 
Africa.  
                                                 
31 Nigeria has a mobile penetration rate of 82%  
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Of the 1.2 billion odd people in Africa, only about ‘500 million’ mobile 
subscribers exist (Collins, 2015; GSMA, 2016b; 2017b; Manson, 2013; Nyambura-
Mwaura & Akam, 2013). An indication that a large part of the continent is either 
unserved/and or underserved, allowing a digital divide to emerge and persist after 
nearly 20 years of market liberalisation. The effort of governments across Africa to 
tackle this market failure and close the digital divide of uneven mobile coverage gave 
rise to UAS policy. This will be further explored in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3: Market failure and universal access and service 
3.1 Introduction 
Compared to the low levels of fixed line penetration that prevailed across Africa 
during the state monopolies regime, Chapter 2 has shown that market liberalisation 
and competition, driven by the spread of FDI from local and MNE MNO, have led to 
unprecedented levels of mobile penetration in the continent. However, while sector 
transformation has enabled more mobile users than ever before, mobile penetration 
and adoption vary between African countries so much so that nearly ‘half’ of the 1.2 
billion people in Africa are believed to lack a mobile subscription (A4AI, 2017a; 
GSMA, 2016b). This indicates that market liberalisation and competition have failed 
to bring widespread mobile coverage to everyone in the continent as promised by the 
sector reform (WTO, 1997, p.1), allowing a digital divide to emerge. Governments 
effort to tackle the market failure of digital divide in Africa led to UAS policy (ITU, 
2013b; Oestmann & Dymond, 2008; Souter, 2016).  
    Countries in Europe, Latin, and North America, as well as Southeast Asia, 
have attempted to address the issue of digital divide through UAS policy (Batura, 
2017; Falch & Henten, 2017; Longstaff, 1996; Stern & Townsend, 2007; Thai & 
Falch, 2017). Before going into the investigation of UAS, it is necessary to explore 
the theory of market failure in light of the fact that market failure is the justification 
of government intervention in the marketplace (Levine & Taylor, 2018; Ortiz, 2016; 
Stiglitz, 2010; Trubnikov, 2017). This analysis will help to provide the theoretical 
understanding for such government intervention and explore what kind of regulatory 
instruments governments employ to correct market failure (Dodgson et al., 2011; 
Stiglitz, 2010). Such an understanding will also be relevant in shaping the presentation 
of the findings and discussion later on in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
3.2 The theory of market failure      
The role of government intervention in a liberalised market appears to be a complex 
topic that has attracted scholars from various schools of thought (Bergman et al., 1998; 
Wallis & Dollery, 1999; Stiglitz, 2010). Prominent among these schools of thought is 
the theory of market failure as proposed by welfare economists such as Bator (1958), 
Baumol (2004), Pigou (1932) and Samuelson (1954). In sum, these scholars argue that 
certain underlying conditions, for example, perfect information and sufficient demand, 
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need to be present for a competitive market to efficiently allocate resources. A lack of 
which will lead to socially undesirable outcomes and economic inefficiency, which 
ultimately results in market failure (Mitchell, 1995). While there is a noticeable 
consensus among scholars about the existence of market failure and that this 
phenomenon provides the intellectual argument for government interventions, such 
consensus seems to disappear when it comes to its definition. For example, while 
Arndt (1988: 222) simply described market failure as “…referring strictly to the 
efficiency and growth promoting performance of markets”, Wallis and Dollery (1999: 
16) referred to market failure as “…the inability of a market or a system of markets to 
provide goods and services either at all or in an economically optimal manner”. 
Further, Weimer and Vining (1992: 13) defined market failure as “… a circumstance 
where the pursuit of private interest does not lead to an efficient use of society’s 
resources or a fair distribution of society’s goods”, and Wolf (1987: 46) stated that 
market failure is a situation where “… markets fail to produce either economically 
optimal (efficient) or socially desirable (equitable) outcomes…” 
 It can be observed from these examples that market failure is defined either in 
terms of economic efficiency, that is, an optimal allocation of resource with a price that 
reflects some element of costs to serve the needs of the society, or equity in terms of 
ensuring equal opportunity for all members of the society (Bergman, et al., 1998; 
Todorova, 2016). This study draws on a synthesis of these views and defines market 
failure as a situation where a competitive market is unable to effectively allocate goods 
and services equitably for the benefit of the wider society and efficiently to encourage 
market actors32. In light of this definition, government intervention should not only 
reflect the benefit of the public (equity) but also stimulate competition (economic 
efficiency) even where it appears infeasible for the market to achieve economies of 
scale (Ortiz, 2016; Wenders, 1988). Furthermore, this definition is particularly 
significant in the context of this study to address the divergence between social 
benefits and private costs of telecommunications (Economides, 2004; Lindsey & 
Teles, 2017; Todorova, 2016). This suggests that neither policymakers alone nor 
market actors by themselves can guarantee both equity and economic efficiency 
                                                 
32 For the purpose of this thesis, market actors include MNO, equipment and mobile device vendors as 
well as other private players in the telecommunications market in Africa. 
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except they work together and allow a joined-up solution for correcting the market 
failure to emerge as will be seen in Chapter 8. 
3.2.1 Causes of market failure 
Having established a definition of market failure, another vital issue to consider is the 
causes of market failure. As with its definition, the literature suggests a lack of 
consensus on the exact number of causes. For example, Stiglitz (1988 & 2008) 
identified eight causes while Wallis and Dollery (1999) emphasised six. Furthermore, 
Dassler (2006) and Gomez-Barroso and Feijoo (2010) broadly identify four causes. 
This thesis will focus on seven causes - natural monopoly, transaction costs, 
information asymmetry, incomplete/missing market, public good, network externality 
and macroeconomic conditions - due to their relevance to telecommunications. This 
will become clearer as this section progresses. 
Natural monopoly helps to explain one of the causes of market failure 
(Christensen, 2010, Dassler, 2006, Pigou, 1932; Posner, 1974; Weimer & Vining, 
2010). Generally speaking, for a free market economy controlled by the forces of 
demand and supply to be efficient in the allocation of goods and services, competition 
must be preferred to a monopoly (Cherry, 2015). However, it is argued that there are 
some industries that would be better served with one (monopoly) or limited suppliers 
(oligopoly) because of the large financial outlay required to supply infrastructure 
(Posner, 1968; Wenders, 1988). Such industries, offering utilities like electricity, 
transportation, telecommunications and water, are termed natural monopolies (Arndt, 
1988; Dassler, 2006; Katz, 2004; Souter, 2018a). The key argument here is that due to 
the large capital requirements in these industries, a limited number of supplier may 
better serve a market to allow for the maximisation of economies of scale and avoid 
inefficient duplication of resources as indicated in Table 3. In the absence of this, 
inefficiency may result and lead to market failure (Wallis & Dollery, 1999). 
Table 3 at the end of this section indicates that the natural monopoly argument 
in relation to telecommunications is critical when it comes to serving disperse and 
isolated communities economically – given that such locations lack a critical mass of 
people needed to recoup the large financial outlay for network deployment and 
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maintenance33 (Gillwald, 2005a). Such disperse and isolated communities can be 
widely observed across rural Africa, albeit in varying degrees with Central and Eastern 
regions having the most spatial population distribution and settlement (GSMA, 2016b; 
ITU, 2013; Linard et al., 2012; World Bank, 2018b). This scenario makes it difficult 
to serve a large part of the population34 in rural and isolated locations across Africa, 
which further adds to the high costs of deploying infrastructure, including national 
backhaul (A4AI, 2018; Deville et al., 2014). In such a case where the costs of 
infrastructure buildout are high and potential users are low, it becomes difficult for 
multiple and competing networks to recoup their investment in an economically 
efficient manner (Katz, 2004; Souter, 2018a).  
With this in mind and considering that a critical mass of people is needed to 
gain economies of scale and justify the large investment on networks, Section 6.3.2 
makes a case for natural monopoly through the issuance of non-competing licence to 
allow individual MNO to be the sole UAS provider for their allotted areas. This would 
then help MNO to maximise economies of scale, prevent network redundancy, avoid 
duplication of resources and make the business of network operation more sustainable 
compared to competing networks in isolated areas. Having said that, Posner (1968) 
asserted that for natural monopolies, government intervention might be needed to 
address certain concerns like equity, QoS, prices and incomplete projects. 
Following from the above, a second cause of market failure can be due to 
transaction costs, especially in a marketplace where the operation of natural 
monopolies are not allowed even if the situation may warrant it like in the case of 
deploying services such as electricity and telecommunications to disperse and isolated 
communities (Arndt, 1988; Gabel, 2007; Newbury, 2013; Zerbe & McCurdy, 1999). 
Before going further, it would be useful to clarify the meaning of transaction costs in 
relation to this study considering that from 1937 when Roland Coase first advanced 
the concept, there appears to be an ambivalent view of this term (Allen, 1999; Wang, 
2003; Williamson & Ghani, 2011; Sitko & Chisanga, 2017). For example, Allen 
(1991) stated that the aggregation of all ‘necessary’ resources needed to transfer, 
establish and maintain property rights is referred to as transaction costs. Bhardwaj and 
                                                 
33 For example, see Section 7.3.3 for the capex and opex of deploying and maintaining BTS  
34 Over 50% of African population live in rural areas (World Bank, 2017). 
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Brooks (1992), Stoll and Whaley (1983), referred to transaction cost as the cost of 
investing in financial markets, including brokerage fees and bid spreads. Coase (1937; 
1961) defined transaction cost as the cost of providing goods and services through the 
open market rather than within the firm. This includes costs associated with searching 
for market information, negotiation and enforcement. Since the definition of the term 
lacks a consensus, Allen (1999) asserted that a relevant definition would depend on 
what is being examined. 
Thus, the definition of transaction costs in this study is through the lens of 
Óliver Williamson’s transaction costs economics (Williamson, 1971; 1985; 1989; 
1998; 2000; 2012). According to Williamson (1985: 1), “a transaction occurs when a 
good or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface.” The costs 
of setting up and running this process are what Williamson refers to as transaction 
costs (1985). This is also in line with Arrow (1969: 501), who was among the first to 
link market failure to transaction costs, stating that transaction costs are costs 
associated with ‘running the economic system’. Transaction costs in this study thus 
mean the costs of network deployment and maintenance. 
Although transaction costs are prevalent in other industries, the deployment of 
telecommunications network is characterised by high levels of investment as stated 
earlier. Such investment results in substantial amount of transaction costs, including 
fixed costs, which are largely sunk35 and variable costs36 (Dodson, Hughes, Foster & 
Metcalfe, 2011; Miller, 1995; Park, 2009). Most fixed costs in telecommunications 
are sunk once the network is deployed because it is, at best, difficult or, at worse, 
impossible to recover a large part of the investment where an operator does not 
succeed and/or wants to exit the market (Gilbert, 1989; Kim, Park & Jeong, 2004). A 
relevant example of the worst case is a fixed access point that provides subscribers’ 
access to the local exchange, which is only valuable for transmitting services to that 
particular area (Falch, 1997). Examples of the difficult scenario could be evident in 
                                                 
35 Sunk costs are irrecoverable costs of setting-up and running a business operation (Hausman, 1998).   
36 Variable costs include digging trenches for the laying of cables, setting up and maintaining billing 
system for collecting tariff and customer acquisitions in terms of advertising and marketing campaigns 
(Park, 2009) 
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recouping the initial (entire) costs of securing GSM/spectrum licence, deploying base 
transceiver stations (BTS) and fibre optic networks (Hausman, 1998; Park, 2009). 
Since transaction costs form a significant part of telecommunications 
investment, it becomes imperative that the business case for network deployment is 
largely anchored on the net benefit of transaction costs (Cannock, 2001). In other 
words, MNO would only be interested in a market where accruing benefits outweigh 
the transaction costs (Wallis & Dollery, 1999; Dollery, 2001). If this is not the case, 
MNO would lose interest and the incentive to expand and continue serving such a 
market could dissipate (Hui, 2014; Williamson, 1971). While it possible for investors 
in other industries to exit the market in such a scenario, it is much more complicated 
and difficult for MNO due to irrevocable sunk costs as indicated earlier. One way to 
ensure that benefits outweigh costs is to set a price that reflects the high level of 
investment. However, the substantial level of transaction costs in telecommunications, 
which are largely sunk, would not allow the market to set a price that reflects the 
marginal cost37 to recoup such investment (Hausman, 1998; Hausman & Sidak, 2014; 
Khan, 1988).  
Table 3 thus highlights that idiosyncratic investment, largely reflected by high 
sunk costs and low marginal costs makes the economic feasibility of network 
deployment difficult. This is particularly significant in the context of Africa where 
transaction costs (fixed and variable) are significant owing to the legacy problem 
associated with a lack of infrastructure across the continent (Section 2.1). In this case, 
a government can use policy instruments such as taxation and other incentives to lower 
transaction costs (Gabel, 2007; Zerbe & McCurdy, 1999). This is further addressed in 
Section 3.2.2.                  
An additional cause of market failure is information asymmetry, that is, an 
unequal availability of information to everyone in the market (Bleda & del Rio, 2013; 
Dassler, 2006; Gomez-Barroso & Perez-Martinez, 2005; Stiglitz, 2016; Weimer & 
Vining, 2010). Studies have established that when it comes to access to information, 
                                                 
37 Marginal cost is the cost of producing an additional unit of a product/service. Typically, the higher 
the total cost of production, the higher the price to reflect the additional marginal costs and vice-versa. 
However, when it comes to telecommunications, if price is to be set based on the actual marginal cost 
of deploying the network, mobile tariff becomes too expensive and may be priced beyond what a large 
proportion of consumers can afford. Hence, the reason why low marginal cost subsist in 
telecommunications despite having high transaction costs, which is sunk t a great degree.   
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market actors generally have far more advantage compared to consumers and 
government institutions (Dassler, 2006; Economides, 2004). As such, the industry can 
use this information to make better-informed decisions to the disadvantage of both the 
consumers and the regulators in a manner that ‘games’ the market.  
Table 3 suggests that information asymmetry is particularly evident in the 
telecommunications industry in two ways. The first scenario is the information 
advantage of market actors over the institutions that are set-up to regulate the industry 
(Dassler, 2006; Dodson, Hughes, Foster & Metcalfe, 2011; Dollery, 2001). This is 
illustrated across Africa where market actors like MNO tend to have better information 
of, for example, where the biggest gaps of digital divide are over telecommunications 
regulators, including USF managers who administer market intervention policies like 
USF (Dorward, 2013; ITU, 2013b). One implication of this is that policymakers could 
misallocate USF to undeserving areas, that is, provide subsidies to MNO for serving 
profitable areas to the detriment of locations with ‘true’ access gaps as evident in 
Lesotho (Section 5.4.2). Furthermore, since MNO are aware of subsidies, they may 
use ‘funding deficiency’ as an excuse to delay network deployment just to benefit from 
USF even when they know that such areas could be served profitably (Xia & Lu, 
2008). MNO can also use their information advantage for fixing prices and dictating 
the terms of QoS (Wallis & Dollery, 1999). 
Gomez-Barroso and Perez-Martinez (2005) introduced a second dimension to 
information asymmetry in telecommunications by arguing that for a consumer to 
appreciate the value of services such as the Internet, certain level of information and 
knowledge are needed, otherwise, people may undervalue their use. This could lead to 
low adoption, which, in turn, leads to low usage and revenue for operators as evident 
in some parts of Africa (Sections 5.3.5). Drawing from Section 1.1, one can argue that 
while the first scenario speaks to the supply-side, this second point highlights some of 
the demand-side barriers of digital divide.     
The subsequent analysis in Chapter 8 suggests that the first scenario 
highlighted in Table 3 could be addressed by empowering regulatory authorities with 
adequate capacity – financial and human resources. This will enable regulators 
conduct market research to reduce their information deficiency and promote better 
resource allocation for USF, carry-out wider stakeholder engagement in order to 
generate reliable information from, for example, local communities and share from 
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the invaluable knowledge of various interest groups. To mitigate the lack of 
knowledge from consumers, policymakers, as well as MNO, should promote public 
education and digital literacy programmes to encourage adoption.   
Market failure can also stem from incomplete and missing markets (Dassler, 
2006; Gomez-Barroso & Perez-Martinez, 2005; Ortiz, 2016; Stiglitz, 2010). The main 
tenet of a market economy is that all needs would be met by the market provided the 
demands of consumers are sufficient to absorb the corresponding costs of supply 
(Dollery, 2001; Wallis & Dollery, 1999). In the absence of this, market failure may 
arise due to incomplete market as suppliers neglect some part of the market due to a 
lack of demand. It then follows that incomplete market is a situation where the lack of 
certain required elements such as sufficient demand in the marketplace may lead to 
inefficiency and thus discourage the supply of goods and services (Beare & Newby, 
2005). Missing market, on the other hand, arise from the absence of a complementary 
market, that is, an instance where the activity of one market is dependent on a related 
activity (Beare & Newby, 2005; Dollery, 2001; Laffont, 2005; Stigliz, 1988).  
Incomplete market is evidence in telecommunications when we consider (as 
argued earlier under natural monopoly) that a critical mass of people is needed to 
justify the large investment on network deployment. If this does not eventuate, the 
business case for network expansion dissipates as MNO would typically concentrate 
in commercially viable areas with greater demand (Ndukwe, 2003; 2005). As for 
missing market, for the telecommunications market to be optimal, apart from 
providing network, end-users need affordable mobile phones and tariffs to maximise 
the demand for services (Gillwald, 2017; Chair & De Lannoy, 2018). This indicates 
that the supply of network and the demand for services are complementary - one 
cannot succeed without the other. Hence, if end-user cannot afford mobile devices or 
tariffs even when there is a network, a complementary segment of the market is said 
to be missing. This results in market failure as evident in Section 5.3.4. This suggests 
that the sum of parts of network supply and service demand are important as the whole. 
Therefore, MNO may not go out of their way to meet the needs of the market for both 
incomplete and missing markets without some form of government intervention and/or 
support (Wallis & Dollery, 1999). 
Section 6.3.2 later suggests that incomplete market can be mitigated through 
rationing disperse and isolated communities (where demand is disaggregated) among 
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individual MNO and issuing them with non-competing licences to promote economies 
of scale and maximise demand for such areas as indicated in Table 3. Table 3 also 
indicates that missing market can be tackled by addressing affordability barriers 
associated with, for example, the cost of smartphones and data tariff to promote 
adoption (see Section 5.3). 
Another cause of market failure can arise from a lack of ability of the market 
to provide public or merit goods (Arndt, 1998; Gomez-Barroso & Feijoo, 2010; 
Weimer & Vining, 2010). Generally speaking, a public good is one in which the 
consumption by one member of the public does not exclude its availability or 
consumption to another (Gomez-Barroso & Perez-Martinez, 2005; Stiglitz, 1988; 
Zerbe & McCurdy, 1999). Conversely, a merit good is a product/service that is of 
immense benefit to the public but may be underprovided by the market due to 
insufficient demand or the inability/willingness of the public to pay (Ali, 2016; 
Musgrave, 1957). Due to the positive externality that comes with such good in terms 
of the wider socio-economic benefit, governments tend to take interest in its 
widespread provision regardless of consumption habit (Ali, 2016; Bergman et al., 
1998; Gomez-Barroso & Perez-Martinez, 2005). A common example of such good 
includes education (UNESCO, 2018). 
Whatever the ‘generic’ term that applies, when such good is produced, its 
aforementioned characteristics of non-excludability and non-rivalry could mean that 
users cannot be prevented from using it even if it is becoming economically inefficient 
to the market (Eliassen & From, 2009). Hence, the market may lack the incentive to 
meet the needs of the wider society owing to a lack of profitability but considering its 
wider socio-economic benefit, governments may intervene to ensure its availability to 
the society (Dassler, 2006; Wallis & Dollery, 1999). 
Although the increasing importance of telecommunications as a critical tool 
for promoting social-economic activities has led to its classification as a public and 
merit goods (Dassler, 2006; Falch, 1997; Eliassen & From, 2009), Gomez-Barroso 
and Feijoo (2010) argued that telecommunications is neither a public nor merit good 
but a mixed good. In the sense that telecommunications reflect an attribute of a public 
good in terms of public use without diminishing quality and a private good where a 
member of the public may be excluded due to, for example, ability to pay (Gomez-
Barroso & Feijoo, 2010; Mitchell, 1995). Furthermore, since a public good is generally 
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believed to attract zero marginal cost for an additional consumer, the high transaction 
costs, which is largely sunk, in telecommunications counters such argument – low (not 
zero) marginal costs is often related with telecommunications (Hausman, 1998; 
Hausman & Sidak, 2014; Stiglitz, 1988). 
This study adopts the viewpoint of a mixed good because this reflects both the 
public interest and economic efficiency perspectives of correcting the market failure 
associated with telecommunications as explained in Section 3.2. Mixed good is further 
illustrated by UAS to telecommunications (Dassler, 2006; Wellenius, 2000; Wright, 
1999). Since UAS involves the provision of telecommunications in a manner that is 
widely available, accessible and affordable, it becomes difficult to achieve this by 
solely relying on market forces. Additionally, the liberalisation of the market also 
implies that UAS could no longer be achieved through cross-subsidisation as 
competition reduced the ARPU of the incumbent (see Section 3.3.2). Table 3 indicates 
that this has resulted in government intervention through, for example, USF in over 
30 African countries as market forces alone cannot guarantee UAS to 
telecommunications. See Section 3.4 for the analysis of USF across Africa.  
Network Externalities can also lead to market failure (Park, 2009; Stiglitz, 
2000; 2008; 2016). Externalities generally occur when a shift (increase or decrease) in 
demand for goods/services by an individual impacts an unwitting third party (Stiglitz, 
1988; Chung& Yoo, 2015). Hence, network externality can be defined as the change 
in the benefit that one derives from a product when the number of people consuming 
the same product changes (Baraldi, 2008; Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995). Dollery 
(2001) and Stiglitz (2008) further argued that externalities derive from the relationship 
between production and consumption patterns, which leads to the divergence between 
private costs and social benefits. The impact could be positive or negative with the 
later leading to market failure. For example: 
…if a manufacturing plant discharges industrial effluent into a lake thereby 
poisoning fish and harming the local fishing industry, then this would constitute a 
negative production externality. By contrast, industrial agglomeration along the 
lines of Silicon Valley represents a positive production externality where separate 
economic activities reinforce one another and lower production costs (Dollery, 
2001, p. 11-12). 
In telecommunications, network externality results when the value of being on 
a network depends not only on an individual but also on the size of the network in 
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terms of the level of deployment and adoption by other users (Mayo & Wallsten, 2011; 
Souter, 2018a). Although there is a variety of products/services for which the utility 
derived by a single user increases with the consumption by other users, network 
externality is arguably more pervasive and problematic in telecommunications (Chung 
& Yoo, 2015; Iimi, 2007; Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Trifunovic & Mitrovic, 2016). This 
is illustrated by Mitchell (1995) who asserted that telecommunications users tend to 
get more value from being on a network that has more users as they pay a lower On-
Net tariff to connect with more people relative to paying the higher Off-Net tariff. 
Mitchell (1995: 195) further added that the consequence of such externality is 
that “… the social value of enlarging the network by one user exceeds the private 
value expressed in a potential subscriber’s willingness to pay.” Consequently, 
although a larger player is able to maximise this effect through promotional offerings 
to its large subscriber base, a smaller player may be unable to appropriate this effect 
because of its limited customer base and network reach. Hence, an operator with a 
larger network could drive out the smaller players (Souter, 2018a). Mitchell concluded 
that this can prevent market actors, particularly, the smaller players, from expanding 
to other locations. In this sense, network externality can result in market failure. 
While the above analysis is widely applicable to the telecommunications 
industry, it important to stress that context also matters. For example, Section 2.2 
highlighted that the market structure of telecommunications across Africa, in term of 
the number of MNO and their respective subscribers, varies between countries and 
regions. Take Nigeria, a market with three major players – Airtel, Globacom and 
MTN, for instance. While MTN is the market leader38 with over 50 million 
subscribers, a non-market leader like Globacom with over 30 million subscribers can 
also benefit from network externalities, not least, when we consider its number of users 
and network reach including the large investment in vital infrastructure like fibre optic 
(Akinyemi & Ramonu, 2018; GSMA, 2017a; Song, 2016b). This differs with a 
country like Kenya, where despite having two major players – Safaricom and Airtel -
, Safaricom appears to be the MNO that benefits the most from network externalities 
due to its over 30 million mobile subscribers, wider network coverage and locking 
people in with its MPESA service (Section 1.1). It then follows that Airtel, which has 
                                                 
38 MNO with the largest market share in terms of subscribers 
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about 5 million subscribers, finds it difficult to benefit from network externalities 
despite offering, on the average, lower mobile tariff relative to Safaricom (see Section 
7.2.1). This is because Airtel lacks a wider network reach, the critical mass of people 
that is crucial for positive externalities (Baraldi, 2008; Falch, 1997; Iimi, 2007).  
Drawing from Sections 3.2.2 and 8.3.2, Table 3 highlights that policymakers 
can mitigate market failure linked with (negative) network externalities directly 
through price intervention - the elimination/reduction of Off-Net tariff, which will then 
give national roaming to smaller players to interconnect with national networks of big 
players. Table 3 also suggests that an indirect approach implemented through 
incentives like timely access to affordable (low) frequency spectrum can also be part 
of the solution.   
    The final cause of market failure, within the context of this study, is the 
volatility of macroeconomic conditions, which leads to an economic downturn that 
disrupts the business cycle and limits the ability of the market to satisfy existing and 
potential demands (Gomez-Barroso & Perez-Martinez, 2005; Zerbe & McCurdy, 
1999). Generally speaking, during periods of macroeconomic instability, the 
purchasing power of consumers may be restricted because of unemployment and low 
income, which may translate to low demand (Stiglitz, 1988). Suppliers may also be 
faced with the difficulties of obtaining foreign exchange (forex) for infrastructure 
expansion, especially in developing economies such as those in Africa where most 
telecommunications equipment are imported from overseas and payment is 
denominated in US dollars. In countries where this persist, market failure may result 
and may need government intervention to mitigate the impact.  
An example of how such volatility can impact telecommunications is evident 
in Nigeria where the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has injected over $9 billion into 
commercial banks to help businesses access forex during its recent recession (Fick & 
Pilling, 2017). However, such intervention appears to have come late following the 
exit of Etisalat from the market due to its inability to secure forex for its operation and 
service its $1.2 billion debts (Carvalho, 2017). A new venture called 9mobile, which 
is jointly owned by the creditors of Etisalat, has now taken over its mobile operation 
while the regulator searches for a new investor (Adepetun, 2017). Ohuocha and Eboh 
(2018) state that Teleology Holdings seem to be the front-runner to takeover 9mobile 
following a successful bid oversaw by Barclays Africa with about $500 million 
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acquisition price. Table 3 suggests that government interventions through fiscal and 
monetary policies can help to mitigate the volatility of microeconomic conditions but 
such interventions need to be timely to match the occurrence of the event in order to 
avoid the aftermath of the market exit of Etisalat in Nigeria. 
In summary, while the literature - for example, Dassler, 2006; Stiglitz; 1988; 
2008 - suggests a lack of consensus on the causes of general market failure, the 
discussion in this section highlights seven factors that are peculiar to 
telecommunications. Given that such factors can also help to explain market failure in 
general, this section makes a clear distinction by discussing how these factors may 
impact other industries in general and telecommunications in particular. Table 3 
presents a summary of this discussion. The key argument in Table 3 is that although 
the aforementioned factors could result in market failure in other industries, their 
impact on telecommunications becomes clearer when we consider the summary 
presented below. Therefore, to close the market failure of uneven mobile 
telecommunications in Africa, these factors should be taken into consideration, as 
subsequently highlighted in the empirical analyses in Chapters 5 to 8.      
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Table 3: Nuances in market failure: general versus telecommunications 
Causes of market 
failure 
In General  In telecommunications Suggested solution  
Natural monopoly Natural monopoly is largely and 
historically associated with utility industries 
like electricity, transportation and water. 
 
Since large investment is needed to deploy 
infrastructure in such industries, it is argued 
that it makes more economic sense to have 
a single (or a few) supplier(s) in order to 
produce economies of scale to maximise 
returns.  
The argument for a natural monopoly in a 
liberalised telecommunications market is relevant 
when it comes to serving countries with large 
geographies and, disperse and isolated 
communities, considering that a critical mass of 
people is needed within an area to justify the high 
transaction costs of network deployment 
 
This would make it more economically feasible for 
individual operators to provide infrastructure and 
services across their designated areas with 
disaggregated population   
Section 6.3.2 suggests that this can be 
implemented through the issuance of non-
competing licence to allow individual MNO to 
be the sole provider of services in their 
allotted areas 
Transaction costs Generally speaking, when the transaction 
costs of engaging in any business are 
greater than returns, a market cannot 
function efficiently 
 
In this case, a market actor can either set a 
price based on higher marginal costs to 
account for the large investment or exit the 
market altogether   
Since high levels of sunk costs are embedded in 
transaction costs, it is difficult to exit a non-
profitable market without incurring a significant 
loss 
 
It also difficult to recoup investment by relying on 
‘standard’ price set at an equivalent marginal cost 
as high margins would be needed to offset, not 
least, the fixed costs element of the transaction 
costs, and allow operators to earn a sufficient return 
on investment 
 
This would price services beyond the reach of a 
large number of consumers. Hence, despite the 
high transaction costs associated with 
telecommunications, low marginal costs are 
applicable  
Section 6.3.3 indicates that policymakers can 
offer various incentives to help operators 
lower their transaction costs  
Information 
asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is observed in 
various industries when some market 
participants lack information to make an 
Information asymmetry is evident in 
telecommunications through: the information 
advantage of MNO over regulators, which results 
The analysis in Chapter 8 suggests that this 
can be addressed through adequate regulatory 
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informed decision on issues relating to, for 
example, price and quality 
 
This generally creates a problem in the 
market as the participant(s) with the 
information advantage tend to exploit 
others 
 
  
in, for example, the misallocation of USF to 
undeserving areas while ‘true’ disadvantaged areas 
continue to lag behind 
 
Secondly, this is highlighted in the lack of 
consumers’ knowledge of the wider usefulness of 
being connected and mobile devices usage. This 
results in low mobile adoption and usage, which, in 
turn, leads to low revenue for MNO 
capacity and promoting public education and 
digital literacy 
Incomplete and 
missing markets 
The success of any market is generally 
predicated on the interaction of the forces 
of demand and supply. That said, market 
actors would typically provide 
goods/services when there is sufficient 
demand to absorb the supply costs 
 
When this does not eventuate, market 
actors are more likely to neglect supply due 
to incomplete/insufficient demand.  
 
Conversely, the consumption of a product 
may be dependent on a related product, 
which when missing could restrict 
aggregate demand         
 
 
Incomplete market is accentuated in disperse and 
isolated communities where demand is 
disaggregated and difficult to get a critical mass of 
people to make network operation attractive and 
profitable 
 
Missing market is reflected in the lack of 
complementary market between the supply of 
network and the demand for services  
Section 6.3.2 suggests that incomplete market 
can be mitigated by issuing non-competing 
licences to designated natural monopolies for 
serving disperse and isolated communities 
 
Section 5.3 indicates that missing market can 
be tackled by addressing affordability barriers 
associated with the cost of smartphones and 
data tariff to promote adoption.     
Public/merit/mixed 
goods 
Although such goods are typically 
considered to be essential to the social-
economic well-being of the wider society, 
the market may stop or inadequately 
provide them when it becomes unprofitable 
 
Government may then intervene due to 
their wider importance to the socio-
economic wellbeing of the society  
The increasing importance of telecommunications 
as a critical socio-economic enabler has resulted in 
its classification as a public and merit goods  
 
However, a mixed good is adopted in this study 
because this reflects both the public interest and 
economic efficiency perfectives of correcting the 
market failure of telecommunications as proposed 
in Figure 19 (Section 8.1)  
UAS to telecommunications cannot be 
achieved by market forces alone but with the 
complement of government intervention  
 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 indicates that such 
intervention is largely implemented via USF 
in over 30 African countries within the wider 
framework of UAS policy 
 
 65 
 
The idea is that USF would help to equate 
marginal social cost (as closely as possible) 
with market prices that reflect transaction 
costs of deploying network  
Network 
externalities 
Network externalities generally occur when 
a shift in demand for goods/services by one 
individual impacts an unwitting third party 
Since such impacts could either be positive 
or negative, production and consumption 
patterns could diverge with the implication 
that private costs and social benefits are 
largely isolated 
 
Market failure typically results in the event 
of negative externalities, i.e., when private 
costs exceed social benefits   
Network externality is arguably more pervasive and 
problematic in telecommunications because: 
 
Subscribers tend to get more value from being on a 
network that has more users due to lower On-Net 
tariff relative to paying a higher Off-Net tariff to 
connect to a different network  
 
That said, a critical mass of people and wider 
network reach is needed for an operator to benefit 
from network externalities 
 
Since market structure differ between countries and 
regions, context matters when analysing network 
externalities 
 
 
Sections 3.2.2 and 8.3.2 indicate that the 
impact of (negative) network externalities in 
telecommunications can be mitigated by 
policymakers through: 
 
Direct intervention (for example, price 
intervention using MTR), and 
 
Indirect intervention (incentivising the 
participation of smaller players through, for 
example, timely access to affordable (low) 
frequency spectrum   
Volatility of 
macroeconomic 
conditions 
This generally impacts various spheres of 
an economy 
  
This, in turn, impact all industries as, for 
example, unemployment result in low 
disposable income and low demand, access 
to forex may also become difficult due to a 
country’s low receipts from international 
trade 
Access to forex is critical to the 
telecommunications industry in Africa, which 
heavily reliant on FDI 
 
Furthermore, infrastructure is largely imported 
from overseas with payment dominated in US 
Dollars. Hence, the risk of default in times of 
economic downturn is high if the source of forex is 
curtailed by  slow-down in the economy   
Government can intervention through fiscal – 
lowering taxes and increasing government 
spending -  and monetary policies – reducing 
interest rate to allow businesses to borrow 
more and increase in money supply by central 
banks    
 
However, such intervention has to be timely to 
match the occurrence of the event in order to 
avoid, for example, the aftermath of the 
market exit of Etisalat in Nigeria  
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3.2.2 Regulatory Instruments 
According to Vedung (1998: 21), regulatory instruments are “a set of techniques by 
which governmental authorities wield their power in attempting to ensure support and 
effect (or prevent) social change”. The social change in the context of this study is to 
effect widespread access to mobile telecommunications, which is fast becoming a 
useful socio-economic enabler for many across Africa (Collett, 2016; Jagun, Heeks, 
& Whalley, 2008). While a wide range of regulatory instruments as discussed in the 
literature (for example, Borras & Edquist, 2013; Burns & Richman, 2004; Mitchell, 
1995) could be deployed by government to correct market failure (Bauer, 2010; 
Gillingham & Sweeney, 2010), this section will highlight those that are relevant to 
telecommunications and how they relate to the issues highlighted in Section 3.2.1. 
They include mandates, incentives and subsidies. 
 Mandate follows the traditional form of ‘command-and-control’ approach 
whereby a regulator can direct market actors to provide what is lacking in the 
marketplace (Bjornstad & Brown, 2004; Gillingham & Sweeney, 2010). ). For 
example, if the good/service in question is a public good, which is essential to the 
socio-economic fabric of the society, a government may decide to mandate market 
actors to address the public need (Weimer & Vining, 2010). Examples of mandate 
instruments in telecommunications include rollout obligation39 and price intervention 
via, for example, reduction in mobile termination rate (MTR). Rollout obligation 
arises from a situation where MNO are required, as part of their licence conditions, to 
commit to a predetermined level of network deployment in commercially unviable 
areas (Jain & Raghuram, 2010; Kalra & Borgohain, 2004; Naidoo, 2011). Failure to 
meet such a commitment will attract penalty such as fines and/or licence cancellation 
(Grabosky, 1995). Price intervention, on the other hand, involves the regulation of 
prices either to prevent large players from abusing their market position or to improve 
user affordability (Bjornstad & Brom, 2004; Intven, Oliver, & Sepulveda, 2000; May, 
2012; Mitchell, 1995).  
A recent example of this can be found in Malawi where the regulator40 
intervened in the market to reduce MTR from $4 to $2 per minute in order to make 
                                                 
39 see Section 6.3.1 
40 The Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) 
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mobile tariff more affordable for end-users (TeleGeography, 2018d). The regulation 
of MTR is particularly useful for preventing large MNO from charging high access 
price (Off-Net tariff) that could stymie the expansion and operation of smaller players, 
limit them from benefiting from network externality and also impact on the end-users 
through affordability (Intven, Oliver, & Sepulveda, 2000). According to OECD (2012: 
65), “… access pricing is a key element of any interconnection regime...” As such, 
pricing must reflect adequate incentive for a network provider to invest in 
infrastructure and for end-users to adopt what is being provided (OECD, 2012). To 
mitigate a market failure that results from network externality and affordability, a 
regulator may intervene in the market and regulate interconnection charges as 
discussed in Section 8.3.2. 
 While the use of mandate instruments offer a government the opportunity of 
achieving public objectives with minimum cost (Stiglitz, 2010), the need for 
enforcement, which requires human and financial resources, negates such argument 
(Panayotou, 2013). The use of mandate instruments can thus result in unintended 
consequences due to limited regulatory capacity (Grabosky, 1995). Secondly, while 
mandate instruments may require market actors to get on with the business of 
providing for the market, the coercive approach may leave market actors with the 
feeling of resentment and alienation (Ayling & Grabosky, 2006). The outcome of this 
may result in dysfunctional behaviour and a lack of cooperation from market actors, 
which will then detract from achieving a given objective (Sherman, 1993). 
Furthermore, although a mandate instrument like price intervention can be a useful 
tool for redistributing economic gains to deprived areas and attract smaller players to 
expand their networks by directing big players to lower interconnection charges, it can 
also be seen as ‘discriminatory’, particular in a liberalised market (Mitchell, 1995). 
 The use of incentive as a regulatory instrument is the polar opposite of 
mandate - instead of a ‘command-and-control’ approach, market actors are offered 
various incentives in order to encourage them to fill market gaps (Ayling & Grabosky, 
2006; Grabosky, 1995; Gillingham & Sweeney, 2010). A relevant example to the 
current study is tax break (Panayotou, 2013: 52). Tax breaks are ‘preferential’ tax 
treatments that depart from the normal tax structure, which is offered to a certain group 
of taxpayers with the intention of mitigating market failures related to the externality 
of critical economic activities such as mobile telecommunications (Chen, 2015). The 
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deployment of telecommunications is inherently capital intensive and when high taxes 
are imposed on such a sector, it can distort further investments (Gillingham & 
Sweeney, 2010; Yardley, Adkins, & Woolfson, 2017). This is particularly true in 
emerging markets where private investors tend to incur more costs in setting up 
business operations due to general lack of infrastructure (Brodzka, 2013). To offset 
such cost, the government can offer tax breaks to encourage more investment 
(Mitchell, 1995; Oman, 2000).  
 One of the advantages of incentive is that since it is less coercive, it enhances 
‘freedom’ in terms of the flexibility to accept or decline any offer made by the 
government compared to the rigidity associated with mandates (Gillingham & 
Sweeney, 2010; Grabosky, 1995). Secondly, market actors are more likely to perceive 
it as ‘legitimate’ as they feel less alienated compared to the use of mandatory 
instruments (Grabosky, 1995). Thirdly, the offer of incentives can help to mitigate 
market failure related to positive externality to the benefit of the wider society by 
compensating market actors for prohibitive transaction costs that cannot be fully 
recovered by market forces (Ai & Sappington, 2002; Chen, 2015). However, one of 
the criticisms of the use of incentives is that it may lead to a free rider problem where 
market actors who benefit from incentives may fail to reflect it their business 
operations (Grabosky, 1995). It then follows that for an incentive be effective, 
regulators need to figure out a way to enforce compliance to ensure that beneficiaries 
are held accountable to provide what they ought to for receiving incentives. In the 
absence of monitoring and compliance, the use of incentives will be susceptible to 
subversion and unscrupulous actions by market actors, which can then detract from 
the intended objective (Grabosky, 1995).  
 Subsidy is another example of non-mandatory regulatory instrument 
(Bjornstad & Brown, 2004; Gillingham & Sweeney, 2010). Although the term lacks 
an agreed definition, there appears to be an agreement that subsidy involves 
governments and part of the beneficiaries are the marginalised in the society 
(Olukoshin, 2004; WTO, 2006: IV & 48). In relation to the current study, subsidy 
refers to a situation where a government provides a certain form of direct financial 
assistance to market actors in order to improve the economic efficiency of serving 
marginalised areas (Cox, 2002; Solaymani, Kari, & Zakaria, 2013). This relates to 
people with low-income and a lack of access to basic public services, for example, 
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education, electricity, telecommunications and transportation (Solaymani, Kari, & 
Zakaria, 2013; WTO, 2006). Apart from offering direct financial assistance like the 
use of universal service fund (USF)41, the government can also implement this 
instrument through cross-subsidies. This is a situation where some users are charged 
above costs margin for international or long distance services in order to subsidise the 
services of other users at a margin below costs for local or low access services (Clarke 
& Wallsten 2002; Xavier & Cave 1995)42. 
 The aim here is to reduce the costs of network deployment and encourage 
operators to expand coverage beyond commercially viable areas. As such, one of the 
advantages of subsidy is that it could be combined with other mechanisms to help 
lower transaction costs and improve market efficiency for market actors (Bjornstad & 
Brom, 2004; Mitchell, 1995). However, the use of subsidies also has some 
shortcomings. Firstly, it encourages a dependency attitude on the part of market actors, 
which, in turn, delay market expansion and innovation (Grabosky, 1995). For 
example, MNO may delay coverage expansion to disadvantaged areas that may be 
commercially viable just to get a subsidy from USF. Secondly, with the existence of 
information asymmetry, a regulatory authority may end-up deploying USF to 
undeserving areas (WTO, 2006), as Section 3.2.1 has highlighted that market actors 
are typically well-informed than a regulator. This will then result in the misallocation 
of scarce resources and reduced public welfare (Allcott & Sunstein, 2015). Thirdly, 
the public sector in emerging markets are often found to lack a robust system of 
accountability, hence, subsidies are susceptible to political capture and corruption as 
those responsible for managing the process may abuse the system and misappropriate 
funds for personal use (WTO, 2006: 75). This is further highlighted in Section 5.2.6 
where corruption is seen as one of the impediments to the implementation of USF in 
Africa. Furthermore, the opportunity cost of providing subsidy in a given sector may 
be an alternative forgone in another critical sector, for example, telecommunications 
versus healthcare or power. Hence, as will be seen later on in Section 6.3.4, it is argued 
that USF should be deployed as a tool that addresses multiple deprivations in 
disadvantaged areas and not just telecommunications. 
                                                 
41 See Section 3.3.3 for details 
42 See section 3.3.3 for details  
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 Regardless of the choice of regulatory instrument, attention needs to be 
focused on the effectiveness and efficiency of the instrument (Gillingham & Sweeney, 
2010). Effectiveness is the ability of a chosen instrument to produce the desired result 
of correcting market failure, and efficiency is the monetary and non-monetary costs of 
deploying a given instrument (Grabosky, 1995). This suggests that the accruing 
benefit of a given instrument should be compared with the cost of implementation in 
order to guide against poor policy design, implementation and, ultimately, policy 
failure (Gillingham & Sweeney, 2010; Trubnikov, 2017). It also highlights the need 
for an ‘appropriate’ balance between equity and efficiency in order to produce a 
regulatory instrument that maximises social gains and minimises transactions costs 
(Coglianese & Lazer, 2003). Although achieving such a balance could pose a 
challenge (Trubnikov, 2017), what is ‘appropriate’ within the context of this study 
would be a regulatory instrument that provides effectiveness in terms of bringing 
connectivity to the unconnected and accounts for efficiency to encourage private 
participation (Borras & Edquist, 2013; Gillingham & Sweeney, 2010). This is evident 
in the model proposed for closing the digital divide in Africa as will be seen in Section 
8.1. 
3.2.3 Criticisms of the theory of market failure 
Although the theory of market failure provides the conceptual framework and 
guidelines, which policymakers rely on to address public equity and economic 
efficiency, various studies have identified some of its limitations (Wallis & Dollery, 
1999; Zerbe & McCurdy, 1999). These limitations can be explained from two broad 
perspectives: public interest theory and the theory of economic regulation (Bonbright, 
2005; Hantke-Domas, 2003; Posner, 1974; Stigler, 1971). 
 The central argument of the public interest theory is that government 
interventions arise in order to prevent or mitigate a lack of equity and efficiency in the 
marketplace in the interest of the wider society (Christensen, 2010; Picot & Wernick, 
2007; Pigou, 1932; Posner, 1974). The theory of economic regulation, on the other 
hand, postulates that in the event of market failure, ‘powerful’ interests, typically 
market actors with large financial resources relative to consumers and regulators tend 
to influence regulatory intervention to maximise their benefits (Dassler, 2006; 
McChesney, 1997; Monti, 2003; Posner, 1974; Wenders, 1988). This underlines the 
argument that the industry is able to ‘capture’ the intervention process and make it 
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work for them to the detriment of the public, and the regulators who are mostly limited 
in their financial capacity (Hantke-Domas, 2003; Hertog, 2010; Picot & Wernick, 
2007; Posner, 1974). As highlighted later in Section 5.3.2, this helps to explain why 
some rent-seeking MNO may try to influence regulatory authorities when it comes to 
issues like frequency spectrum allocation. 
Since market failure is defined from the viewpoint of equity and economic 
efficiency, the limitations from both theories are reflected in the theory of market 
failure (Bergman, et al., 1998; Todorova, 2016). Firstly, the public interest theory 
presumes that in the event of market failure, government intervention is costless 
(Hantke-Domas, 2003; Posner, 1974). This indicates that it would cost governments 
little or nothing to implement market interventions. Juxtaposing this with 
telecommunications, this assumption appears inconsistent with evidence from practice 
where it has been proven that government needs human and financial resources to 
effectively run a regulator and with this comes a great deal of cost (Panayotou, 2013). 
For example, costs of setting up the office of the regulator either as an independent 
body or a unit within a government ministry, staffing and (re)training, legal and 
administrative, dealing with customer complaints and consultancy services where 
experts are engaged to assist with the complexity of telecommunications (Hansen, 
2009; Xavier & Ypsilanti, 2008). The capacity of a regulator to carry out these 
activities is critical not least in policy formulation, implementation and policing 
(Bauer, 2013; Hantke-Domas, 2003; Posner, 1971; 1974). 
Secondly, both theories assume that policymakers have access to sufficient and 
reliable information that is needed for informed decision-making in the event of 
tackling market failure (Wallis & Dollery, 1999; Hertog, 2010). Critics, however, 
disagree with this tenet arguing that in practice, more often than not, market actors 
tend to have access to better information while at best regulators imperfectly promote 
public interest with limited information (Estache & Wren-Lewis, 2009; Posner, 1971). 
Similarly, in the context of telecommunications, market actors like MNO are 
predisposed to better information about the market, hence, better informed if an area 
is economically viable or deserving government subsidy. This can be illustrated with 
the case of Lesotho where a lack of information has led the regulator to allocate 
subsidy to undeserving areas (see Section 5.4.2). Therefore, information asymmetry 
may lead policymakers to misallocate subsidies to less vulnerable areas and end up 
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subsidising MNO for deploying infrastructure to profitable areas (WTO, 2006). In 
countries where this happens, market failure, in terms of lack of mobile coverage, may 
persist as disadvantaged areas where subsidies are actually needed may be neglected. 
Thirdly, critics also question the presupposition that the government can 
design public policy to address market failure in an ‘altruistic’ manner, which is, 
putting public interest ahead of self-interest (McChesney, 1997; Wenders, 1988). 
Downs (1957: 136) was particularly vocal on this front saying “… what reason is there 
to believe that men who run the government would be motivated to maximise it”? He 
further argued that the government, like any other agent, would discharge their duties 
to satisfy their self-interest, for example, money, prestige and power. Consequently, 
any attempt to formulate public policy to address market failure without accounting 
for the interests of those who are tasked with the administration and formulation of 
intervention would amount to little results. This helps to explain issues such as the 
undue political influence limiting the performance of USF as argued in Section 5.2.8.     
   In spite of these criticisms, the theory of market failure provides the intellectual 
debate for government intervention in the marketplace. It also provides the conceptual 
framework and guidelines that policymakers draw on to address market failure (Wallis 
& Dollery, 1999; Trubnikov, 2017). It is within this context that UAS of 
telecommunications has emerged as a policy framework for mitigating the digital 
divide of uneven mobile coverage.   
3.3 Universal access and services 
As a corollary of the discussion in Chapters 1 and 2, it is apparent that although 
liberalisation and competition were introduced following the 1997 WTO Basic 
Telecommunications Agreement to enable the market to provide widespread access to 
telecommunications, evidence abounds that this objective has not been achieved in 
Africa. This follows the estimation that that nearly half of the 1.2 billion people in 
Africa are believed to lack a mobile subscription (A4AI, 2017a; Collins, 2015; GSMA, 
2016b; Manson, 2013). The market has, therefore, failed to meet the 
telecommunication needs of the wider society. Section 3.2.2 highlighted that in an 
effort to correct market failure, government can deploy various regulatory instruments. 
As such, governments across Africa have introduced UAS policy, specifically, the 
deployment of USF, which fits with the use of subsidy as a regulatory instrument to 
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tackle the market failure of uneven mobile coverage. This section will thus explore 
USF within the wider context of UAS policy by critically reviewing various issues in 
the literature, including its definition, origin and other UAS strategies. It will then 
conclude by presenting a summary of the conceptual framework for this study, clearly 
indicating how all the different elements within the framework fit together and reflect 
on the main research problems that this study aims to address.    
3.3.1 Definition and origin of universal access and services 
Various studies use different terms when it comes to UAS. For example, ITU (2013b) 
and Longstaff (1996) call it ‘universal service’, Oestmann and Dymond (2008) term 
it UAS, and Srinuan (2014) reference it as universal service obligation. A synthesis 
from these various sources indicates that they are all referring to the same issue but 
using different terminologies. This study adopts UAS, firstly, for the purpose of 
consistency and secondly, for the fact that in this form, one can clearly show that 
access to telecommunications is dependent on the availability of infrastructure and 
services to both individuals and the public. This will become clearer as this section 
progresses.  
The advent of UAS could be traced back to the USA where Theodore Newton 
Vail first used the term in 1907 when he was the president of AT&T (Economides, 
2004; Mueller, 1993). Although the likes of Blackman (1995) is of the opinion that it 
was Vail’s initiative that led to the widespread of telephone penetration in the USA, 
Crandall and Waverman (2000) and Muller (1993) disagree. They argued that Vail’s 
effort only made Bell a monopoly as the majority of end-users were now connected to 
its network. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why Hudson (2006) linked the origin of 
the term to an industrial strategy, that is, a policy that favoured the industry rather than 
the public. While it is not within the scope of this research to substantiate the 
difference in opinion of these authors, the origin of UAS, which predates mobile 
technology, appears not to be in dispute. Having established this, the next step is to 
explore the meaning of UAS. 
As with the terminology, it is unsurprising there is a general lack of consensus 
regarding the definition of UAS with varying views from both academics and 
practitioners (Alleman, Rappoport, & Banerjee, 2010). For example, Blackman (1995: 
171) noted that “…it [UAS] looks to be coated in myth, a slippery and ideological 
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concept manipulated by different parties to support their own case for special 
treatment.” Jain and Das (2001) and Milne (1998) thus stated that the composition of 
UAS varies from country to country depending on economic conditions and the level 
of telecommunications development. Blackman (1995) concluded that the UAS is a 
dynamic concept that needs to be viewed through the lens of a particular country’s 
stage of development, economic, political, and social objectives. The definition of 
UAS is, therefore, not straightforward (Xavier & Cave, 1995). Nonetheless, some of 
the definitions contained in the literature and practices from across Africa are 
presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Definition of UAS: views from the literature and practices across Africa 
Source Definition 
Literature 
Muller (1993: 353) “In its common modern construction, universal telephone service means 
reaching every member of society, no matter how remote or poor.” 
Nett (1998: 661) “Universal service in telecommunications comprises that a minimum 
standard of services has to be supplied to everybody at an affordable 
price.” 
Oestmann and 
Dymond (2008: 1) 
“Universal service (US) refers to service at the individual or household 
level, e.g., typically a telephone in each home. Universal access (UA) 
refers to a publicly shared level of service, e.g., through public payphones 
or Internet telecentres. However, in more and more countries, UA and US 
apply at the same time, and it, therefore, makes also sense to use the 
generic term universal access and service (UAS)”. 
Practice in Africa 
ANRT (2017) In Morocco, universal service is defined as “… a mechanism to allow, in 
the long term, access to the entire Moroccan population to basic 
telecommunication services: telephony and internet”. 
USPF (2015) Universal service in Nigeria is seen as the promotion of “…the 
achievement of national policy goals for universal access and universal 
service to information and communication technologies (ICTs) in rural, 
un-served and under-served areas in Nigeria”. 
UCSFA (2014) Tanzania defines universal service as “a minimum set of communications 
services of a specified quality which is available to all users independent 
of their geographical location, and in the light of specific national 
conditions, at an affordable price.” 
TRASA43 (2002: 12) TRASA defined universal service as the “affordable and equitable access 
by everyone to information and communications networks”. 
Table 4 illustrates the argument made earlier that various sources use different 
terminologies when it comes to UAS. Xavier (2008), who made a distinction between 
UA and US further underlines this position. Xavier stated that though UA and US are 
closely related and used interchangeably, they mean different things. Xavier defined 
US as the provision of telecommunication services to every household regardless of 
their locations and UA as a guarantee to telecommunication services on a shared basis. 
Feijoo and Milne (2008) also corroborated this distinction as they defined US as the 
                                                 
43
 The Telecommunications Regulatory Association of Southern Africa (TRASA) is a regional 
telecommunications body formed by 15 member states of Southern African Development Community 
(SADC, 2012). 
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provision of telecommunication services at the individual or household level and UA 
as the provision of telecommunication services on a public share basis like public 
payphones or telecentres. 
 From a synthesis of the various definitions presented above, one can argue that 
UAS is a government intervention targeted at ensuring widespread access to 
telecommunications for individuals and the public. Furthermore, although the 
definitions provided echoes varied views from the literature and practices across 
Africa as illustrated by Table 4, some commonalities can be observed. These include 
availability, affordability and accessibility. On the back of reviewing the contributions 
from various literature, Feijoo and Milne (2008) asserted that from the late 1980s, 
these three elements have been the main foundations of UAS. ITU (2013b) and 
Oestmann and Dymond (2008) alluded to this by stating that these three elements 
constitute the underlying principles of a ‘good’ UAS policy. Since these principles 
may have different meanings, depending on influences like economic conditions, 
developments within the telecommunications sector, and political will (Milne, 1998), 
this study adopts the definition of ITU (2013b):  
 Availability implies that the level and QoS should be the same for everybody 
regardless of where they live or work, at any time across geographies; 
 Affordability implies the ability of everybody to afford or pay for 
telecommunication services, regardless of their locations or income level; and 
 Accessibility implies that everyone, without distinction of race, sex, religion, 
etc., should have access to telephone services without any discrimination such 
as price and QoS. 
In the light of this reasoning, one could argue that, regardless of the different 
definitions adopted by various countries, a viable UAS policy should reflect these 
three principles in order to close the digital divide (Oestmann & Dymond, 2008, ITU 
2013b). In addition to these three long-standing principles, this study makes a case for 
an extension that includes assessment and awareness. The basis for this argument is 
anchored on the fact that the origin of UAS predates mobile technology and when 
these three traditional principles were conceived around 1907, technology was not as 
advanced as it is now (Batura, 2017; Mueller, 1993). One of the implications for 
technological advancement is that, the availability and accessibility of physical 
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infrastructure are critical for UAS but not sufficient in terms of helping end-users to 
experience the full benefits of digital technology (Shenglin et al., 2017). As such, there 
is need to look beyond physical infrastructure and affordable access to network and 
build capacity to promote technological knowledge and a host of content because as 
technology advances, so do end-users needs and the knowledge required to explore 
such technology (Nsengimana, Kende, & Rose, 2015). For example, the emergence of 
smartphones and various mobile applications would mean that the information needs 
of the society are constantly and rapidly changing (Batura, 2016). These changes are 
also dynamic in their impact on infrastructure as modern communication networks are 
increasingly becoming IP-based, enabling small and big players to bundle-up services 
like voice, video, and data in a single package for end-users (Xavier, 2008).  
What results from this process is the convergence of telecommunication 
services that are constantly and rapidly changing (Cramer, 2015; Hudson, 2006). 
Consequently, the perception of what constitutes a relevant telecommunication need 
is evolving and for policy to be relevant and effective, regular assessment of needs is 
arguably required (Batura, 2016; Okerlund, Parsons, & Hulterstrom, 1995). 
Assessment would then help policymakers to identify relevant gaps in 
telecommunication and facilitate the formulation of more effective and efficient policy 
(Crosby, 1996; Mamabolo, 2016b; Thomas & Grindle, 1990). 
 This study also makes a case for awareness in the sense that it is insufficient 
to deploy network without informing people about its benefits and how to use mobile 
devices as they evolve (Ameen & Willis, 2016; van Dijk, 1999). Awareness thus 
highlights the importance of digital education and training, which is critical to 
stimulate mobile adoption, generate online traffic and increase ARPU44 for MNO 
(Msimang, 2012; Nsengimana, Kende, & Rose, 2015; van Dijk, 2003). Therefore, the 
definition of access to telecommunications in this study refers to the provision of 
mobile telecommunications in a manner that encompasses availability, accessibility, 
affordability, assessment and awareness – in the sense that where any of these 
principles are missing, UAS policy cannot fully address the digital divide. See Section 
6.2.1 for more insight.  
                                                 
44 Average revenue per user 
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 From the definitions presented in Table 4, particularly the views from various 
regulators in Africa, it appears that some policymakers are aware of the advancement 
of technology and the need to capture this in UAS policy. However, some of these 
definitions appear rather ambiguous in terms of setting clear targets and/or incomplete 
in terms reflecting the principles of UAS discussed above. For example, although most 
countries target UAS at ‘unserved’ and ‘underserved’ areas, no specification is 
provided as to what this constitutes with a few exceptions like Egypt and Ghana. Egypt 
explicitly states that such areas shall include regions with at least 300 inhabitants (ITU, 
2013b). Ghana, on the other hand, defined unserved areas as locations with ‘no 
communications service’ and underserved areas as communities with only ‘2G 
services’ or ‘poor 3G services’ (NCA, 2017). UAS definition in certain countries like 
Nigeria and Malawi also covers ‘ICT’ without explicitly stating what ICT is limited 
to (MACRA, 2013; USPF, 2015). In practice, ICT could cover a host of different 
services, technologies and networks, and to imply that UAS in such countries covers 
unlimited scope is arguably unattainable.   
3.3.2 Strategies for funding universal access and services  
Contrary to the assumption by the public interest perspective of market failure, that 
government intervention is costless (Section 3.2.3), evidence from practice suggests 
that government need resources to, among other things, fund the subsidisation of 
telecommunications infrastructure in disadvantaged areas (Xavier & Cave, 1995). 
This raises the question of how and who pays for such subsidy? 
 Prior to the introduction of competition, the strategy for executing UAS was 
Cross Subsidy (Bhuiyan, 2004; Kaserman, Mayo, & Flynn, 1990; Mitchell, 1995). 
Cross-subsidy involves a complex process where, for example, some users are charged 
above costs margin for international or long-distance services in order to subsidise the 
services of other users at a margin below costs for local or low access services (Clarke 
& Wallsten 2002; Longstaff, 1996; Xavier & Cave 1995). This cost-shifting practice 
can be illustrated with the case of the USA where, for example, in 1995, the average 
single-line rate for businesses was $41.77 compared to $19.54 for residential users 
(Parsons, 1998). Apart from businesses cross-subsidising residential users, long-
distance services also attracted higher rates compared to local telephone rates 
(Majumdar, 2011; Palmer, 1992).  
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One of the problems associated with this mechanism, apart from the fact that 
it is more applicable under a monopolistic market, is ineffectiveness in the sense that 
it can distort consumption and investment decisions in the process of trying to separate 
price from cost (Clarke & Wallsten 2002; Majumdar, 2011). Critics also see it as a 
non-transparent mechanism due to the difficulty in differentiating between those who 
receive a subsidy and those who actually pay for it (Clarke & Wallsten, 2002; 
Majumdar, 2011; Parsons, 1998). Hatta (2008) further argued against this method of 
funding because it comes at a cost in terms of higher prices for certain customers. 
Hence, as the traditional means of extending coverage to disadvantaged areas, it 
gradually became inoperable with the advancement of liberalisation, as MNO who 
relied on subsidising one service with another, now face competition from rivals who 
can offer lower prices for both local and long-distance services (Hudson, 2006). 
 Universal Service Fund (USF) is another UAS funding strategy suggested by 
Blackman (1995) and Clarke and Wallsten (2002). This funding mechanism is 
consistent with a liberalised market where competing MNO and other service 
providers are required to contribute a proportion of their annual revenue into a pool of 
fund for subsidising network deployment in disadvantaged areas (Blackman, 1995).  
The idea behind such initiative is that MNO will not extend service to uneconomically 
viable locations without financial assistance to help lower their transaction costs 
(GSMA, 2014). Although USF is consistent with the deployment of subsidy as a 
regulatory instrument (Section 3.2.2), it also has the attribute of a mandatory 
instrument since the payment of USF levies by MNO are compulsory. This makes 
USF a hybrid regulatory instrument, the implementation of which could be complex 
as it reflects the characteristics and limitations of both mandatory and subsidy 
instruments discussed in Section 3.2.2. 
In a study conducted by GSMA (2014), 64 countries were surveyed and a key 
finding was that USF as a UAS strategy appears to be inefficient and ineffective, as 
over $11 billion was lying idle without disbursement across countries including Gabon 
and Zimbabwe. Similarly, although USF was first established in Latin America in the 
mid-1990s (Hudson, 2010), over 30 countries in Africa have established USF as their 
UAS strategy to bridge coverage gaps. Its impact across the continent raises more 
questions than answers in terms of promoting widespread access to 
telecommunications. Section 3.4 examines this in detail. 
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 UAS can also be executed through Auctions (Blackman 1995; Clarke & 
Wallsten, 2002; Nett 1998). Hatta (2008) referred to this as a competitive process of 
issuing licences with conditions specifying a given level of geographical or population 
coverage over a period of time. Operators participate in this process through a 
transparent and open competitive bidding process where the winner of the bid becomes 
the UAS provider for specific locations (Nett, 1998; Jain & Das, 2001). The successful 
bidder is expected to meet certain conditions like a specified standard of QoS and 
competitive tariffs that reflect the benefit of whatever support received from the 
government (Blackman, 1995).  
The award of $18.3 million contract to Tunisie Telecom to deploy 3G and 4G 
network to unserved areas with 180,000 people across 112 districts in Tunisia helps to 
illustrate this strategy (TeleGeography, 2017f). The use of auctions has also been 
successfully implemented in countries like New Zealand, Australia, and Chile (Jain & 
Das, 2001). One of its advantages is that it can help to facilitate market entry and 
exploit MNO cost and revenue valuations as against imposing an external costing 
method by the regulator (Blackman, 1995). Regulators can then devise a method for 
geographical allocations as well as the monitoring and enforcement of performances 
against a set of determined conditions. 
 ‘Pay or Play’ strategy is another mechanism highlighted by Blackman (1995). 
In this case, an operator can either pay to support UAS by contributing to USF or 
undertake the process of improving UAS in a given location by itself (Blackman, 
1995; ITU, 2013b). The strategy thus has the hallmark of a mandatory and non-
mandatory instrument – in the sense that when an operator opts for the pay option, it 
is mandatory to contribute to the fund and when it chooses to undertake the process 
alone, USF contribution is not compulsory (ITU, 2013b). Although one of the 
advantages of this strategy is that operators are more involved in the process of 
improving UAS as they can choose between two alternatives, but there is also the 
dangers of excluding certain locations, especially areas with low population density 
and poor supporting infrastructure such as roads and electricity (Dorward, 2013).  
It could then argue that if the choice of selecting locations is left exclusively 
to the discretion of MNO, achieving widespread access may not be possible, especially 
in a continent like Africa where there is a considerable level of lack of supporting 
infrastructure. To mitigate this in a country like Morocco where pay or play is 
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practiced, operators that are willing to undertake the process themselves are required 
to propose their projects and then submit proposals to CGSUT45 for review and 
approval (ANRT, 2017; Dorward, 2013). Morocco and Togo are two examples in 
Africa where the pay or play strategy is being practiced with a mixed outcome in terms 
of mobile penetration rate – 125% and 63 % for 2016 respectively (see Figure 4, 
Section 2.2). 
 Hatta (2008) and Jain and Das (2001) suggested the use of Licencing 
conditions as an alternative to USF. This involves a situation where issuance/renewal 
of licences and frequency spectrum are bundled with buildout requirements that 
encompass UAS (Hatta 2008; Jain & Das 2001). Indian and the Philippines are some 
of the countries where this strategy has been implemented as a given level of rural 
coverage are included as part of the licencing conditions of MNO. For example, 10% 
of unserved rural areas was imposed as part of licence conditions for operators in India 
while licences for viable and unviable areas were bundled for operators in the 
Philippines (Jain & Das, 2001). Brazil also adopted this strategy in 2007 by requiring 
the winners of 3G licences in profitable areas like Sao Paulo in the south to deploy 
network to unprofitable areas in the north, which led to coverage expansion for over 
5,000 communities without recourse to USF (GSMA, 2013b). Since these countries 
share similar socio-economic conditions with African countries as emerging markets, 
it may be worthwhile for governments in Africa to consider this strategy by informing 
MNO from the outset what level of investment they need to earmark for meeting UAS 
as part of their licensing conditions. This strategy falls under the purview of a 
mandatory instrument (Section 3.2.2). 
 Regardless of the strategy adopted, Xavier and Cave (1995) asserted that the 
viability of any choice must fulfill certain critical criteria - the process must be 
transparent and equitable in terms of including relevant stakeholders in the discussion 
process and the selection of projects. Policymakers should ensure that there is some 
level of flexibility in terms of reviewing the terms of reference as the situation may 
warrant. The issue of cost-effectiveness and project efficiency were also raised in 
                                                 
45 The Universal Telecommunications Services Management Committee (CGSUT) 
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terms of deploying the ‘right’ technology in accordance with the needs of users, the 
physical conditions of a given area and the stage of network development. 
3.3.3 Stages of universal access and services          
The study of Milne (1998) put forward a unified framework termed the ‘five stages of 
network development’, which a nation can implement to attain a desirable result for 
UAS. In the process, a nation may then identify with any of the stages to reduce the 
number of choices they need to consider. A brief overview of these five stages is 
contained in Table 5. 
Table 5 provides a simplified yet broad view on how a country could develop its 
telecommunications sector over a given period by going from the rudimentary stage 
of network establishment to a full modern telecommunications infrastructure stage 
where a plethora of services is readily available to the wider society. While the 
framework draws largely from the historical development of various developed 
economies, issues such as technological changes and liberalisation may enable some 
developing economies to combine or jump certain stages due to overlaps (Milne, 
1998). Although the proposed five stages have their differences, the following 
common elements cut across all the stages: 
 UAS is desirable for social and/or political reasons which include the notion of equity 
 The commercial viability of UAS is most likely not achievable 
 The definition of UAS will keep changing with the evolution of technology and the 
needs of the society 
 The issue of ‘basic’ telecommunications services encompasses a well-established and 
relatively cheap service to all people 
 Adequate QoS is defined and understood 
 Affordability of services for end-users if critical for adoption 
While the above elements may hold true, the issue of the non-commercial 
viability of UAS, in terms of a lack of profitability for operators, is debatable when 
one considers the impact of externality (Section 3.3.2). A case in hand is Burundi 
where almost 90% of its more than 10 million population reside in the rural areas 
(World Bank, 2017). If mobile coverage is extended to these people, the externality 
effect of those in rural areas communicating with their urban counterparts presents a 
situation where UAS can be profitable as operators will have access to a bigger market 
(ICTA, 2004). It then follows that a commercially ‘unviable’ area today may become 
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a commercially ‘viable’ area tomorrow as disadvantaged locations are connected and 
continue to interact with served areas (Blackman, 1995). Hence, UAS can transform 
from being an obligation to an opportunity in the long run. 
One of the implications of the stages outlined in Table 5 for Africa is that countries 
should structure their UAS policies according to the level of their socio-economic 
development and market liberalisation. For example, UAS that fits for say Kenya may 
not necessarily work for Burundi and vice-versa as these two countries are on different 
levels when it comes to indices such as GDP, teledensity, market constraints, and 
network developments. Instead of the practice of countries seemingly copying each 
other’s framework as indicated by Muriu (2002) in his analysis of Kenya and Ghana, 
policymakers should engage their respective industries and collectively decide a 
somewhat bespoke UAS strategy.  Although basic building blocks, for example, the 
five principles of UAS proposed earlier in Section 3.3.1, having an open discussion 
with various stakeholder and a transparent process for projects selection can be the 
same (Xavier & Cave, 1995). This can then lead to the establishment of a more cost-
effective and efficient UAS framework in line with the recommendations in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Five Stages of UAS Policy 
Characteristics Stage One Stage Two Stage Three Stage Four Stage Five 
 Network 
establishment  
Wide geographic reach Mass-market take-up Network completion Service to individuals 
Teledensity 0-5 per 100 1-20 per 100 15-40 per 100 35-60 per 100 >50 per 100 
GDP range Low income Lower middle income Upper middle income High income High income 
Business take-up 0-30% 20-80% 70-100% 100% 100% 
Household take-up 0-10% 5-30% 20-85% 75-100% 100% 
Typical phone company 
culture 
Entrepreneurial Administrative 
(government dept.) 
Operational  
(huge workforce) 
Commercial 
(privatised) 
Competitive 
Typical management 
preoccupations 
Large-scale capital 
investment in new 
technology 
Public service and 
technical network 
improvement 
Growing the network Growing call revenue 
(marketing) 
Profitability 
Main constraints to 
network expansion 
Investment funds, the 
right technology and 
skills 
Limited demand as a 
result of high tariff and 
the use of alternatives 
Manpower for plant 
installation in meeting 
mass demand (waiting 
list) 
Affordability of 
services to poorer 
households and cultural 
acceptability of 
telephony 
Market appeal 
Typical public policy 
(telecom) 
Investment incentives Government control 
(due to national security 
and economy) and 
geographical uniform 
charges 
Installation and rental 
charges kept low in 
order to stimulate 
service demand 
Network completion 
and cost-oriented tariffs 
Free and fair 
competition 
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Characteristics Stage One Stage Two Stage Three Stage Four Stage Five 
Universal service goal 
type 
Technological 
(acquisition of new 
technology) 
Geographical (maintain 
regional parity) 
Economical 
(stimulation of the 
economy) 
Social (achieve political 
cohesion) 
Libertarian (individual 
right to communicate) 
Examples of universal 
services goals 
Long distance 
services linking all 
major centres and 
public telephones 
were necessary 
The availability of 
telephone services in all 
population centres and 
widespread usage of 
telephony in business 
Widespread residential 
take-up of telephony 
and meeting all 
reasonable demands for 
telecoms 
Telephone affordability 
to all and adapting 
telephones to special 
needs 
Everyone can meet 
basic communication 
needs and public access 
to advanced services 
(esp. education and 
health) 
Typical market research 
focus 
Payphone rates and 
locations 
Main small business 
requirement 
Main household 
requirements 
Rural, disabled, and 
low-income needs 
Needs created by new 
services e.g. mobility 
internet 
Typical public policy 
measures for universal 
service 
License conditions on 
network rollout 
Profitable licences s.t. 
un-profitable obligations 
Control speed of price 
rebalancing 
Targeted subsidies Identify and meet non-
market demand 
Source: Modified from Milne (1998: 776).  
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3.3.4 The future of universal access and services  
According to Dordick (1990, p. 223) “Societies are not static, nor are the policies they 
deploy to meet their needs”. This is indicative of the central argument in Section 3.3.3 
that UAS policy should evolve along with socio-economic and technological 
development. Similarly, Xavier (1997) suggests that factors such as competition, 
technological convergence, and advancement in networks would continue to influence 
the extent and nature of UAS (Xavier, 1997). Hence, UAS scholars have called for a 
re-think of the concept in order to continuously reflect the changes that are sweeping 
through the information society (Feijoo & Milne 2008; Hatta 2008; Xavier 2008). 
Xavier (2008) examined the issue of advancement in technology, which he said is 
creating a convergence of various activities leading to a situation where a single 
platform can now provide voice, data and other services. This underlines the argument 
in Section 2.2 that the technological developments such as those offered by mobile 
have enabled countries across Africa to leapfrog years of neglect by state monopolies 
and their fixed network (Economist, 2008; World Bank, 2017).  Xavier (2008) then 
argued for the scope of UAS to be extended beyond the basic service of voice 
penetration to other emerging services. 
 Xavier (2008) draws four conclusions. Firstly, that the traditional scope of 
UAS should not be downgraded or eroded as the deployment of IP-enabled networks 
may facilitate coverage faster in some areas than others. This is necessary in order not 
to create a new digital divide and deny people the basic access being promoted by 
UAS. Secondly, the need for countries to address the issue of what support is required 
to encourage more broadband access since this is a catalyst to accessing services in an 
emerging convergence environment. Each country needs to consider this in their own 
context since they all have different capacity, political and social factors. Thirdly, end-
users should be empowered with open-access conditions to switch between operators 
of their choice. Lastly, as IP-enabled networks continue to spread, measures should be 
taken by authorities and all concerned to ensure affordability of such services to end-
users as well as providing special assistance to disabled and other marginalised people 
in the society in accessing relevant telecommunication services. 
 Drawing on the analysis recounted so far, telecommunications development in 
African countries may not be expected to be at par with the developed economies 
given their late liberalisation, and the various stages of network development outlined 
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in Table 5. However, one could argue that as policymakers and other key actors across 
Africa considers the future of UAS, there is need for such deliberation to encompass 
‘basic’ telecommunication services that include voice and data irrespective of any 
barrier as access to such services is fast becoming a critical socio-economic enabler 
for many across Africa (Collett, 2016; Donner, 2004; Molony, 2006). 
3.4 Universal service funds in Africa 
Governments around the world implement UAS through different strategies (Thai & 
Falch, 2017) and Section 3.3 highlighted that over 30 African countries have 
established USF as their UAS strategy. This section will thus investigate into USF by 
looking at its origin and objective, theoretical and practical definitions with respect to 
Africa, explore how USF is generated, administered and distributed. This section will 
also highlight the current state of USF in Africa by drawing on country examples from 
across Africa as well as other parts of the world including Latin America where USF 
originated from for the purpose of comparison. 
3.4.1 Origin, objective and definition of USF 
USF was first established in Latin America in the mid-1990s (Hudson, 2010). Contrary 
to Hatta (2008) who argued that market intervention through UAS is unnecessary since 
competition will address market inefficiencies, USF was established in recognition of 
the fact that the market has failed to meet the telecommunication needs of the wider 
society (Msimang, 2012; Oestmann & Dymond, 2008). This is particularly relevant 
for those at the margins whose participation in the information society may be 
hampered by barriers such as geographical location and income level as examined in 
Section 2.4. For example, as with other Latin American countries, market 
liberalisation increased the levels of mobile penetration in Colombia between 1995 
and 2004, but suburban and rural areas were marginalised (Stern & Townsend, 2006). 
This prompted the establishment of the first USF in Colombia in 1994 to subsidise the 
expansion of telecommunications to disadvantaged areas (Hudson, 2010). USF in 
Colombia collected over $400 million via a 5% levy and disbursed over $160 million 
between 1994 to 2006, installing rural payphones in 9000 communities with over 5 
million people (Hudson, 2010; Stern & Townsend, 2006). 
 A synthesis of various studies on USF (for example, GSMA, 2014; ITU, 
2013b; Sepulveda, 2010; Stern & Townsend, 2006) defines USF as a fund established 
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by policymakers to provide financial subsidy to MNO in order to facilitate the 
deployment of networks in economically unattractive areas with the intention of 
achieving UAS. The definitions from practice are also similar. For example, South 
Africa, which was the first country to establish USF in Africa, defined USF as a fund 
created to finance projects and programmes that facilitate UAS to ‘ICTs’ for everyone 
in South Africa (Hudson, 2010; USAASA, 2017). Tanzania described USF as a UAS 
mechanism created to ensure the availability of ‘communication services’ in 
disadvantaged areas for the purpose of promoting socio-economic development 
(UCSAF, 2014). Elsewhere in Egypt, USF is viewed as a funding mechanism created 
to ease the provision of affordable ‘basic’ telecommunication services for all citizens, 
particularly those in ‘economically non-feasible’ regions of the country (MCIT, 2017). 
 Drawing on the views of both practitioners and studies (such as GSMA, 2014; 
ITU, 2013b; Sepulveda, 2010; Stern & Townsend, 2006 ), it came to the fore that the 
main objective for establishing USF in Africa (in broad terms) is to compensate MNO 
and other service providers for extending coverage to disadvantaged areas. While the 
definition and objective of USF appear to be broadly the same between countries, there 
are differences when it comes to how USF is established, its legal framework, funding, 
administration and disbursement. These issues are addressed in the following sections. 
3.4.2 Establishment of USF 
As with other development programmes, the establishment of USF usually begins with 
political discussions at the national level through either cabinet and legislative debates 
or a unilateral decision under a non-democratic system of government (Dorward, 
2013). This results in passing of parliamentary law or decree that creates USF and 
drive the legal and regulatory framework for its implementation (ICTA, 2004; 
Oestmann & Dymond, 2008). Such process is usually significant in light of giving 
USF the authority and credibility that stems from national leadership to ensure an 
effective policy implementation (ICTA, 2004). While the majority of countries from 
other parts of the world have established USF through an act of parliament – for 
example, Telecommunications Act (amended) of 1997 in the USA and the Federal 
Telecommunications Law of 1995 for Mexico, countries in Africa have created USF 
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through parliamentary laws and decrees. For example, USF in South Africa46 was 
created under the Electronic Communications Act of 2005 with the mandate to offer 
financial subsidies to: 
 Assist ‘needy’ people with the cost of providing and using broadcasting and 
electronic communications services; 
 Finance the construction and expansion of electronic communications 
network in under-serviced areas; 
 Procure broadcasting and electronic communication network services and 
access for educational institutions; and 
 Offer training and payment of allowances for people working where access to 
electronic communications network can be obtained (USAASA, 2017). 
In contrast, USF in Algeria47 was established by Decree Number 03-232 and amended 
by Law 55-01 of 2004 with the following mandates: 
 The provision of ‘adequate’ telephone services to remote and low-income 
locations; 
 The provision of public payphones 
 The provision of access to public and free emergency call and information 
directory 
 The scope was widened in 2009 to include access to the Internet and ‘new’ 
technologies like broadband (APRT, 2003; Dorward, 2013). 
The majority of USF in Africa become operative several years after their establishment 
while some remaining inactive but continues to receive funds. For example, Ivory 
Coast established USF in 1998 but began operation in 2006 while DR Congo created 
USF in 2002 but remains inactive until now even when it had over $63 million in 2008 
(ITU, 2013b; Sepulveda, 2010). While the delay in operation stems from the time lag 
between fund collection, project identification and disbursement, inactive funds are 
caused by factors such as a lack of political will from government to utilise the funds 
and a lack of technical skills to deploy USF (see Section 5.2). Since 
telecommunication services are moving targets driven by technological changes, the 
                                                 
46 Universal Service and Access Fund (USAF) 
47 Universal Telecommunication Service Fund (FSUT) 
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underlying legal and regulatory framework of USF should also be flexible to meet the 
changing needs of the society (Dorward, 2013; ITU; 2013b). While countries like 
Ghana and Rwanda reflect examples in Africa where USF framework have been 
transformative in terms of broadening its scope to support rural broadband and one 
laptop per child initiative, others like Cameroon and Gabon appears to be stagnant 
with the provision of fixed line rooted in their frameworks even when mobile has 
become the default means of communication in Africa (Arakpogun, Wanjiru, & 
Whalley, 2017; Curwen & Whalley, 2018; GSMA, 2013a). 
3.4.3 Funding USF 
Although the sources of funding USF varies between countries, levies collected as a 
percentage of operator revenues appear to be more popular. Such levies range from 
0.04% in Estonia to 3% in Ukraine, 1% in Ecuador to 5% in Columbia, and 0.75% in 
Indonesia to 6% in Malaysia (Hudson, 2010; Intelecon, 2009; OECD, 2014). These 
levies are usually collected from both fixed and mobile operators with a few 
exceptions like Peru where cable TV providers are required to contribute the 1% USF 
levy and Nepal where ISPs also contribute 2% along with other fixed and mobile 
operators (Intelecon, 2009). Apart from operator levies, countries such as Chile, 
Guatemala and Paraguay fund USF through government budgets and the World Bank 
also support USF in countries like Chile and Mongolia (Hudson, 2010; Intelecon, 
2009). Hudson (2010) refers to such governments and international contributions as 
seed funding48. On a different note, USF is funded in Jamaica via levies on incoming 
international traffic with $0.02 on mobile termination and $0.03 on fixed termination 
(Intelecon, 2009). 
 When it comes to Africa, USF is also largely funded through levies, albeit 
contributed by MNO as a percentage of their annual revenues. For example, USF is 
funded via a 1% MNO levy in Ghana and, 2% in Rwanda and Zimbabwe (GIFEC, 
2013; Intelecon, 2009; POTRAZ, 2015). Arakpogun, Wanjiru, & Whalley (2017) 
found that over 30 countries across Africa fund USF through varying degrees of levies 
collected from MNO as indicated in Figure 5. 
                                                 
48 The mechanism of contributing to UAS in a liberalised market, without direct involvement in the 
ownership or management of targeted projects.  
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Figure 5 indicates that USF levy varies across Africa. While Mauritius and 
Tunisia are highest with 5%, Swaziland has the lowest rate at 0.1%. Other countries 
are somewhere between 0.2% in South Africa, 0.5% in Kenya and 1% in Nigeria. 
Although Morocco and Togo fund USF through a 2% USF level, the pay or play 
strategy highlighted in Section 3.3.2 is also operational. For example, in Morocco, an 
MNO can contribute to UAS in two ways: either by paying 2% USF levy or by 
constructing networks in deprived areas identified by the CGSUT49 (ANRT, 2017). 
Apart from levies, USF is also funded through parliamentary allocations and grants 
from the World Bank in certain countries such as Burkina Faso, Ghana, Madagascar, 
Tanzania and Uganda. Due to the lack of financial reporting associated with most USF, 
the actual amounts of these contributions are not publicly available, except for 
Uganda, where about $15.1 million funding has been received from the World Bank 
from 2002-2014 (UCC, 2015). IFC (2016) also highlighted that from 2007-2015, the 
World Bank provided financial and technical assistance to USF projects in 
Madagascar across 660 rural communities. 
To determine the ‘sufficient’ amount of levy that will match actual project 
funding, it is good practice to conduct market research and determine what project 
needs to be funded, the scale of the project and the total estimated costs (ICTA, 2004; 
Stern & Townsend, 2006). A USF levy is then set according to such analysis, however, 
studies (for example, GSMA, 2013b; ICTA, 2004; Stern & Townsend, 2006) have 
found that countries across Africa tend to fix arbitrary USF levies with the effect that 
more funds are collected with fewer projects to execute while some countries are 
unable to quickly identify projects for funds collected. This has led to the accumulation 
of idle funds, which is over $400 million across 20 African countries. It should be 
stated here that idle funds are not peculiar to African countries alone as this is also 
evident in other parts of the world, for example, USF in Brazil has over $4.5 billion 
while India has $3.9 billion (GSMA, 2013b; ITU, 2013b).  
 
                                                 
49 Universal Service Telecommunications Management Committee 
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Figure 5: USF levies across 34 African countries in 2016 
 
Source: Arakpogun, Wanjiru, and Whalley (2017, p.4) 
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3.4.4 Administration and disbursement of USF               
The administration of USF in various countries can be broadly classified into three 
categories following respective underlying legal and regulatory frameworks. For 
example, while countries like India, Peru and Vietnam administer USF through their 
ICT ministries, Chile, Romania and Saudi Arabia administer USF through their sector 
regulators, and others like Pakistan and the USA have established separate 
independent agencies to manage USF (Intelecon, 2009; Thai, Falch, & Williams, 
2018; USAC, 2018). Regardless of the method of administration, an interesting issue 
among countries is the level of ‘independence’ accorded to various administrators – 
where independence means the level of autonomy an administrator has over USF 
without the encumbrance of government (Dorward, 2013; ICTA, 2004). Therefore, 
autonomy is a key driver of how dependent or independent the management of a fund 
is (Hudson, 210).   
It is generally believed that fund administrators in countries with independent 
regulators and agencies tend to have more autonomy with less government 
interference and, by extension, more transparency and accountability relative to USF 
managed by government ministries (Intelecon, 2009; Hudson, 2010). However, there 
is evidence to suggest that this may not always be the case as government interference 
could be a threat to USF regardless of how it is administered. For example, although 
USF in Pakistan is an independent agency headed by a chief executive officer (CEO) 
and an independent board with private and public representation, the Prime Minister 
took over the control of the fund following the dismissal of the CEO in 2013 (GSMA, 
2013b; ITU, 2013b; Khan & Butt, 2011). The Minister of Finance in Indonesia has 
also interfered in USF in the country by insisting on reallocating the funds to another 
purpose rather than providing subsidies for UAS (GSMA, 2013b). 
      USF across Africa are either administered ‘independently’ by a separate 
entity or dependently by a department situated within the relevant ministry or sector 
regulator. For example, USF in Ghana, which was created in 2008 under the Electronic 
Communications Act 775, is administered independently by GIFEC50 with Abraham 
Kofi Asante currently acting as its administrator (GIFEC, 2017; ITU, 2013b). The 
                                                 
50 Ghana Investment Fund for Electronic Communications (GIFEC) 
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responsibilities of GIFEC include the design, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of USF in line with the Electronic Communications Act 775 of facilitating 
UAS to unserved and underserved communities (GIFEC, 2017). On the other hand, 
USF in Morocco, established by the Finance Act of 2005, is administered by a 
management group called CGSUT51, which is appointed by the government and 
situated within the sector regulator (ANRT, 2017). Since Morocco practices the pay 
or play strategy, MNO who want to serve a disadvantaged area without contributing 
to USF are required to propose their projects and then submit proposals to CGSUT for 
review and approval (ANRT, 2017; Dorward, 2013). CGSUT is also responsible for 
disbursing USF among MNO who choose the pay option and contribute the 2% USF 
levy. 
This leads to the issues of project identification and disbursement of USF. It is 
apparent from Stern and Townsend (2006) who looked at USF in early adopting 
countries in Latin America that projects can both be identified and proposed by 
policymakers or by operators and local communities. While the policymakers led 
initiative is termed a ‘top-down’ approach, the community and operator-led initiative 
are called a ‘bottom-up’ approach since such projects originate from the affected 
communities and operators who usually have better market information than 
policymakers. While countries like Colombia, Bolivia and Peru have adopted the top-
down approach, Brazil and Chile have used the bottom-up approach to identify USF 
projects (Stern & Townsend, 2006). Stern and Townsend found that, although projects 
executed with the bottom-up approach appear more successful, some top-down 
projects originated by policymakers in Colombia and Peru were also successful. They 
concluded that while the top-down approach is more suitable for the execution of 
large-scale projects, a key success factor of the bottom-up approach is the active 
involvement of stakeholders at the local level right through the planning and execution 
stages.  
Having said that, regardless of the approach a country adopts, USF money is 
generally disbursed through a competitive bidding process called the ‘least subsidy 
auction’ – where the operator with the least subsidy request wins the tender to execute 
UAS projects (Alleman, Rappoport, & Banerjee, 2010; ICTA, 2004). The winner of 
                                                 
51 The Universal Telecommunications Services Management Committee (CGSUT) 
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the bid is also expected to comply with conditions such as rollout dates and specific 
QoS upon which the regulator sets out to monitor the project for accountability and 
compliance (Hudson, 2010).  
Countries across Africa generally follow the top-down approach where USF 
administrators are largely responsible for identifying the locations where funds are to 
be deployed. For example, the USF advisory group, overseen by the USF 
administrator, is responsible for originating UAS projects in Mauritius, following 
which a bidding process is conducted with the award to provide UAS given to the 
MNO with the least subsidy request (ICTA, 2004). The winner of the bid is also 
expected to comply with seven criteria including costs plan, QoS, quantity of service 
and implementation plan (ICTA, 2004). Although countries like Nigeria have adopted 
both the bottom-up and top-down approaches, a lack of interest from and engagement 
with affected communities mean that policymakers are largely responsible for 
initiating USF projects (Abdullahi, 2012; Connect Africa, 2010). 
Certain countries such as, for example, Ghana and Rwanda also execute UAS 
projects by outsourcing them to niche providers called ‘specialised access providers’ 
(Balancing Act, 2014). The EU contracted one of such providers, Africa Mobile 
Networks, to provide rural connectivity for about 4 million people who have never 
had access to telecommunications in parts of Cameroon and DRC for a contract sum 
of about $26.7 million (Telecompaper, 2017a). The reason for using such niche 
providers appears to be borne out of their ability to deploy low-cost innovative 
solutions for mobile telecommunications. For example, constructing solar-enabled 
towers to address the prevalent electricity problem and using multiple technologies 
such as satellite, VoIP and Wi-Fi (Balancing Act, 2014). 
3.4.5 Summary of USF performance in Africa 
From its inception in South Africa in 1998 until recently in 2015 and 2017 when USF 
began to take shape in Kenya and Gabon respectively, only a handful of studies (for 
example, Dorward, 2013; GSMA, 2013b; ITU, 2013b; Sepulveda, 2010) have 
investigated into how these funds are performing across Africa. The central argument 
that echoed from these studies is that the implementation of USF across Africa is 
fraught with difficulties and, as such, the performance of various funds has been 
grossly inadequate - in terms of the failure of USF to close the digital divide in Africa. 
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For example, after surveying 22 funds in Africa, Dorward (2013) highlighted how 
poorly conceived underlying legal and policy framework impinges on the ability of 
USF to be transformative in terms of widening its scope to reflect technological and 
service changes. Dorward argued that the review process of changing the focus of USF 
is either too slow or not happening at all, hence, idle funds cannot be disbursed for 
emerging technology like broadband as this was not their original mandate. 
 With regards to idle funds, GSMA (2013b) and ITU (2013b) voiced their 
disquiet on the growing levels of unspent USF across Africa52. Although there is a 
general lack of public disclosure and financial probity when it comes to accounting 
for money collected and disbursed in Africa, it is estimated that from $575 million 
collected at the end of 2011, only $175 million was disbursed across Africa (ITU, 
2013b). Consequently, over 12 funds in Africa, including Burkina Faso and Mali, are 
non-operational with money lying idle while policymakers continue to collect levies 
(GSMA, 2013b; ITU, 2013b). A recent estimation shows that there is about $408 
million unspent money across 37 countries, including $10 million in South Africa 
(iAfrikan, 2018; Thakur & Potter, 2018). It is argued that these unspent USF could be 
used to narrow the digital divide in Africa through, for example, bringing 
“…approximately 6 million women online, or… provide digital skills training to 
nearly 16 million women and girls…” (Thakur & Potter, 2018, p. 3). 
The lack of public disclose on the financial affairs and overall operation of 
USF in most countries highlights the issue of a lack of transparency with some 
exceptions like Uganda – since its inception in 2001/2002 until the end of 2014/2015, 
RCDF53 of Uganda has collected over $38 million and disbursed around $37.8 million 
(UCC, 2015). A lack of transparency makes USF susceptible to corruption and 
mismanagement, for example, the case of South Africa where the USF CEO and board 
members were suspended in 2011 due to allegations of corruption (ITU, 2013b). The 
wider impact of idle funds and corruption is that, scarce resources that could have been 
used to close the digital divide are either redundant or diverted for personal use while 
disadvantaged areas lag behind (Dorward, 2013). 
                                                 
52 See Section 5.2.5 for more insight on idle funds in Africa. 
53 Rural Communications Development Fund 
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 Another common finding shared by the aforementioned studies (for example, 
Dorward, 2013; GSMA, 2013b; ITU, 2013b) is the issue of a lack of regulatory 
independence stemming from political interference from governments and politicians 
who tend to subvert the operation of USF for their interests. A case in hand is South 
Africa where a former executive manager of programmes at USAASA54 alleged that 
he was dismissed because he refused to award a USF contract of 500 million ZAR 
following a directive from the ruling African National Congress (Bailey, 2014; van 
Zyl, 2014). Such action tends to undermine the authority of the regulator and subject 
USF to bureaucratic inefficiency as relevant staff within the regulator are hindered 
from implementing USF objectively (Hudson, 2010). 
 Overall, the implementation of USF in Africa has produced mixed results with 
a recent study (Arakpogun, Wanjiru, & Whalley, 2017) indicating that more than 20 
USF across Africa have largely failed to meet the objective of closing the digital divide 
in respective countries. The study carried out an assessment of 34 USF using a 
framework derived from Jain and Raghuram (2009) and ITI (2013), and found that 
issues like poor policy formulation, lack of accountability and political interference all 
interact to impinge on the implementation of USF and the effort of various countries 
to close their digital divides. See Appendix A for a summary of the performance of 
various USF in Africa. While the result of the analysis indicates that majority of USF 
across Africa are inactive, some active and better performing funds are highlighted in 
Appendix B with Uganda being the most exemplary. For example, following the 
establishment of RCDF in 2003 under the Communications Instrument of 2002, 
around $38 million was collected from 2001 to 2015 while $37.6 million was 
disbursed for the deployment of over 7000 projects, including 24000 public 
payphones, over 600 broadband sites and 880 GSM towers (UCC, 2015). Although 
there is general lack of public financial records on USF in Africa, Uganda also appears 
to be an exception as there is a great degree of public financial record of RCDF 
activities right from the inception of the fund in 2001 to 2015 detailing not only the 
amount collected and disbursed, but also executed and future projects.  
                                                 
54 The Universal Service and Access Agency of South Africa 
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3.5 Conceptual framework    
As stated in Chapter 1, the conceptual framework for this study is predicated upon the 
interaction of market liberalisation, market failure and UAS policy. The investigation 
of market liberalisation in Chapter 2 shows that competition, driven by the spread of 
FDI, has transformed the telecommunications sector in Africa and, increased mobile 
penetration and adoption from 4% in 1999 to around 50% in 2016 (ITU, 1999; GSMA, 
2017b). While such evidence highlights the unprecedented impact of liberalisation and 
competition on the development of the sector, it also indicates that the market has 
failed to address the digital divide in Africa as over half of the one billion odd people 
in the continent lack access to mobile telecommunications (Collins, 2015; GSMA, 
2016b; Manson, 2013). This shifted the discussion to market failure where Chapter 3 
began by exploring the theory of market failure with the aim of explaining why 
markets fail and the various regulatory instruments that governments can deploy to 
mitigate its impact. It is within this context that UAS policy has emerged as a policy 
tool which governments across the world deploy (using various strategies) to address 
the market failure of uneven access to telecommunications. Figure 6 outlines a 
summary of the interaction between these three aspects with the numbers in brackets 
signposting the flow of the process. 
 As with any given industry, sector reforms and policy formulation are 
somewhat aligned with the political perspective of a given country and this may vary 
depending on the system of government and a given political party (Whitfield et al., 
2015). Therefore, the geopolitical situation of a given country tends to have an 
overarching effect on the state of the economy and its industries. This is why the 
conceptual framework for this study sets out with geopolitical context as indicated 
Figure 6. According to White et al. (2014), a volatile geopolitical environment poses 
a great deal of insecurity and risk to investors. This will arguably have a wider 
implication on the institutional endowment and political stability, which when lacking 
can undermine the security of FDI and the country as a whole (Mshelia & Anchor, 
2018). Investors are particularly wary of this as some governments may behave 
opportunistically by altering the rules of the engagement to take advantage of those 
who have made fixed investments like that of telecommunications (Andonova, 2006; 
Berg & Hamilton, 2002). Therefore, the perception of political risk associated with a 
given country can affect the FDI flows, which, in turn, influence the overall business 
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operation and performance (Dupasquier & Osakwe, 2006; Osabutey & Okoro, 2015; 
UNCTAD, 2018). Geopolitics is thus instrumental to the liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector and spread of FDI across Africa following the decision of 
various governments to embrace reforms and implement the WTO Basic 
Telecommunications Agreement (Ojo, 2016; WTO, 1997). 
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 Figure 6: Conceptual framework  
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The telecommunications sector reforms across Africa coincided with the 
periods when countries like Nigeria and Kenya began to move towards democracy 
(Muriu, 2002; Whitfield et al., 2015). For example, after three decades of the military 
regime, Nigeria became a democracy in 1999 and in 2001, the telecommunications 
sector was opened up through the introduction of liberalisation that ended the 
monopoly of the inefficient fixed-incumbent, NITEL (Ndukwe, 2005; Okonjo-Iweala, 
2012). Following such political decision, three GSM licences were subsequently 
issued at a cost of $285 million each with the first two going to MTN and Econet while 
Globacom, an indigenous MNO, was awarded the third licence (Onyeajuwa, 2017; 
Osabutey & Okoro, 2015). Although telecommunications markets across Africa are 
generally perceived to have weak political and institutional reforms compared to 
advance markets in Europe and North America, politics played a key role in the 
liberalisation of the market at the turn of the millennium (Baek & Qian, 2011; 
Onyeajuwa, 2017; van-Huyssteen, 2012). 
  With market liberalisation came a shift in the role of governments from 
owning and operating networks to policy formulation and regulation (Ndukwe, 2005; 
Williams & Kwofie, 2014). Governments now regulate the industry through 
independent and dependent agencies whose responsibilities include the issuance of 
licences to MNO (Curwen & Whalley, 2018; Sutherland, 2014). Figure 6 indicates 
that licences are issued with certain conditions rooted in the regulatory frameworks. 
From the country analysis conducted for this study, it appears that the regulatory 
frameworks of early liberalising countries tend to influence that of late adopters. This 
was highlighted in Muriu (2002) where Kenya seems to have adopted a similar 
regulation to Ghana and Uganda during its earlier stage of liberalisation. Although 
recent evidence suggests that this has changed over time following various regulatory 
reforms carried out by Communications Authority of Kenya (CA, 2015). 
 Having said that, Figure 6 highlights that the licensing conditions across 
various countries affect the FDI flows strategy of MNO as they spread their footprint 
across Africa. This is evident in certain markets where a given stake of ownership is 
required to be held by local investors. Chapter 2 indicated that such licencing 
conditions tend to influence the FDI strategy adopted by MNO as they cannot own a 
network except they enter into some form of collaboration with local partners via JV 
and M&A. For example, the minimum ownership stake for local investors is set at 
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20% in Kenya, the indigenisation law in Zimbabwe mandates foreign MNO to provide 
majority shares to local investors while ownership restrictions do not exist in countries 
like Nigeria and Rwanda (Baily & Hoskins, 2015). In any case, licensing conditions 
tend to influence the FDI strategy and internationalisation of MNO as shown in Figure 
6 with the implication that countries with ownership restrictions may not be too 
attractive to big players that desire 100% ownership. Although collaborative FDI 
strategies like JV and M&A offer MNO with the opportunity to share risk and reduce 
the transaction costs associated with coverage expansion as well as the liability of 
foreignness (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009), this also means sharing ROI, which some big 
MNO may not want to do as indicated in Section 2.3. 
 Fast forward to the turn of the millennium, competition has transformed 
African telecommunications market into a vibrant and dynamic sector with over 186 
MNO operating across the continent at the end of 2016, improving mobile coverage 
and subscribers than ever before. Nonetheless, Chapter 2 highlighted that mobile 
coverage varies between countries and regions as the market has failed to provide 
widespread access to telecommunications in disadvantaged areas compared to urban 
locations. Although the digital divide of uneven mobile coverage can be observed 
across Africa as illustrated in Figure 4 in Section 2.2, Eastern Africa appears to be 
disproportionate compared to other regions within Africa. 
The effort of governments to mitigate market failure and close the digital 
divide of uneven mobile coverage led to UAS as shown in Figure 6. Chapter 3 
analysed UAS and found that governments across Africa largely favour the use of USF 
as a regulatory instrument to tackle digital divide. However, since the implementation 
of USF is fraught with various difficulties, a digital divide persists as an estimated 
‘500’ million people still lack access to mobile coverage across Africa (Collins, 2015; 
Dorward, 2013; GSMA, 2016b; 2017b; ITU, 2013b; Manson, 2013). This led to the 
two research questions raised in Chapter 1, one that this study is poised to address and 
develop a model for closing the digital divide that persists across Africa.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The analysis in Chapter 2 has shown that while market liberalisation and competition 
have transformed the telecommunications sector in Africa providing access to mobile 
telephony than ever before, pockets of digital divide persist between countries and 
regions as evident in the mobile penetration rates. Chapter 3 then investigated further 
and highlighted that governments across Africa have attempted to close the digital 
divide by deploying USF as their preferred UAS strategy. However, evidence from 
the handful of studies (for example,  Dorward, 2013; Gillwald, 2005b; GSMA, 2013b; 
ITU, 2013b; Sepulveda, 2010) that have explored the performance of USF in Africa 
highlight mixed but largely poor results, with less than ten countries including Ghana, 
Nigeria and Uganda having active and operating funds. In contrast, over 20 USF in 
Africa are underperforming due to a plethora of difficulties arising from the 
implementation of USF. As such, the performance of USF across Africa in terms of 
narrowing the digital divide is largely disappointing following the estimation that 
nearly half of the 1.2 billion odd people in the continent still lack a mobile subscription 
(Collins, 2015; GSMA, 2016b; Manson, 2013). This point to a research gap that both 
the market and UAS policy have failed to closed the digital divide in Africa, prompting 
two critical questions: 
RQ1 - with the introduction of market liberalisation and the establishment of UAS 
strategy like USF, why does the digital divide of uneven mobile coverage persists 
areas across Africa? 
RQ2 - how can the digital divide of uneven mobile coverage be mitigated? 
In answering a research question, a particular methodology is adopted which 
should ‘fit’ the field of enquiry – where fit refers to the situation where there is 
coherence between literature review,  research question and research design 
(Edmondson & McManus, 2007). This thesis adopts a multiple case study approach 
in answering the research questions by drawing data from multiple sources including 
primary data via 28 semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders with 
knowledge and experience across Africa, and other parts of the world. This chapter 
aims to provide insight into this methodological approach, what shaped the choices 
that were made in the process, and how data was collected and analysed. In the end, 
this chapter will show the research design for this study and argue that the nature of 
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the research problem the study is trying to address informed the choice of methodology 
(Patton, 1990; Creswell, 2009). 
4.2 Ontology and Epistemology 
The philosophical viewpoint of a researcher stems from two broad perspectives – 
ontology and epistemology, which, in turn, shapes the overall research design and 
situate a research within a given paradigm (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Saunders & 
Townsend, 2016). While ontology and epistemology focus on the nature and 
development of knowledge, the former borders on ‘what’ is the nature of knowledge 
and if such knowledge is the outcome of an objective construct or the human mind 
(Holden & Lynch, 2004; Walsham, 1995). This argument underlines the existence of 
two ontological worldviews – objective in terms of the construct of knowledge being 
external to social actors and subjective where knowledge is built on the perception and 
action of social actors (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2012; Holden & Lynch, 
2004).  
Conversely, epistemology centres on the best ways of enquiring about the 
nature knowledge (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2012). In simple terms, 
ontology may ask ‘what’ knowledge is while epistemology may ask ‘how’ to 
construct knowledge (Crotty, 1998; Walsham, 1995). There are also two 
epistemological worldviews – positivism in terms of objectively constructing 
knowledge without the influence of the researcher and social constructionism where 
knowledge comes into existence as the research relates and interact with realities 
(Crotty 1998; Pilot & Beck, 2010; Williamson 2006). 
 This study adopts a subjective ontological approach and argues that the result 
of this study draws from the viewpoint of different stakeholders such as policymakers, 
MNO and civil society. Since their interests are different, their views on the digital 
divide and the overall telecommunications sector in Africa would also differ. Thus, 
the outcome of this study is socially constructed through diverse opinions (Crotty, 
1998; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Holden & Lynch, 2004). Furthermore, since this 
research centres on understanding a social problem associated with fostering an all-
inclusive digital society through the expansion of mobile coverage by engaging 
different stakeholders in the industry, epistemology from the viewpoint of social 
constructionism fits more with the research as the interaction with relevant 
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stakeholders will be the best means of answering the research questions. This 
underlines the fact that the nature of the research problems of this study informed the 
choice of the research paradigm and approach (Creswell, 2009; Hughes & Sharrock, 
1997; Patton, 1990). 
4.3 Inductive reasoning and qualitative research 
Since the epistemological stance of this study is based on social constructionism, an 
inductive approach is adopted. Unlike the top-down logic followed in studies related 
to a deductive approach where applicable theories are tested for acceptance or 
rejection using quantitative data, this study adopts a bottom-up approach associated 
with inductive reasoning where insights are developed using qualitative data (Crotty 
1998; Hyde 2000; Ritchie et al. 2013). There are various definitions in literature when 
it comes to the meaning of qualitative research (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
However, this study adopts that of Sinkovics and Alfoldi (2012: 188), which states 
that a qualitative research is “…a set of interpretive activities that seek to understand 
the situated meaning behind actions and behaviours, and rely heavily on the 
researcher as a unique interpreter of the data.” This definition is adopted as it aligns 
more with the subjectivism research philosophy guiding this study.  
 In a qualitative study, the goal of the researcher is to develop and generate 
insights not to arrive at the frequency with which a phenomenon is most likely to 
happen in a given situation (Hyde, 2000). This can be achieved by providing the 
accounts of participants and drawing conclusions (Hyde, 2000; Williamson, 2006). 
This will allow the research to gain an in-depth knowledge in the field of inquiry, as 
data collection is not strictly limited to predetermined sets of ideas (Hyde, 2000). 
Bearing in mind that the data gathered in this case are largely or partly associated with 
the perspective and experience of participants, this raises the issue of interpretation as 
the researcher tries to make sense of the data (Williamson, 2006; Stake, 2010). This 
brings to the fore that the theoretical perspective of interpretivism will be used in 
analysing and making sense of the data gathered from the participants in this study 
(Crotty, 1998). 
Since participants are largely involved in the research process of an 
interpretivist research, there is the emergence of the researcher and the participants as 
co-constructing partners in generating meanings (Crotty, 1998; Williamson, 2006). 
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This is one of the anticipated outcomes of this study as the researcher seeks to produce 
co-constructed insights by drawing on the views of various stakeholders with hands-
on experience and key roles in the sector to develop a model for closing the digital 
divide in Africa. One of the weaknesses associated with qualitative research is that it 
may lead to misunderstanding and bias, as the researcher tries to make meaning of the 
data gathered (Stake, 2010). A qualitative researcher should thus be aware of such 
limitation and implement routine triangulations by comparing interpreted data with 
other sources (Stake, 2010; Hines, 2016). Triangulation was carried out in the current 
study as the interpretation of primary data (interviews) were constantly checked 
against other secondary sources such as ITU and GSMA databases, previous studies, 
country analysis and various online articles. 
4.4 Case study methodology 
A methodology, also known as a research strategy, is a plan of action that underlines 
the choice and method taken by a researcher to answer a given research question 
(Crotty, 1998; Bryman & Bell, 2007). Although various methodologies are discussed 
in the literature, for example, ethnography, phenomenology and grounded theory, this 
study adopts a case study (Charmaz, 2001; 2006; Crotty, 1998). This choice stems 
from the interpretivism paradigm and qualitative research approach adopted in this 
study (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2002; 2012; Hyde, 2000). Furthermore, 
case studies are often adopted in studies such as this given its usefulness in addressing 
wide-ranging developmental issues relating to telecommunications, including policies 
and refining regulatory interventions (Jagun, Heeks, & Whalley, 2008; Menon, 2016; 
Sutherland, 2015; 2016; Xia, 2016a; 2016b). A case study research is also suitable for 
addressing research problems with ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions (Yin, 2014) as reflected 
in RQ1 and RQ2. This further justifies that the nature of the research problem for this 
study informed the choice of the methodology adopted (Creswell, 2009). 
 The use of case study as a research methodology has been explored by various 
scholars (for example, Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2012; Eisenhahardt, 1989; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006; George and Bennet, 2005; Hines, 2016; Johansson, 2003; Siggelkow, 
2007; Stake, 1995; 1998; 2006; Yin, 2009; 2014). A case study takes an in-depth look 
at a given phenomenon over a period (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2012). 
Johansson (2003:2) synthesised the definition of scholars such as Robert Yin and 
Robert Stake thus: “The case study should have a ‘case’ which is the object of study. 
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The ‘case’ should be a complex functioning unit, investigated in its natural context 
with a multitude of methods, and be contemporary”. These definitions (by Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2012 and Johansson, 2003) are reflective of this study – 
the country analysis and examples have enabled the researcher to gain an in-depth 
knowledge of the state of the wider telecommunications sector in Eastern Africa and 
more broadly on other parts of the continent. Additionally, UAS became a strategy for 
addressing digital divide (phenomena) in Africa (context) post-liberalisation in 
1999/2000 (time), and data has been gathered from various sources (multitude of 
methods) in this study. 
4.4.1 Strengths and weaknesses of case study 
 Although this study adopts a multiple case study that draws on examples from across 
Africa, case studies (single or multiple) in general have their strengths and weakness. 
One of such strengths is its conceptual validity – the extent to which the claims of 
participants are proven within a study (George & Bennett, 2005).  Some phenomena 
are typically difficult to measure. In order to make sense of such issues, researchers 
may explore contextual comparisons across different or similar context. Consequently, 
a case study will then help to identify and measure the factors that best explain the 
theoretical concepts of interest and thus lead to achieving a high level of conceptual 
refinement and validity. Secondly, since case studies consider evidence from various 
sources, they help to identify causal mechanisms in individual cases and facilitate 
further probing. Furthermore, case studies are instrumental in generating new insights 
revealing gaps in literature and practice as well as helping to fill them, a feat, which 
this study is poised to achieve (Eisenhardt, 1989; Siggelkow, 2007). 
 Case studies are also subject to criticisms, prime of which is that the process 
may lack rigour (Yin, 2009; 2014). A key reason for such criticism is the tendency of 
a case study to lack a systematic procedure and allowing ambiguous evidence dictate 
the outcome of findings and conclusions (Yin, 2009; 2014). To address this, a research 
needs to have a clear design that reflect a clear research question prior to data 
collection, a unit of analysis, a link between the research question and the data to be 
collected, and how data would be interpreted (Garvin, 2003; George & Bennett, 2005; 
Yin, 2009). The current study followed these steps using an iterative approach as the 
research questions were generated from the literature and country analysis in Chapters 
2 and 3 with the aim of producing proof of validity and rigour (George & Bennett, 
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2005). Therefore, a rigorous process was undertaken in this study to mitigate some of 
the concerns associated with using a case study as outlined in Section 4.5. Other areas 
of interest that help to illustrate the rigour of this study include a unit of analysis, 
sources of information, iteration and triangulation, and case study protocol.  
4.4.2 Unit of analysis 
According to Yin (2014), deciding on a unit of analysis may be very challenging and 
crucial to the research design of a case study. Yin then suggested two steps, which 
may help in tackling this problem – defining the case and bounding the case. While 
the former has to do with choosing the ‘case’, that is, the primary unit of analysis, for 
example, a specific location, the latter has to do with delineating the ‘case’ by a time 
period. The essence of this is to avoid the tendency of wanting to cover ‘everything’, 
which in reality is not possible as no single study can solve all problems (Trafford & 
Leshem, 2008). As such, by choosing a specific ‘case’ and bounding it, precise and 
relevant information can be collected to make a better argument and answer a specific 
research question.  
Consequently, the primary unit of analysis adopted for this study is ‘country’, 
delineated by time – from 1999/2000 (the starting point of liberalisation in the sector) 
until 2016. The justification for such choice was to further verify the claim in the 
literature that areas of low mobile penetration remain in disadvantaged areas despite 
the sector liberalisation and the establishment of UAS across Africa. Although a 
multiple case study was adopted in this study with examples drawn from across Africa, 
a more in-depth analysis was conducted for Eastern Africa as countries in this region 
have the lowest mobile penetration rate, despite having, on the average, more MNO 
as illustrated in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 also indicated that while Eastern African 
countries have more disproportionate levels of low mobile coverage, such digital 
divide is also evident in other regions albeit with varying degrees. Hence, comparisons 
between countries across different regions in Africa (as well as other parts of the 
world) was inevitable, especially where there is a lack of example from Eastern Africa 
to illustrate the comments of interviewees. This further contributed to strengthening 
the triangulation process (Stake, 1995). 
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4.4.3 Sources of information 
Benbasat, Goldstein, and Mead (1987) asserted that evidence from multiple sources 
will combine to support research findings. According to Yin (1994), there are six main 
sources of evidence, which include archival records, documentation, interviews, direct 
observations, participant observations, and physical artefacts. This list is by no means 
exhaustive as there may be other sources depending on the kind of research strategy 
adopted and the data required (Yin, 1994). Regardless of the sources, it is important 
to note that they have their strengths and weaknesses. Table 6 highlights the data 
adopted in this research as well as their strengths and weaknesses 
Table 6: Data sources including strengths and weaknesses 
Data Sources Strengths Weaknesses 
Archival Records: for 
example, various telecoms 
regulatory websites, ITU and 
GSMA databases, the World 
Bank database, research 
diary, etc. 
 stable and exact 
 can be used 
repeatedly 
 unobtrusive, i.e., 
attracts no attention 
or obstruction 
 may be difficult to 
access 
 may be difficult to 
retrieve 
 may be biased in 
selection and 
report, i.e., 
reflecting the views 
of the author 
Documentation: for example, 
relevant literature, other 
written reports by ITU, 
GSMA and other 
independent consultants such 
as Sepulveda (2010). 
Online articles from sources 
such as TeleGeography, 
ITWeb Africa, 
Telecompaper, ITNews 
Africa, Reuters, Financial 
Times, etc. 
 same as archival 
records 
 same as archival 
records 
Interviews: with stakeholders 
such as regulators, USF 
managers, mobile operators, 
international lending 
organisations, representative 
of civil society, industry 
researchers, experts and 
consultants, etc. 
 targeted directly on 
case studies 
 insightful as it 
provides perceived 
causal relationships 
 may help to identify 
other relevant 
sources 
 may be used to 
explore broader 
issue 
 may be biased by 
poorly constructed 
questions 
 may be response 
bias 
 gaining access to 
participants may be 
a challenge 
 obtaining the trust 
of participants may 
also be difficult  
Sources: Compiled by the author from Creswell (2014), Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson, 
(2012), Saldana (2016), Stake (1995) and Yin (1994). 
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No single source should be seen as having a complete advantage over the other 
as they all combine to complement each other. Hence, a good case study research will 
benefit from the use of multiple sources of evidence (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, &, 
Jackson, 2012; Yin, 2014). This helps to strengthen the validity of data sources and 
the information provided (Hines, 2016). Similarly, this study combines multiple 
sources of secondary data, for example, the literature review, country analysis and 
databases with primary data sourced through interviews. This act of comparing one 
data source with others (triangulation) helped this research to guard against relying on 
a single source of evidence, provided better grounds for argument and helped to 
counter the bias that may be inherent in a single source. For example, when a 
regulatory website reports that the country has a certain level of mobile coverage, such 
claim is then verified by checking other sources like GSMA Intelligence, ITU and the 
World Bank. Furthermore, in cases where information relating to UAS was obscurely 
placed on the websites of regulators (lacking clarity and depth), previous studies, as 
well as other documentary and archival sources, were consulted for further 
information. 
4.4.4 Interviews 
One of the most important sources of (primary) data for implementing a case study 
research is an interview (Walsham, 1995; Yin, 2014). This is because the interview 
helps the researcher to better comprehend the developments within a phenomenon of 
interest and helps in verifying and extending knowledge as interviewees share their 
unique experiences of the subject matter (Stake, 1995). This process also helps the 
researcher to step back and access the interpretations of participants regarding a 
subject matter and help reveal information which may not be obvious or available in 
other (secondary) sources (Walsham, 1995). There is, therefore, a linkage between 
interview and the interpretivism paradigm adopted in this research as the researcher 
examines and interprets the underlying experiences and subjective meanings shared 
by participants (King & Horrocks, 2010). 
 In this study, after the critical analysis of the literature and country analysis 
was conducted to gain an understanding of the state of the telecommunications market 
in general and in-depth for Eastern Africa, it became pertinent to conduct interviews. 
Apart from helping to triangulate with other sources of information, such interviews 
further contributed to the researcher’s understanding of why the liberalisation of the 
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sector and the establishment of UAS mechanisms have failed to fully address the 
digital divide across Africa. A semi-structured interview approach was adopted mainly 
for two reasons (Stake, 2010). Firstly, it offers response categories from which 
participants can opt for the options that are closer to their views and secondly, it 
addresses the flexibility limitation associated with structure interview as participants 
can ask the researcher for more clarity on questions that may be vague to them (Flick, 
2009; Jackson, 2015). Issues surrounding the selection of participants, how they were 
recruited, and the means by which the interviews were conducted are discussed in 
Section 4.5. 
4.4.5 Iterative process and triangulation 
When conducting a case study, a case researcher needs to be cautious of the 
shortcomings associated with this research strategy and make deliberate efforts to 
mitigate them. One of such ways is through an iterative process, which involves 
moving back and forth between different sources of information (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Siggelkow, 2007). The iterative process adapted for this study is outlined in Figure 7. 
Figure 7: Case study as an iterative process 
 
Data source: Adapted from Stake (2010: 186) 
Data is sourced from multiple sources such as literature, country analysis, 
databases, regulatory websites, online reports and interviews. The process of 
Interviews and 
other data sources
Analysis and 
reporting
Literature review 
and country 
analysis
Research questions Iterative process 
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combining these sources, that is, aggregating the data collected, to make an informed 
decision is called triangulation. This is aimed at providing confirmability as the 
researcher analyse the data and writes the report (Denzin, 1978; Hines, 2016; Stake, 
2010). For example, evidence from the literature and regulatory websites indicated 
that countries in Eastern Africa had the lowest rates of mobile penetration compared 
to other regions in Africa (see Chapter 2). Eastern Africa was then chosen as a more 
detailed unit of analysis in order to better understand the phenomenon of the digital 
divide in Africa. As the 16 countries in the region were analysed, the evidence 
gathered was further confirmed by combining data from various sources such as 
GSMA and ITU databases, and online reports. Through repeating this process for each 
country in the region, the problem of digital divide of uneven mobile coverage 
emerged. This process sheds detailed light on the fact that though digital divide 
persists across Africa, Eastern African countries appear to be worse-off (AMTW, 
2016; GSMA, 2017a; ITU, 2008). On the back of such analysis, Chapters 2 and 3 
concluded by raising RQ1 and RQ2, which prompted the sourcing of more data 
including interviews with various stakeholders with practical knowledge of the 
industry. Such data was then analysed and reported in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
Apart from helping to provide confirmability, this process further addressed the 
issues around the rigour of a case study through validity and reliability (Hines, 2016; 
Stake, 2010; Yin, 2009; 2014). Yin (2014) delineated validity and reliability into four 
tests: - 
 Construct validity: setting the correct operational process for measuring the 
phenomena of interest. 
 Internal validity: establishing a causal relationship, i.e., where certain 
conditions may lead to other conditions, instead of things happening 
spuriously. 
 External validity: setting the domain to which the study findings can be 
generalised. 
 Reliability: showing that the process of the study such as data collection can 
be repeated with the same outcomes. 
These four criteria were implemented in the current study following the tactical 
application in Baker (2012), as highlighted in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Framework for implementing the methodological rigour of a case study 
Test Tactic Research Phase Application in this Research 
Construct 
validity 
-Use multiple sources 
of evidence 
-Establish a chain of 
evidence 
-Have key informants 
review draft case study 
report 
Data collection 
and composition 
 
-Data triangulation via the 
combination of multiple sources 
such as archival and current records 
from ITU and GSMA databases, 
regulatory websites, other online 
resources, interviews, etc. 
-Clear explanation of data collection 
and analysis 
-Review of interview transcripts by 
participants in other to verify the 
interview data and where the 
researcher was not clear on certain 
thoughts of participants, further 
correspondence was made 
-An independent review of 
transcripts and coding by peers from 
Newcastle Business School (NBS) 
-After such clarification, data 
coding and analysis were then 
carried out 
Internal 
validity 
-Do pattern matching 
-Do explanation 
building 
-Address rival 
explanations 
use logic models 
Data analysis -The research framework explicitly 
derived from the literature and 
country analysis helped in pattern 
matching and explanation of the 
state of the telecoms industry in 
Africa 
-The process was critically executed 
and the data gathered was used in 
addressing issues as they emerged 
- Theory triangulation was also 
carried out by considering different 
bodies of research that have 
addressed the phenomena of interest 
External 
validity 
Use replication logic in 
multiple-case studies 
Research design -In-depth country-by-country 
mapping and analysis were carried 
out, especially for the 16 countries 
in Eastern Africa in order to 
ascertain the fact that areas of low 
mobile penetration exit in rural and 
remote locations 
-The rationale for chosen Eastern 
Africa was also addressed 
Reliability -Use case study 
protocol 
-Develop case study 
database 
Data collection -As data were collected from 
various sources, a case study 
database was created for each of the 
country analysis 
-A case study protocol was created 
showing how the current case study 
was executed 
Adapted from Baker (2012: i34) and Yin (2014: 45) 
The tactics outlined in Table 7 were executed following the iterative process 
outlined in Figure 7 in order to satisfy the validity and reliability test because as 
indicated in Yin (2009; 2014), until a research design is repeated, one cannot know 
for certain if a methodology is reliable. 
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4.4.7 Case study protocol 
According to Yin (2014: 84), a case study protocol is a “standardised agenda for the 
researcher’s line of enquiry.” It includes not only the instrument but also the 
procedures and general rules guiding the conduct of a case study (Yin, 2014). The 
research instrument adopted can either be qualitative, such as interview, or 
quantitative, such as questionnaire (Maimbo & Graham, 2005). Since the current study 
is based on a qualitative enquiry by design, the research instrument applicable here is 
an interview. The use of case study protocol is extremely important when conducting 
a multiple case research such as this because it does not only guide in data collection 
but also helps to increase the reliability of the overall process as previously outlined 
in Table 6.  
Adapting the general principles suggested in Yin (2009; 2014), the structure 
and outline of the case study protocol for this study can be found in Appendix C. It 
shows the overarching theoretical framework, research questions, interview questions, 
etc., associated with this study. Looking at the various sections outlined in Appendix 
C, a case study protocol is indeed a vital tool in conducting a multiple case research 
as it reminds the researcher what the research is about, focuses on the target of the 
study, anticipates possible problems and the overall research completion (Yin, 2014). 
4.5 The research process and the role of the researcher 
The preceding discussions have centred on the justification of the methodology and 
method adopted in this study. This section seeks to explain how the research approach 
was implemented (Saunders & Townsend, 2016). This will further help to address the 
issue of subjectivity surrounding a qualitative research as the researcher gives an 
account of his role in the research process (Matthews & Kostelis, 2011).  
4.5.1 Generating interview questions and identifying research participants 
The interview questions emerged in the process of conducting the literature review 
and country analysis in Chapters 2 and 3. During this process, a topic guide of key 
issues was constructed upon which semi-structured interview questions were framed 
according to the category of participants (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2012). 
The participants for the study were mainly identified and classified using the 
stakeholder theory as applied in previous studies (for example, Freeman, 2010; 
Freeman & McVea, 2001; Pouloudi, 1999).  
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According to Freeman and McVea (2001:4), stakeholder refers to “…any 
group or individual who is affected by or can affect the achievement of an 
organisation’s objectives”. Relating this to the current study, these groups of people 
include those whose decisions can shape telecommunications policy and whose 
activities can affect the overall development of the sector. Similar ICT studies (for 
example, Papazafeueioulou and Pouloudi, 2000; Choudrie, Papazafeueioulou, & Lee, 
2003; Manh, Falch, and Williams, 2016) have also employed the stakeholder theory 
in identifying key actors and addressing issues around electronic commerce, 
broadband adoption and UAS. These studies agreed that identifying and engaging with 
the relevant stakeholders are crucial to knowing the needs of various groups and 
designing a more effective and proactive solution in a fast-changing sector like 
telecommunications.  
As such, the identification of the relevant stakeholders is crucial to the success 
of this study as these people, the researcher believes, hold key information that is 
partly needed to answer the research questions (Saunders & Townsend, 2016). Since 
previous studies were conducted in different contexts, it was necessary to tailor the 
stakeholder theory to fit with the different interest groups within the 
telecommunications sector in Africa. For example, there was a need to include civil 
society representative, UAS consultants and OTT players all of whom have hands-on 
experience and play key roles across Africa. Juxtaposing these groups with those 
identified in Papazafeueioulou and Pouloudi (2000: 6), the literature and other 
secondary sources, this study identified and categorised stakeholders using the adapted 
framework in Figure 8. Policymakers are placed at the centre of the framework as a 
symbol of the foundation and link that hold other relevant groups together (Manh, 
Falch, & Williams, 2015). This is because it is the responsibility of national 
governments to identify relevant groups, engage and coordinate with them in order to 
ensure successful formulation and implementation of telecommunications policy 
(Papazafeueioulou & Pouloudi, 2000; Smith, 2003).  
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Figure 8: Relevant stakeholders 
 
Source: Adapted from Papazafeueioulou and Pouloudi (2000: 6) and other secondary sources. 
Furthermore, each group is linked together with arrows indicating the need for some 
form of cohesion and interactions between and across stakeholders so that the specific 
needs of different interest groups are reflected in the process (Choudrie, 
Papazafeueioulou, & Lee, 2003). The categories of participants in Figure 8 were 
engaged in this study and it was critical that they have relevant knowledge of the 
subject matter and/or the telecommunications market in Africa, and in other parts of 
the world (Stake, 1995). In all, four categories of questions were generated according 
to the interest and the role of each group: (i) policymakers, (ii) civil society and 
international lenders, (iii) UAS consultants, industry experts and researchers, and (iv) 
MNO. From over 60 correspondence, 28 interviewees participated in the process with 
academics, civil society, industry analysts and UAS consultants accounting for more 
than 50%. Appendix D contains the list of the 28 interviewees by category with the 
dates and time the interviews were conducted, the reporting of which was anonymised 
in accordance with the ethical consent form. A sample of the interview questions is 
attached to the case study protocol in Appendix C. 
 Given that the interviewees were representatives of a diverse set of 
stakeholders, it is expected that their comments would include some degree of bias 
towards their own interests (Bini, D’Ambrosio, & Di Santo, 2017; Boyce, 2006; Kien, 
2014; Parent & Deephouse, 2007; Papazefeiropoulou & Pouloudi, 2000; Thai, Falch, 
Policymaker: 
government, 
regulator, 
USF manager
MNO
Consultants, 
Industry 
experts and 
Researchers 
Civil society 
and 
International 
lenders
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& Williams, 2015). Hence, while the comments of interviewees in this study provide 
useful insights on how to mitigate the digital divide in Africa, it may also reflect the 
risk of bias. For example, the issue of taxes and spectrum fees drew more comment 
from industry groups like GSMA and MNO compared to regulators as evident in 
Section 5.3.3. Overall, there was a general indication that while stakeholders like 
regulators commented more on how to promote the public interest element of market 
failure discussed in Chapter 3, industry representative like GSMA and MNO 
emphasised more improving economic efficiency. However, the comments from UAS 
consultants appear to highlight issues from both public interest and economic 
efficiency perspectives. This is evident in the data presented in Chapter 5. 
 With this in mind, and following the imbalance in the spread of stakeholder 
representation in this study as evidence in Appendix D, the researcher is aware that 
this might lead to some level of bias in the findings. However, it is interesting to note 
that some stakeholders have worked across different categories. For example, there 
were instances where a regulator may have worked with an MNO and vice-versa or a 
consultant who was formerly a regulator. This, to some extent, helped to mitigate bias 
in some cases as a particular participant, say an MNO, may give an account of the state 
of a regulator when he/she was a regulator even while speaking as an MNO. For 
example, Interviewee17 while speaking in the capacity of a consultant in support of 
tax incentives also highlighted the need to empower regulators with the capacity to 
enforce compliance in order to ensure that beneficiaries like MNO are held 
accountable to provide what they ought to for receiving such incentives (see Section 
8.3.1.1). 
 To this end, this study has been conducted with as much impartiality and 
transparency as possible by, for example, drawing on the diverse knowledge of 
interviewees through probing questions as illustrated with the case of Interviewee17. 
Furthermore, triangulation of data with multiple sources from the ITU, 
TeleGeography, Telecomspaper, ITWeb Africa, Research ICT Africa, A4AI, 
Balancing Act, etc., was also carried out to mitigate the risk of bias and strengthen the 
reliability of the outcome of this study. See Section 4.4.5 for details of how data 
triangulation was implemented in this study.        
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4.5.2 Accessing and recruiting participants 
Since the identification of participants and generating interview questions had 
contributed to sorting the overall direction of the research, the next phase was to 
negotiate access to participants and solicit their cooperation in the research process 
(King, 2004). Gaining access to the identified participants was one of the major 
challenges of this study (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 
2012). This painstaking process needed to be repeated with correspondence back and 
forth after months of searching for contacts through the internet, reports, publications 
and attending relevant conferences. When participants were first contacted, some were 
sceptical and reluctant to participate in the process, but after series of correspondence 
and a clearer explanation of what the researcher is trying to achieve, they eventually 
showed positive interest. Furthermore, issues around confidentially and anonymity 
were dealt with. This initial process contributed to building trust and transparency so 
much so that after some participants had finished contributing to the research, they 
willingly recommended and gave contacts to other participants (Saunders & 
Townsend, 2016).  
One of the first means of contact was via email, which was sourced using 
online resources such as blogs, LinkedIn, organisation and regulatory websites. Some 
emails were also sourced from written reports and snowballing from other participants. 
The researcher then followed up these contacts and some of them yielded positive 
responses while others did not. Other contacts were sourced from academic and 
industry conferences, for example, Commonwealth WRC Preparatory Meeting, 
London, 2015 and the 1st African Regional Conference of the ITS, Accra, 2016. The 
researcher’s supervisory team also gave useful recommendations. 
4.5.3 The semi-structured interview process 
Twenty-five of the 28 interviews for this study were conducted between October 2015 
and November 2016, with the last three between March and April 201855. According 
to Yin (1994), when interviewing participants, researchers must make provision for 
participants’ schedules and availability, not theirs. Therefore, as participants were 
sourced and consent received, interviews were scheduled based on the time and date 
                                                 
55 Including two on March 15 2018 at the 2nd Regional Conference of ITS, Lusaka, 2018. 
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agreed by participants and in some cases, the schedules were changed as participants 
committed to other activities. The researcher used www.worldtimebuddy.com to 
convert time zones to GMT. Outlook calendar was also utilised to avoid conflicts with 
other interviews, research tasks and other engagements. The interviews were 
conducted through face-to-face and online platforms such as Skype, Google Hangout, 
telephone, and email. Table 7 highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the various 
interview methods.  
Although piloting is recommended by, for example, Bryman and Bell (2007), 
there was no ‘standard’ pilot in this study per se, as access to participants was difficult 
to get and when some eventually pulled through, the interview was conducted right 
away. However, interview questions were subsequently amended following reactions 
and recommendations from participants as the data collection progressed, on whether 
or not they understood the question(s). This was particularly applicable in the first four 
interviews. Therefore, in a way, the questions went through some refining process, 
which is somewhat equivalent to having a ‘formal’ pilot study. Most participants were 
only willing to be contacted a second time for the review of their transcripts and that 
also took a rather long turnaround time. 
Most of the interviews were conducted using online platforms such as Skype 
and telephone due to some constraints. First was the geographical distance between 
the researcher and the participants, which made it impossible to conduct most of the 
interviews face-to-face. The second was the constant travelling of some participants 
as they commute between countries where they had business operations and 
engagements. Although it was practically impossible to keep following these people 
around physically, technology made this possible. Three of the interviews took place 
at the conferences mentioned earlier and participants were willing, in some instances, 
to do the interview on the spot but this situation was quite limited as they were either 
presenters or key facilitators at these conferences. 
The use of online as a medium of interaction between participants and researchers is 
not alien to qualitative research as the adoption of the internet expands worldwide and 
researchers are now adapting face-to-face interaction with the online environment 
(James & Busher, 2012). Like any other means of data gathering techniques, it has its 
strengths and limitations (Mann & Stewart, 2000). Table 8 highlights some of those 
applicable to this study. 
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Table 8: Strengths and weaknesses of interview mode 
Mode Strengths Weaknesses 
Face-to-face -relevant additional questions that 
come to mind can be asked during the 
interview process 
-opportunity for both the researcher 
and the respondent to correct any 
misunderstandings in terms of the 
questions or responses 
-limited access to wider 
participants 
-gaining access and getting the 
participant to commit to a 
meeting time 
 
Email -participants can proffer answers to 
questions at a convenient time 
-participants and researcher need not be 
online at the same time 
 
 
-may take a longer time to get 
an in-depth response 
-the absence of the researcher 
to ask more probing questions 
may limit the information 
provided by respondents 
-if the participant doesn't have 
good writing skills in 
expressing their thoughts, this 
could negatively impact the 
quality of response 
-the response may be less 
spontaneous due to the time 
lag between receipt and reply 
 
Skype, Google 
Hangout, and 
telephone 
-wider reach 
-helps overcome the geographical 
limitation 
-more cost-effective 
 
-network disconnection 
-loss of coherence and flow of 
thoughts when contact is 
restored 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author from Mann and Stewart (2000), Curasi (2001), James and 
Busher (2012), and personal experience from the interview process. 
Nineteen of the 28 interviews were recorded with permission from 
participants. This was to ensure the accuracy of capture and to avoid the problem of 
having to recall all the conversations (Carr & Worth, 2001). In order to mitigate some 
of the limitations outlined above, transcripts were sent back to participants for edit and 
verification. In some cases, respondents altered or added to what was previously said 
and some of them were forthcoming in answering further questions for clarity. This 
further helped to strengthen the trustworthiness of the research (Curasi, 2001). The 
breakdown of the various methods as well as the quality of interviewees is presented 
in Appendix D.  
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4.6 Data preparation and analysis 
Apart from the secondary data that were gathered from various sources outlined in 
Table 5, 28 interviews were conducted. This is consistent with the recommendation of 
12-30 participants for a heterogeneous population (Saunders, 2012; Saunders & 
Townsend, 2016). For the researcher to make sense of these interviews, further 
preparation was needed beyond the actual conversation with participants (Miles, 
Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). Firstly, the voice-recorded interviews were transcribed 
by the researcher to guarantee the confidentiality of participants and to become 
immersed in the data, and accelerate the coding process (Hahn, 2008). In situations 
where participants gave further useful comments after the tape recorder was turned-
off, such information was then recorded in the research diary. This was later 
transferred into the transcripts of respective interviewees before sending them back 
for verification and/or editing. While most interviewees returned their transcripts 
unchanged, some added to their initial comments. For example, Interviewee1056 
emailed back their transcript with further comments on the activities of OTT players 
in their country. 
 Although partial transcription may be suitable to some studies with a focus on 
the conversation that addresses the research question or theoretical proposition, the 
audiotapes for this study were transcribed in their entirety (Saldana, 2016; Yin, 2011). 
This was borne out of the desire to provide a rich description of the thoughts of 
participants as in-depth as possible (McLellan, MacQueen, & Neidig, 2003). See 
Appendix E for a sample of transcribed interview. It was after this procedure was 
concluded that the researcher then moved formally into the data analysis phase, which 
the approached following an incremental and iterative process by adapting and moving 
through the five phases suggested by Yin (2011). These include data compilation, data 
disassembling, data reassembling, data interpretation and conclusion. While the last 
two phases are covered in the latter part of the study, the first three phases are 
discussed below. 
                                                 
56 A USF director 
 122 
 
4.6.1 Compiling data 
Yin (2011) suggested that an analysis should (formally) begin with orderly 
compilation and sorting of field data including field notes and other accumulated 
evidence in order to allow for easy access and reference. In this study, the field data is 
the interview with participants. After each interview was conducted and transcribed, 
they were then sent back to participants for verification/edit. It was after this process 
that the compilation was done immediately. An indication that the organisation of the 
transcripts was not accumulated and compiled in one lump sum but organised as each 
interview was completed with necessary feedback from participants. 
4.6.2 Disassembling data  
Disassembling involves breaking down compiled data into smaller units and (but not 
necessary) accompanied by new labels or codes assignment (Charmaz, 2006; Saldana, 
2016; Yin, 2011). In the current study, the researcher implemented this procedure by 
going through each interview transcript using each question as a smaller unit. This was 
particularly useful because participants sometimes switched between issues even 
though they were answering a non-related question. For example, when some 
participants were talking about infrastructural sharing, they suddenly switch to issues 
relating to wider stakeholder engagement and vice-versa. Subsequently, the researcher 
then sorted various issues into their separate places by disassembling each transcript 
on a question-by-question basis. This allowed for more robust analysis of individual 
issues and opportunity for clear patterns and relationships to emerge. 
4.6.3 Reassembling data 
This involves the rearrangement and recombination of disassembled data in order to 
reveal plausible relationships and patterns among codes (Charmaz, 2006; Attride-
Stirling, 2001). One of the ways this has helped in the current study is that as individual 
issues were grouped and compared, common relationships emerged. For example, by 
combining issues relating to infrastructure sharing and stakeholder engagement, a 
relationship emerged - as MNO combine resources to deploy infrastructure in order 
to, for example, lower transaction costs, engaging with the local communities has the 
tendency to further reduce costs. For example, a community may be willing to provide 
free or ‘cheap’ land for building tower sites for a price below what MNO would have 
paid without such an engagement. The local communities may also be engaged to 
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provide security for the tower sites instead of hiring a formal security outfit, which 
may cost more for MNO and they may lack local knowledge of the area. This 
relationship only became apparent as the data was reassembled to see the bigger 
picture (Yin, 2011). 
 The implementation of these phases was executed following a non-linear 
process as the researcher moved back and forth between phases, allowing room for 
flexibility and issues to emerge, making the whole process a recursive and iterative 
relationship (Yin, 2011). Apart from the data preparation process, another important 
task in the data analysis process has to do with the identification of codes and themes 
(Attride-Stirling, 2001). 
4.6.4 Codes and themes 
Informed by the analysis in Chapters 2 and 3, the codes and themes in this study were 
a judgment decision on the part of the researcher, which is in line with the interpretivist 
paradigm of this study (MacQueen, et al., 1998; Ryan & Bernard, 2003; Saldana, 
2016). While coding involves the labelling of various parts of data, theme involves the 
grouping of codes into similar or dissimilar features, moving data analysis from an 
initial level to a higher conceptual level, which then allows in-depth discussion of 
events and emergent of more meanings (DeSantis & Ugarriza, 2000; Saldana, 2016). 
For example, 15 codes may emerge from a chunk of data, and these 15 codes may be 
grouped into three parts, which may then result in three themes. These themes are 
subjected to further analysis and discussion, leading to the generation of meaning and 
insight formulation. Therefore, codes and themes were deployed in this study as a data 
reduction strategy - to simplify the volume of data accumulated and help to organise 
and bring meaning to the data (Charmaz, 2001; 2006; Miles, et al., 2014). Both the 
literature and country analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 extensively (but not exclusively) 
informed the broad process of code and theme identifications in this study to reflect 
theoretical and practical perspectives (MacQueen, et al., 1998; Miles, Huberman, & 
Saldana, 2014). The next section illustrates how codes and themes were generated. 
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4.6.5 How codes and themes were operationalised 
It is important to state in advance that the tool employed for coding was MS Word57 
(La Pelle, 2004; Hahn, 2008). The decision to use MS Word was based on three factors 
– money, expertise and time (Basit, 2003; Kruckenberg, 2016). The initial plan was to 
use NVivo58, but due to the limited training and financial support from Newcastle 
Business School (NBS), the researcher did not feel comfortable to employ NVivo 
using a basic knowledge. Since the lack of financial support only became apparent at 
the later stage of the study, there was insufficient time to improve on the basic 
knowledge obtained. As such, the researcher was inclined to fully utilise MS Word, 
which was the tool that was used to execute the initial coding of the transcripts. 
Moreover, whether a CAQDAS like Nvivo is used or not, we should not expect 
any qualitative data analysis tool to unravel ‘hidden’ codes and themes (Rademaker et 
al., 2012: 2). All the analytical decision is incumbent on the researcher (Plakoyiannaki, 
2016; Yin, 2011). For example, in this study, the researcher decided on the codes 
assigned to a given chunk of data guided by the research questions, issues raised in the 
literature and the overall topic of the thesis. The researcher thus created the codes, not 
the tool employed. Like Nvivo, MS Word also has its limitation (Alfoldi, 2016). For 
example, the use of MS Word for coding in this study turned out to be tedious and 
time-consuming (Basit, 2003). Nonetheless, it was a useful tool in the data analysis 
process. More specifically, it assisted in better planning and management of data in 
terms of coding and retrieval, discovering and marking interesting aspects of the data 
using different colours (Lewins & Silver, 2007). 
Having said that, the coding process began with a line-by-line reading of each 
transcript. Since the researcher conducted and transcribed the interviews personally, 
open coding59 began upon a second reading, as the researcher had become immersed 
and familiar with the data (Ryan & Bernard, 2003). In the open coding process, the 
researcher went through the transcripts and then began to generate tentative codes for 
                                                 
57 Microsoft Word 
58 A Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) (Lewis & Silver, 2007; 
Weitzman, 1999). 
59 Open codes involve the initial identification and labelling of relevant information emanating from 
the data while axial codes goes further to assist in organising codes into themes for better examination 
and discussion (Hahn, 2008; Saldana, 2016). 
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chunks of data drawing on the knowledge gained from Chapters 2 and 3. The 
researcher also documented examples of participants’ direct words for each code in 
order to preserve the embedded meaning as intended by participants (Charmaz, 2006; 
Gallicano, 2013a; Ryan & Bernard, 2000). For example, see the screenshot in Figure 
9. 
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Figure 9: A screenshot of MS Word exemplifying the code and theme processes 
Interviewee15: a key MNO figure
Interviewee24: an 
academic and UAS consultant
Code
Theme
Code
Theme
 RQ1
 RQ2
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Following the coding process, themes were then abstracted from the codes 
generated. For instance, responses to RQ1 generated codes such as inadequate 
regulatory capacity, fund diversion and corruption. These codes were then combined 
and discussed under a single theme called ‘Lack of strong ICT leadership and 
commitment’ (Section 5.2). Furthermore, in order to represent the data succinctly, 
themes were further refined not only to make them more specific and discrete, but 
broad (constructs that link different kinds of expressions), embodying the ideas 
contained in the data (Ryan & Bernard, 2000; 2003). As the researcher went through 
the transcripts, a number of codes were accumulated and recorded (Ryan & Bernard, 
2000). Such recording was particularly useful for keeping track of codes, organising 
and reorganising the codes as they emerged through the data analysis process (Saldana, 
2016). After open coding was done for each transcript, axial coding was then carried 
out as categories of codes were grouped in order to identify underlying relationships 
and from this emerged the themes (Gallicano, 2013a; 2013b). 
 Considering the high level of subjectivity associated with coding and the fact 
that different researchers may assign different codes to the same chunk of data (Miles, 
et al., 2014; Saldana, 2016), the researcher solicited the services of other people to 
validate the process. One of such measure was constant ‘shop talking’ with peers, 
friends, and supervisors about the research and data analysis, knowing that this could 
lead to provocative questions that the researcher may not have considered (Saldana, 
2016). Secondly, peers from NBS were engaged to independently review five 
transcripts and carry out their own coding for comparison with that of the researcher. 
While the results from peers were exact in most places, there were instances where 
they used different words, which more or less had the same meaning as that of the 
researcher. For example, there was a chunk of text that the researcher coded as 
‘stakeholder engagement’ (Sections 5.3.5.4 and 6.2.3), which a colleague codded as 
‘multi-stakeholder consultation/engagement’. This process did not only offer more 
validity to the research, it also proved useful in articulating the researcher’s thinking, 
clarified emerging issues, developed new insights and revealed better connections 
between codes and themes (Saldana, 2016).   
In conclusion, the whole process of codes and themes followed an iterative 
pattern as the researcher moved back and forth within data, codes, and themes, guided 
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by the overall research questions that emanated from the literature and country 
analysis (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012). Figure 10 outlines this process. 
Figure 10: Framework for coding and thematic analyses 
 
Figure 10 outlines the process used in the data analysis process. The thick red 
lines show the interaction between different phases while the dotted green lines show 
the repetitive and non-linear interaction between phases. It can be observed that as 
codes were assigned and reassigned, the researcher kept following an iterative process 
on an incremental basis, moving into higher conceptual level (themes) until the main 
researcher questions were addressed (DeSantis & Ugarriza, 2000; Yin, 2011; 2014). 
Since these research questions emerged from the literature and country analysis 
(conceptual framework), it was also necessary to closely intertwine the whole process 
by moving back and forth between various elements – conceptual framework, research 
questions, and data analysis (Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012). In other words, theory was 
compared to data, data to theory, data to data, data to code, code to code, code to 
themes, themes to themes, and themes back to data (Saldana, 2016; Sinkovics & 
Alfoldi, 2012). Figure 10 also provided a flexible model to follow as data was coded 
and recorded giving room for adjustments where necessary, after all, “…no one gets 
it right the first time” (Saldana, 2016: 38) even though he or she may think otherwise 
(Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). 
Since the primary data in this study was sourced from people, it then informed 
the need to address ethics - issues around the safety and protection of participants as 
well as the information they have shared (Yin, 2014). The researcher anonymised 
Literature review 
and country analysis
Research questions Research design
Data Codes: 1, 2, 3,...n Themes: 1, 2, 3,...n
Interpretation and 
conclusion
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responses by using Interviewee1, Interviewee2, etc., and kept data in accordance with 
university guidelines. A sample of the approved informed consent form is contained 
in Appendix F. 
4.7 Data mapping description 
The data map in Figure 11 illustrates the outcome of the data analysis process 
discussed above with a synthesis of the overall issues that emerged from the data as 
various interviewees recounted their experience and knowledge of the digital divide 
across Africa and other parts of the world. Figure 11 indicates that UAS policy is a 
complex and dynamic process with a series of interrelated issues. While the data 
presented highlights some of the reasons why the digital divide in Africa persists, it 
also offers some insights on how to mitigate the problems identified. The various 
issues raised in Figure 11 are differentiated using various shapes and symbols. This 
was necessitated by the desire to make sense of the messiness of the data as the analysis 
of the 28 interviews generated a raft of issues, which increasingly became confusing 
just by going through the transcripts and documenting the evidence. 
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Figure 11: Overall emerging issues from the data: the big picture 
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Thus, the use of Visio was borne out of the desire to address this confusion and 
help the researcher to better understand and present the myriad of issues emerging 
from the data. The blue circles represent issues behind the persistent low levels of 
mobile coverage in Africa as recounted by the interviewees while the green circles 
indicate the recommendations given on how to mitigate the problems that were 
identified. These were subsequently delineated into issues related to RQ1 – the blue 
circles – and RQ2 – the green circles. A higher-level categorisation was then carried 
out to generate the various themes under each research question. All issues relating to 
RQ1were themed using the orange rectangles and RQ2 using the grey rectangles. 
 Figure 11 shows that UAS is complex and dynamic with a series of interrelated 
issues signposted by the dotted blue lines. If one were to pick on the theme: ‘Lack of 
strong leadership and commitment’, for example, Figure 11 indicates that a series of 
issues feed into this theme. Note that these issues are connected to the theme using 
arrows, which indicates causality, that is, a lack of strong leadership and commitment, 
according to the interviewees, is because of inadequate regulatory capacity, undue 
political influence, etc. Since these issues reflect on each other, the blue dotted lines 
depict the linkages and dynamism in the data. The various issues that were raised by 
interviewees tend to have either a positive or a negative impact on mobile coverage. 
Some of these issues were highlighted in Section 2.4 using the pull (negative) and 
push (positive) factors. This is signposted by the positive and negative signs at the tip 
of the arrows. The issues that lacked consensus among interviewees are highlighted 
by question marks, for example, the impact of OTT players and infrastructure sharing 
on UAS in disadvantaged areas proved divisive. The numbers in bracket indicate 
aggregate interviewees’ responses.  
Although Figure 11 highlights a series of complex relationships, seven themes 
stand out in relation to the two research questions. RQ1 covers three themes, namely, 
lack of leadership and commitment, economic feasibility and UAS complexity, while 
RQ2 covers four themes, improving the current form of USF, indirect market 
interventions, collaboration and innovative solutions for UAS. The presentation of 
these seven themes will be split and discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. In these chapters, 
the data map will be fragmented along the lines of respective themes to further 
simplify the message relayed by the interviewees. 
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4.9 Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed the research philosophy, methodology and method for this 
study. The purpose of this is to provide justification for the research strategy adopted 
for this study and to document the process of how the research design was 
implemented. It was argued that the nature of the research problem informed the 
choice of the research approach. Using a multiple case study strategy, the research 
adopted a qualitative approach to data collection and analysis. Multiple sources of data 
were sourced including primary data via semi-structured interviews with relevant 
stakeholders with knowledge and experience across Africa, and other parts of the 
world. This further supported the iterative process as data from various sources were 
triangulated to gain an in-depth understanding of the mobile telecommunications 
industry in Africa and to address the issues surrounding the rigour of the study.   
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Chapter 5: Findings – Limited coverage 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will present the findings from the data with respect to RQ1 - with the 
introduction of market liberalisation and the establishment of UAS strategy like USF, 
why does the digital divide of uneven mobile coverage persists areas across Africa? 
Applying the iterative framework outlined in Section 4.6.5 to the 28 interviews, three 
themes emerged: lack of strong ICT leadership and commitment, lack of economic 
feasibility and universal access and service complexity. 
These themes will be presented and illustrated in detail with interviews 
excerpts in italics highlighting the voices of interviewees. This process will also 
articulate emerging relationships between issues and triangulate it with evidence from 
relevant literature, country examples, databases of GSMA and ITU, online articles, 
etc. in order to ascertain the veracity of what is being said and add to the validity of 
this study. The chapter then concludes with a summary and suggest issues for further 
examination in the discussion chapter drawing on the analysis from Chapters 2 and 3, 
the level of interconnectedness of issues from the data and aggregate interviewees’ 
responses. 
5.2 Lack of strong ICT leadership and commitment 
The lack of strong leadership and commitment to ICT related issues was highlighted 
by six interviewees as one of the main hindrances to the expansion of mobile coverage 
in disadvantaged areas and further development in the sector. Drawing on a synthesis 
of the comments from interviewees, ICT leadership and commitment refers to the 
resolve of various national governments to put ICT related issues at the heart of their 
economic and political agenda and debates. A position that this group of participants 
said is lacking in certain parts of Africa. For example, Interviewee2360 noted that: 
In the developed countries, you see high political office holders like the Prime 
Minister talking about the ecosystem of telecom services but in developing 
countries like Nigeria, Ghana, etc., the leaders are not so much into this. They are 
more concerned with visible projects like bridges, roads… I am not saying these 
are not important, but the leaders are not talking about telecom services as it 
should be and I think they are missing out on something by not giving this sector 
top priority. 
                                                 
60 One former USF CEO, who consults for the ITU and some countries in Africa 
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Interviewee661 added that governments should not only be willing but also able to 
support such discussions with the needed attention and resources. Although this ought 
to be reflected in the vision of national government and political leaders in terms of 
expressing long-term genuine interest in transforming and integrating a country into 
the global information economy (Cross & Adam, 2007; O’Donovan & Johnson, 2016), 
Interviewee1362 disagreed. Interviewee13 noted that from their interactions with 
governments across the continent, it appears that most governments are more focused 
on “short-term vision”, that is, a political situation where people think only in terms 
of their tenure in office when it comes to ICT instead of looking at the wider impact 
of their actions. Although it was generally agreed by this group of interviewees that 
certain countries in Africa seem not to be doing enough to reflect the importance of 
leadership in ICT, one civil society and access specialist drew attention to two 
exceptions: Kenya and Rwanda. Recounting their experience from the region, this 
interviewee argued that both countries have benefited from very strong leadership 
within government: 
So, in Rwanda, obviously Paul Kagame as the President has set an ICT agenda 
for the country but equally, in Kenya, Bitange Ndemo played a catalytic role in 
setting an ICT agenda for Kenya…There is such a strong sense of pride in 
Kenya’s leadership in ICT that it often trumps the issue of mistrust...such strong 
government leadership can actually be transformative. Interviewee163 
Section 2.5 appears to support the experience related by this interviewee that the drive 
from these top political leaders has contributed to the level of success achieved in their 
telecommunications sectors. This is evident by the relatively better mobile penetration 
rates in Rwanda and Kenya - 70% and 78% respectively, for year-end 2016 compared 
to the other 16 countries in Eastern Africa, excluding the small-island nations of 
Mauritius and Seychelles with over 100% (see Figure 4, Section 2.2). Furthermore, 
Dr. Vanu Bose, the CEO of Vanu – an access specialist provider – stated that they are 
currently building local mobile network to connect over one million unconnected 
people across Rwanda and that part of the reasons for accepting the project was 
because of the ‘very pro-ICT’ attitude of President Paul Kagame (Gilbert, 2016b). He 
                                                 
61 An independent telecommunications policy analyst with expertise in Africa and other parts of the 
world 
62 One key multinational MNO employee in charge of regulatory policy across Africa 
63 A civil society representative and access specialist promoting the proliferation of low-cost 
infrastructure in disadvantaged areas in emerging markets including Africa 
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concluded that other countries in Africa could draw parallels from the strong ICT 
leadership in Rwanda. 
 Having said that, the interaction with various interviewees revealed that the 
impact of a lack of strong ICT leadership and commitment on the implementation of 
USF and the expansion of mobile coverage to disadvantaged areas is reflected in a 
host of interconnected issues. In contrast to the complex data map presented in Chapter 
4 (Figure 11), Figure 12 portrays a more focused version to clearly highlight the 
dynamics as discussed below.  
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Figure 12: Lack of strong ICT leadership and commitment 
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5.2.1 Inadequate regulatory capacity 
At the heart of the issues presented in Figure 12 is regulatory capacity - the level of 
relevant skills and funds available to enable regulators to discharge their duties. Fifteen 
interviewees, including Interviewee564, argued that although regulatory capacity is 
critical to the success of USF in advancing mobile coverage, regulatory bodies across 
Africa are generally faced with shortages in skills and funds. For example, one 
regional head for access policy in Africa stated that: 
Once these monies have been collected, how do you now make sure it is 
channelled to the right place? This leads to the second problem, which is the lack 
of expertise on the part of the regulator in the deployment of the funds collected in 
terms of maybe determining the areas that need the funds… The cost of the 
contract also needs to be worked out… Inerviewee4 
Interviewee1 added that from their experience, people with the right technical and 
business expertise needed to quickly design coverage solutions do not run USF in 
Africa. Although certain countries try to overcome this difficulty by enlisting the 
services of consultants, this strategy seems not to have fully addressed the problem in 
the long run. Interviewee1165 underlined this by noting that although it is part of their 
reference point to transfer skills to regulatory personnel to continue when they leave, 
the skills are so specialised and difficult to transfer within a short period. The 
consultant further added that this leaves a regulator lacking critical skills such as 
technical, economic and legal to deploy, manage and sustain UAS projects.  
Interviewee5 further asserted that: 
This [shortage of regulatory capacity] is true particularly in the countries where 
these funds are most needed in the sense that the more you need the fund the less 
capacity you have to manage it. 
This interviewee articulated that the inability of regulators to compete with 
larger corporations in offering a competitive salary to attract and retain skilled labour 
is a contributing factor to the lack of regulatory capacity. Although this is a general 
reflection of the low salary applicable to the civil service in comparison to the private 
sector, insufficient regulatory funding is also a determinant. A recent example of this 
can be found in Zambia where the president issued a directive to reduce funding for 
                                                 
64 A well-established UAS consultant and research with over 20 years industry experience 
65 A USF specialist and UAS researcher with over 15 years’ experience across 17 countries in Africa 
and the ITU 
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the sector regulator (Malakata, 2017b). The president of Zambia argued that this is 
meant to ‘transform’ the regulator into a profitable institution that is capable of 
contributing more to the treasury. However, the civil society is concerned that such 
action could lead to a lack of funding and limit the ability of ZICTA66 to formulate 
and deploy policies aimed at increasing access and ICT adoption.    
Apart from the fact that inadequate capacity limits regulatory capability and 
resources, which then impinges on a regulator’s ability to function and attract qualified 
personnel, it has other far-reaching consequences as shown in Figure 12. The 
remaining sections under this theme will further examine these issues. 
5.2.2 Lack of performance monitoring and enforcement 
Since Section 5.2.1 highlighted that regulators are generally faced with inadequate 
capacity, Figure 12 indicates that the resources (skills and funds) for monitoring and 
enforcing compliance on issues like UAS are limited. The comments from five 
interviewees, including Interviewee967, help to underline this argument. 
Interviewee1768 noted that: 
…there are often no very good ways of monitoring performance even if they are 
clear on what they are trying to achieve. So often, there are no very good ways of 
measuring… whether or not all the people the operator say they have connected 
to the network, as a result of receiving the subsidy, have actually being 
connected… Interviewee17 
Interviewee6 and Interviwee2169 added that to ensure compliance with project 
specifications such as timely completion, technical and quality agreements, USF needs 
to be monitored and where failings are observed, regulators need to hold MNO to 
account in order to prevent a free rider problem. This is a situation where MNO collect 
USF without constructing the network and providing telecommunication services as 
hinted earlier in Section 3.2.2. Interviewee2370 added that in countries where this 
occurs, USF could do very little in terms of pushing coverage expansion to 
                                                 
66 Zambia Information and Communications Technology Authority 
67 A head of spectrum administration  
68 A former multinational MNO executive, now a senior international policy adviser 
69 A former public policy director for a multinational MNO 
70 A former USF CEO who now consult for the ITU and some countries in Africa 
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disadvantaged places. Interviewee1271 extended the discussion to the inability of some 
countries to make big multinational MNO comply with coverage obligations due to 
their wealth and influence relative to the host country. Interviewee12 made a 
comparison between Nigeria and Zambia by referring to the $5.2 billion fine on MTN 
for failing to disconnect unregistered SIM cards (see Section 5.3.5.3). Interviewee12 
argued that since Nigeria is the biggest market in Africa in terms of subscribers, the 
government has some level of leverage, however, a smaller market like Zambia may 
struggle to contend with the wealth and influence of MTN. Interviewee12 concluded 
that: 
Nigeria can pull its weight because it is bigger, South Africa and a few others as 
well, but a lot of the smaller countries cannot. Yes, it [compliance] is probably in the 
licence terms but the operators don’t do it, what can the smaller countries do? I 
don’t know. 
In other words, although some countries may be willing to actually enforce the 
expansion of mobile coverage to disadvantaged areas, their inability to make large 
MNO comply could undermine such effort. 
The argument above indicates that to successfully implement performance 
monitoring and enforcement, regulators need capacity in terms of skills and funds to 
police the process and hold MNO to account. It is more likely that in countries where 
regulators have fewer resources, the impact of USF would be limited as MNO could 
take the subsidy and fail to execute projects as specified in their contracts. While this 
may be linked to the lack of political will of policymakers to support the plan of 
building an all-inclusive digital society with the required level of capacity, the relative 
power of big MNE to smaller countries could also be a contributing factor. While a 
regulator can retract the licence of MNO for failing to meet their licence obligation as 
illustrated with the case of RwandaTel (Section 2.5), Interviewee12 highlighted that 
when it comes to MNE, this could lead to the loss of jobs and increase in 
unemployment, a risk that policymakers would presumably want to avoid. 
Consequently, the incentive to execute this regulatory task appears rather weak. Figure 
12 thus indicates an underlying relationship between regulatory capacity and 
performance monitoring in the sense that a regulator with less capacity can do little 
                                                 
71 A key figure of a specialised access provider 
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when it comes to USF monitoring and enforcement, which is part of the key success 
factors of deploying such regulatory instrument as indicated in Section 3.2.2.   
5.2.3 Policy imitation 
Another consequence of inadequate regulatory capacity is the issue of policy imitation 
– a situation where certain regulatory bodies ‘copy and paste’ frameworks from other 
countries and/or international organisations directly with little or no modifications to 
adapt such laws to the dynamics at play in their respective countries. The comments 
from four interviewees highlight this argument. For example, Interviewees2072 and 
2873 noted that: 
The USF model that is generally deployed in Africa is one that originated in Latin 
America back in the 1990s… There is always a question about whether it is 
transferring success out of the original Latin American countries to other 
places… I would question whether a model that was developed in the 1990s for a 
very different telecoms industry is likely to be the best model for today. 
Interviewee20 
Some regulators have also adopted a ‘copycat’ approach to policy formulation – 
this is evident when you take one country’s policy and compare with another, you 
will find that they all look the same. Interviewee28 
This sentiment was also shared by Interviewee474, who asserted that the tenets upon 
which the so-called Latin America model of USF are based emanated from the World 
Bank and that governments across Africa have, more or less, “copied and pasted” 
these policies without considering its implications and suitability to their contexts. 
Interviewee6, who was particularly vocal about South Africa, added that some 
countries have telecommunication policies that appear satisfactory on paper but 
fraught with difficulties in its implementation. For example, this interviewee stated 
that although South Africa came up with the idea of issuing ‘unserved and under 
service area licences’, the implementation never materialised due to a flawed policy. 
See Section 6.3.2 for more insight.  
 The comments from interviewees thus suggest that although it is critical to 
examine and reflect local factors in the decision-making process of a regulatory 
framework as various countries are dynamic and have their fundamental differences, 
                                                 
72A former head of an intergovernmental ICT body, now an independent consultant and researcher  
73 A former regulatory head 
74 A former regulator who is now a regional head of access policy for a multinational OTT 
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some parts of Africa, significantly late adopters of liberalisation, pay little or no 
attention to this when drawing from alien policies. This confirms the argument in 
Section 3.5 that the regulatory frameworks of early liberalising countries tend to 
influence that of late adopters. As such, the implementation of USF becomes 
problematic and difficult to execute and manage. This underlines the argument that a 
‘one size fits all’ approach would most likely yield less result in a dynamic sector like 
telecommunications (ITU, 2013b; O’Donovan & Johnston, 2016). Figure 12 indicates 
that a possible reason for policy imitation in the region could linked to the lack of 
regulatory skills needed to draw up country-specific policies for UAS. Therefore, such 
policies do not account for local factors and this is reflected in the inefficiency of USF 
to expand mobile coverage in disadvantaged areas across Africa. 
5.2.4 Narrow scope of USF  
Apart from policy imitation, Figure 12 highlights that another impact of inadequate 
regulatory capacity, as supported by five interviewees, including one UAS director, is 
the narrow scope of USF in terms of the variety of telecommunication services covered 
by UAS. Interviewees articulated that regulators not only lack the skills needed to draft 
a robust policy framework that can capture the diverse telecommunication needs of 
the public, they also lack the financial resources to expand the reach of USF in terms 
of the number of projects it can effectively monitor. This then restricts the ability of 
USF to push mobile coverage into disadvantaged areas. For example, Interviewee5 
stated that: 
…another difficulty is that… these funds have been around for a while 
considering when they were originally set up, the purposes for which the funds 
could be used were defined rather narrowly…but we need to do other things with 
the money now not the original ones and the simple example of that is that the 
money could be reserved for fixed development when what we really want is 
mobile… Interviewee5 
Interviewee1975 added that many USF frameworks may have been well configured for 
voice solutions but may not fully account for mobile networks as a means of providing 
internet usage for people. In other words, policies that are suitable for the provision of 
voice access may not be the best possible solution for providing data access. This 
interviewee then asserted that since telecommunications is constantly and rapidly 
                                                 
75 An independent research with interest in developing digital inclusion in developing economies  
 142 
 
changing, the implementation of USF should reflect such changes to avoid undesirable 
results: 
…telecoms is a moving target in the sense that if you are administering funds based 
on old technology, it is not going to fit. Interviewee19 
Interviewee1776 commented that one of the reasons why narrowly defined scope may 
undermine the performance of USF is the fact that since mobile telecommunications 
now include voice and data, targeting USF on voice alone may be counterproductive, 
as people are now increasingly in need of access to data almost as much as they need 
voice. Interviewee17 added that, providing one service (voice) and excluding or 
paying less attention to the other (data) may cause coverage gaps to persist.   
With respect to data, although this group of interviewees agreed that USF 
should be extended to cover emerging services like data, there seems to be a lack of 
consensus on what form of data should be considered as part of UAS. For example, 
Interviewee20 was of the opinion that for USF to really address digital gaps, the scope 
has to be extended to the provision of new technology and services like broadband. In 
contrast, Interviewee2577 disagreed arguing that it is a bit too early for African 
countries to include broadband within UAS, as it may not be economically viable at 
this stage of their telecommunications development. Such a disagreement is also 
highlighted in the literature in Section 3.3.4, where various UAS scholar failed to agree 
on what UAS should cover as technologies and services evolve. Interviewee19 then 
suggested the need for further research in order to provide more clarity on what should 
constitute “minimum” data.  
5.2.5 Idle funds 
Figure 12 indicates that a further consequence of inadequate regulatory capacity is 
reflected in the accumulation of large sums of unspent money lying idle in various 
USF across Africa. Although an accurate figure for this sum is lacking due to a dearth 
of public data, Section 3.4.5 projected over $400 million at the end of 2013. Although 
the regulators and fund managers interviewed for this study were reluctant to comment 
on this, 12 interviewees, including two established UAS experts who have consulted 
                                                 
76 A former multinational MNO executive responsible for public policy, who is now an international 
policy adviser 
77 One UAS director 
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and executed projects for various government across Africa, did voice their opinions. 
Their comments highlighted that idle funds are a chronic problem that hinders the 
implementation of USF in Africa and that this is partly connected to the lack of skills 
needed to quickly design projects and deploy funds. For example, Interviewee878 
disclosed that: 
There are multiple reasons for that [idle funds]. One… is a lack of skills and 
experience in infrastructure deployment… it is simply wrong to have USF 
resources sitting idle. If a USF is unsure what to do, they need to take note of 
some of the latest deployments in the likes of Kenya, Tanzania… and take a lead 
from there… Interviewee8 
Interviewee23, recounting an experience from the region, asserted that collecting 
levies for USF seem not to be a problem as the funds keep coming in from MNO but 
the problem lies in their non-disbursements. Unsurprisingly, Interviewee1179 asserted 
that MNO find such practice unpleasant as they complain that USF levies are just 
another form of taxation since governments collect the money without releasing it to 
support the expansion of coverage to disadvantaged areas as intended. 
 Apart from the lack of skills to design projects and deploy funds, interviewees 
also drew attention to three other factors responsible for the growing amount of idle 
funds across Africa as indicated in Section 3.4.5. The first of these is the collection of 
what appears to be an arbitrary USF levy, the second is the time lag between money 
collection and disbursement, and the third is government bureaucracies that cause 
undue delays in decision and implementation process as indicated in Figure 12. Using 
arbitrary levies, as an illustration, Interviewee11 commented that the percentage of 
USF levy in many countries is randomly determined, with the implication that USF 
accumulate rapidly with regulators struggling to design projects fast enough to match 
the funds. Interviewee11 further added that it is not sufficient to design projects but 
that funds collected have to match identified coverage gaps otherwise if policymakers 
collect more than is needed, then the extra funds lie idle. The question that then arose 
from this discussion was ‘what should be the right amount of levy for USF?’ 
                                                 
78 The head of one specialised access provider deploying mobile networks in disadvantaged areas in the 
region 
79 A USF specialist with over 15 years’ experience across 17 countries in Africa 
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Interviewee11 suggested that what they found from designing various USF projects 
across Africa is that USF levy should not be above 1%: 
We found, typically, as a rule of thumb, that regulators should not be collecting 
more than 1% of operators’ revenue and anything above that is not just good.  
Interviewee11. 
Such an assertion was made following several years of planning and implementing 
USF projects for different countries in the region. This appears to be largely 
inconsistent with the findings from the country analysis in Section 3.4.3, where it was 
found that 21 (60%) out of 35 funds in Africa have USF levies above 1% with the 
highest at 5% collected in Mauritius and Tunisia. Interviewee11 underlines one of the 
issues that resonated from the country analysis of USF in Africa – a widespread 
accumulation of unspent USF lying idle without disbursement, which governments 
divert elsewhere. In addition to undermining the performance of USF as pointed out 
by interviewees, Figure 12 highlights that idle funds encourage corruption and fund 
diversion.  
5.2.6 Corruption 
The comments from seven interviewees highlighted that idle funds encourage 
corruption, which then undermines the implementation of USF in Africa as some 
government officials and USF administrators misappropriate the funds. The following 
quotes from two leading figures help to illustrate this point: 
…unfortunately, we have to talk about corruption as these funds are being 
abused. I mean corruption is a problem that exists everywhere in the world and 
most certainly in places where people are paid very little to handle very huge sum 
of money… Interviewee1280 
…but the problem with our countries, given the weakness from the government 
perspectives, people see opportunities with these funds… So we find people 
managing these funds in a very subjective manner, therefore, corruption gets 
involved and the purpose is not met… Interviewee1381 
Interviewee12 added that, although corruption exists in every society, its high level 
across Africa, especially when it comes to the administration of public funds, is a cause 
for concern. Interviewee5 stated that even though money from USF are 
misappropriated and not made known to the public, it is generally accepted that it 
                                                 
80An access specialist and the director for business development of a niche provider  
81 A multinational MNO employee with a footprint across Africa in charge of public policy 
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happens and that this restricts the effectiveness of USF. Interviewee8 asserted that this 
is rather unfortunate considering that USF were established to address the 
telecommunication needs of the “rural poor” and not for satisfying the personal 
interest of policymakers.    
Interviewee5 asserted that in an attempt to safeguard USF from corruption, 
“excessive regulation” might result - in terms of putting strict rules in place to make 
it very difficult for anybody to do anything with the funds. Further adding that 
policymakers might become extremely anxious not to be accused of misappropriation 
that they avoid disbursing the funds even for the right purpose. Interviewee 5 
concluded that: 
…corruption is an insidious evil here: if it doesn’t do bad work, it makes it harder 
for anybody to do good work…  
 The corruption concern raised by interviewees is consistent with Section 3.2.2, 
which argued that public sector deployment of subsidies in emerging markets 
generally lack accountability and, as such, subsidisation is susceptible to political 
capture and corruption. It was also suggested that corruption disrupts the operation of 
USF and deprive disadvantaged areas of the needed resource for coverage expansion. 
The suspension of the operation of USF in South Africa in 2011 following a series of 
corruption allegations, is one of the few documented examples in Africa (ITU, 2013b). 
Therefore, evidence from both the interviews and country analysis suggest that 
corruption poses a threat to USF and can be problematic to the campaign of improving 
digital inclusion owing to the mismanagement of funds. 
5.2.7 Fund diversion 
Apart from corruption, ten interviewees also suggested that idle funds could lead to 
fund diversion as USF are reallocated to serve other purposes. The following quotes 
help to support this argument: 
There are a lot of funds being collected… but the problem is that the funds are 
being channelled to other areas to fulfill some short-term objectives of the 
politicians… They may be doing something good somewhere but they are not 
being used for the purpose they were created… Interviewee23 
…these funds end up on the balance sheet of the country and are used as assets to 
basically secure other loans. So they sit on the balance sheet of countries and they 
are unwilling to spend them because it makes them a little bit better… 
Interviewee12 
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Interviewee782 emphasised that in countries where funds are collected and then 
transferred to the national treasury, no sectoral reform would ameliorate the conditions 
in disadvantaged areas if governments do not refrain from such practice. Figure 12 
further illustrates that fund diversion has far-reaching consequences such as the award 
of low ‘maximum’ USF subsidy (see Section 3.4.4) and lack of project ownership and 
sustainability. Interviewee23 argued that since the diversion of fund limits the amount 
of money available for UAS projects, it creates a situation where policymakers indulge 
in under-pricing USF bids to the level that the execution and maintenance of network 
become unattractive and unstainable. Other interviewees commented that 
governments sometimes see USF as some form of tax revenue rather than using it to 
subsidise the expansion of telecommunications in needy locations. For example, 
Interviewee11 stated that: 
Sometimes operators say, ‘Oh we don’t like funds, they are just taxing us and we 
don’t want this’ and I understand that because in some countries, they just take the 
money and they don’t disburse it and that is a problem. Interviewee11 
The analyses in Sections 5.2.6 and 5.2.7 suggest that if idle funds are not 
diverted for personal use, governments can reallocate USF for other purposes. See 
Section 8.2.2 for the case of Kenya and Zimbabwe. This does not only limit the funds 
available to USF but also reduce the overall resources needed to help regulatory 
authorities discharge duties such as monitoring and enforcement. Consequently, 
Figure 12 highlights a complex link between idle funds, corruption, fund diversion, 
performance monitoring and regulatory capacity in the sense that where funds are 
misappropriated or diverted to other sectors, there is very little USF can achieve in 
terms of project execution and mobilising the regulator to monitor and enforce 
compliance.  
5.2.8 Undue political interference 
Eight interviewees agreed that another drawback limiting the implementation of USF 
in Africa is undue political interference by governments and politicians. For example: 
From my experience as a regulator, some of the problems undermining the 
performance of the fund include political influence where government sometimes 
                                                 
82 A UAS expert and research who consults for the ITU, Word Bank and some countries in Africa 
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divert the amount collected towards another project entirely not related to 
telecommunications. Interviewee283 
… USF are politicised a lot. This is a big problem in Africa because sometimes, 
they host these funds at the regulatory body, sometimes a complete body is 
created completely out of the regulator and sometimes a different unit is set up 
under the ministry to manage the fund. In all these forms, government has a lot to 
say about it. Interviewee4 
The above interview excerpts demonstrate that governments have the ability to alter 
the primary trajectory of USF to fit either their short-term interests or personal gains. 
The corruption case of the USF in South Africa (Section 5.2.6) and the diversion of 
USF in Kenya and Zimbabwe (Section 8.2.2) are some illustrative examples of this in 
practice. This suggests that regulators in such countries can become corrupt and 
subject to the influence of politicians, instead of being professional and free to perform 
their duties objectively. This supports the argument in Section 3.2.2 that subsidies are 
susceptible to political capture as those responsible for managing the process may 
abuse the system. 
Figure 12 indicates that six interviewees commented that such practice would 
undermine the regulatory process and erode its independence as specified by 
respective enactments. Interviewee13 asserted that: 
…we have a problem in Africa in terms of best practices that encourage the 
government to have independent regulators… whose position is not politically 
affected without fear or favour... If you look at the US – FCC, if you look at the 
UK – Ofcom… the effort is made. But what we find, in most of the cases in Africa, 
is that they put together a legal framework that makes the regulator basically a 
division of the department of telecoms or an office in the presidency. This means 
they will be… subjected to any form of political interference and put in question 
the objectivity of the sector. 
Furthermore, Interviewee6 argued that if regulatory bodies were truly independent as 
enshrined in the law, their ability to implement USF and perform other regulatory 
functions should be free from the encumbrance of government and politicians as 
observed in certain parts of Africa. Interviewee5 also recounted that: 
…there are possibilities where the fund will go to villages where the politicians come 
from in order to build political support for their return to office in the next elections.  
Since regulators are afraid of losing their jobs, Interviewee5 continued, they simply 
comply even when they know that such decision is detrimental to USF. Evidence of 
                                                 
83A senior regulatory figure  
 148 
 
this is illustrated in the case of South Africa where Mmatlou Morudu, a former 
executive manager of programmes at USAASA84, alleged that he was dismissed from 
his position for failing to award a R500 million (about $47 million) contract to Cell C 
to upgrade networks in Emalahleni Local Municipality on the instruction of the ruling 
African National Congress (Bailey, 2014).  
 Apart from distorting USF allocation, undue political influence, according to 
Interviewee1585, leads to the award of USF projects to players who do not have the 
‘means’ to service disadvantaged locations. It was also suggested that this could result 
in the appointment/recruitment of unqualified regulatory personnel or people with the 
wrong skill sets, which could then subject the management and operation of USF to 
difficulties. Consequently, any attempt to formulate public policy to address market 
failure without accounting for the interests of those who are tasked with the 
administration and formulation of intervention would amount to little results (Section 
3.2.3). This then raises the question of how to guarantee regulatory independence since 
the sector regulator and USF manager are part of the wider public institutions created, 
funded and run by the government. The response of Interviewee13 appears apt: 
Obviously, you cannot have an institution that is separate from government but 
independence comes from the fact that the process that has been put in place to 
create that institution, appoint people to run that institution, does not allow 
government to give them direct instructions in terms of how they should run the 
sector… Interviewee13 
This suggests that ‘true’ regulatory independence comes from the fact that such 
institution should be empowered and set up in a way that no matter who comes to 
power, the decisions and operation of the regulatory body would be difficult to 
influence. The above analysis presents a complex, yet, interconnected web of issues. 
For example, the comments from interviewees indicate that undue political influence 
could be linked to corruption and fund diversion. Altogether, these three issues could 
also be linked back to inadequate regulatory capacity as shown in Figure 12, signalling 
a domino effect where one issue triggers another. Likewise, the lack of accountability 
and transparency, which is addressed in the next section, also reflects in this complex 
relationship. 
                                                 
84 Universal Service and Access Agency of South Africa 
85 A senior representative of one pan-Africa MNO 
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5.2.9 Lack of accountability and transparency  
Figure 12 indicates that undue political influence also promotes a lack of 
accountability and transparency. Accountability and transparency here involve public 
availability and accessibility of up-to-date information relating to, for example, cash 
inflows and outflows as well as details of executed, on-going and planned USF 
projects. The correspondence from six interviewees, including Interviewee2, 
underline the argument that USF in Africa largely lacks transparency as their 
operations and management are obscured from the public even though USF is set up 
to serve public interest. For example, Interviewee5 stated that: 
Another problem is a lack of transparency as a lot of these funds don’t produce 
proper reports and although it is very much a matter of public interest but the 
public can’t find out anything about it. And where they do produce financial 
reports, they are very much out of date… Interviewee5 
 Evidence from the 34 funds surveyed as part of this study shows that although 
Lesotho, Nigeria, Rwanda and Tanzania are among the few examples of USF with 
publicly available financial records, such information is typically insufficient and/or 
outdated, with the exception of Uganda (see Appendix A and Section 3.4.5). The 
message here appears to be consistent with Estache and Wren-Lewis (2009) who 
found that institutions in emerging markets such as those in Africa are generally less 
accountable than developed countries and, as such, may be susceptible to the 
manipulation of governments and politicians.  
Figure 12 indicates that countries where governments can unduly influence 
USF lack the political will and incentive to promote accountability and transparency. 
Similarly, such practice may also encourage corruption and funds diversion because 
if regular stewardship and reporting were to be allowed, it may help to forestall 
misappropriation of funds and deter the government from starving USF of its money. 
It then goes without saying that a fund that is more transparent in its dealings and 
accountants publicly for the money in its possession would be more likely to hedge 
itself against the influence of corruption and funds diversion, and contribute more to 
coverage expansion as illustrated with the case of Uganda in Appendix A and Section 
3.4.5.          
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5.2.10 Lack of Interest from MNO 
The evidence presented in Sections 5.2.5 to 5.2.9 aggregate to support the argument 
that, although a substantial amount of money is being amassed by various USF as 
indicated in Section 3.4.5, very little is invested into the extension of mobile coverage 
in disadvantaged areas. Six interviewees, including a regulator and a former executive 
of a multinational MNO, were of the opinion that in countries where the issues raised 
in Sections 5.2.5 to 5.2.9 are prevalent, MNO may be discouraged and lose interest in 
the whole process of digital inclusion. With respect to idle funds, for instance, 
Interviewe11 noted that:  
…Sometimes operators say, ‘Oh we don’t like funds, they are just taxing us, we 
don’t want this,’ and I understand that because in some countries, they just take 
the money and they don’t disburse it and that is a problem… Interviewee11 
If governments continue to collect USF without disbursement, this may discourage 
MNO from participating in the whole process of promoting digital inclusion since the 
money meant for implementing the process is being held back. See Section 8.2.2 for 
the case of Econet in Zimbabwe. When MNO become disinterested, this could also 
impinge on the ability of governments to collect USF levies, which some policymakers 
are already finding problematic. For example, when Interviewee2 was asked what 
were the challenges facing USF in their country, the comment was that: 
From my experience as a regulator, one of the challenges of USF is trying to 
involve the operators, as they may not agree with the rules of engagements set by 
government… This leads to another challenge of trying to collect the money from 
operators at the end of each period. Interviewee2 
The [formal] ‘rules of engagements set by government’ highlighted in the 
aforementioned quote include the amount of subsidy allocated to USF project, which 
may be set very low as a result of idle funds, corruption and fund diversion. For 
example, Section 5.2.7 suggested that fund diversion might result in the under-pricing 
of USF bids to the level that the execution and maintenance of network become 
unattractive and unstainable. Interviewee23 commented that this hinders the 
participation of MNO in making bids for projects from the outset. Therefore, the 
concerns raised in Sections 5.2.5 to 5.2.9 can erode the trustworthiness of the 
campaign of digital inclusion and question governments commitment to providing 
telecommunication services for all. In jurisdictions where this happens, it becomes 
difficult for policymakers to gain the trust, cooperation, and contribution of MNO 
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towards coverage expansion. This is consistent with Section 3.2.2, which highlighted 
that this may result in the dysfunctional behaviour of market actors and detract the 
regulator from mitigating market failure.  
Distinctively, three other interviewees, including Interviewee19, hinted that 
the lack of MNO interest in UAS is linked to basic economics, as areas perceived as 
less commercially viable would receive less attention and investment. For example, 
Interviewee23 commented that:  
Operators also say ‘oh it is a hassle going into such areas’ as it is not so easy; 
hence, they also try to find the easy way, i.e., the deployment of telecom services 
in areas which are lucrative… So if the operators are much more profitable in 
bigger cities, then they naturally gravitate towards such locations as these 
companies were made for profits. They see rural areas as an extra burden, which 
doesn’t bring much…  
This quote shifts the focus of the discussion to another theme: the lack of economic 
feasibility. 
5.3 Lack of economic feasibility  
Over half the interviewees, including a mix of regulators, consultants and researchers, 
stated that a host of complex and interconnected issues pertaining to the costs and 
benefits of network deployment would make an area either commercially viable or 
unviable. This, in turn, influences the investment decisions of MNO. For example, 
Interviewee1 noted that: 
…it is simply a matter of economics that the existing technology used by the 
mobile network operators and the operational costs associated doesn't make it 
profitable for them to extend their networks into remote sparsely populated rural 
areas, and those areas bring their own challenges as well. Interviewee1 
Interviewee13 added: 
You can’t spend $6000 or $7000 a month [OPEX] on a site that gives you only 
$200. Interviewee13 
It, therefore, goes without saying that the prevailing lack of economic feasibility in 
disadvantaged areas is a major contributing factor to low mobile coverage in such 
locations and this is largely fuelled by prohibitive transaction costs86, that is, a 
disproportionate level of costs relative to returns on investment. Hence, MNO only 
                                                 
86 Transaction costs in this study means the costs of network deployment and maintenance (see Section 
3.2.1). 
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have the appetite of improving coverage in commercial areas (Oiteno, 2018). This 
appears to have stalled the expansion of mobile coverage across Africa as evident in 
the 500 million odd mobile connections generally reported and particularly illustrated 
with the case of Kenya where over 10% of the population has remained unserved since 
2013 (Collins, 2015; Dorward, 2013; GSMA, 2016b; 2017b; ITU, 2013b; Manson, 
2013; Otieno, 2018). The market failure of uneven mobile coverage can thus persist 
when the costs of deploying and maintaining infrastructure surpass the benefits 
derived (Section 3.2.1). This is further reinforced in a recent study by the ITU where 
Lehr (2018) asserted that “the social and economic adjustment costs of responding to 
the forces of digital transformation are significant and may exacerbate inequalities 
between haves and have-nots”.  
Unlike the complex data map in Chapter 4 (Figure 11), Figure 13 provides a 
focused version that shows a more nuanced interaction between the issues related to 
this theme.  
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Figure 13: Lack of economic feasibility 
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5.3.1 Rights of way 
The starting point of the argument raised under this theme revolves around the costs 
of network deployment and maintenance vis-à-vis and returns on investment, which 
feeds into business sustainability. Regarding costs, four interviewees, including 
Interviewee2, revealed that the costs and difficulties of obtaining rights of way in some 
parts of Africa further add to the discontentment of MNO from participating in 
coverage expansion. For example, Interviewee23 said that: 
Rights of way is a big issue, especially, when you are outside the cities. First of 
all, to get the right of way from the government is a big hassle and if you have to 
pass through a private land, the owners will ask for money. All these make it 
difficult to lay a fibre or erect a tower in such places because the moment they 
find out that it is a telecoms company, they say ‘ah okay, that means money. 
Interviewee23 
Interviewee1887 added that from their experience in facilitating rural 
telecommunications projects in Africa, operators always say that their “biggest 
problem” is land acquisition and environmental issues. According to the interviewees, 
rights of way in telecommunications not only provide operators with the needed land 
and/or space to deploy physical network infrastructure such as towers and cables but 
also encompass the ability to obtain environmental approval from relevant agencies. 
They further suggested that such land and space are usually not owned by the MNO, 
hence the need to negotiate costs of acquisition or lease with landowners and host 
communities. Furthermore, the installation of new sites, more often than not, requires 
some sort of clearance from environmental agencies. It came across from interviewees 
that, not only is it costly to obtain a concession to use public and private lands, but 
negotiating and obtaining an environmental clearance is also complicated and fraught 
with difficulties, which adds extra costs to network deployment.  
Juxtaposing this with the prevailing low-income in countries such as, for 
example, Burundi, Madagascar and Togo (World Bank, 2018c) and the legacy 
problem of lack of supporting infrastructure (Section 2.2), over ten interviewees, as 
indicated in Figure 13, argued that the resulting ARPU may not be enough to sustain 
network operations. As such, MNO would see no economic justification to expand 
coverage into such locations. Evidence from the country analysis further strengthens 
                                                 
87 A regulatory specialist with an international lending organisation who is working with countries in 
Eastern Africa to improve coverage in disadvantaged areas 
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this argument. For example, the Executive Vice-Chairman of the NCC, Professor 
Umar Danbatta, echoed this sentiment saying that the demand for the issuance of rights 
of way from states and local government across Nigeria is one of the factors 
threatening the expansion of mobile networks in the country (Adepoju, 2016b). 
5.3.2 Spectrum costs and allocation 
Another area that tends to exacerbate the transaction costs of network deployment is 
frequency spectrum pricing and administration. Unsurprisingly, of the seven 
interviewees that shared this sentiment, MNO were particularly vocal. Perhaps this 
may be due to the critical impact spectrum has on the success of mobile 
telecommunications and the fact that it is a limited resource with an increasing demand 
(ITU, 2007; Curwen & Whalley, 2010; Song, 2016a). Interviewee13 stated that: 
…cost of spectrum is priced beyond any business plan… We had an instance in 
*** [a country in Africa] where… they wanted to sell 4G LTE spectrum on 
auction and the reserve price was around $62 million. Now when you do a 
business plan, you realise quickly that you cannot get that money back as it is 
simply too expensive. Interviewee13 
Recounting their experience in the region, Interviewee18 and Interviewee23 also 
added: 
On the other hand, this [spectrum auction] was acting like a barrier as only big 
operators… can participate in these auctions. Ordinary businessperson or 
entrepreneur can never participate because the minimum base price to enter these 
auctions is like hundreds of millions of dollars… Interviewee18 
…considering the high costs of deployment, why would government and 
regulators still fix a high price for spectrum? Interviewee23 
The responses from interviewees suggest that policymakers in some parts of Africa 
set spectrum prices that do not reflect the socio-economic conditions in respective 
countries considering that MNO will need to spend ‘significant’88 amount of 
investment on supporting infrastructure like electricity and roads as recounted by 13 
interviewees in Figure 13. For example: 
                                                 
88 For example, the cost of running a typical BTS (base transeiver station) in African countries like 
Malawi and Zambia takes up to 40% of the overall network opex with about 13 litres of diesel needed 
to power a single site and nearly half of the over 240,000 BTS across Africa are deployed in off-grid 
locations (Malakata, 2015; Kumar, 2014). Therefore, MNO need to deploy electricity alongside 
networks (Deloitte, 2014; Lerner, Fukui, & Gallegos, 2017). 
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 … if you pick countries where other kinds of infrastructure… are poorly developed 
such as road, rail, power, it just adds significant expense to the mobile network 
operator… Interviewee1 
Interviewee17 added: 
So if anyone is thinking about extending coverage, they should think carefully about 
the conditions they attach to spectrum licence. 
These interviewees were unanimous in their assertion that the lack of supporting 
infrastructure, significantly electricity, coupled with spectrum prices further increase 
the overall transaction costs of network deployment and maintenance. This makes it 
harder for both small and large players to recoup their investment, especially in areas 
perceived as commercially unviable. Table 9 below illustrates some examples of 
spectrum pricing across Africa. 
Table 9: Examples of spectrum pricing across Africa 
Country Year of 
auction 
Spectrum awarded Amount 
Algeria 2016 4G LTE 
Mobilis for DZD 5 billion 
 
Optimum Telecom Algeria for DZD 4 
billion  
 
Ooredoo for DZD 2 billion 
 
$45.9M 
 
$36.3M 
 
$18.1M 
Egypt 2016 4G spectrum licence initially offered at 
 
After rejection from MNO, a new offer 
was made as follows:  
 
4G LTE licence with 20MHz to Orange 
 
4G LTE licence with 5MHz to 
Vodafone 
 
4G LTE licence with 10MHz to Etisalat 
$806M 
 
 
 
 
$484M 
 
$37M 
 
$60M 
Ghana 2015 
2017 
2x10 in 800MHz 
4G LTE licence 
$67.5M 
$67.5M 
Kenya 2016 
 
 
2018 
800MHz for 
Including obligation to share 30% 
capacity with smaller operators 
4G LTE licence in the 800MHz band 
$25M each to the three MNO 
– Airtel, Orange and 
Safaricom 
$25M paid by Airtel Kenya 
Niger 2018 4G licence issued to Airtel $22M  
Nigeria 2007 
2013 
2016 
Four blocks of 10MHz paired spectrum 
in the 2GHz band for 3G services at 
One slot of 30MHz in the 2.3GHz band 
One slot of 2x5MHz in the 2.6GHz 
band 
(with a total of 14 slots) 
$150M each 
 
$23M 
$16M 
Senegal 2016 4G spectrum licence $51M 
South 
Africa 
2016 600, 700, and 800 MHz bands $200M each 
Source: Compiled by author from a variety of sources  
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It can be observed from Table 9 that different spectrum prices apply across Africa, 
sometimes substantially so. For example, 800MHz is offered for $200 million in South 
Africa while Kenya offers the same band for a significantly lower amount, albeit with 
an obligation for the three main players to share 30% of their network capacity with 
smaller providers. Furthermore, the three main players in Egypt initially refused to 
apply for 4G LTE licence offered by the regulator in the last quarter of 2016 because 
of the asking price, which they argued would make their business plans commercially 
unviable. The CEO of Vodafone Ghana, Yolanda Cuba, also shared this sentiment 
arguing that the $67.5 million set by NCA89 for a 4G licence as indicated in Table 8  
is too ‘high’. Yolanda asserted that, although MTN, who also complained about the 
price, had acquired the licence, Vodafone would only do so when NCA offers a price 
that is economically viable to its business and customers (Lokko, 2017). Despite such 
concern, NCA appears unwilling to lower the price as the Communications Minister, 
Ursula Owusu, said, “there is no way we will go below that amount [$67.5 million]…” 
Furthermore, interviewees also highlighted that the decision-making process 
around spectrum administration appears to be fraught with inconsistency and 
uncertainty, and that such practice makes it difficult for MNO to project and plan for 
future expansion. This was amplified in the response of Interviewee1 thus: 
I think the other problem that has emerged is that spectrum has gone from a 
relative surplus to apparent scarcity. I say apparent because I think there is 
spectrum available but it is a kind of administrative scarcity as opposed to a 
tangible or physical scarcity… So, generally across the continent, we have seen 
very, very slow release of new spectrum to operators… Interviewee1 
This suggests that spectrum allocation policy in some parts of Africa could be deficient 
in terms of delays and creation of scarcity. According to the Group Chief Technology 
Officer of MTN, Babak Fouladi, when policymakers delay spectrum allocation, it 
limits the ability of MNO to rollout network and extend services (Mamabolo, 2016). 
Also see Section 8.2.1 for the case of South Africa where an impasse between sector 
ministry and the regulator has led to an ‘indefinite’ postponement of spectrum auction 
and allocation for bands 700MHz, 800MHz and 2600MHz.   
                                                 
89 National Communications Authority 
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5.3.3 Taxation 
Concerns were also raised about the prevailing system of taxation in the sector. Five 
interviewees indicated that the tax burden on the sector is an issue of concern in terms 
of the rates and multiple charges across countries. The response from Interviewee13 
underline this argument thus: 
The tax pressure is extremely high and increasing by the day. You have the 
general tax, the income tax, and then you have what we call telecoms-specific tax, 
inbound tax, SIM cards import, handsets, tax on literally everything… why would 
you, in a place where service is so expensive and penetration is so low, impose a 
tax on handsets importation, for example? Interviewee13 
Interviewee17 added that government actions like taxing mobile devices and other 
telecommunications equipment appear puzzling considering that regulation ought to 
be driving down the transaction costs of getting people connected as low as possible 
to mitigate market failure. Interviewee17 argued that such practice has the tendency 
of undermining the success that has been recorded in the sector post liberalisation. 
This echoes the view in Section 3.2 that government intervention should not only focus 
on promoting equity but also stimulate economic efficiency. Triangulating the 
responses of interviewees with the secondary evidence from the literature and country 
analysis, Table 10 highlights some examples of sector-specific taxes across Africa. 
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  Table 10: Examples of mobile telecoms related taxes across Africa 
Tax Country example Comment 
Airtime tax Airtime is applicable in 12 countries in Africa. For example, 10% in DRC, 18% in 
Gabon, 3% in Niger, 10%, 10% in Kenya and Tanzania, 12% in Uganda, etc. 
A flat rate of $0.06 is applicable in Angola 
Zimbabwe: $0.5 levy on every $1 worth of airtime and mobile data top-up 
Algeria increased airtime tax from 5% to 7%   
 
Corporate tax Cameroon: 39% on MNO compared to 25% standard rate 
Tunisia: 35% on MNO compared to 25% standard rate 
This tax is levied on organisations’ profits, but from the data, it 
is clear that MNO are taxed higher than the standard rate 
applicable to non-telecoms organisations. 
According to Deloitte and GSMA, average telecoms tax rate in 
Africa and Asia (just below 30%) is the highest globally while 
Latin America and Europe lag behind at 25% and under 25%, 
respectively.  
Customer duties Gabon: $5 flat rate on imported handsets  
Madagascar: 1% tax on imported handsets  
Mozambique: 7.5% tax on imported handsets  
Nigeria: 12% customs duty is charged on imported handsets 
Zambia: 5% tax on imported handsets 
 
VAT and excise 
tax  
Angola: 5% VAT on basic telecom services – voice and SMS. Another 5% is applied to 
advanced services like data (10% standard rate) 
Egypt: 15% VAT on mobile services (10% standard rate) 
Lesotho: 5% apiece for both basic and advanced telecom services (14% standard rate) 
Tanzania: 10% excise flat rate on telecom services 
Uganda: 10% and 20% excise on basic and advanced services, respectively (18% 
standard rate) 
5% VAT currently applies in Nigeria. Additional 9% telecom service bill is being 
considered by the National Assembly in a country where data affordability is a major 
concern and internet penetration is still low 
Algeria increased VAT on mobile services  - from 7% to 19% on data and 17% to 19% 
on voice 
The value-added tax (VAT) is typically applied to the final 
goods and services of consumers. While some countries apply 
a flat and sometimes higher VAT on telecom services, others 
apply different rate on basic and advanced services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sector-specific 
consumer tax 
Gabon: $5 flat rate is applied to handsets sale 
Ghana: 20% handsets tax 
Some countries in Africa levy consumer tax on mobile devices 
in addition to VAT 
Sector-specific 
MNO tax 
Tanzania: 12% tax is applied to MNO revenue 
South Sudan: exercise duty on telecoms services increased from 10 to 15% in 2018 
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Tax Country example Comment 
Other taxes Nigeria: MNO pay other taxes to local and state governments 
Kenya: 10% flat rate is applied to mobile money transactions 
Tanzania:10% flat rate on mobile money transactions 
Uganda: 10% tax applies on mobile money transactions and 14% is applied to revenues 
that accrue to MNO from mobile money  
     20% SIM cards tax is applicable in Nigeria 
In Nigeria, these non-standard taxes are coined in different 
names like environmental taxes, etc. 
  Source: compiled by the author from a variety of sources.  
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Table 10 clearly helps to establish the veracity of the claims made by interviewees. 
Not only is the sector subject to relatively higher corporate taxes than the standard 
rates, the industry is also subjected to multiple taxes. For example, the standard 
corporate tax rate in Cameroon is 25% in contrast with 39% on MNO as indicated in 
Table 10. Of particular concern is the effect of such taxes on services and transactions 
of small denominations, which are typically generated by low-income earners. For 
example, a significant number of suburban and rural dwellers who do not have access 
to traditional banking infrastructure across Africa use mobile money (Abdella, 2017; 
World Bank, 2015). At the end of 2014, the value of mobile money transactions was 
over $45 billion across Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, an equivalent of 32% of their 
combined GDP (GSMA, 2016a). Across these three Eastern African countries, 10% 
tax is levied on mobile money transactions as shown in Table 10. The comments of 
interviewees suggest that this has the tendency of limiting the adoption of such mobile 
services as taxes are reflected in charges offered by the MNO. This is consistent with 
studies (GSMA & Deloitte, 2015; GSMA, 2017c) that found that taxes on mobile 
money in Eastern African countries like Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe come with 
the consequence of excluding people from digital financial inclusion. 
 Apart from such taxes, there is also pressure from various government agencies 
who impose series of charges on the industry. This can be illustrated with the case of 
Nigeria where IHS, a towerco, is in dispute with three states in the country (Cross 
River, Enugu and Kogi) over ‘illegal’ charges (Akintaro, 2018). The Kogi State Fire 
Agency is demanding “safety charges”, Enugu State Waste Management wants 
payment for “effluent discharge permit fee” and the Cross River State Infrastructure 
Safety and Regulation Agency is asking for evidence of state “permits and approval” 
before HIS can deploy infrastructure (Akintaro, 2018). The NCC is currently trying to 
intervene in the issue since IHS has legally obtained its licence and paid the relevant 
fees to the regulator.       
 Such charges and taxes could be absorbed by market actors with the 
consequence that it affects their ARPU and discourages further investment, or the 
burden may be shifted to subscribers and limit service usage with a wider negative 
impact on the sector (Afadhali, 2016; GSMA, 2016a; Tredger, 2014). Furthermore, it 
is interesting to note from Table 9 that Eastern African countries have the highest 
cumulative rate of telecommunication taxes and the least mobile penetration region in 
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Africa as indicated in Chapter 2. Interviewee13 also asserted that multiple taxes could 
also impinge on the affordability of mobile devices and services as vendors and MNO 
would more likely shift the tax burden to the consumers as indicated in Figure 13. 
Where this is not possible, the industry may end up neglecting such areas altogether 
resulting in market failure that stems from incomplete market as explained in Section 
3.2.1. This leads to the next discussion on affordability.   
5.3.4 Affordability barriers 
Affordability is one of the fundamental principles for achieving UAS as argued in 
Section 3.3.1. To recount, it refers to the ability of everybody to pay for 
telecommunication services regardless of location and income level. Figure 13 
indicates that the issues raised in Sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.3 aggregate to exacerbate high 
costs of network deployment and maintenance, which then feeds into affordability in 
terms of the ability of end-users to purchase mobile devices and pay for mobile tariffs. 
Take taxation (5.3.3), for instance, the response from Interviewee13 appears apt: 
Now, what that does [tax pressure] is that it puts pressure on the viability of the 
business and as a business, since we are not NGOs, we can only pass that on to 
the customers and this makes the service a bit more expensive and it does 
challenge the affordability… This also does not help in terms of incentivising 
operators to invest enough. Interviewee13 
Over 50% of interviewees voiced their unease on this issue, an indication that 
affordability is one of the major explanations of the digital divide in Africa in terms 
of limiting mobile adoption. This is consistent with Section 2.4, which highlights that 
affordability is one of the causes of digital divide. The discussion of affordability is 
broken down into mobile tariffs and cost of mobile devices as examined below. 
5.3.4.1 Mobile tariffs 
There was a general consensus among seven interviewees that although mobile tariffs, 
particularly for voice, have declined compared to what prevailed during the early stage 
of market liberalisation, but the same cannot be said of advanced services like data. 
Interviewee5 and 1690 were quite vocal on this. 
…they [MNO] should be providing telecom services…at affordable cost and perhaps 
with a graded fee structure to make small transactions very inexpensive… 
Interviewee5 
                                                 
90 A senior figure of a civil society organisation with over 20 countries 
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I don't think they [MNO] should expand – they provide too costly an option for 
most rural Africans…Interviewee16  
These comments emanated when the interviewees were asked to suggest ways to 
encourage MNO to expand into disadvantaged areas. Other interviewees added that: 
…people perceive the need but there is affordability problem where they 
fundamentally do not have income to subscribe to these services. Interviewee17 
…affordability is also an issue because even if people are somehow not faced with 
the first three problems I have discussed, they may not be able to pay for it as the 
tariff, particularly for broadband is more expensive than voice. Interviewee23 
Interviewees further suggested that affordability of mobile tariffs is not only a major 
challenge for people in suburban and rural areas across Africa, but also for low-income 
earners in urban areas, especially when the cost for data subscription is included. For 
further triangulation, Table 10 highlights tariff bundles91 using some examples across 
Africa in contrast with OECD Telecommunications Price Baskets92, which offers 
valuable means of assessing and comparing the tariffs ‘experienced’ by subscribers 
across OECD countries (OECD, 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 This is a tariff strategy whereby MNO offer one or more telecommunication service as a package to 
end-users, that is, voice, SMS, and data services as a single price offering (Research ICT Africa, 2014; 
Telecoms Pricing, 2014). For example, a bundle may consist of a given number of minutes for voice 
calls, SMS and/or allocation of a given unit of data all in one tariff plan. 
92 OECD Telecommunications Price Baskets is a methodology that pulls together the prices of 
telecommunication services – bundles - offered by operators to calculate the average tariff paid by 
subscribers across OECD countries (OECD, 2017).  
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Table 11: Examples of tariff bundles across Africa 
Country MNO Bundle offering OECD Price 
Baskets ($) 
Cheapest country 
offering ($) 
Angola Movicel Voice, SMS, data 25.68 19.84 
Egypt Mobinil 
Etisalat 
Vodafone  
Voice and SMS 
Voice and data 
Voice 
13.01 
6.94 
6.94 
2.77 
Cameroon Orange  Voice and SMS 8.40 8.40 
Kenya Orange 
Airtel  
Voice and SMS 
Voice and SMS 
3.52 
2.39 
1.47 
Tanzania Airtel 
Tigo 
Vodafone 
Zanzibar 
Telecom 
Voice, SMS, data 
Voice, SMS, data 
Voice, SMS, data 
Voice and SMS 
6.40 
6.41 
9.60 
19.19 
6.40 
Namibia Telecom 
mobile 
MTC 
Voice, SMS, data 
Voice, SMS, data 
 
8.05 
12.71 
8.05 
Nigeria Glo Voice and SMS 6.12 4.49 
South Africa MTN 
Cell C 
Voice, SMS, data 
Voice, SMS, data 
91.98 
91.98 
4.85 
Source: Research ICT Africa (2014). 
From the eight examples provided in Table 11, the mobile tariffs of bundle 
offerings in five (Angola, Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa) countries are 
higher than the cheapest offering. For instance, the bundle offering by Glo in Nigeria 
is 1.3 times93 higher than the cheapest country offering while it is 19 times94 higher in 
South Africa. However, the trends in Cameroon, Namibia, and Tanzania show a mixed 
picture, as mobile tariffs of bundle offering are equivalent to the cheapest country 
offering. Table 11 thus highlights the concern raised by interviewees that the 
affordability of mobile tariffs in some parts of Africa remains a challenge, especially 
in relation to average earnings in the continent, which is $1000 or less per capita 
annually than in the rest of the world (Anderson, 2016). For example, Malawians 
spend over $12/month on mobile services, an equivalent of more than 50% of an 
average monthly income in the country and up 22% among rural dwellers in South 
Africa (ITU, 2014; Gilbert, 2016b). This is in stark contrast to the 5% recommended 
by the UN (A4AI, 2017b; ITU, 2013a). Consequently, although the introduction 
pricing strategies like bundling have contributed to driving down prices, the mobile 
                                                 
93 6.12/4.49 = ~ 1.3 
94 91.98/4.85 = ~ 19 
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tariffs being offered are still very high or at the very least, limit the rate of mobile 
adoption for data related services (Katlic, 2014; Telecoms Pricing, 2014). 
5.3.4.2 Cost of mobile devices 
According to five interviewees, another way affordability challenges mobile coverage 
and adoption in Africa is the cost of mobile devices. Interviewee17 stated that: 
…another big piece is the affordability issue, which includes the cost of 
devices…Historically, in many of these countries, it has been difficult to get low-
cost devices that really have good data connectivity because having the user 
interface, the battery power and so forth to support data usage adds a lot of cost 
to the device… Interviewee17 
Interviewee2295 added that the high cost of mobile devices, especially smartphones96, 
is a major barrier to mobile penetration and adoption among the rural poor. Overall, 
the responses from interviewees suggested that the affordability of smartphones is a 
very critical issue in the campaign of digital inclusion because the demand and use of 
data are fast becoming more important than it was a few years ago before the advent 
of mobile applications and social networks. Smartphones are fast becoming the 
platform of choice for accessing these advanced services and applications, which are 
increasingly becoming critical socio-economic enablers (Manson, 2013; ITU, 2017a).     
The proliferation of second-hand and low-cost smartphones from advanced 
countries in Europe and North America as well as emerging markets like China and 
Taiwan have increased across Africa by 20% between 2013 and 2015 (GSMA, 2015a). 
However, contrasting that with the world average of 40%, one can understand the 
argument made by interviewees that more needs to be done to close the gaps in 
smartphones affordability in Africa. The case becomes even more compelling when 
the average price range for low-cost smartphones in the continent, which is between 
$100 and $50, is compared to the prevailing $1000 or so per annual capita income 
                                                 
95 A long-term academic and UAS expert 
96 These are high-end mobile phones with advanced computing capabilities, execute an identifiable OS 
such as Android, Windows, iOS, allow for multiple and fast connectivity to GSM, Wi-Fi, etc., and 
allow third party application installation from app centres (Donovan & Martin, 2012; Theoharidou, 
Mylonas, & Gritzalis, 2012) 
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(Anderson, 2016; GSMA, 2015b). As a result, feature phones97 adoption has increased 
in Africa from 55% in 2016 to 60% in 2017 while smartphones adoption fell from 
45% to 40% in the same period, driven by the activities of Transsion, a Chinese low-
cost manufacturer (Balancing Act, 2018c). This indicates that the cost of smartphones 
is still a lot of money for low-income earners who form a bulk of Africa’s population 
(World Bank, 2017).  
 Evidence from the data suggests that the cost of smartphones, especially for 
low-income earners, can be partly linked to the tax policy in the sector, for example, 
Interviewee13 asserted that: 
…Why would you, in a place where service is so expensive and penetration is so low, 
impose a tax on handsets importation?  …we can only pass that on to the customers, 
this makes the service a bit more expensive, and it does challenge the affordability. 
 
Interviewees agreed that tax policy such as charging ‘high’ or multiple duties on the 
importation of smartphones would lead to increase in the prices offered by vendors, 
making the cost of smartphones more expensive. This could then act as a disincentive 
for the industry to expand coverage in the sense that mobile adoption by end-users 
could be restricted by their inability to afford mobile devices. This indicates that a 
complementary segment of the market is missing, which could result in a market 
failure that stems from a missing market as highlighted in Section 3.2.1. This raises 
the issue of mobile adoption and usage as examined in the next section.  
5.3.5 ICT adoption and usage 
This section explores the benefit component accruable to MNO by looking at various 
factors that influence mobile adoption and usage, which then impacts on ARPU and 
returns on investment. According to Interviewee17: 
The economics of mobile network deployment is all about the cost of providing the 
network relative to the revenue you can earn. The difference between urban and 
rural areas, fundamentally, is that in rural areas, the costs are higher particularly in 
Africa since you may need to cover a bigger area as there are fewer people in terms 
of the density of usage… Interviewee17 
                                                 
97 These are low-end mobile phones with low bandwidth connectivity or limited computing capacities, 
hence, cannot not run operating system (OS) or at the very least, run limited OS such as Android, 
Windows, and iOS (Donovan & Martin, 2012; Theoharidou, Mylonas, & Gritzalis, 2012). 
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This suggests that when MNO plan the expansion of telecommunications 
infrastructure, they typically focus on the costs of providing the network relative to 
accruable benefits in terms of revenues that stem from adoption and usage. This is 
consistent with the argument in Section 3.2.1 that, it is the comparison of the revenue 
arising from adoption and usage relative to costs that inform the investment decision 
of a given location. Seven interviewees stated that the existence of low ICT usage is 
noticeable in disadvantaged areas across Africa and that this results in low mobile 
adoption. Two interviewees commented thus:  
Another factor is that there seems to be no intensive use of ICT in rural areas… 
hence less need or demand by rural inhabitants. Interviewee2 
We took smart handsets with a lot of data and gave it to a group of people in 
some villages and after a month, we realised that they did not use the data… 
Because they did not know what to do with all the data we gave them. I am sure if 
I were to give it to you [the interviewer], you would access content, you would 
access movies, you would do research because you have the knowledge to use the 
data. Interviewee13 
 In countries where such condition prevails, interviewees asserted that MNO may be 
dissuaded from expanding coverage into such areas due to the perceived low demand 
and adoption of telecommunication services. In all, evidence from the data suggested 
that low ICT usage does not exist in isolation but linked to multiple issues as shown 
in Figure 13 and outlined below.  
5.3.5.1 Lack of digital literacy and awareness  
Six interviewees, including two regulators and one multinational MNO employee, 
argued that both policymakers and MNO are not doing enough to promote digital skills 
and educate end-users on how to use technology. Two interviewees asserted that:   
Although mobile penetration has increased significantly in *** [the name of a 
country in Africa], however, there are still some challenges to address, for example, 
the high level of digital illiteracy among rural population… Interviewee1098 
…lack of awareness is also a problem, as people don’t fully know the benefits that 
accrue from using telecom services such as broadband… They don’t even know, 
for example, what learning they can do from the internet, how they can improve 
their crop yield that they can limit the rate of animals falling sick, on which their 
livelihood depends… Interviewee23 
                                                 
98 A USF director 
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The above interview quotes would suggest that apart from not doing enough to 
promote digital literacy, the same is true when it comes to informing a given 
community on what telecommunication services exist and the importance of such 
services to their daily lives. Interviewees further suggested that since little attention is 
given to digital literacy and awareness creation in general, the adoption and use of 
mobile telephony, as well as other ICT, might not be as popular as it should be. This 
is consistent with the argument in Section 2.4 that there may be instances where 
network is available but people may not use them due to a lack of awareness and digital 
literacy, which then contribute to digital divide. Interviewee23 quoted above added it 
is the responsibility of policymakers to lead the campaign of awareness creation in 
collaboration with other stakeholders in the industry. When awareness is created, it 
stimulates demand and MNO would most likely go and spread telecommunication 
services when they know that people would use their services with or without USF. 
 Section 3.3.1 indicated that it has long been argued in the literature (for 
example, Blackman, 1995; ITU, 2013b; Oestmann & Dymond, 2008) that availability, 
accessibility and affordability are the three underlying principles that a viable UAS 
policy should reflect in order to close the digital divide. However, evidence from the 
data also shows that a lack of awareness that encompasses digital literacy can equally 
challenge the achievement of UAS. For example, it not sufficient to provide affordable 
access to telecommunications when people do not know how to use technology or the 
importance of the services provided. This goes to suggest that in light of the constant 
advancement in technology and services, ignoring awareness creation may push back 
the achievement of UAS as this reflects in low mobile adoption and usage. Therefore, 
there is need to extend the principles of UAS to include awareness in order to ensure 
that people become aware of the importance of new technologies and educated on how 
to use them as they evolve (Section 3.3.1).   
5.3.5.2 Lack of needs assessments and relevant local content 
Another factor advanced by interviewees that is responsible for low mobile adoption 
and usage is the lack of needs assessments. This involves having a clear knowledge of 
what the relevant telecommunication needs of a given community are. Six 
interviewees were particularly vocal on this point, with, for example, Interviewee11 
noting that: 
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We often find that people operating in these areas don’t know what the actual gap 
is and then it is difficult to discuss solutions or to discuss what needs to be done 
when you don’t know exactly what is the problem and how big it is, what would it 
cost to close the gaps and where in the country are the gaps? Interviewee11 
In addition to this, Interviewee17 added that in disadvantaged areas, it appears that 
nobody really knows what the ‘real’ problems are, as all that exist seem to be different 
opinions. If there is low mobile penetration and adoption, Interviewee17 asked, do we 
understand why that is? Just having poor coverage in an area, insisted Interviewee2499, 
is not in itself an expression of need, there are local sensitivities and different levels 
of needs that require consideration to address the digital divide of uneven mobile 
coverage a given area. It came across from the interviews that although policymakers 
and MNO often assume they know the telecommunication needs of an area, but 
practice would suggest otherwise. For example, Interviewee17 asserted:  
One of the things that should be done to achieve a better result with USF is, before 
anyone even thinks of disbursing any fund on actual projects, they should spend a 
small amount of money on really understanding what is really the access gap? What 
is the problem? People always assume they know what the problem is and that all 
the money should be spent on the answer but going back to one of the things I said 
before, is the problem really coverage? Do the government and the regulator really 
know what coverage is in these areas?  Is it changing all the time? Interviewee17 
This argument was further highlighted in the data where Interviewee13 said they 
assumed that affordability was the reason why a given community was not demanding 
more data. Hence, the MNO decided to give free smartphones preloaded with data to 
a selected number of people in order to see if that would stimulate demand. 
Surprisingly, after a given period, the users did not consume a large part of the data. 
Why? The multinational MNO responded: 
…because they did not know what to do with all the data we gave them… So we 
realised that giving them handsets with data is not the solution. There were 
dimensions that needed to be added: relevant content and education… 
Interviewee13 
The multinational MNO in question obviously assumed that affordability was the only 
telecommunications need in the community, but in hindsight, it turned out that a lack 
of digital education and relevant local content were part of the puzzle. Figure 13 
indicates that a lack of need assessment may lead to a mismatch between demand and 
supply of telecommunication services and, in turn, result in low mobile adoption and 
                                                 
99 An academic and UAS consultant 
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usage. Although Interviewee13 asserted that the lack of relevant local content and 
digital literacy were the reasons why the project failed, one can only know, for 
example, the relevant content to provide when the actual needs of a group of people 
are known. Therefore, the starting point is needs assessment. Since it is arguably 
impracticable to replicate the strategy adopted by Interviweee17 across all 
disadvantaged areas considering the level of resources that would be needed, 
Interviewee24 suggested that:  
…some country research needs to be done to know where the true needs are. It is 
important for the government to do this because they need to see the reason why 
operators choose certain cities and not the other city, know what is lacking in 
such places... Interviewee24 
Interviewees23 and 24 further added that needs assessment is the task of the 
governments, as MNO will most likely do this for only commercially viable areas. 
Therefore, policymakers need to take the responsibility and invest in some market 
research to know what the relevant telecommunication needs are and deploy USF 
accordingly. This reinforces the argument in Section 3.3.1 that for UAS to fully 
address the digital divide in this current information age, it is critical to include 
assessment as part of the underlying principles of UAS.     
5.3.5.3 SIM card registration requirements 
Two interviewees were of the opinion that the conditions attached to SIM card 
registration100, especially the required means of identification, is acting as a barrier to 
mobile adoption and usage:  
…some of the barriers to increasing penetration include…the difficulty in getting 
the subscription itself in terms of where many countries have a sort of onerous 
registration requirements before you can actually get access to a mobile service. 
For example, the provision of ID, this is not available in some rural communities. 
Interviewee21101 
Interviewee17 added that SIM registration and aggregation of usage do not sit well 
together in the sense that government can say they want it but they also have to 
consider the wider socio-economic impact of such a policy. For example, although the 
lack of a valid means of identification may hinder SIM registration for urban areas as 
                                                 
100 This refers to regulatory mandates, which require MNO to register the identity information of 
individuals before activating their mobile SIM (Donovan & Martin, 2012). 
101 A former multinational MNO figure responsible for public policy. 
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well, the impact of this is more severe on those in the rural areas who may need to 
travel to the city where government institutions responsible for issuing such valid 
identifications are located. Apart from the fact that embarking on such a journey comes 
with an extra financial and time burden, some of the people living in such areas may 
not have other needs for these identifications.  
The growing trend of mandatory SIM card registration across Africa has not 
gone unnoticed with governments arguing that the exercise is necessary to address 
national security concern and the criminal behaviour of individuals (Donovan & 
Martin, 2012; GSMA, 2013a; 2016; Africa Research Bulletin, 2017). This is fast 
becoming part of the obligations of MNO in Africa so much so that 49 of the 55 
countries in the continent have mandated it or are in the process of doing so (Gillwald, 
2015). Although Malawi recently suspended this exercise due the disquiet of state 
spying and long queues for registration (Balancing Act, 2018b), it also raises the issue 
of policing, which puts extra strain on regulatory capacity. The enormity of the issue 
can be observed in Nigeria where MTN was fined $5.2 billion for failing to disconnect 
5.2 million unregistered SIM cards in 2015 (Africa Research Bulletin, 2016; Prinsloo 
& Ibukun, 2016). After eight months of litigation and negotiation, NCC and MTN 
later settled out of court with MTN agreeing to pay $1.7 billion over three years 
(Prinsloo & Ibukun, 2016).  
Although the purpose for the introduction of SIM registration has been 
associated with national security, interviewees suggest that the inability of those living 
in disadvantaged areas to secure the required means of identifications serves to limit 
mobile adoption and usage. In many ways, the fault is not theirs but a reflection of 
national conditions in certain countries in Africa where there is a lack of a national 
identity database. Interviewees17 and 21 suggested that it imperative for policymakers 
to allow some form of flexibility for SIM registration, especially for people in rural 
areas.  
5.3.5.4 Inadequate stakeholder engagement 
There was a general consensus across 21 interviewees that a major contributing factor 
to issues discussed thus far largely stems from inadequate stakeholder engagement as 
highlighted in Figure 13. Drawing upon the comments of interviewees, this refers to a 
situation where there is an inadequate representation of a diverse and relevant group 
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of stakeholders in UAS debate and their wider implications on the society. Such group 
should include MNO, equipment vendors, towerco, civil society, local communities 
and the emerging OTT. Interviewees argued that in countries where there is a lack of 
engagement, not only would the issues outlined in Sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.5 result, but 
the overall impact of USF could be limited as well. The following quotes from 
interviewees help to support this argument:     
…one of the things that are missing in many countries is an ongoing multi-
stakeholders’ dialog on the importance of communication, broadband and 
infrastructure to their country. So very often you find that government is not in 
dialog with industry and neither of them is talking to civil society or they are 
having bilateral communications which are not including other important 
stakeholders…what you want is an ongoing forum where issues can be raised and 
dealt with before they become a debilitating crisis in a country. Interviewee1 
…I think in countries where USF have not been successful, government should be 
willing to sit down with other stakeholders to evaluate the framework of USF, 
particular where the funds are there, after all, these monies are from operators and 
their subscribers… I do think it will make sense to create a discussion… 
Interviewee4 
I think that cooperation has to happen. I think that something as complex as USF 
takes a lot of capacity in the regulator to do well… You, therefore, need a sharp, 
skilled and powerful regulator to stand up, cajole, and work with their counterparts 
including the MNO. Interviewee19 
It was suggested that to get more from the implementation of USF, there has to be a 
transparent consultation process that involves a wider circle of representation from 
various interest groups. Such consultation, insisted Interviewee21, should not be a 
‘one-off’ event but a continuous process because as market and technology continue 
to evolve, needs will change and so should UAS policies and strategies. Although it 
was further gathered that policymakers in certain countries in Africa only begin to 
engage with stakeholders at the project execution stage, Interviewee9 noted that 
engagement should begin right from the inception of policy formulation through to the 
project execution stage. In addition to this, policymakers should not organise 
consultation for the sake of it without actually considering and including such 
contribution in policy formulation as alluded to by Interviewee15 who stated that: 
Although we [MNO] are allowed to contribute our views, but they seem not to be 
implemented. Interviewee15 
When the views of all stakeholder are considered and incorporated into the 
implementation process of USF, Interviewee9 argued that this will help to address the 
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issue of viability, sustainability and ownership of USF projects. Interviewee20 added 
that:  
The point about a multi-stakeholder, regardless of the number, is that nobody should 
win. Often, people go into these processes thinking they must win… Actually, the 
outcome of any multi-stakeholder engagement should be a consensus… 
Interviewee20 
Interviewee20 further stated that stakeholders should not come into such discussion 
necessarily with the intention of winning but arriving at a consensus where the 
outcome is the most advantage or less disadvantage to all. Although managing 
different stakeholders who have different objectives is a difficult task for the regulator 
(Johnson, 2018), regulators and other policymakers have a critical role to play here in 
terms of coordinating the process and enforcing agreements.  
 Interviewees also highlighted that, more often than not, relevant stakeholders 
like local communities are excluded from the consultation process in some parts of 
Africa either by default or because of a lack of awareness. For example, although USF 
in Nigeria is structured to accommodate both bottom-up and top-down initiatives as 
indicated in Section 3.4.4, Interviewee9 revealed that local communities hardly come 
forward to demand coverage. Consequently, other stakeholders such as policymakers 
and MNO could shape events in their interest as noted in Section 3.2. This indicates 
that not all stakeholders are equally important in terms of their input and impact on 
policy direction, underlining the ‘capture’ form of regulation where ‘small’ but 
‘powerful’ interest groups influence regulatory policy to work for them to the 
detriment of the public (see Section 3.2). Interviewee5 contended that the exclusion 
of local communities from the consultation process of policy decisions may prove 
detrimental to the expansion of mobile coverage as such people hold vital information 
on the actual state of affairs in disadvantaged areas.  
 Following the above analysis, it is apparent that there is a link between 
stakeholder engagement and the issues raised in Sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.5. Take SIM 
registration, for instance, the comments from interviewees suggested that various 
governments introduced this policy with little or no stakeholder debate about the wider 
implication for the industry, part of which is acting as a barrier to mobile adoption and 
usage. Furthermore, engagement with local communities could help to mitigate the 
issue of lack of needs assessments and forestall a mismatch between the demand and 
supply of telecommunication services. Overall, the responses from interviewees 
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suggest that if policymakers cultivate the culture of continuous stakeholder 
engagement, collective effort and pragmatic ideas may result, which could then help 
to limit the complexity of UAS. The next section further examines this and other issues 
relating to the complexity of UAS.    
5.4 Universal access and service complexity 
Although a UAS strategy like USF is consistent with the deployment of subsidy, it 
also has the attribute of a mandatory instrument since the payment of USF levies by 
MNO are compulsory (Sections 3.2.2). This makes USF a hybrid regulatory 
instrument, the implementation of which could be complex as it reflects the 
characteristics as well as the limitations of both mandatory and subsidy instruments 
discussed in Section 3.2.2. Similarly, the discussion presented thus far suggests that 
UAS encompasses diverse sets of interconnected issues, which makes policy 
formulation and implementation not only complex, but also dynamic. According to 
Interviewee24, it is where any of these issues are missing that UAS becomes 
problematic because: 
…one needs to execute all these elements together as a package, you cannot have 
one and not the other. When you have the problem of policy implementation in a 
country, then, it is most likely that one of these components…is often missing. 
Interviewee24 
Interviewee11 further echoed the complexity of UAS thus: 
I have worked in this field for 17 years and I am talking with operators all the time, 
the USF is complicated and if there is a better way of reaching this last 5% we are 
all for it… Interviewee11 
 It came across from the comments of interviewees that aside the issues raised in 
Sections 5.2 and 5.3, the typical starting point of the complexity and difficulty 
surrounding UAS in term of policy formulation and implementation is evident in a 
lack of clear UAS objectives, which then leads to other issues as highlighted in Figure 
14. In all, Figure 14 highlights four key findings with respect to the complexity of 
UAS as examined below. 
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Figure 114: Universal access and service complexity 
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5.4.1 Lack of clear UAS objectives 
Recounting their experiences across Africa, five interviewees revealed that one of the 
primary reasons why the implementation of USF appears to be complex and 
problematic is due to unclear UAS objectives. As such, it is not clear what 
policymakers are trying to achieve. According to Interviewee17: 
There are a lot of reasons for that [why USF are poorly implemented] and the 
first is that in many cases, it is unclear what they are trying to achieve. In most 
cases, they charge or tax the operators in the industry and that is then 
administered by a regulator or by the government and reallocated to another 
operator in order to achieve some objectives, which are often unclear... I think it 
is a problem in parts of Africa - understanding the difference between need, 
availability, and affordability. I suspect that it is all three of those issues together 
that should be looked at and to some extent, they relate to each other as well… 
Interviewees further added that although UAS policies tend to focus on access from 
the viewpoint of availability in many countries, if no one actually connects to or adopts 
its services, it could be of no economic value. Consequently, interviewees contended 
that the development of clear and precise policies stems from having a clear definition 
for UAS, which then results in setting realistic targets for USF. This, they argued, is 
missing in many countries. Hence, a lack of clear objective, which then adds to the 
complexity of UAS and the setting of what appears to be unrealistic targets for USF. 
One of the implications of this in practice is that USF is seeing as a tool that can 
remedy all the information needs of the society, a feat that is rather difficult to achieve.   
 This is reflected in Chapter 3. For example, looking at the various definition 
of UAS in practice as highlighted in Table 4 in Section 3.3.1, they appear somewhat 
vague, that is, too broad in terms of services covered. For instance, the use of the word 
‘ICT’ in many of the definitions, which in reality could mean a wide-range of services, 
technologies or networks. Furthermore, most definitions in Africa seem not account 
for all the underlying principles of UAS, which are the key success factors for 
achieving widespread access to telecommunications as explained in Section 3.3.1. 
According to interviewees, a robust UAS definition should encompass all underlying 
principles:  
…it should not just be about coverage. If you solve the availability problem and 
you don’t solve the affordability or the need problem, you don’t really get 
anywhere. I think this is important when people think about the problem of 
universal service. Interviewee17 
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This position is also supported by Interviewee19 who argued that providing access 
alone does not translate to usefulness. Interviewee19 added that this can result in low 
mobile adoption because people may be under the footprint of a tower with 3G or 4G 
capacity and end up not using it due to, for example, a lack of awareness.   
The above discussion would suggest that there is a missing link between policy 
formulation, implementation and expected outcomes arising from what appears to be 
connected with the initial flaws inherent in the definition of UAS. This then results in 
a lack of clear objective, which does not only make the implementation of USF 
complex and problematic, but also makes it difficult for USF to target specific set of 
outcomes.  
5.4.2 Inadequate and reliable data 
Six interviewees, including Interviewee6, stressed that another reason why the 
implementation of USF has become so complex and problematic in many parts of 
Africa is due to the lack of adequate and reliable data to ascertain how many people 
actually lack access to a given telecommunication service. For example, Interviewees5 
and 21 stated that: 
One thing we don’t have in every country, I am not sure of how far it goes yet, is 
reliable statistics of what mobile penetration is. I assume that you are familiar 
with the fact that what is called penetration, very often, is just number of active 
mobiles divided by either population or households. This does not tell us how 
many people or households don’t actually have a mobile phone… Interviewee5 
The first thing I would say here is that there are no reliable good statistics to 
ascertain the true picture of mobile penetration. I’ll be really interested in some 
quality data which look at what is the really rural penetration. Inteviewee21 
Apart from exacerbating the complexity of UAS, the lack of adequate and reliable data 
also becomes a barrier to the success of USF because the availability of such data is 
critical to the effective and efficient planning and allocation of scarce resources. A 
position that is further complicated by multiple SIM usage, which results in unreliable 
headline figures of mobile penetration that distort the measurement of digital divide 
in Africa as highlighted in Section 2.2. Without such reliable data, Interviewee20 
asserted that policymakers might find themselves in a situation where they are giving 
subsidies to MNO for doing what is commercially viable:  
 
 
 178 
 
…you don’t want to be subsidising operators for doing things that are profitable to 
do. Bear in mind that what is profitable to them would change from year to year. 
Interviewee20 
 A demonstrable example of this can be found in Lesotho where the regulator alluded 
to the fact that one of the challenges facing the implementation of USF in the country 
is a lack of reliable and accurate data to accurately identify disadvantaged areas with 
true access gaps (LCA, 2016). Consequently, they end up allocating USF to 
undeserving areas. This also helps to explain one of the criticisms highlighted in 
Section 3.2.2, which argues that the use of subsidies in addressing market failure 
encourages a dependency attitude on the part of market actors, which, in turn, delay 
market expansion and innovation. Aside from leading to the misallocation of funds, a 
lack of adequate and reliable data also make it difficult for policymakers to identify 
disadvantaged areas as discussed in the next section.  
5.4.3 Identification of disadvantaged areas 
Another issue that underlines the complexity of UAS is the identification of 
disadvantaged areas where the market would ordinarily not deploy telecommunication 
services to without some form of subsidy. According to one of the four interviewees 
that raised this issue: 
Underserved areas are really tricky because how do you know if an area is 
underserved or not? Of course, it is easy to say where you have coverage of 90% 
and then you can simply assume that 10% are underserved. But if you have 
coverage of maybe 50%, then can you really assume that the other 50% is 
underserved? I really don’t think so… It is not always correct to assume that all 
unserved or underserved areas are due to market failure. It may simply mean that 
the market needs to be created first. Interviewee24 
The above response and that of other interviewees indicate that in practice when MNO 
fail to deploy services to certain areas, it is often assumed that such locations are being 
overlooked due to the lack of economic feasibility. However, the above interviewee 
suggested otherwise, arguing that it might be a case of missing market as highlighted 
in Section 3.2.1. Consequently, such area may be wrongfully classified as locations 
needing a subsidy, resulting in the misallocation of funds.  
‘Good’ practice requires careful identification of disadvantaged areas prior to 
the allocation of USF in order to avoid and/or mitigate subsidy misallocation and direct 
scarce resources to vulnerable areas (Jamison, 2017). However, it goes without saying 
that to accurately identify ‘true’ disadvantaged areas, policymakers need to have 
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relevant data to guide informed decision and previous analysis in Sections 2.2 and 
5.4.2 indicate that access to such data is largely lacking in across Africa. Furthermore, 
some level of human and financial resources are needed to map out areas that lack 
coverage, a feat that is lacking in parts of Africa (Section 5.2.1). This goes to show the 
dilemma facing regulators in their effort to implement USF. Having said that, there 
seems to be a link between reliable data and clear UAS objectives in the sense that if 
the latter is completely confused, it becomes difficult to know what kind of data to 
collect from the outset and regulators may find it even more difficult to identify the 
most deserving areas to allocate funds.    
5.4.4 Rapid technological changes 
The final issue to consider under this theme, as recounted by four interviewees, is the 
difficulty of policy in keeping up with rapid and constant technological changes. 
Interviewees argued that for UAS to be relevant, the underlying terms of reference, 
that is, regulatory framework, needs to evolve. However, the ability to do this and keep 
pace with technology appears to be a huge challenge for policymakers. For example, 
according to Interviewee8:  
Another problem with USF is that technology development is so rapid that the 
regulators and USF struggle to keep up – this is understandable; we all struggle 
to keep up with technology development so it must be particularly challenging for 
those trying to regulate it… Interviewee8 
Interviewee20 alluded to this argument thus:  
…the market is constantly shifting and so is the technology, it is, therefore, very 
difficult to run USF on the basis of a set of regulations or legislation because 
regulations and legislation go out of date so quick… Interviewee20 
According to the country analysis, the first USF project proposed in Kenya has 
an expected life cycle of seven months from project design to contract awards and 
execution (CA, 2015). Considering the pace of the evolution of technology and the 
argument of interviewees, a lot would have happened within this period with the 
implication that the usefulness of the project becomes obsolete or less relevant. The 
dilemma then lies in the relevance of such networks and services when completed 
because the telecommunication needs of the targeted communities may have changed 
over time. As a result, their needs may remain unsatisfied even when there is a network 
available. Consequently, what constitutes UAS is fast becoming a moving target 
because changes in technology would mean changes in telecommunication needs, a 
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dynamic highlighted in Section 3.3.4. This phenomenon further fuels the debate on 
what services should fall within the scope of UAS and if there a framework to cope 
with such changes? 
 Following the analysis presented thus far in this section, one could argue that 
what drives UAS regulation stems from its objectives. As such, for regulation to 
remain relevant and move with changes in technology, the definition and the 
objectives of UAS also needs to evolve. Therefore, changes in technology should 
trigger the need for a review of the initial objective, which would then influence the 
overall structure of UAS framework and USF targets. This goes to show that an 
underlining relationship exists between technological changes and the overall 
objectives of UAS as reflected in Figure 14. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The findings presented in this chapter clearly address RQ1 by showing that the digital 
divide of uneven mobile coverage across Africa is due to a series of complex and 
interlinked issues as illustrated in Figures 12 to 14. These findings echo some of the 
issues responsible for digital divide and the difficulties encountered in implementing 
USF identified in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 5 thus validates some of the issues 
highlighted in the literature, for example, that digital divide can be explained by 
affordability issues, a lack of awareness and digital literacy (Section 2.4). More 
insights were also provided on some of the issues identified in Section 3.4.5 that limit 
the impact of USF in Africa. For example, while it was estimated that over $400 
million was lying idle across 37 USF countries across Africa (ITU, 2013b; Thakur & 
Potter, 2018), Section 5.2.5 highlighted that the accumulation of idle funds is due to 
the lack of skills to quickly design projects and deploy funds as well as government 
bureaucracies that act to slow down the decision making process. Having said that, 
guided by the level of interconnectedness of issues and interviewees’ responses, the 
overriding message from this chapter largely boils down two key underpinning issues 
of regulatory capacity and transaction costs. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that regulatory capacity is critical to the 
success of UAS and digital inclusion in general in the sense that regulators need to be 
well-resourced to formulate, implement and police regulatory intervention. This is 
reflective of the issues raised in Section 5.2 where inadequate regulatory capacity 
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results in a ripple effect as shown in Figure 12. For example, a lack of skills to quickly 
design and implement USF projects leads to the accumulation of idle funds, which 
then subjects USF to corruption and fund diversion. The lack of skills and funds also 
impinges on the ability of regulators to effectively monitor and enforce USF and other 
UAS obligations with a wider implication on the poor performance of USF across 
Africa. Furthermore, when one considers the issues outlined in Section 5.4, it is 
apparent that without regulatory capacity UAS even becomes more complex as a great 
deal of human and financial resources are needed to, for example, design clear 
objectives, source the required data to effectively plan USF projects and identify 
disadvantaged areas to avoid misallocation of funds. Therefore, for a regulatory 
intervention like USF to effectively address the market failure of uneven mobile 
coverage, regulatory authorities need to be well-resourced otherwise very little can be 
achieved. 
Issues around benefits and costs dominated the discussion in Section 5.3 and 
Figure 13 highlighted the various issues that feed into this discussion such as the costs 
of obtaining rights of way, frequency spectrum and taxation. Interviewees argued that 
these issues aggregate to increase the transaction costs of network deployment and 
maintenance. In an industry that is typically capital intensive like telecommunications, 
such pressure further adds to the burden of market actors like MNO who also need to 
finance the construction of supporting infrastructure like electricity, which is largely 
lacking across Africa. This was further highlighted by Thomas Chalumeau102, who 
asserted that “Energy is one of the main essential needs of our African customers. On 
the continent, there are 300 million people with no access to power” (Chalumeau, 
2018). When such costs are accumulated and compared to accruable benefits, which, 
in turn, is impacted by issues such affordability and low ICT adoption, MNO tend to 
concentrate attention and resources on commercially viable areas to the detriment of 
disadvantaged areas where over half of the population in Africa reside. The impact of 
transaction costs on the digital divide in Africa has also been acknowledged by the 
World Bank who has contributed over $10 billion to the continent since 1999/2000 
                                                 
102 Thomas Chalumeau is the Senior Vice President for Strategy and Development, Orange Middle East 
and Africa. 
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with the aim of expanding coverage and reducing the costs of deploying 
telecommunications (World Bank, 2018b). 
It is, therefore, clear from this chapter that regulatory capacity and transaction 
costs are the two most important issues that reflect on the overall data when it comes 
to closing the digital divide in Africa. This is further examined in Chapter 8.      
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Chapter 6: Findings – Improving coverage part I 
6.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Section 1.3, the presentation for RQ2 will be done in two chapters to 
make it easier for the reader to follow given the length of the findings from the data. 
Hence, this chapter and the next outline the findings from the data with respect to RQ2 
- how can the digital divide of uneven mobile coverage be mitigated? Following the 
same iterative framework and procedure outlined in Section 5.1, four themes emerged: 
improving the current form of USF, indirect market interventions, collaboration and 
innovative solutions for UAS. Since these themes unfolded as a result of the issues 
identified in RQ1, they will be examined in relation to the findings in Chapter 5 in a 
manner that shows how various issues intertwine and fit together. While this chapter 
examines the first two themes, Chapter 7 will present the last two themes, including a 
summary of both chapters, highlighting the key issues for further examination in 
Chapter 8. 
6.2 Improving the current form of USF 
In response to RQ1, there was a consensus among interviewees that the performance 
of USF across Africa is largely ineffective and, as such, disadvantaged areas that are 
supposed to benefit from the funds remain either unserved and/or underserved. While 
Chapter 5 has identified and extensively outlined the various issues responsible for the 
‘poor’ performance of USF, this section presents the insights offered by interviewees 
on how to improve the current form of USF and develop an effective model that is 
capable of bridging the existing digital divides. The data map in Figure 15 presents a 
summary of these insights and how they address and relate to the corresponding issues 
that were raised in RQ1. A detailed report is presented in Sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.6.      
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Figure 15: Improving USF 
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6.2.1 Clear universal service objectives 
Responding to the finding that USF is underachieving in most countries due to lack of 
clear UAS objectives (Section 5.4.1), five interviewees asserted that it is incumbent 
on policymakers to set clear and realisable objectives from the outset to provide clear 
overall direction for UAS and the USF that draws on its framework. To illustrate this, 
two interviewees commented that: 
…there should be a governmental national prepared policy to improve 
connectivity within a country. For example, there should be a strategy paper… 
that declares the political commitment to achieve certain goals, and this paper 
should be…as succinct as possible… and it should be very, very clear and it 
should contain a list of policy actions… Interviewee24103 
…go back and ask yourself what do we want to deliver? Do we want rural 
coverage? Do we want, say as in New Zealand, to connect all the schools? Do 
you want to connect the hospitals and the medical clinics? Is that your objective? 
Then, what do you have to do to deliver that? I am giving these answers to draw 
contrasts to others that have done it differently… Interviewee6104 
Interviewee10105 added that it is the responsibility of policymakers to design a 
framework where specific targets for UAS are succinctly defined and this should be 
properly documented and communicated when issuing/renewing GSM licences. When 
Interviewee6 was prodded on why USF should be deployed to connect places like 
schools and hospitals, they revealed that if MNO run fibre-optic connections to such 
places, they could then ‘piggyback’ on the same infrastructure to supply GSM 
connection to the same area. However, for any progress on coverage expansion to 
happen, interviewees argued that it is imperative for policymakers to be clear upfront 
on what they want to achieve in terms of what services should be covered, the types 
of institutions to be connected and the minimum population density living in a given 
square kilometre that USF should target.  
Ten other interviewees, including Interviewee21106 and Interviewee19107, 
further argued that at the heart of setting clear UAS objectives is having a robust 
definition of access. By this, they mean a definition that not only considers coverage 
                                                 
103 An academic and UAS consultant 
104 An independent policy analyst and researcher 
105 A USF director 
106 A former multinational MNO figure responsible for public policy 
107 An independent research with interest in developing digital inclusion in developing economies 
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from the viewpoint of availability of the network, but also reflect affordability, 
accessibility, assessments and awareness as highlighted in Section 3.3.1. For example, 
Interviewee17108 stated that: 
A lot of universal services policies focus on access from the viewpoint of 
availability - on whether there is network or infrastructure but if no one actually 
connects to it or exploits it, it is of no economic value. Interviewee17 
While the relevance of affordability and accessibility to UAS has been highlighted in 
Section 3.3.1, these interviewees were particularly vocal on needs assessments and 
awareness creation. Interviewee24 argued that some amount of resources should be 
targeted at investigating what the ‘real’ information needs of a given community are 
in order to forestall a mismatch between the demand and supply of telecommunication 
services. When such needs are identified and provided, added Interviewee23109, effort 
should be made to inform and enlighten people on the relevance of such services and 
promote digital education on how to use them in order to stimulate adoption and 
forestall redundancy. Interviewee19 added in the face of the rapid and constant 
evolution of technology, assessment and awareness should be considered as critical 
components for achieving UAS, otherwise it would be counterproductive to invest in 
coverage expansion that does not reflect the information needs of the society as people 
may end up not using the network and services provided. This support the argument 
to extend the three traditional principles of UAS to include assessment and awareness 
as argued in Section 3.3.1.  
Drawing on the discussion above, Figure 15 indicates that there is an 
underlying relationship between assessment, clear UAS objective(s) and awareness in 
the sense that when the information needs of the society are known through an 
assessment, policymakers can then better articulate what to be included in UAS and 
the scale of resources required. This is evident in the following interview excerpt: 
There is the need to spend a little bit of money to understand the true nature of 
the problem and depending on the answers to that, I will then set very, very clear 
objectives as to what problem I am trying to solve and put the money against that 
problem in a way that minimises the cost, maximise the opportunity for innovation... 
Interviewee17 
                                                 
108 A former multinational MNO executive responsible for public policy, who is now an international 
policy adviser 
109 A former USF CEO who now consult for the ITU and some countries in Africa 
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While such a suggestion may be transformative to USF, its implementation in practice 
is currently limited in Africa as explained in Section 3.3.1. Nonetheless, the insights 
offered by interviewees have the potential to mitigate some of the problems identified 
in Chapter 5 as illustrated in Figure 15. For example, setting clear objectives can help 
to limit the complexity of UAS as USF can then target precise and realisable outcomes 
in contrast to the wide-ranging targets currently being observed across Africa (Section 
3.3.1). Assessments and awareness could help to promote economic feasibility 
through the facilitation of mobile adoption and usage. This is consistent with ITU and 
UNESCO (2016: 81), which found that awareness creation can stimulate mobile 
adoption and increase market growth for MNO.    
6.2.2 Reliable data 
The lack of adequate and reliable data was highlighted in Section 5.4.2 as one of the 
causes of a lack of evidence-based policy to drive the implementation of USF in 
Africa. Six interviewees, including Interviewee18110, suggested that when clear UAS 
objectives are set, this could then ease the collection of relevant data, which is critical 
for planning, resource allocation and implementation of USF. This is reflected in the 
comments of Interviewee5111 and Interviewee21 thus: 
One…recommendation…would be the need for better statistics and better 
monitoring so that we know what challenges we have to deal with. This is also 
important from the view of targeting any effort that goes beyond the market 
because at the moment, in many countries, we don’t just know where the biggest 
needs are. Interviewee5 
The first thing I would say here is that there are no really reliable good statistics to 
ascertain the true picture of mobile penetration. I’ll be really interested in some 
quality data which look at what is the real rural penetration. Interviewee21 
Interviewee11112 added that the success of USF is partly hinged on having reliable 
data to actually measure who lacks ‘what’ and ‘where’ the most needs are even if it 
means having a rather approximate idea instead of allocating resources ‘blindly’. 
Recounting a consultancy experience an African country, Interviewee11 stated that 
                                                 
110 A regulatory specialist with an international lending organisation who is working with countries in 
Eastern Africa to improve coverage in disadvantaged areas 
 
111 A well-established UAS consultant and research with over 20 years industry experience 
112 A USF specialist and UAS researcher with over 15 years’ experience across 17 countries in Africa 
and the ITU 
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the first thing they did was to carry out a geographic information system (GIS)113 
mapping of existing network coverage for both 2G and 3G in order to ascertain how 
many people had access to services. They also obtained GIS reference coverage maps 
from all MNO in the country and hired a specialist who did an overlay of both maps 
for the country. This then allowed them to calculate the actual population coverage 
that showed that only 5.6% of the entire population was without any form of mobile 
signal, which in actual terms were over 2 million people. Following this process, they 
then began to plan the implementation of USF in conjunction with MNO and 
policymakers. Apart from helping to identify coverage gaps, Interviewee20114 added 
that sourcing reliable data can also help policymakers to guide against subsidising 
MNO for doing things that are profitable, bearing in mind that what is profitable to 
them would change with time. While this process appears to be promising, one could 
also argue that the costs implication may restrict its wider application as regulators are 
generally faced with a lack of resources (5.2.1).  
 Apart from the GIS mapping strategy suggested by Interviewee11 above, 
Interviewee6 suggested a rather non-technical strategy, namely, a ‘small-scale 
survey’: 
Ofcom in the UK has put a rather complicated mapping application where you could 
put in a postcode and it would tell you who has coverage in the area. I think there 
are still some disputes as to the accuracy of that. I mean that is technically quite 
difficult. Now, doing that in say DRC would be technically challenging. But the 
question could be what would small-scale surveys do? Interviewee6 
Going further, Interviewee6 suggested that small-scale survey could be conducted by 
opening a register at various local government councils and asking people to put down 
their names and locations against what telecommunication services they lack in their 
communities. This could be a standalone exercise or conducted alongside other events 
such as voters’ registration and national census. Accumulating this over a period for 
different locations may then give an approximate idea of what the coverage gaps of a 
given community look like. Interviewee6 stated that it is incumbent on policymakers 
to take the responsibility to coordinate this exercise with organised interest groups 
including an enlightenment campaign to increase awareness across local communities. 
                                                 
113 GIS is a computer-enabled tool that identifies, capture, store and display information of geographical 
locations as well as various features in relation to the earth’s surface.    
114 A former head of an intergovernmental ICT body, now an independent consultant and researcher 
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However, there is limited evidence to suggest that this would happen in practice 
considering that local communities are often excluded from policy debate as 
highlighted in Section 5.3.5.4. Another possible weakness in this strategy could also 
be the time lag between data collection, usage for planning and implementing USF, 
which may, in turn, slow down the overall process of coverage expansion or at the 
very least provide outdated information. Nonetheless, Figure 15 indicates that reliable 
data is imperative for a successful implementation of USF and helps to limit the 
complexity of UAS in terms of identifying coverage gaps and the locations impacted 
by market failure.  
6.2.3 Continuous stakeholder engagement 
As indicated in Figure 15, the comments from 21 interviewees help to underline the 
importance of a wider stakeholder engagement to the success of USF. This is evident 
in the following assertions:  
I think in countries where USF have not been successful, the government should 
be willing to sit down with other stakeholders to evaluate the framework of USF, 
particular where the funds are there, after all, these monies are from operators 
and their subscribers and as such, it should be spent wisely. Interviewee4115 
…no single stakeholder can solve the problem alone. If the government just sets 
policy without consulting the industry, it won’t work and the industry can’t 
achieve anything without the support of the government. So they need to come 
together and listen to each other and consult with each other and then come up 
with some policies… Interviewee11 
In addition to this, Interviewee1116 stated that stakeholder engagement should be a 
continuous process to reflect technological and service changes. Although stakeholder 
engagement at any level would require human and financial resources, doing this on a 
continuous basis as recommended by interviewees would arguably put more strain on 
regulatory capacity. Apart from the continuity of the process, Interviewee11 added 
that what it is even more pertinent is for policymakers is to define ‘who’ the relevant 
stakeholders are as this may also vary with the evolution of technology. The 
emergence of OTT players like Facebook (see Section 7.3.4) serves to illustrate this 
point. Overall, interviewees argued that policymakers should widen UAS conversation 
                                                 
115A former regulator who is now a regional head of access policy for a multinational OTT  
116 A civil society representative and access specialist promoting the proliferation of low-cost 
infrastructure in disadvantaged areas 
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to include representatives of, for example, infraco/towerco, telecommunication 
vendors (including handsets manufacturers), satellite providers, OTT, international 
lending organisations (like the World Bank), not-for-profit organisations (NGO), civil 
society and local communities. 
Such argument is significant in the light of the findings that inadequate 
stakeholder engagement is problematic to the implementation of USF (Section 
5.3.5.4). Interviewee23117 and Interviewee1 revealed that even in countries where 
stakeholder consultation is conducted, it appears that such an exercise is skewed 
towards either governments, or, governments and MNO. Interviewee23 asserted that: 
…a model which every stakeholder has a representation is bound to work better 
than a model that has only representatives from the government and politicians. 
Unfortunately, in most countries, the prevailing model is the later one, which is 
largely made of government. Interviewee23 
This further helps to highlight the issue of regulatory capture and raises the concern 
of how to balance different views against one another to reflect various interest groups 
as indicated in Section 3.2.3. While the interviewees did not specifically address this 
concern, they did state that each stakeholder group brings valuable input into the 
debate of UAS. For example, according to Interviewee13118, MNO could fill the gaps 
of some of the expertise and skill sets needed to deploy USF, which may be lacking 
in the regulator and telecommunication vendors could come up with more affordable 
devices. NGO may look for ways to subsidise the cost of mobile devices for some 
communities, lending organisations can provide expertise from other countries with 
good examples, added Interviewee22119 and Interviewee23. Additionally, 
Interviewee5 asserted that the local communities could provide local knowledge to 
help policymakers and service providers to better anticipate what is actually lacking 
in such communities. The whole process, moderated by policymakers, could result in 
collective tinkering that could ensure relevant opinions and experiences are considered 
to design a robust and dynamic UAS framework for USF and the overall process of 
digital inclusion. 
                                                 
117 A former USF CEO who now consult for the ITU and some countries in Africa 
118 A key multinational MNO figure with a footprint across Africa in charge of public policy 
119 A long-term academic and UAS expert 
 191 
 
Five interviewees, including Interviewee5, drew attention to the fact that civil 
society and local community participation in ICT related issues are generally weak 
across the continent, as people from the grassroots are not engaged as much as they 
should even when the policies and debates are about them: 
I think a bottom-up expression of demand and using civil society, are very 
valuable inputs, which has been sort of overlooked. Interviewee5 
Interviewee2120 suggested that this problem could be mitigated by an increase in 
awareness and engaging the local communities by giving them some responsibilities 
in the formulation and implementation processes. For example, engaging with them to 
provide manual labour and land for the construction of infrastructure such as cables 
and towers. This is consistent with the analysis in Section 3.4.4 that shows that a 
bottom-up approach to the implementation of USF as practiced in Latin American 
countries like Brazil and Chile tend to yield better results than a top-down strategy.     
Figure 15 indicates that the comments from interviewees appear to highlight a 
complex and dynamic relationship between stakeholder engagement and various 
issues raised in Chapter 5. For example, according to Interviewee21, local community 
engagement could help to provide free land or at a much more reduced price for the 
deployment of tower sites. As such, this could improve the economic feasibility in 
disadvantaged areas by helping to tackle the cost and difficulties associated with rights 
of way (Section 5.3.1). The skills, expertise and experience from a wide range of actors 
could also be harnessed to provide a synergy that is beyond the single effort of 
policymakers. On the one hand, this could help to address inadequate regulatory 
capacity (Section 5.2.1), and on the other help to limit the complexity around UAS 
(Section 5.4) by providing reliable information and encouraging cooperation from 
MNO and local communities.  
6.2.4 Performance monitoring and enforcement 
Reacting to the concern of a lack of performance monitoring and enforcement in 
Section 5.2.2, five interviewees, including Interviewee9121, argued that it is not 
sufficient for regulators to award USF contracts, but they should also establish 
performance indicators from the outset. This is critical for tracking progress and 
                                                 
120 A senior regulatory figure 
121 A head of spectrum administration 
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enforcing sanctions where MNO default. The comments from Interviewee22 and 
Interviewee23 underline this recommendation: 
There is… the need to build in good planning and organisation into the policy 
formulation of USF… in terms of outcome, in terms of performance matrix. 
Interviewee22 
…If the operators are taking the money and doing nothing, USF can do very little 
but the regulator has a lot of power, hence, they should throw their weight behind 
USF so that in case some operators try to abuse USF, there should be some 
remedies available to ensure compliance. Interviewee23 
Interviewee23 added that if MNO say they have deployed USF projects in a given 
area, there should be a way to verify such claim because if what they have actually 
done is inconsistent with the terms of the project, this could undermine mobile 
coverage. Therefore, when projects are awarded, added Interviewee17, there should 
be a mechanism in place to check actual performance with what was agreed with 
MNO. Such mechanism should contain performance indicators such as project 
milestones, time to completion and the level of QoS. Interviewee10 insisted that such 
performance indicators should be clearly stated and communicated to MNO and in the 
case of default, there should be some remedies to hold MNO accountable. This is 
consistent with Section 3.2.2, which argued that performance monitoring and 
enforcement are part of the key success factors of deploying subsidies.   
Talking about remedies, Interviewee24 articulated that one of the contributing 
factors to an effective monitoring mechanism is a robust legal framework: 
…one needs a very strong, very well developed legal framework. The legal 
framework is there in order to implement this… commitment. Interviewee24 
In addition to this, there also has to be an active and a reliable legal system legal system 
that can confidently interpret a legal framework and enforce sanctions with due 
recourse to the law. Such sanctions may range from financial penalties to the loss of a 
licence depending on the nature and frequency of default (Hudson, 2006). It is also 
important to set the costs of such a default so high that it would discourage MNO from 
opting to pay the fines than actually executing the projects, as noted by 
Interviewee8122:  
                                                 
122 The head of one specialised access provider deploying mobile networks in disadvantaged areas in 
the region 
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In some cases, operators would rather pay the regulatory fines for rural coverage 
non-compliance - a cheaper solution - than actually penetrating the rural areas… 
Interviewee8 
 It is, therefore, imperative that the consequence for non-compliance is set in a manner 
that discourages MNO from defaulting to ensure that the mechanism for performance 
monitoring and enforcement can reflect better outcomes for USF. Although UAS 
frameworks across Africa encompass various sanctions, evidence from Section 2.5 
and Appendix A indicates that very few countries such as Ghana and Lesotho actually 
implement such sanctions.      
 Figure 15 suggests that there is a link between clear UAS objectives and 
performance monitoring and enforcement in the sense when policymakers clearly state 
what they want to achieve through USF, it becomes easier to devise a mechanism to 
match such objectives. Since this process involves a considerable level of interaction 
with MNO and the local communities, continuous stakeholder engagement could also 
prove useful. 
6.2.5 Virtual fund 
In order to mitigate the problems of idle fund (Section 5.2.5), corruption (Section 
5.2.6) and fund diversion (Section 5.2.7), three interviewees, including Interviewee5, 
recommended making USF a ‘virtual’ fund. A virtual fund, according to Interviewee5, 
is some sort of accounting mechanism rather than an actual fund where MNO could 
be mandated to invest a given proportion of their revenue on mobile coverage in 
disadvantaged areas instead of actually paying USF levies. The following quotes serve 
to strengthen this recommendation: 
…in order to rid it of some of the deficiencies associated with traditional funds, 
such funds may be set-up with features like being a virtual fund… Interviewee5 
One of what the operators say is that: okay, why don’t we just propose our won 
projects? Instead of giving the fees to the government, we put the fees in a virtual 
account and then we propose our own project of how to reach non-commercial 
areas…Interviewee11123 
Interviewee4 added that policymakers should engage with MNO and ask them to use 
the amount that was supposed to be contributed via a USF levy to execute projects 
directly in a given disadvantaged location. The main thrust of the argument here is that 
                                                 
123 A USF specialist and UAS researcher with over 15 years’ experience across 17 countries in Africa 
and the ITU 
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the virtual fund may help to eradicate or mitigate the aforementioned impediments 
associated with traditional funds. For example, Interviewee5 contended that in a 
country where there is a political will to adopt this strategy, there may be no need for 
a central pool of idle money. Furthermore, nobody needs to guard themselves against 
accusations of malpractices, as there is no idle cash stored up anywhere even if such 
persons wanted to indulge in corruption. Since limited management is needed for such 
a fund, this could also help to mitigate inadequate regulatory capacity (Section 5.2.1). 
However, one could argue that this is debatable, as regulators would still need human 
and financial resources to ensure that MNO actually spend such money in 
disadvantaged areas. Interviewee4 also suggested that a virtual fund would yield 
better outcomes where stakeholders collectively decide areas of deployment: 
This [Virtual fund] can be achieved by picking some target locations in conjunction 
with the operators annually and looking at what level of coverage can be achieved. 
Different proportions can then be allocated to different operators based on their 
resource capacities and level of investment and in so doing, create synergy among 
them. Interviewee4 
Projects allocation should then be implemented in phases in order to prevent MNO 
and other relevant stakeholders from being stretched beyond their capacities and 
commitment. This could also help policymakers to carry out their regulatory duties 
more effectively. For example, by concentrating scarce resources in policing a given 
area for a specific period before moving on to new projects. Regardless of the 
anticipated benefits, Interviewee11 had some reservations. For example, if one MNO 
say it spent a given amount on the rollout of coverage in disadvantaged areas and 
another MNO thinks it should be cheaper, how do policymakers coordinate and 
reconcile these two positions? This further underlines the importance of having an 
effective performance monitoring and enforcement mechanism to help prevent MNO 
from abusing the system and defaulting on their agreements. In conclusion, apart from 
mitigating issues like corruption, it could be inferred from Figure 15 that virtual fund 
could also help to improve accountability and transparency of USF (Section 5.2.9) as 
no physical money is collected over which there may be a financial impropriety.  
6.2.6 USF as a last resort 
The last point to be considered under this theme is the deployment of USF as a measure 
of last resort. This recommendation was advanced by four interviewees, particularly 
Interviewee24 and 17, who commented thus: 
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…my conviction…is that universal service as a policy should be used as an 
instrument of last resort - it should only be used where there is a so-called market 
failure, i.e., where the market does not supply either certain territories or certain 
people with telecoms services… Interviewee24 
This does not mean that there is no role for USF but this should be seen as a last 
resort after everything else is exhausted, it shouldn’t be the first thing to do. I am 
not a big fan of USF, there may be a case for them, but I think you should only do 
them when you run out of other ideas. Interviewee17 
The underlying argument here is that since the operation of UAS is complex, 
policymakers should only employ this strategy after exploring all the possibilities that 
competition can offer. Interviewee24 asserted that countries should not be too quick 
to establish USF because the whole process requires a lot of capacity, which, to some 
extent, is lacking in some countries. For example, having an in/dependent regulator 
that has adequate personnel with the right skill sets, financial resources and the ability 
to coordinate and collaborate with a wider stakeholder. Executing these tasks together 
as a package is rather challenging and a country that wants to succeed with USF cannot 
have one and not the other, otherwise the difficulty of policy implementation becomes 
inevitable. As such, various aspects of competition should first be explored before 
considering USF.  
Interviewee24 further stated that it is not always correct to assume that all 
disadvantaged areas are due to market failure, it may simply mean that the market 
needs to be created first and served by competition. Apart from creating awareness, 
interviewees also insisted that investment should be made in market research to 
ascertain if a given area is actually commercially viable or not and depending on the 
outcome of such research, the decision can then be made as to the suitability of 
competition and/or USF. The assumption of non-commercial viability was evident in 
the earlier stage of market liberalisation in Africa where multinational MNO were 
reluctant to enter the market at first with the assumption of insufficient demand 
(Ibrahim, 2012). The unprecedented level of mobile adoption now prevalent across 
the continent as shown in Chapter 2 proves that the initial assumption was inconsistent 
with market reality. A more recent example can be found in South Africa where 
Vodacom witnessed a pent-up demand of 1000% for data and 32% for voice traffic 
from 50,000 people after constructing 3G sites across 7 locations in rural 
Umhlabuyalingana municipality of KwaZulu-Natal (BusinessTech, 2018b; Tech 
Central, 2018). This followed a community-led appeal in April 2017 by the mayor of 
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the municipality for MNO to improve network coverage in the area, which is located 
along the Mozambique border with around 164,000 people (Tech Central, 2018). This 
also helps to support the argument that mobile penetration rates are largely overstated 
across Africa considering that the headline figure for South Africa is 159% as 
indicated in Figure 3 (Section 2.2), yet over 100,000 people remain disadvantaged in 
Umhlabuyalingana and this is just one of the six municipalities in the district of 
Umkhanyakude (Tech Central, 2018).   
The above recommendation appears consistent with the Economides (2004) 
who states that regulatory intervention should only be employed as a ‘last resort’ 
where it is obvious that competition cannot completely address market inefficiency. 
Apart from reducing the strain on government budget and regulatory capacity, Figure 
15 indicates that deploying USF as a last resort could also help to limit the complexity 
that comes with UAS. 
6.3 Indirect market interventions 
Drawing on the preceding section, it is apparent that not all interviewees see USF as 
an effective means of achieving UAS to telecommunications. This thought was echoed 
by Interviewee5 who noted that:   
Although not all people are in favour of USF but even those in favour would have 
to agree that there hasn’t been an enormous success altogether. Interviewee5 
As such, certain interviewees, largely non-regulatory figures, suggested that 
policymakers should explore alternative measures to push coverage beyond big cities 
and towns. One of such alternatives is through indirect market interventions. They 
argued that not only would such measures help to limit the complexity that comes with 
UAS, but also help to lower transaction costs and, in turn, promote the economic 
feasibility of coverage expansion in disadvantaged areas with the aim of attracting 
small and large operators to participate in the process. The data map in Figure 16 
presents the various recommendations made under this theme and the discussions are 
outlined in Sections 6.3.1 to 6.3.4. 
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Figure 16: Indirect market interventions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Funding 
supporting 
infrastructure
(5)
Incentives like tax 
breaks, affordable and 
timely access to (low) 
frequency spectrum, 
etc.
(10)
with USF to address multiple 
deprivation in disadvantaged 
areas
for MNO and other small 
operators to reduce costs of 
network deployment and 
maintenance
Indirect market 
interventions such 
through:
incorporate into 
licence conditions
Rollout 
obligation
(8) Rationing 
disadvantaged 
areas
(3)
Non-competing 
rural licence
(7)
 to promote business 
viability and network 
economies
Promote economic 
feasibility by reducing 
costs and increasing 
economies of scale
Limit UAS complexity as 
regulator focuses on, for 
example, performance 
and enforcement
links between issues
Keys
causality
Themes for RQ1
+
+
+
+
+
  
 198 
 
6.3.1 Rollout obligation 
Firstly, ten interviewees suggested that USF could be replaced with rollout obligation 
where MNO would be required to commit to a predetermined level of investment in 
disadvantaged areas and execute such projects by themselves without the use of USF. 
Interestingly, two key regulatory figures were part of this group of interviewees. This 
recommendation came to the fore when interviewees were asked if there are other 
ways (aside USF) to ensure MNO do more to improve coverage in disadvantaged 
areas, to which Interviewee25124 and Interviewee10 responded: 
This can be done using coverage obligations in their license terms. Interviewee25 
The most important thing… has been the network rollout plan that you have agreed 
with operators when bidding for a licence. In Rwanda, when there’s call for a 
new network operator to bid, one of the selection criteria is the network coverage 
plan. Interviewee10 
Interviewee22 added: 
…I would recommend rollout obligation instead of having USF because MNO 
would then be held accountable for meeting coverage expansion into rural areas 
as part of their licence conditions. This is a better way to ensure rural coverage 
expansion than asking the operators to pay levies for USF. Interviewee22 
If policymakers decide to adopt this strategy, Interviewee22 continued, they would 
have to discontinue USF because they cannot have it both ways - MNO cannot be 
made to pay USF levies and at the same time mandated to rollout services in 
disadvantaged areas as this would mean double costs. However, Rwanda and South 
Africa appear to have rollout obligation and USF as part of their licence obligations. 
While rollout obligation in Rwanda has been successful relative to South Africa in 
terms of closing the divide in voice service with USF now being targeted at advanced 
services like data in rural areas, its implementation has been problematic in South 
Africa (Hodge, 2004, Lewis, 2013). Part of the problem in South Africa was that 
rollout obligation contracts were drawn without the flexibility of making changes as 
market conditions evolved, which is critical in a dynamic industry as 
telecommunications (Gillwald, 2005a; Hodge, 2004). There was also a lack of 
performance monitoring to ensure that MNO executed contracts as agreed, which 
resulted in limited outcomes (Hodge, 2004). Drawing on lessons from their home 
country, Interviewee10 asserted that sanctions for non-compliance need to be 
                                                 
124 One UAS director 
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explicitly defined and enforced by the regulator in order to hold MNO accountable. 
Such sanctions could include licence revocation as a last resort after a given number 
of warnings and/or fines. 
 There appears to be a consensus regarding this strategy as this recommendation 
was not only supported by regulators and UAS experts but MNO interest groups as 
well. For example, Interviewee 3125 commented: 
…whenever new spectrum is being licensed especially low frequencies spectrum 
below 1GHz, which is good for rural coverage... the regulator can then impose 
coverage obligation to say that the winner of that spectrum would need to rollout 
infrastructure to cover rural areas…Interviewee3 
It was argued that rollout obligation could be implemented by combining 
economically attractive areas with unattractive areas as a condition for 
initial/subsequent renewal of GSM licences and/or spectrum allocation, especially 
low-frequency bands such as 700 and 800MHz that can propagate longer distance and 
wider signals. MNO would then be required to commit to coverage expansion in 
unattractive areas as part of the preconditions for getting such frequency bands. 
However, Interviewee18 cautioned that the success of operationalising this strategy is 
partly hinged on the willingness of policymakers to issue/renew GSM 
licence/spectrum free of charge or at a much more reduced rate. Interviewee18 drew 
parallels with countries like Sweden where they allocated 3G licence without asking 
for ‘billions of dollars’ during the auction. Instead, as part of the bidding process, the 
MNO that won the licence were required to cover rural areas for getting the licence 
free. 
 Following its implementation in 2005, Sweden achieved a 50% 3G population 
coverage at the end of 2005 and 99.6% in 2011 (EC, n.d.; GSMA, 2015b). Following 
another initiative ensued in March 2011, the auction of 790-862MHz  from the ‘digital 
dividend’126 band, 4G population coverage increased rapidly across the country from 
56% in 2011 to 90% at the end of 2012 (GSMA, 2015b). The increase in both 3G and 
4G was driven by rural coverage expansion, which rose from 7% in 2011 to 70% at 
                                                 
125 A regional director for government and regulatory affairs of an international trade body representing 
the interest of MNO 
126 According to Doeven et al. (2012, p. 2), “… digital dividend is used to express the spectrum 
efficiency gain due to the switchover from analogue to digital terrestrial television services.” 
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the end of 2012, illustrating the success of using low-frequency bands and rollout 
obligation in serving disadvantaged areas (Point Topic, 2017). In essence, it is not 
sufficient for policymakers to include rollout obligation into old or new licences, other 
dimensions need to be considered to make the offer attractive. Section 3.3.2 
highlighted that this has also been replicated in Brazil, India and the Philippine with 
some level of success. For example, this resulted in coverage expansion for over 5,000 
communities without recourse to USF in Brazil in 2007 as the winners of 3G licence 
in profitable areas like Sao Paulo in the south were obligated to deploy network to 
unprofitable areas in the north (GSMA, 2013b). 
 Lessons could also be drawn from Rwanda where Interviwee10 revealed that 
one of the criteria for issuing GSM licences in the country was that MNO were 
mandated to provide coverage plans that accounted for disadvantaged areas. It was 
gathered from Interviewee10 that this was how Rwanda managed to achieve a high 
level of population coverage, particularly for voice service within a ‘short period’ 
following the civil war. USF has now shifted focus to the deployment of advanced 
services like broadband. Figure 16 indicates that incorporating rollout obligation into 
licence conditions could limit the complexity of UAS as it helps the regulator to focus 
more performance monitoring and enforcement instead of a whole raft of complex 
issues associated with USF as discussed in Chapter 5.   
6.3.2 Rationing and issuing non-competing licence  
A second indirect strategy suggested by ten interviewees, including Interviewee12127, 
is the rationing of disadvantaged areas among small and large operators, and then 
issuing them with a non-competing licence to be the sole provider for their allotted 
location(s). The following comments from Interviewee18 and Interviewee21 highlight 
this recommendation: 
…we are not in a position to say that subsidy based mechanism is the best 
approach. Maybe it is time to look at other strategies being implemented in some 
countries. Take France and Scotland, for example, …they divided these unserved 
areas among the operators and the regulator mandated it…Interviewee18 
It becomes interesting [covering disadvantaged areas] in a situation where one 
operator does the deployment and if the revenue benefits were 12 and the costs 
were 11, then the operator can act more rashly and say ‘well, if I go there, I will 
                                                 
127 A key figure of a specialised access provider 
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be the only operator getting all the 12 units of revenues for 11 units of costs, 
there’s not much profit but I still have a little as a monopolist’. Interviewee21 
This recommendation was borne out of the fact that one of the reasons why MNO 
cluster the cities and big towns is because of network economics – the costs of network 
deployment in relation to the actual benefit. The actual benefit is, in turn, dependent 
on factors such as, for example, population density and income levels. Section 5.3 
highlighted that areas with sparse population density and low income would attract a 
low benefit in terms of ARPU. This could encourage digital divide to persist as the 
market may fail to serve such locations (Section 2.4). Hence, a considerable mass of 
people and income are critical to “justify the relatively high costs” of network 
deployment by MNO (Gillwald, 2005a, p. 13). Interviewees argued that if small and 
large operators were permitted to serve such disadvantage areas exclusively without 
competition and keep improving things over time, the business could be more 
sustainable even without direct interventions like USF. To further underpin this 
argument, Interviewee12 asserted that:  
MNO would typically not cover disadvantaged areas not necessarily because there is 
no demand for telecommunication services, but for the fact that when multiple MNO 
compete in such areas it ultimately dilutes ARPU and makes it unprofitable. 
Interviewee12 
Whereas, continued Interviewee12, if one operator had stayed there and improved 
things over time, then the business would probably become profitable and sustainable. 
 South Africa has attempted a similar strategy via its ‘under-serviced area 
licencing initiative’, which permit ‘small-scale’128 entrants to deploy network in 
disadvantaged areas albeit with financial assistance from USF (Gillwald, 2002). 
Although the initiative was proposed in 2002, delays resulting from infighting between 
ICASA and the Ministry of Communications over its implementation meant that 
licences129 were not issued until 2004 (Gillwald, 2005a). Apart from delays, its 
implementation was also hampered by the lack of political will to release funding for 
the operators as stipulated in the licence conditions and licences appeared to have been 
                                                 
128 Small operators with local ownership besides the traditional MNO in the country 
129 Four licences were issued in 2004 to Bokone Telecoms to cover Limpopo area, Thinta Thinta 
Telecoms and Kingdom Communications were both licenced to cover KwaZulu-Natal, and IIizwe 
Telecoms was licenced to cover Eastern Cape (Gillwald, 2005a). 
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awarded to operators that lacked the capacity to deliver projects (Gillwald, 2005a; 
Lewis, 2013). 
 To forestall these failures, interviewees recommended rationing disadvantaged 
areas and issuing non-competing licences without USF support. This is consistent with 
the argument for a natural monopoly explained in Section 3.2.1 with the implication 
that a limited number of operators may better serve a given location to allow for the 
maximisation of economies of scale and avoid inefficient duplication of resources. 
Interviewees argued that policymakers could then allocate areas based on MNO 
capacity, allow MNO to decide which disadvantaged locations they want to serve 
and/or offer such licence free to smaller operators to encourage their participation in 
the process. Interviewee4 particularly stated that in the light of competition, 
policymakers should guide against discrimination when allocating such licences. It 
was suggested that the whole process: from the identification of targets to allotment 
be done in conjunction with stakeholders including local communities and smaller 
operators and not unilateral (policymakers) or bilateral (policymakers and MNO). This 
would help to promote transparency in the marketplace and prevent the abuse of 
licence issuance as illustrated earlier in the case of South Africa. Interviewee24 
asserted that it is incumbent on policymakers in different jurisdictions to consult with 
various stakeholders and decide what works best for them.  
   Interviewee8 and Interviewee5, however, cautioned that for this strategy to 
succeed policymakers need to mandate all operators in a given country to exclude Off-
Net charges for such locations. For example: 
…all the operators have to give national roaming to each other subscriber without 
charging anything extra. This was one mechanism where [in rural France] without 
duplicating the infrastructure, consumers got the benefit of competition because 
operator A was offering let’s say x price to its own subscribers and the same price to 
other subscribers as well. Interviewee18 
The aim of this is to give national roaming to the subscribers living in such areas to 
promote affordability and help to sustain the business model of MNO that do not have 
a footprint in other disadvantaged areas due to rationing. Further, this would make it 
possible for smaller players to interconnect to the networks of the larger players at 
little or no cost, especially for serving sparsely populated areas. Section 3.2.1 argued 
that such price control strategy can help smaller players to mitigate the negative impact 
of network externality by overcoming limitations like small customer base and 
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restricted network reach. Figure 16 indicates that this strategy could to promote the 
economic feasibility of serving disadvantaged areas as economies of scale could help 
to absorb the impact of transaction costs. 
6.3.3 Incentives 
A cross-section of ten interviewees, including key regulatory employees, MNO, UAS 
experts and academics, suggested that policymakers can indirectly intervene in 
coverage expansion through the provision of incentives such tax breaks, affordable 
and timely access to (low) frequency spectrum and rights of way. The following 
interview snippets serve to underline this argument: 
… I think the strategic intervention I would recommend is to lower the barrier to 
market entry. That entails a number of things. One is ensuring that there is an 
affordable access to the backbones… In most African countries, it cost more to 
deliver data to the coast than to get it from the coast to Europe or North 
America… So many countries treat telecommunications companies as a ‘cash 
cow’ in terms of generating revenue for the government. I think, at the very least, 
you want to reduce the taxes…Interviewee1 
Fiscal policy may also help in providing more incentives and compensation for 
operators willing to extend services to rural areas. This may include providing 
free land for the building of mast in such locations. Interviewee2 
The essence of such intervention is to boost economic feasibility in disadvantaged 
areas through a reduction in transaction costs for MNO and promote affordability for 
end-users. Section 5.3.3 illustrated that the tax burden on the industry is stark in certain 
jurisdictions in Africa either through ‘high’ tax rates and multiple levies. This, in turn, 
increases the overall transaction costs of network deployment for MNO and vendors 
who import, for example, equipment and mobile devices. A phenomenon which five 
interviewees, including Interviewee13, said impinges on the ability of operators to 
invest in coverage expansion and end-users affordability of mobile tariffs and devices 
like smartphones. In this light, interviewees argued that tax reduction and the 
elimination of multiple levies would reduce the costs of deploying infrastructure and 
service delivery and create an enabling environment that could incentivise MNO to 
invest in coverage expansion. In addition, vendors may be encouraged to lower, for 
instance, the costs of smartphones for the benefit of end-users. According to a key 
regulatory figure in Rwanda, this is one of the ways the government is driving the 
development of the sector:  
 204 
 
…by removing ‘all import taxes on ICT equipment’ with the aim of reducing 
the costs of doing business and boosting the adoption and usage of ICT services. 
Interviewee10 
Apart from lowering taxes and eliminating multiple levies, another way to 
incentivise MNO to participate in coverage expansion could be using the influence of 
policymakers to secure the required rights of way as earlier alluded to by Interviewee2. 
This was also echoed by Interviewee23: 
This is a very big issue [rights of way], particularly, in remote areas. The 
government should somehow help; USF could also help in getting the operators the 
required right of way, whether in the deployment of fibres or towers. Interviewee23 
Section 5.3.1 highlighted that obtaining rights of way in some parts of Africa could be 
very costly and problematic. As such, interviewees argued that in order to persuade 
MNO to expand coverage, policymakers might offer to secure such rights by negotiating 
with local communities and/or pay for the land to deploy infrastructure using USF. This 
is evident in the case of Nigeria where the Executive Vice-Chairman of the NCC used 
his influence to secure a ‘permit fee’ waiver of about $700,000 for MTN (Adepetun, 
2017; ITNews Africa, 2017). This was to facilitate the right of passage for the 
deployment of fibre infrastructure in Kano, one of the northern states in Nigeria.   
 Furthermore, six interviewees, including Interviewee1, recommended that 
policymakers could also use spectrum as an incentive to attract both smaller and larger 
operators to invest more in disadvantaged areas. For example, Interviewee21 
recommended that: 
…indirect interventions in terms of promoting things like allocation of low-
frequency bands can have a tremendous impact and a much more effective result. 
Interviewee21 
This suggestion was offered to address the concern raised in Section 5.3.2 on the 
allocation and costs of spectrum. Interviewees suggested that policymakers should 
keep the price of spectrum low and not always see the sale of spectrum as an 
opportunity to raise more money for the treasury as such practice would greatly impact 
the costs of deployment and the final tariffs charged to end-users. Interviewee20 
indicated that another way to reduce the costs element of spectrum is by using USF to 
fund the reallocation of different frequency bands. For example, when trying to release 
low-frequency spectrum for allocation to MNO, quite often, there are institutions like 
the military already using the spectrum that needs to be reassigned. USF could be used 
to help this process by offsetting some of the relocation costs. 
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 Still on the issue of spectrum allocation, four interviewees, including 
Interviewee18, suggested that policymakers can go a step further by offering low-
frequency spectrum such as those obtained from TV White Spaces130 free to operators 
to connect disadvantaged areas in order to lower the cost burden of network expansion. 
According to Interviewee4:  
Such move can also encourage small ISP players to deploy service to rural areas 
since the cost of doing so would have reduced with free access to spectrum. This will 
ensure the sustainability of such business model in rural locations. Interviewee4 
Interviewees17, 20 and 21, however, cautioned that when policymakers provide such 
incentives, they should also make sure that beneficiaries actually do what they have 
promised. For example: 
When you provide such incentive, you have to also make sure the benefiting 
operator actually do what they have promised as a result of enjoying such 
subsidy. Since government control spectrum, they have power and control over 
the operators and if the operators know that their spectrum can be taken away 
and reassigned, this may force them to fulfil their obligations. Normally, not 
always, there are operators I know who have failed to meet their promises but on 
the whole, this is quite a good way of extending coverage. Interviewee17 
Interviewee17 further added that policymakers should then focus more on monitoring 
and enforcement and leave MNO to work out the most effective and efficient way to 
deploy networks in line with the incentives they have been offered. Interviwee20 then 
concluded that: 
So you either create an economic incentive for the operators to serve unconnected 
areas or you create a disincentive for them not to. Interviewee20 
While Figure 16 indicates that the use of incentives may help to promote economic 
feasibility, the political will, which is both a necessary and sufficient factor, to adopt 
these recommendations may be lacking. This is because governments across Africa 
rely heavily on revenues from telecommunication taxes and licence fees to fund their 
national budgets (Curwen & Whalley, 2018).  
 
                                                 
130 TV White Spaces are frequencies vacated as a result of broadcast TV migration from analogue to 
digital signals (Donner, 2015). 
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6.3.4 Funding supporting infrastructure    
The lack of supporting national infrastructure such as electricity was highlighted in 
Section 5.3 by 13 interviewees as one of the major factors that exacerbate transaction 
costs and, in turn, limit the economic feasibility of network expansion. Consequently, 
five interviewees, including two former public policy executives of a multinational 
MNO, advocated that the idle money in USF could be used to fund the deployment of 
such infrastructure, especially, electricity, which appears to be a major challenge 
across Africa. The following comments serve to underline this argument: 
…If you put USF in building a network and you then have no plan in connecting 
them to the electricity grid in say the next 30 years, you are wasting people’s 
money. Go and spend it on the electricity grid, don’t spend it on telecoms. Having 
grid power changes the economics of some of the so-called unviable areas. 
Interviewee17 
…something that looks at the deprivation of communities across many 
sectors might make more sense than a sector by sector one that has USF for 
telecoms and some other strategies for electricity and other utilities. Interviewee20 
The main thrust of this argument is that policymakers may continue to collect USF but 
instead of using it to directly deploy telecommunications in disadvantaged areas, such 
money should be used to deploy supporting infrastructure such as electricity and then 
allow MNO to do network expansion themselves. Interviewees argued that this would 
help to reduce the costs of network deployment and maintenance, for example, the 
high costs of purchasing generator sets, diesel and the provision of security to guard 
installations. Such costs savings would free up more money for investment and attract 
both small and large operators to extend their footprints into disadvantaged areas.  
The criticality of electricity to coverage expansion cannot be discounted. This 
was alluded to by Interviewee14131 in one of the countries that have over 100% mobile 
penetration rates in Africa. When the interviewee was asked how the country has 
managed to achieve such feat, it was revealed that the improvement of electricity 
played a key role: 
…the complete electrification of all the country’s populated locations… has, 
in turn, made it possible to spread the telecommunication network coverage to more 
than 99% of the kingdom’s populated locations, thus providing a basic access to 
telecommunication services. Interviewee14 
                                                 
131 A key regulatory figure  
 207 
 
This electrification was not done solely by USF but rather in a multi-sector approach 
via collaboration with the National Office of Electricity in Morocco through 
PERG132initiative. However, the feasibility of a multi-sector approach to USF, that is, 
funding other utilities like electricity alongside telecommunications, is rather difficult 
to evaluate, as evidence from the country analysis indicates that Mauritania is the only 
country in Africa to adopt this practice. APAUS133  is responsible for promoting UAS 
to ‘commercial public services’ for ‘low-income’ population in Mauritania (World 
Bank, 2011; DGTIC, 2015). Such services include telephone, water and electricity. 
Although Mauritania adopted a multi-sector approach to address the deprivation of 
public utilities, its main challenge is the coordination between various departments 
and the harmonisation of interventions (World Bank, 2011). This has resulted in 
disjointed activities and the implementation of certain projects has stalled (World 
Bank, 2011). Although it may be difficult to judge the success of using USF in another 
sector from a single country example, the above analysis does illustrate the importance 
of complementary infrastructure such as electricity to coverage expansion. 
Furthermore, since disadvantaged areas appear to suffer from multiple deprivations 
like electricity, telecommunications and water, Interviewee17 asserted that: 
They [policymakers] should not think of mobile telecoms separately from 
thinking about electrification and about power. Mobile telecoms policy should be 
enshrined in the overall development policy of a country, because without access to 
low-cost energy, not only can the operators not run the base stations, but also people 
cannot recharge their phones. Interviewees17 
Interviewee17 added that when telecommunication is provided and there is no 
electricity, this would most likely challenge the affordability component of UAS as 
tariff would increase to account for the extra costs of providing generator sets and 
diesel. This appears to underline the argument in Section 3.2.2 that the opportunity 
cost of subsidising telecommunications may be an alternative forgone in another 
critical sector like power. That being said, Figure 16 indicates that collaborating with 
other government departments in funding and providing supporting infrastructure such 
as electricity would help to lower transaction costs and improve the economic 
                                                 
132 Programme d’Electrification Rurale Globale. 
133 Agency for the Promotion of Universal Access to Services - USF in Mauritania - was established by 
Ordinance No. 2001-06 of June 27, 2001 (DGTIC, 2015). 
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feasibility of network deployment. A detailed examination of other areas of 
collaboration is presented in the next chapter. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter partially addresses RQ2 by presenting the various suggestions offered by 
interviewees on how to mitigate the digital divide of uneven mobile coverage in 
Africa. As indicated in Section 6.1, these suggestions unfolded because of the 
problems identified in Chapter 5. Hence, the discussion outlined in this chapter is 
intertwined with Chapter 5. Following the analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 where it was 
established that although market liberalisation and competition have transformed the 
telecommunications sector across Africa in terms of investment, infrastructure 
development and coverage, digital gaps persist in varying proportions. The effort of 
government in Africa to address the market failure of imbalance in mobile coverage 
led to the establishment of USF, which over 30 countries implement within the wider 
framework of UAS policy. However, due to challenges such as idle funds, corruption 
and lack of enforcement, the impact of USF has not been widely felt. Chapter 5 
addressed these challenges in detail and at the heart of these issues were regulatory 
capacity and transaction costs. 
 To address these two key underpinning issues, Chapter 6 began with 
suggestions on how to improve USF in order to provide a model that is more effective 
in narrowing the digital divide. The findings in Section 6.2 highlighted that regulatory 
capacity is critical to the success of such model. For example, regulators need qualified 
staff with the relevant skill sets to succinctly articulate and design a comprehensive 
UAS framework to guide the implementation of USF. Apart from qualified staff, 
regulators also need financial resources to execute tasks like the sourcing of reliable 
data for planning USF, to carry out stakeholder engagement and conduct market 
research to ascertain who lacks ‘what’ and ‘where’. It then goes without saying that a 
regulator that is lacking capacity will arguably achieve very little in terms of 
promoting UAS. 
 The transaction costs of network deployment and maintenance is the second 
fundamental issue that resulted from Chapter 5, as MNO will typically base their 
decision to invest in network expansion on cost-benefit analysis. More often than not, 
areas where costs are perceived to outweigh returns will get little or no attention from 
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the market as MNO are keener on commercially viable locations. Although the 
deployment of telecommunications is generally considered capital intensive, Chapter 
5 identified various reasons that tend to exacerbate the costs burden in Africa, which 
then limits the feasibility of providing services economically. In response to this, 
Sections 6.3 outlined series of suggestions, which policymakers and MNO could 
employ to lower transaction costs. For example, the allocations of disadvantaged areas 
among small and large operators and then issuing them with a non-competing licence 
to be the sole UAS provider for their allotted areas (Section 6.3.2). The argument here 
is that such a strategy would result in economies of scale and make the business of 
network operation more sustainable compared to competing networks from different 
operators. This is consistent with Section 3.2.1, which argued that certain 
disadvantaged areas would be better served with a natural monopoly of one or limited 
operators. Other costs reduction strategies are presented in Chapter 7, which is a 
continuation of the findings on RQ2 as indicated earlier in Section 6.1.   
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Chapter 7: Findings – Improving coverage part II 
7.1 Introduction 
Since this chapter is a continuation of the findings on RQ2, it follows the same 
approach laid-out in Chapter 6 to examine emerging issues as they related to Chapter 
5 with more emphasis on how to lower transaction costs and improve economic 
efficiency of network deployment. This chapter begins by exploring areas for further 
collaboration as hinted in Section 6.3.4 and then move on to innovative solutions for 
UAS. 
7.2 Collaboration 
A diverse range of interviewees stressed the need for stakeholder collaboration in 
order to promote cooperation among various interest groups in building a more 
inclusive digital society. According to Interviewee13:  
Now we still, as mobile operators, feel uncomfortable with the fact that our people 
are not as connected as possible and we are saying that perhaps the answer is in the 
cooperation…Interviewee13 
In many ways, the issues raised under this theme further underline the key role of 
continuous stakeholder engagement to the success of coverage expansion (Section 
6.2.3). This is against the backdrop of interviewees suggesting that such collaboration 
should cut across wider interest groups. Figure 17 highlights the issues that emerged 
under this theme, which are subsequently discussed below.  
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Figure 17: Collaboration 
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7.2.1 Infrastructure sharing 
Figure 17 indicates that one way through which stakeholders could collaborate to 
promote coverage expansion is through infrastructure sharing134. Twenty-four 
interviewees commented on this issue, albeit with mixed views. For example, 
Interviewee25 and Interviewee13 stated that: 
Currently, operators in Egypt are using passive infrastructure sharing among 
them. This is done based on commercial agreements and not mandated by the 
operators. This is very beneficial to them, especially in remote areas. In projects 
financed by USF, operators are mandated to provide National Roaming to other 
operators in those areas. Interviewee25 
…there are different school of thoughts in terms of infrastructure sharing but 
definitely, it is the way to go as it will help us spend less and reach the most 
remote areas and fulfill that obligation from a rural coverage perspective. 
Interviewee13 
Aside from these two interviewees, three others, including Interviewee1, added that 
the benefit of infrastructure sharing to coverage expansion is “incontestable” as it is 
a demonstrable fact that if two or more MNO share the same tower, diesel generator 
and power backup equipment, their capital and operating expenditure (capex and 
opex) will be halved. This may then free up more capital to invest in coverage 
expansion because of the cost savings from sharing. While this may be true, one may 
also argue that if the process is not properly monitored, MNO may end up investing 
such money elsewhere as discussed in Section 3.2.2. Nonetheless, Interviewee8 added 
that evidence from countries where they have collaborated with MNO and towerco 
suggests that apart from acting as a cost reduction strategy, infrastructure sharing can 
also help to improve QoS for end-users as various specialists focus on their areas of 
strengths.  
For example, towerco can provide specialised management of power-supply 
solution through the introduction of more efficient hybrid power solutions. MNO can 
then focus on building their brands as they compete on service delivery levels rather 
than infrastructure ownership. It was also suggested that infrastructure sharing helps 
                                                 
134 It involves the partial or full sharing of telecommunications equipment and/or networks  - where 
partial sharing is referred to as passive infrastructure, for example, tower, power supply, generators and 
security, and full sharing involves passive as well as active infrastructure such as spectrum, microwave 
radios, switches, antennas and backhaul (Baijal & Jain, 2007; Deloitte & APC, 2015; KPMG, 2011). 
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to lower the barrier to market entry, especially for new entrants and smaller players. 
This view was echoed by Interviewee10 who commented that: 
We have also put in place infrastructure sharing guidelines on towers and 
sites to allow newcomers to use existing infrastructure...  
 In spite of the benefits recounted above, three interviewees, including 
Interviewee1, argued that from their experiences across Africa, the practice of 
infrastructure sharing is often limited or at best restricted to passive infrastructure. 
When they were prodded on why this is the case, a couple of reasons emerged. First is 
a lack of trust. This is evident in the response of Interviewee1: 
I think the reason it doesn’t happen more often is because of a lack of trust... I 
recently came back from Liberia speaking with the three major MNO there and they 
have attempted several times to engage in infrastructure sharing... They have 
carried on for a few months but then the deal has fallen apart and it boils down to a 
lack of trust among MNO.  
Interviewee6 went further to add that MNO do not only have trust issues among 
themselves in terms of their competitors undermining their services, but there are also 
concerns that the regulatory and legal framework needed for effective implementation 
from policymakers may be lacking. This argument is consistent with Warsen et al 
(2018) who found that trust is a critical success factor when it comes to multilateral 
cooperation on infrastructural projects. Secondly, there is the fear that sharing core 
networks may reduce QoS because of shared capacity. This view was reflected in the 
comment of Interviewee9 thus:  
The operators have mixed views about the introduction and acceptability of 
active infrastructure sharing due to competition issues and QoS concerns.  
Interviewee9 further asserted that the threat of a diminished QoS owing to 
infrastructure sharing might undermine ARPU, as coverage and service reliability 
appear to be among the critical factors that influence the choice of end-user. Thirdly, 
MNO, particularly the ones with first mover advantage, may not want to give up such 
competitive edge by sharing their network. Finally, this group of interviewees also 
raised the issue of On-and-Off Net tariffs. Typically, MNO who rollout first very often 
captures the market and keeps it through On-Net tariffs, i.e., offering low tariff to users 
within the same network and higher Off-Net tariff for users on rivals’ network. 
Interviewee5 illustrated this with the case of Kenya where they found that even though 
Airtel offers a lower tariff, people working in Nairobi with families in the villages 
prefer a more expensive option offered by the market leader, Safaricom. This reason 
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being that Safaricom has a more extensive level of coverage compared to Airtel. 
Safaricom also offers cheaper tariff for On-Net calls than Off-Net and given that most 
of their families use this network, it is more economical to use Safaricom. Network 
externality, in this case, favours Safaricom. 
Interviewee5 then concluded that MNO with low subscribers may not benefit 
much from infrastructure sharing because of the high margins between On-and-Off 
Net tariffs. This further underlines the argument in Section 3.2.1 that since network 
externality tends to favour the big players, its negative impact on smaller players may 
lead to market failure as (small) MNO may decide not to participate in such 
arrangement altogether. 
In addition to the above, Interviewee20 and Interviewee24 reflected on other 
forms of sharing, namely, cross-sector sharing and single wholesale network135. The 
following interview snippets shed further light on this: 
…one needs to consider infrastructure sharing... between different mobile 
operators… but also infrastructure sharing between different sectors, for 
example, energy and telecoms… Interviewee24    
I think that makes sense [infrastructure sharing] … It is about how you structure 
it. A single network is going to be more cost-effective for telecoms in rural areas 
in the same way that a single railway network is cost-effective. Interviewee20 
Interviewee24 was particularly vocal on cross-sector infrastructure sharing arguing 
that the most expensive part of infrastructure deployment in practice is civil works, 
specifically, the digging and paving of roads for the laying of cables. Cross-sector 
sharing can help to reduce the costs associated with civil works through collaboration 
between respective sectors. Interviewee24 stated that it is incumbent on policymakers 
to facilitate this process by providing incentives for intragovernmental departments to 
collaborate in the deployment of infrastructure. For example, the ministry of works 
can collaborate with the ministry of telecommunications by inviting MNO to lay their 
cables during road construction. This will save costs of infrastructure deployment for 
all the parties involved and since such activity may require permission and/or rights 
of way, this could be negotiated and obtained jointly. It may also limit the level of 
                                                 
135 This is also known as ‘open access’ in some jurisdiction. It is a situation where a country provides 
operators with wholesale access to network infrastructure and/or services such as backbones and 
broadband on a competitive basis that is fair, transparent and non-discriminatory (OECD, 2013). 
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activity disruption and environmental impact along such route. Furthermore, MNO 
could collaborate with railway companies to share any excess fibre capacity that may 
be available. Evidence of this exists in South Africa where Vodafone is collaborating 
with PRASA136 in a deal worth over R1 billion137 (Tredger, 2016). Vodafone would 
lease PRASA’s ‘dark fibre’ cables - excess capacity - and make same available to 
public and private institutions at a reduced rate. However, the finite availability of rail 
infrastructure across the continent (ADB, 2015) may hinder the proliferation of such 
collaboration. 
 Moving to the issue of the single wholesale network, Interviewees20 and 17 
argued that single wholesale is an ‘extreme’ form of network sharing where everybody 
resells and compete on the retail level. Interviewee17 recommended that single 
network should only be introduced when it is no longer possible to ‘squeeze’ coverage 
from competition. As such, stakeholders including operators and policymakers should 
then work together and come up with a proposal on how this should work. Although 
there is a growing support for a government-controlled model of single wholesale 
network in Zimbabwe (see Section 8.3.2), Interviewee17 argued that evidence from 
practice suggests that this is not the right way to go. Mexico is a classic example where 
the government has budgeted $7 billion to set up a single network to compete with 
Telmex, which controls about 80% of the mobile market (Frontier Economics, 2014; 
TeleGeography, 2015a; Webber, 2016). Despite the large amount that has gone into 
the project, Interviewee17 stated that it appears that there is no end in sight, putting 
the success of the entire project in doubt. Similar outcomes can be observed in the 
cases of Nigeria and South Africa where single wholesale network has been proposed 
for mobile broadband delivery to prevent competing mobile networks from leaving 
disadvantaged areas behind, its implementation has proven to be problematic (Frontier 
Economics, 2014; Gilwald, Esselaar, & Rademan, 2016).  
Take the case of South Africa, for example, it is argue that one of the reasons 
why the so-called WOAN138 has failed is that such initiative needs strong institutional 
capacity and skills for a successful implementation, both of which is lacking not only 
                                                 
136 Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 
137 An equivalent of about $74.3 million 
138 Wireless Open Access Network 
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in South Africa but other parts of the continent (Gilwald, Esselaar, & Rademan, 2016; 
Gillwald et al., 2017). Furthermore, there is the issue of a lack of clear policy action 
to guide the implementation of WOAN coupled with the lingering challenge of 
spectrum allocation (Gilbert, 2016b). There are also concerns that the current proposal 
of WOAN could create a monopoly in the market (Mzekandaba, 2017c). In the light 
of these difficulties, Interviewee17 concluded that: 
…it is a very risky strategy for government to get involved in the 
telecommunications market directly and history does not suggest this is a good idea 
looking at the poor state of the industry pre-liberalisation.  
Interviewees17, 20 and 24 proposed a joint venture model that is regulated by 
government but managed by the private sector who are better skilled and equipped to 
execute the project. In order to prevent rent-seeking MNO from exploiting the 
situation and treating others unfairly, Interviewee17 highlighted the need for 
regulatory oversight. Such regulatory oversight should also ensure that networks are 
upgraded as at when required, added Interviewee20. 
 In contrast to those that supported infrastructure sharing, four interviewees, 
particularly Interviewee12 and Interviewee21 had some reservations. They 
commented: 
I actually don’t think infrastructure sharing has a big part to play here because of 
the way in which rural villages work. Interviewee12 
Network and infrastructure sharing can stop stupidity – the ridiculous duplication 
of infrastructure - but it just can’t change the fundamental economics because if 
you half the costs, you half the revenues, it is still the same equation. 
Interviewee21 
This group of interviewees agreed that sharing in general could lower costs so that it 
becomes feasible to provide services economically, however, it does not change 
prevailing circumstances such as sparse population density, low ICT usage and low-
income levels in disadvantaged areas. Hence, there may not be enough customers to 
compete for or their ability to afford telecommunication services might be restricted 
by their disposable income. They further argued that sharing might not necessarily 
work for disadvantaged areas because whoever is first to deploy to a given village, for 
example, tend to get most of the customers. In this case, MNO might not be interested 
in going into such location even when there is an opportunity to share infrastructure. 
Therefore, while Figure 17 shows that there was a consensus among interviewees, that 
infrastructure sharing reduces the overall costs of network deployment and 
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maintenance, opinions were split on whether it could facilitate coverage in 
disadvantaged areas. Consequently, Intervieweee5 stated that: 
I don’t think, as far as I know, that anybody has worked out exactly where 
you should draw the line or indeed whether it is a sharp line or some sort of 
gradation in the middle. This is something we should face up to and that could be a 
whole Ph.D. in itself if you went into it in enough depth… Interviewee5 
Interviewee13 added that: 
This [infrastructure sharing] needs to be further explored because it has 
different level of complexities. Interviewee13 
Both interviewees suggested that there is a need for further research in order to have 
a more informed understanding of the ‘where’, ‘what’, and ‘how’ of infrastructure 
sharing. That is, ‘where’ is the right location to share in terms of rural, urban, both or 
in-between, ‘what’ part of the sharing should be promoted in terms of active and/or 
passive infrastructure, and ‘how’ should the sharing be done with respect to process, 
procedures and regulations. 
7.2.2 Joint venture USF  
Another form of collaboration suggested by three interviewees139 is the operation of 
USF as a joint venture, that is, formulating coverage policies, managing and operating 
USF in partnership with other stakeholders. The following excerpts from 
Interviewee13 and Interviewee15140 help to cement this argument: 
Maybe the fund needs to be managed by a joint venture… with enough scrutiny in 
terms of managing the investment… strong internal policies that any commercial 
business has. From this perspective, not only would the fund benefit from the 
expertise of the operators but also from their way of doing business, which… is 
more effective and efficient. Interviewee13 
It [USF] should be taken away from the government and managed by an 
independent party that can allocate it for services it is meant for under the 
management of a committee representing all… shareholders that contribute to the 
fund and it needs to be audited both in terms of the collections and the services it 
is deployed for… like what was done with the number porting company in South 
Africa where all the carriers are shareholders. Interviewee15 
The two interviewees quoted above argued that a joint venture approach would create 
a synergy where all relevant stakeholders can make vital and creative contributions so 
                                                 
139 Two key MNO figures representing pan and multinational entities and one civil society advocate. 
140 A senior representative of one pan-Africa MNO 
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that USF can benefit from a rather more diverse opinion on how to achieve an all-
inclusive digital society.  Interviewee15 further suggested that a USF that is jointly 
managed and operated by a broad interest group would not only strengthen its 
independence but also promote a more transparent process where parties have their 
respective responsibilities. Interviewees1, 5 and 23 also suggested that civil society 
and local communities should be involved in the process, as the local information they 
provide can prove useful, especially when it comes to ascertaining what kind of 
infrastructure and services are needed in a given location. Interviewee1 suggested that 
one way of doing this might be through shared responsibilities in terms of resources 
and commitment: 
I would ensure that it is essential for municipalities to co-invest in the 
network so that they have some skin in the game. Interviewee1 
Such effort, added Interviewee1, would ensure that all relevant stakeholders have 
some form of stake in coverage expansion and pooling their collective resources. This 
could then help to mitigate the misallocation of risk largely inherent in the current USF 
model in Africa where bureaucrats have nothing to lose in the event of failure. When 
all relevant stakeholders have a ‘skin’ in the game and vested interested in the process, 
there would be more incentive to be ambitious and more success could result. For 
example, civil society and local communities could put more pressure on policymakers 
to deliver, especially where project execution is delayed or abandoned, MNO would 
not sit back and watch the levies they have contributed being misallocated or diverted, 
and policymakers would want to deliver to their people to gain more approval. 
 However, this recommendation does not address the coordination issues like 
communication and the harmonisation of diverse interests from stakeholders raised in 
Section 6.3.4. Furthermore, giving that the participation of civil society and local 
community in ICT debate is generally limited in Africa (Section 6.2.3), it may be 
difficult to involve them in the process, not to mention the resources needed for 
repeated contacts and organising consultation meetings. Nonetheless, Figure 17 
indicates that joint venture USF has the tendency to reduce the complexity of UAS by 
drawing from diverse expertise and knowledge of stakeholders. It can also promote 
strong ICT leadership and commitment as policymakers and other parties have the 
incentive to make USF work due to their vested interests. 
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7.2.3 Network governance 
Responding to the lack of performance monitoring and enforcement of USF and other 
coverage obligation raised in Section 5.2.2, Interviewee12 argued that this problem 
partly stems from the lack of strength of regulators in terms of their ability and 
resources vis-à-vis large MNO. The following extract helps to underline the impact of 
large MNE on small countries: 
Nigeria is a big country… they can stand up to MTN so the government has some 
amount of leverage. However, when MTN go to say Zambia, invest a couple of 
millions of dollars, buildout the networks, employ some 2000-3000 people, etc. 
and then the government decides that: MTN you haven’t done your rural 
coverage, therefore, we are going to fine you say $50M. MTN just goes ‘oh okay 
go ahead… and see what happens’. This is because, essentially, MTN are bigger, 
stronger, and wealthier than Zambia. Furthermore, when Zambia says okay MTN 
get-out, all of a sudden, you have up to 3000 people unemployed and these people 
may be supporting another 4-5 people. So the relative weight of these mobile 
operators in Africa is generally bigger than a lot of the states… Interviewee12 
 In other words, some MNO are global MNE with a vast amount of resources and 
influence and considering that the regulators in Africa are (generally) often under-
resourced as evident in Section 5.2.1, they are comparatively weaker. Section 2.3 
highlighted that the spread of FDI is a key driver of the transformation of 
telecommunications market in Africa and MNE are critical to attracting such 
investment. While they have attracted over $70 billion for the deployment of 
telecommunications infrastructure in Africa from the late 1990s/ early 2000s, a further 
projection of $214 billion has been estimated by 2020 (GSMA, 2016a; van-Huyssteen, 
2012). MNE MNO are thus powerful and with their resources, they can exert a great 
deal of influence over the regulators. Interviewees argue that this can undermine the 
ability of regulators to enforce obligations and hold MNO accountable. Interviewees6 
and 20 suggested that one way of dealing with this problem is through network 
governance: 
…the regulators are very weak in relation to the operators. There is, therefore, 
the question of how do you solve that problem? …regional collaboration among 
countries could be part of the solution. Interviewee20 
…if you were to look in Europe, or the OECD countries, the key places where the 
discussions on universal service take place are within the European Commission and 
its Committees, or within the OECD Committees. Now, that kind of network 
governance doesn’t really happen in Africa. So, there is an institutional issue there 
which says if African countries really want to optimise their rural coverage and 
universal service, there ought to be a kind of network governance, whether at the 
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level of ECOWAS or AU, to sit down and brainstorm on what works and does not 
work. Interviewee6 
Interviewee6 asserted that network governance provides regional policymakers with 
the opportunity to congregate for the purpose of cooperation and collective action to 
tackle the market power of large MNE. The decision taken in such platform will then 
assist policymakers at national levels to hold MNO accountable because MNO may 
be richer than some countries but not in their sum of parts. Although some of these 
organisations exist across Africa141, there is very limited evidence (as illustrated with 
the case of COMESA142 below) to suggest that they collaborate to pass binding 
harmonised regulations that could put pressure on MNE to comply with the 
proliferation of UAS. However, this is evident in the EU where countries have 
localised laws from the Digital Single Market directives, which is binding on MNO 
across member states. For example, Directive 2014/61/CE – measures to reduce the 
high cost of deploying high-speed broadband (EC, 2016). In this case, small member 
states, in terms of size and resources, can arguably deal with MNE from a position of 
‘strength’.  
 Regulatory cooperation can thus give regulators a bit more clout to put pressure 
on MNE to comply with issues related to UAS. Figure 17 illustrates that this could 
help to promote strong ICT leadership and commitment through the enforcement of 
coverage obligation. For example, in October 2017, COMESA reached an agreement 
to collectively eliminate roaming charges for mobile users across member states in an 
effort to reduce mobile tariff and address affordability problem (Malakata, 2017a). 
Upon implementation, MNO in these countries will need to comply as this is a 
collective agreement of 18 countries across Eastern and Southern Africa.    
                                                 
141 For example, The West Africa Telecommunications Regulators Assembly and Southern African 
Development Community (ITU, 2011). 
142 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa is an economic bloc of 18 African countries, 
including Egypt and Seychelles 
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7.2.4 National Research and Education Networks (NREN) 
The last form of collaboration suggested by Interviewee5 is that policymakers should 
consider collaborating with National Research and Education Networks (NREN)143 as 
this could help to bring inexpensive connectivity to educational institutions: 
Another point I should add is how worthwhile it can be for universal service 
managers to collaborate with national research and education networks 
(NREN)… There is often international support for NREN (e.g. from the European 
Union), which significantly brings down the cost of international connectivity 
…this can be a valuable part of government universal broadband strategies. 
Interviewee5 
The underlying argument for the connection of educational institutions is that it acts 
as a catalyst to increase ICT demand and the adoption of mobile telephony because as 
Interviewee17 noted: 
…when you think about universal service, demand aggregation for say children 
are called schools.  
In the same light, Interviewee24 added: 
When I also think of broadband the biggest investment you can make is in schools… 
I think money is better spent in connecting the schools either with a computer lab or 
tablets… I mean if you think about where such monies are best invested; it should be 
on the future of the country like what we just did in Botswana where mobile 
operators agreed that it is good to connect all the schools to broadband.  
This interviewee was drawing parallels from what they did in a consultancy project in 
Botswana. It was revealed they managed to convince MNO and policymakers that it 
is critical to connect all the schools in the country to broadband, as this is a better way 
to accelerate digital inclusion since young people are more likely to continue to access 
telecommunication services through their mobile devices even while at home. It, 
therefore, creates an indirect demand and promotes the early exposure of young 
people, who will form the bulk of MNO future customers, to the benefit of the internet. 
When this happens, MNO may then be encouraged to further deploy infrastructure and 
services as a result of perceived demand. 
                                                 
143
 NREN are NGO made up of academics and scientific communities that champion the provision of 
internet connectivity to educational institutions through coordination and collaboration with local and 
international bodies (Dyer, 2009; Metri, 2018a). For example, GEANT in Europe, Internet 2 in the USA 
and RedCLARA in Latin America (Metri, 2018a). 
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 Since educational institutions connectivity is a viable means of promoting ICT 
usage and adoption, Interviewee5 recommended that collaboration with NREN could 
help to facilitate the spread of affordable connectivity to such places and ICT 
diffusion. Interviewee5 suggested that MNO could also be encouraged to include some 
level of school connectivity in disadvantaged areas as part of their corporate social 
responsibility (CSR)144. Tanzania is one country where such an initiative occurs. For 
example, the e-School Project of Tigo Tanzania has collaborated with the Ministry of 
Communication to deploy computer labs and internet access points across secondary 
schools in Tanzania (ITNews Africa, 2016a; Touchard, 2016). The ministry was 
responsible for identifying the schools while Tigo was responsible for funding the 
project. Figure 17 indicates that collaboration with NREN and MNO via CSR can help 
to improve the economic feasibility of network expansion as school connectivity will 
promote early exposure of young people to the benefit of using ICT. This will, in turn, 
spur an increase in mobile adoption and usage. 
 There are over 18 NRENs operating across Africa, for example, UbuntuNet 
Alliance in Eastern and Southern Africa, with funding support from the EU through 
the AfricaConnect project with a mixed picture in terms of their impact (Foley, 2016). 
The main challenge is the difficulty of getting government leadership to buy into the 
initiative, which has resulted in a lack of funding and expansion (Foley, 2016). Since 
this lack of persuasion by government leadership is partly due to the lack of awareness 
on the workings of the Internet, the value added that NREN can bring to higher 
education and digital inclusion in general, there is a need for more advocacy to bring 
policymakers on-board (Foley, 2016).      
7.3 Innovative solutions for universal access and service 
In the light of the issues raised in Section 5.3, interviewees suggested that 
disadvantaged areas could become more attractive if policymakers would allow and 
encourage various innovative solutions for UAS to flourish. The various issues that 
emerged from this theme are presented in Figure 18 and discussed below.  
                                                 
144 Corporate social responsibility are various forms of voluntary and social welfare activities, which 
goes beyond profit maximisation of firms with the aim of making them socially responsible and global 
corporate citizens (McWilliams, 2015; Sutherland, 2016) 
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Figure 18: Innovative solutions for universal service 
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7.3.1 Inexpensive and heterogeneous technologies 
Seven interviewees argued that policymakers and MNO need to be pragmatic about 
their technological choices as the sole deployment of traditional GSM network may 
not be cost-effective in certain disadvantaged areas. This recommendation is reflected 
in the following quotes: 
Another important thing is to try and consider different technologies… because very 
often when people talk about mobile, they seem to talk about circular technology, but 
if we speak of mobile in a broad sense, we can see that, for example, satellite is 
mobile in a way, or Wi-Fi, or WiMAX, or other technologies. One should think about 
this mix of technologies in order to bring mobile connection or the internet to 
everybody as this would bring true connectivity to countries… Interviewee24 
I think generally, we on the technology side should have a rethink especially about 
the deployment of the same technology to all areas like 4G and 5G. These 
technologies are very expensive to deploy especially in rural areas where it does not 
make economic sense to do so as they may not be profitable... So there should be 
some effort to have other cheap technologies that can provide services to rural 
areas… Interviewee4 
These views were supported by Interviewee1 who added that since the costs of 
deploying coverage to disadvantaged areas using traditional solutions have proven to 
be significant, policymakers should encourage and facilitate coverage expansion using 
a combination of technologies. For example, Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) provides the 
possibility of deploying inexpensive wireless local areas networks with the capacity 
of covering an entire village, depending on the size. This is more cost and time 
effective compared to GSM technologies such 3G (Graham, 2016). World Wide 
Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) technology could be used to 
connect various Wi-Fi hotspots and Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) to the 
internet and can cover up to 50 kilometres without direct line of sight linking BTS145. 
Furthermore, a microwave technology may be more suitable for extending network 
for flat and valley topographies while satellite may be preferred for mountainous and 
isolated geographies. 
On the issue of satellite, Interviewee17 pointed out that: 
Satellite is not an economic solution in terms of affordability, it may help in solving 
availability but it is too expensive. Interviewee17 
                                                 
145Base Transceiver Stations  
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This goes to suggest that although satellite may be a good option for isolated areas 
and, as Interviewee24 articulated, for people living nomadic life as they moving from 
one area to another in search of pasture for their livestock, it may not necessarily 
reduce the costs of network deployment. 
Interviewees12 and 18 advanced the use of Network Function Virtualisation 
(NFV). A synthesis of both views indicates that NFV is a technology that helps to 
lower the cost of infrastructure deployment by reducing the amount of hardware 
needed to operate and maintain a telecommunications network. For example, to run a 
GSM network, one would need a structured architecture that encompasses various 
components such as a given number of BTS connected to BSC146, which is also 
connected to a switching centre and so on. With NPV, it is possible to 
compartmentalise all these processes into a ‘single small box’ and remotely control 
and monitor various BTS. So rather than having separate buildings for all these 
architectures with air-conditioning and other energy costs, the implementation all of 
these different network functions can be virtually executed through a single piece of 
computing. Interviewee18 concluded that: 
This [NFV] is one change, which is helping the industry to go to the rural areas. 
Operators in Africa may want to deploy more of this technology and implement this 
strategy in serving rural areas. Interviewee18 
One of the implications of NPV is that the costs of running a network could be 
drastically reduced, as a fewer investment would be required in terms of limited energy 
and building costs. This is consistent with Han, Gopalakrishnan, Ji, and Lee (2015, p. 
90), which asserted that NPV is a low-cost innovation that “…can potentially bring 
several benefits to network carriers, dramatically changing the landscape of the 
telecommunications industry.” This is particularly significant in light of the projection 
that NPV can reduce capex by 68% and opex by 67% (ACG Research, 2015). Another 
implication is that local communities can now build their own network with a small 
amount of investment since NPV is cheap and much simpler to implement relative to 
traditional GSM technology (Ananth & Sharma, 2017; Han, Gopalakrishnan, Ji, & 
Lee, 2015. The issue of local communities building their own network is further 
examined in the next section. 
                                                 
146 Base Station Controller 
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 The discussion above suggests that in order to achieve effectiveness and 
efficiency in coverage expansion, policymakers should encourage and promote the 
deployment of inexpensive and heterogeneous technologies as solely relying on GSM 
technologies may not be economical in certain disadvantaged areas. Interviewee8 
asserted that the choice of deploying various technologies should be weighed against 
its visibility in other to maximise value for all involved because:  
The wrong technology deployed for the wrong reasons is equally damaging – it 
always ends in disappointment for all the stakeholders. The merits of small cell 
solutions versus a GSM macro site deployment in rural areas should be open for 
debate.  Interviewee8 
In the same light, Interviewee24 concluded that:  
I believe there is no blanket solution for all countries combined. One needs to see 
what is there in terms of infrastructure, geography and density in order to decide 
which policy strategy is best.  
These interviewees suggested that since different conditions exist within countries and 
between regions, policymakers should talk with stakeholders and collectively decide 
what kind of technology is best for different locations in terms of its effectiveness and 
efficiency as highlighted in Section 3.2.2. 
7.3.2 Local community enterprise 
According to Interviewee1, local community enterprise (LCE) is typically a group of 
small entrepreneurs who come together to facilitate the ownership and management 
of telecommunications network to meet the information need of their local 
communities. Altogether, five interviewees articulated that this kind of ‘bottom-up’ 
initiative led by members of the affected communities could help to facilitate low-cost 
coverage solutions and improve the commercial viability of network expansion in 
disadvantaged areas. This recommendation is highlighted in the following quotes: 
…local community enterprise… can put together systems that work. These may not 
be top quality but for people in isolated villages, some communications are better 
than no communication. So I don’t see why regulation should prevent it as that is 
regulation working in the wrong way. This is another thing to bear in mind in the 
African context, community enterprise should be fostered and encouraged and 
certainly, it should not be illegal. Interviewe5 
Some more forward-thinking regulators are even considering new licence models 
geared specifically to cater for the rural market - small cell solutions with rural 
villages, village licenses or community licenses. Mexico is pioneering this at the 
moment while Rwanda is considering this for the African rural market. Interviewee8 
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Unlike the MNO who are largely motivated by profit, Interviewee1 added that LCE 
are primarily motivated by the desire to close the gaps of the socio-economic needs in 
their local communities. As such, LCE can attract the attention of volunteer experts 
and NGO who can offer technical and financial support for deprived areas to building 
a cost-effective network. For example, an organisation called Rise American is 
building GSM networks with low-cost technology that are community led in Mexico 
and serving certain communities like Wahaka and Sierra de Juarez. Interviewee1 
concluded that in communities like Wahaka: 
The deployment of low-cost technology has helped to reduce the cost of building a 
base station to around $6000. This means they can operate on an ARPU of $3 per 
person and create a sustainable network. This is another new approach using very 
low-cost technologies operating in the GSM spectrum that can provide sustainable 
access in rural areas. Interviewee1 
However, Interviewee17 argued that to organise the entire process, one needs a local 
entrepreneur - somebody in the community who sees a business opportunity or other 
reasons to bring all parties together. There is also the need to have someone with some 
level of technical know-how on network deployment and according to Interviewee5, 
such person can be within or outside the local community who would then carry out 
‘on-the-job’ training for members of the community to take over the management of 
the network. Interviewees suggested that LCE cannot happen in a vacuum, it needs a 
concerted effort that is initiated and led by somebody or a group of persons and finding 
the right mix of people could be a challenge. 
Apart from finding someone in the community to lead this initiative, 
Interviewee1 suggested other key success factors. For example, policymakers should 
create innovative licence models that would permit LCE to flourish and stimulate 
solutions that can rapidly facilitate UAS. An innovative idea could be to issue a non-
competing licence and establish regulations that will then allow LCE to interconnect 
with the networks of the larger players at little or no cost, especially for sparsely 
populated areas as indicated in Section 6.3.2. Secondly, such licence should be 
technology neutral147 in order to allow LCE to deploy inexpensive and heterogeneous 
technologies according to the budget and information needs of a given community. In 
addition, policymakers can also allocate low-frequency spectrum at no fee considering 
                                                 
147 Technology neutral is a situation where a single licence is issued to cover the deployment of multiple 
technology and services (CEG & GSMA, 2012). 
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that profit is not the main driver for LCE. This can be illustrated with the Zenzeleni 
Networks, a solar-powered ISP formed by Mankosi148 community with the technical 
support of researchers from the University of the Western Cape to provide affordable 
voice and data services (Tucker, 2017). Zenzeleni was granted a licence fee exemption 
by ICASA to operate infrastructure and services without charge, however, they pay 
for backhaul connectivity from wholesale providers with funds from local 
cooperatives. Zenzeleni offers voice service for 20 cents per minute relative to a 
minimum of R1.50 offered by MNO, data tariff is ‘20 to 40’ times cheaper and the 
solar-powered stations provide charging points for mobile phones (Tucker, 2017). 
This was corroborated by Interviewee27149, who revealed that …the community 
determines the tariff, which is much more affordable than that of the MNO. 
It is also interesting to note that the Internet Society now offers technical and 
financial support in the range of $10,000 and $30,000 for LCE in emerging economies 
through its ‘Beyond the Net’ initiative aimed at providing Internet connectivity for all 
(Internet Society, 2018). Dodoma District in Tanzania is one example in Africa where 
the Internet Society is partnering with the University of Dodoma to pilot an LCE 
network solution using TVWS technology to bring connectivity to unserved remote 
areas in the region (Metri, 2018b). LCE can thus help to promote a bottom-up initiative 
with low-cost coverage solutions that are centred on the capacity and the needs of local 
communities. However, this is dependent on certain factors among which is the 
permission to deploy a wide-ranging technology and services according to the capacity 
and needs of a given community. This helps to explain the underlying relationship 
between inexpensive and heterogeneous technologies and LCE as indicated in Figure 
18.  
7.3.3 Outsourcing USF projects  
Another innovative solution that could help drive the proliferation of coverage in 
disadvantaged areas is the outsourcing of USF projects to specialised access 
                                                 
148 Mankosi is a remote community located in South Africa’s Eastern Cape Province with a population 
of about 6,000 (Tucker, 2017). 
149 An ICT academic and rural community network expert, who was part of the team that provided 
technical support for Zenzeleni Networks 
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providers150. Of the four interviewees that supported this point, two are key figures of 
a specialised access provider. Hence, one could argue that some degree of ‘self-
interest’ may be at play here relative to the views of the other two interviewees: one 
civil society advocate and one OTT employee. Having said that, the following quotes 
help to underline this argument: 
What some of the countries have done is quite encouraging like Ghana where Ghana 
Investment Fund for Electronic Communication (GIFEC) actually give money to 
local companies to go and buildout networks in certain villages. Interviewee12 
One good model is what people are doing in DR Congo when small companies are 
contracted to deploy mini BTS… powered by solar. These small companies are 
responsible for the installation and management of these BTS and there is a revenue-
sharing model between them and MNO. Interviewee4 
The main argument here is that specialised access providers are better placed to deploy 
networks to deprived areas as they have the know-how to implement low-cost 
solutions and technologies to meet the telecommunication needs in such locations. 
Interviewee8 asserted that the costs of deploying coverage to disadvantaged areas 
using traditional GSM solutions can be significant with a typical GSM tower costing 
between $122,000 to $150,000 of capex151. This is excluding opex like energy costs 
from generator sets and diesel, which Interviwee13 said cost between $6,000 to $7,000 
on average a month to maintain a single BTS. Interviewee8 asserted that when this is 
compared with the deployment of solar-powered small cells towers that cost between 
$75,000 to $50,000, it becomes apparent that this is a fundamental ‘game changer’. 
Interviewee8 further added that specialised providers not only provided a sustainable 
network access for disadvantaged areas but also facilitate access to other value-added 
services such as health, education, agriculture and mobile money. Interviewee12 also 
shared this sentiment by adding that: 
I think it is simply possible to make any rural coverage profitable to deliver mobile 
services. If it is 10 people living in a hut, probably not but anywhere from a 
community where you can get 100 users, you can make it work. There are small cell 
technologies; the price of satellite bandwidth is cheaper, solar energy is becoming 
cheaper and widely spreading. So it is possible. Interviewee12 
                                                 
150 These are niche providers such as, for example, Africa Mobile networks and Connect Africa (AMN, 
n.d.; Connect Africa, n.d.) 
151 This is somewhat consistent with Otieno (2018) who appears to suggest that CA is planning to spend 
around $838,000 of USF on 6 BTS in disadvantaged areas in Kenya, which amounts to about $140, 000 
per BTS. 
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Interviewees suggest that this initiative could either be funded with money 
from USF or entirely by the specialised provider. Under the first option, policymakers 
outsource the buildout of infrastructure to specialised providers using funds from USF 
and after the project is completed, it is then handed over to MNO to operate and 
manage. Section 3.4.4 indicates that DRC, Cameroon and Ghana are among the few 
countries in Africa deploying USF through this strategy. 
 The second option is not supported with USF but rather, the specialised 
providers fund, manage and operate the infrastructure buildout by themselves. In order 
to connect users in such locations to the wider reach of the country, they negotiate a 
revenue-sharing agreement with MNO who then integrate them into their networks. 
According to Interviewee12, they typically propose a 50:50 revenue sharing 
agreement. Although this model presents an opportunity to economically expand 
coverage without the use of subsidy or direct investment from MNO, it has failed to 
gain traction due to the difficulty of negotiating commercial agreements with MNO. 
This is reflected in the comment made by Interviewee8: 
We proved the technology, we successfully built and operated this rural solution as a 
trial for two years with MTN, and we have negotiated with other operators, all of 
whom were happy with the functionality of the equipment, but we could not get past 
commercial agreement.  
7.3.4 Over-the-top players 
A further innovative solution that emerged from the data that could contribute to the 
improvement of UAS is the activities of over-the-top players152 (also referred to as 
OTT). However, the comments from the 15 interviewees that contributed to this 
discussion indicated that the issue of OTT could be very divisive because while some 
agreed that the initiative has a role to play in promoting UAS, others disagreed. The 
following interview excerpts serve to illustrate the arguments from both sides of the 
debate with the first two comments arguing in favour of OTT while the last two are 
against: 
In my opinion, this is just another example of innovation. I think it is great. I think 
anything that finds an innovative way of funding mobile connectivity and 
communication is good. I know there are concerns about how it is not the full 
                                                 
152 OTT players refer to online content providers like Facebook and Google who use internet protocol 
to transmit telecommunication services like multimedia, text and voice to mobile users over private and 
public networks (CTO, 2016; Gillwald et al., 2016). 
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internet; there are commercial issues with Facebook having privileged access to 
people’s data and so forth…Interviewee17 
…Google is introducing Wi-Fi access points into some of the larger African cities 
like Kampala. Such activity is opening up social media and VOIP for people in areas 
that did not previously enjoy data coverage and it is being made affordable. 
Microsoft and its TV White Space initiative is looking into $2-$3 per month for 
unlimited data access. In other words, using a very low-cost spectrum to provide 
coverage across Africa. Interviewee8 
I don’t believe in zero rating based on what I have said earlier: it needs to be a 
sustainable business solution and giving people something for free which has a value 
doesn’t make it economically sustainable… I think it gets a good press for people 
like Facebook and Google but it is completely long-term unstainable. Interviewee12 
Well, the claim these big tech giants make is no doubt for their own reasons and 
there is nothing wrong with that as such entities exist to make money… if they can 
bring cheap technologies, if they can offer something which is easier and affordable 
for people living in unserved and underserved areas, then that will be beneficial. So 
far, we have not seen anything like that… Interviewee23 
The views advanced by interviewees from both side of the argument would 
suggest that there is a wide-ranging issue while some would support OTT and others 
would not. One of the reasons why some interviewees advocate for OTT is that some 
of their activities contribute to the spread of heterogeneous telecommunications 
infrastructure. For example, Google’s Project Link in Kampala, Uganda that involves 
the deployment of affordable fibre network and Wi-Fi wholesale access (Google, n.d.; 
Mutegi, 2015). Interviewee23, however, voiced disquiet that such initiative is limited 
to a few countries and cities, not necessarily in deprived areas where the efforts of 
UAS are needed the most. A second reason advanced by interviewees in favour of 
OTT is that they help to drive the innovation of telecommunication services including 
social media, which are widely used by people for communication and other value-
added services. For example, while 63% of internet users in Middle East and Africa 
use WhatsApp, over 90 million people use Facebook across Africa (ITNews Africa, 
2016a; Statista, 2017). Tully and Ekdale (2014) also found that a growing number of 
people in Kenya use OTT like Twitter to express their opinion and contribute to 
debates that may affect their lives. The third reason is that OTT promote affordability, 
which was highlighted as one of the major impediments to the adoption of mobile 
telephony in Africa, significantly for data tariffs (Section 5.3.4). This is illustrated by 
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OTT activities such as ‘zero-rating’153, which allows mobile users in over 20 African 
countries such as South Africa and Zambia to access limited contents such as 
WhatsApp and Facebook without data charges (Jackson, 2014). 
 Conversely, other interviewees, including Interviewee16154, opposed OTT not 
necessarily on the grounds that they do not contribute to UAS but that such effort may 
not be substantial. For example, OTT effort to improve physical infrastructure is rather 
limited to a few countries like Microsoft 4Afrika TV White Space project in Tanzania 
and Google’ Project Link in Uganda (Microsoft, 2016; Mutegi, 2015). As such, 
Interviewee13 stated that they are against OTT as they derive value from the 
infrastructure provided by others with little or no contribution:  
It [OTT] is a good example of what innovation can do… When you look at it from a 
telecom landscape, there is a problem. We have operators like us who are spending 
millions of dollars to invest in infrastructures, on the importation of handsets, to 
make sure that we have networks that are able to convey broadband signals… Then 
you just have these applications that bypass your systems and suddenly it is 
contributing to you losing revenues… we effectively have a partnership with OTT but 
it does not mean that we agree on everything because social media drives usage and 
it increases data revenue. Interviewee13 
Apart from the fact that they utilise infrastructure with little or no contribution, OTT 
activities such as zero-rating also contribute to the loss of revenue for MNO as 
illustrated in the claim of MTN Nigeria (Adepoju, 2017d). This is because the use of 
OTT platforms such as WhatsApp can provide users with more affordable access to 
telecommunication services like voice and messaging, thereby limiting the ARPU that 
would have accrued to MNO. Interviewee10 also expressed their disquiet about the 
perceived lack of clarity and transparency of OTT:  
We have some [OTT] coming to ask for areas lacking coverage and for TV White 
Space. But when you see their model, it is not yet clear what they are trying to 
achieve. 
Interviewee10 argued that this of lack clarity and transparency might result in a lack 
of support from other stakeholders in the industry because although the intentions of 
OTT appear ‘good’ on the surface, some of their initiatives seem to lack a clear action 
                                                 
153 Zero-rating is the practice whereby MNO in partnership with OTT, exempt mobile users from data 
charges for selected content (Curwin, 2015). 
154 A senior figure of a civil society organisation with over 20 countries 
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plan. Hence, their request for regulatory support like TV White Space to serve 
disadvantaged areas has failed to gain traction.  
Consequently, it was suggested that since OTT involvement in UAS is a new 
phenomenon, more observation and research are needed to unravel the concerns from 
various quarters. According to Interviewee24: 
It’s [OTT] quite a recent phenomenon and very controversial. Perhaps more 
research is needed, especially by the economists because I think it’s very important 
to calculate exactly how many benefits accrues to each party – users and providers – 
and who is worse off? 
Concerning the issue of ‘who is worse off’, there was a consensus among interviewees 
from both sides of the debate that regardless of the role of OTT in UAS, the protection 
of users against any form of abuse is critical. The statement of Interviewee6 helps to 
articulate this point thus: 
…countries need to establish effective data protection agencies to forestall the abuse 
of platform operators and protect the people. Interviewee6 
This recommendation comes against the backdrop of OTT gathering user information 
to create personalised data for targeted advertising by third parties without making it 
explicitly clear to users that this would occur (Irion & Helberger, 2017). However, 
considering the complexity of the internet and the fast-changing nature of technology 
and services, regulating OTT may be a very difficult task for regulators (Bauer & 
Knieps, 2018). 
7.3.5 Relevant local content 
Five interviewees argued that promoting the proliferation of relevant local content 
would help to encourage ICT/mobile adoption and usage. The following interview 
extracts help to underline this argument: 
...people may be more interested in the adoption of these services, regardless of the 
challenges bedevilling them if contents are more localised. Nowadays, the internet is 
filled with contents but localised, specific contents, which can be easily understood 
and created for specific needs of a given community, are not widely available. 
Interviewee23 
So the issue about remote areas profitability is just about the business model… we 
have to think about a number of things including relevant content… because the 
perception today is that those places are not viable but when you fine-tune your 
business model, you can make it viable - you have to give them a product that they 
understand… and they also need to be educated on how to use it. A megabyte 
does not mean anything to my mother, but if you tell her that ‘with a megabyte, 
 234 
 
you can watch… a film from your village and it can last for x number of days, you 
can call your son on Skype for 30 minutes a day for a week, etc.,’ then it begins to 
make sense to her. Interviewee13 
This group of interviewees suggested that relevant local content means the availability 
of telecommunication services that address the information needs of a group of people. 
As such, telecommunications become not only attractive but also useful for the 
improvement of personal and professional lives of people. For example, added 
Inteviewee23, the best video that teaches a farmer how to farm in a modern way is the 
video that is recorded with the local contents of the African people, not the one made 
in Europe for the European farmers. This could be for fisheries, poultry and cattle 
farming. Apart from making technology relevant to farming, Interviewee5 asserted 
that mobile money services like M-PESA in Kenya could be used to promote local 
content to capture the interest of people living in disadvantaged areas without access 
to traditional banking platforms. This sentiment was also shared by Interviewee10 who 
stated that: 
…the introduction of mobile money has been a key driver for mobile phone usage in 
rural areas. Interviewee10 
Both interviewees argued that not only would this encourage mobile adoption, it could 
also act as incentives for MNO to expand their footprint as mobile money has the 
potential of increasing their ARPU. For example, MNO may get the transaction 
revenue for mobile money on top of the normal mobile revenue. Lessons can be drawn 
from the operation of MPESA in Kenya as highlighted in Section 1.2. Furthermore, 
Interviewee19 stated that: 
Just because you have access, in theory, doesn’t mean that the internet is useful to 
you or that you can use it effectively… Just because ITU, GSMA and everybody 
have kind of accepted it doesn’t mean that it is right. We might just say that ‘look, 
everybody is living under a tower so our work here is done.’ I am concerned that 
is not the case. Interviewee19 
In other words, it is not sufficient to deploy networks, MNO and policymakers need 
to promote ICT/mobile adoption and usage by providing useful services and educating 
people on how to use technology as they evolve (Nsengimana, Kende, & Rose, 2015). 
It also interesting that Interviewee13 quoted earlier linked the improvement of the 
viability of disadvantaged areas to a business model that reflects local content in terms 
of services that can address the information needs of people. One of the key 
components of this, added this interviewee, is engaging with people in a given 
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geography in order to co-create content that could impact their lives, because local 
content …in Nigeria, for instance, may be different from local content in South Africa 
(Interviewee13). Drawing from exploring 15 villages in rural DR Congo, Champion, 
Cibangu and Hepworth (2018, p. 18) concluded that co-creating content with users 
require a great deal of partnership and end-user engagement, which will then allow 
relevant content that reflect “…local cultural views, specific beliefs, needs, or realities 
of …” users to emerge. 
 In summary, policymakers, MNO, content providers and other key decision 
makers in the industry need to start seeing the creation and promotion of relevant local 
content as one of the key components for achieving UAS and embedded in this is 
digital literacy. The more local content is created, the more people are likely to engage 
with technology and this translates to more adoption, which then encourages the 
industry to push coverage beyond big cities and towns. This further underlines the 
argument made in Section 6.2.1 that the traditional principles of UAS need to be 
extended to include assessment (finding out the telecommunication needs of people) 
and awareness (informing people of the importance of using technology and educating 
them on how to use technology as it evolves).     
7.3.6 Anchor customers 
The last form of the innovative solutions suggested by four interviewees is the 
commitment of private and public institutions to act as ‘anchor’ customers for the 
consumption of telecommunication services as reflected in the following comments: 
Another way is to encourage the adoption and usage of telecom services through 
government services, i.e., E-government is a very good tool as it will generate traffic 
for the operators and create services for the people so that they will travel less to the 
cities to access and pay for government services. In this way, government becomes 
the so-called anchor customer… Interviewee23 
In a place like New Zealand… Their model is that government subsidises a fixed 
fibre connection to a base station in the village, they connect schools to it including 
library and any other government institutions first. In this way, through the 
government, it has some demand and then mobile operators can then use the same 
base station to provide services to individual households… Interviewee6 
 The aim of having an anchor customer is to create a situation where institutions act 
as ‘guaranteed’ customers to reassure MNO that they would serve as ‘minimum’ 
capacity users of deployed infrastructure and services. Interviewee23 suggested that 
government, as an institution, could act as an anchor customer in two ways. Firstly, 
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through the digitisation of public institutions and rendering service through electronic 
platforms such as mobile phones and computers. This would then encourage ICT 
usage/mobile adoption, boost aggregate public demand for telecommunication 
services and contribute to the bottom-line of MNO. Examples of such services include 
online utility payments, an electronic application for driver licence and engaging with 
farmers via text messages. Secondly, government could also act as an anchor customer 
through the utilisation of telecommunications infrastructure as illustrated with the case 
of New Zealand by Interviewee6 above.  
Interviewee26155 also commented that “…Zambia is trying to set up internet 
facilities in post offices across the country as anchored customers to encourage 
adoption of ICT.” Interviewees further added that government can work with MNO to 
provide connectivity for other public institutions such as schools, public libraries, local 
government offices, clinics and police stations. Such initiative would create some level 
of assurance to MNO that when they deploy coverage to disadvantaged areas that are 
perceived to have low demand, minimum capacity utilisation from government 
institutions would help to generate some revenue. This could increase over time as 
people living in such communities may be attracted to take up their own services 
having been introduced to technology through schools and workplaces connected by 
the government. Such actions would also help to ensure that telecommunications 
infrastructure does not become redundant as result of low capacity usage. 
 The discussion above suggests that the thinking behind institutions acting as 
anchor customers is in some ways linked to relevant local content in the sense that to 
attract anchor customers, MNO have to provide relevant services. On the other hand, 
digital education appears critical in order to ensure that the institutions that are 
connected see the importance of technology in making their work easier and 
employees need to be trained on how to use the platforms that have been provided. 
People also need to be educated on changes to service delivery and how to navigate 
digital platforms to access public services. This helps to illustrate the link between 
relevant local content and anchor customers as indicated in Figure 18.  
                                                 
155 A senior employee within one of the Ministry of Transport and Communications in Africa 
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7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter and the previous one address RQ2 by presenting the various suggestions 
offered by interviewees on how to mitigate the digital divide of uneven mobile 
coverage in Africa. Since these findings emerged from the problems identified in 
Chapter 5, the discussion in Chapters 6 and 7 has been presented in a manner that 
clearly highlights the interaction between issues. Following the argument that 
regulatory capacity and transaction costs are the two key underpinning issues that help 
to explain why digital divide persist across Africa, Chapter 6 highlighted how a lack 
of regulatory capacity could be tackled. Chapter 6 also indicated how to mitigate the 
issue of transaction costs through, for example, incentives. Chapter 7 continued by 
further exploring other costs reduction strategies. For example, interviewees 
recommended the issuing of technology-neutral licence to encourage the deployment 
of a mix of technologies to serve disadvantaged areas so much so that small and large 
operators will have the liberty to deploy heterogeneous networks based on cost 
efficiency and the needs of a given community. This will help the industry to move 
away from solely relying on expensive traditional technologies like 3G, 4G and 
advance a combination of inexpensive technologies such as Wi-Fi, WiMAX and VoIP 
to bring connectivity to commercially unviable areas.  
There were various dynamics within the recommendations of interviewees as 
typified by, for example, infrastructure sharing. While there was a consensus among 
interviewees that infrastructure sharing among operators could help to lower the 
overall costs of network deployment, opinions were split on the impact it has on 
disadvantaged areas. The reason being that although sharing generally reduces the cost 
of deployment, it does not necessarily change prevailing circumstances such as sparse 
population density, low ICT usage and low-income levels in disadvantaged areas. 
Figures 15 to 18 further illustrates other dynamics and various interactions between 
the issues that were raised. Therefore, consistent with Chapter 5, it is evident from 
Chapters 6 and 7 that the issue of regulatory capacity and transaction costs are two 
fundamental underpinning issues that need to be addressed by various countries in 
Africa in order to close the digital divide. These two fundamental issues are further 
analysed in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
Similar to various studies (for example, ITU, 2017a; OECD, 2008; Thakur & Potter, 
2018; UNCTAD, 2008; Urama & Ogbu, 2018; World Economic Forum., 2014), 
interviewees agreed that widespread access to telecommunications can be 
transformative and critical to the socio-economic development of any country. Despite 
this consensus, Chapter 2 showed that pockets of digital divide persist across Africa 
with a projection that over half of the continent’s population is either unserved or 
underserved. While Chapter 5 highlighted a wide range of issues as to why digital gaps 
persist across Africa, Chapters 6 and 7 provided insights on how to mitigate the issues 
identified in Chapter 5. Drawing on the public interest and economic efficiency 
perspectives of market failure in Chapter 3 and the depth of the interaction between 
the data in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, this chapter identifies two key underpinning issues of 
regulatory capacity and transaction costs to develop a model for closing the digital 
divide in Africa. Figure 19 highlights this model along with the dynamic of how issues 
interact to mitigate the market failure of uneven mobile coverage.  
For example, one of the findings from Chapter 5 highlighted a lack of strong 
ICT leadership and commitment as one of the themes that help to explain the 
impediments to the implementation of USF in Africa. The discussion that follows 
suggests that the issue of regulatory capacity is at the heart of this theme as depicted 
in Figure 12 in Section 5.2. Fifteen interviewees asserted that although regulatory 
capacity is critical to the implementation of USF in advancing widespread access, 
African regulators are generally faced with a lack of capacity. It came to the fore that 
when this happens, it tends to have a ripple effect on the ability of a regulator to 
formulate robust UAS policy (Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4), monitor and enforce mandates 
as well as effectively and efficiently deploy funds in a timely manner (Section 5.2.2).   
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Figure 19: Model for closing the digital divide in Africa 
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Such a delay in the implementation of USF leads to the accumulation of idle funds 
(Sections 3.4.5 and 5.2.5), which then leads to the issue of corruption where those 
responsible for administering the funds can divert them for their personal use (Section 
5.2.6). Figure Error! Reference source not found.9 indicates that a timely d
eployment of USF could help to overcome the challenges of idle funds, corruption and 
fund diversion. However, contrary to the assumption that regulatory intervention in 
the event of market failure is costless (Section 3.2.3), for a timely deployment of USF 
to happen, human and financial resources are needed to help regulators achieve this 
feat. Figure Error! Reference source not found.9 also highlights that the availability 
of such resources is vital to help regulators monitor and enforce USF and other 
coverage obligations. This is significant in light of the fact that the absence of 
monitoring and compliance can make regulatory instruments susceptible to subversion 
and unscrupulous actions by market actors (Sections 3.2.2 and 5.2.2). This helps to 
illustrate that regulatory capacity is a fundamental issue that feeds into the bigger 
picture of unravelling the reasons why digital divide persists across Africa. 
 Although the use of subsidies such as USF is popular among policymakers in 
Africa, Section 3.2.2 argued that regardless of the regulatory instrument of choice, 
attention needs to be focused on its effectiveness and efficiency (Gillingham & 
Sweeney, 2010). This can be achieved in a liberalised market by designing a regulatory 
instrument that not only ensures equitable access to telecommunications but also 
promotes economic efficiency (Ortiz, 2016; Stiglitz, 2010). This is significant 
following the argument that, for government to achieve the equity objective of 
providing UAS, it needs the cooperation and participation of market actors who are 
actually responsible for the deployment of infrastructure and services (Anker, 2017). 
However, of all the causes of market failure examined in Section 3.2.1, Section 5.3 
suggested that the transaction costs of network deployment and maintenance act as a 
disincentive for MNO participation as this is the most significant factor that limits the 
economic efficiency of coverage expansion. Apart from the fact that 
telecommunications is a capital-intensive sector, the general lack of supporting 
infrastructure across Africa, especially electricity and roads, substantially increases 
the costs of deploying network and services in the continent (World Bank, 2018a; 
2018b). This discourages MNO from investing beyond commercially viable areas - 
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underlining the argument that transaction costs are a ‘root’ cause of market failure 
(Todorova, 2016; Williams, 1985). 
Hence, as various policymakers formulate UAS policy to promote widespread 
access to telecommunications, Chapters 6 and 7 argued that they should also look for 
ways to lower transaction costs to encourage operators to participate in coverage 
expansion and build a wider support for digital inclusion. Although Chapters 6 and 7 
presented series of recommendations that could help to reduce transaction costs, 
Figure 19 illustrates that such reductions could be achieved through incentives such 
as taxation and encouraging collaboration like infrastructure sharing. The key message 
from Figure 19 is that UAS policy should be formulated in a manner that empowers 
regulatory authorities with adequate resources to promote widespread access to 
telecommunication services and, at the same time, facilitate economic efficiency in 
order to make it feasible for MNO to economically provide infrastructure and services. 
This would allow a joined-up solution for tackling digital divide to emerge and pave 
the way for a regulatory instrument(s) that maximises social gains and minimises 
transactions costs (Coglianese & Lazer, 2003). Hence, the reason for synthesising a 
definition of market failure that accounts for both equity and efficiency in Section 3.2. 
Achieving such a balance could be a complex and daunting task as there is a 
difficult tradeoff between promoting competition (efficiency) and simultaneously 
committing to UAS (equity) (Rob, Tausha, & Vilakazi; 2017; Trubnikov, 2017). 
Longstaff (1996) thus argued that many countries around the world have failed at their 
attempts to find a balance between equity and efficiency. Figure 19 indicates that 
working with other stakeholders in the industry can help to mitigate such complexity 
by, for example, leveraging on the skills and experience of a wide range of actors to 
provide synergies that are beyond the effort of isolated policymakers. As will be seen 
in Section 8.3, in addition to deploying USF to promote widespread coverage, 
policymakers across Africa have begun engaging with operators to promote the 
economic efficiency of coverage expansion. For example, NCC support for MTN 
Nigeria to secure rights of way (Section 8.3.1.3), NCA offering free spectrum 
frequency in 900MHz to MNO willing to deploy 3G to disadvantaged areas in Ghana 
(Section 8.3.1.2) and South Africa’s treasury announcing the alignment of its 
telecommunications tax to ease the burden on the sector in order to encourage more 
investment in fibre optic infrastructure (Section 8.3.1.1). Such governments effort, 
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albeit limited, indicate that as difficult as it may be to square the tradeoff between 
equity and efficiency in the event of market failure, where there are strong leadership 
and political will from policymakers to engage with the industry, there is a way 
(Shenglin et al., 2017). Therefore, drawing on the interaction between issues in Figure 
19, this chapter argues that addressing concerns around regulatory capacity and 
transaction costs would go a long way in helping to close the digital divide across 
Africa. To this end, using fragmented data maps from Figure 19, Section 8.2 examines 
regulatory capacity while Section 8.3 explores issues around transaction costs. Section 
8.4 concludes the chapter.  
8.2 Regulatory capacity 
Contrary to the assumption in Section 3.2 that government intervention in the event of 
market failure is costless, 15 interviewees in Chapter 5 asserted that to address market 
failure from a public interest perspective, a regulatory authority needs to be well-
resourced. This allows it to formulate viable policies, implement and police mandates 
to ensure compliance. Figure 20 indicates that when a regulator is well-resourced, the 
impact appears to be dynamic just as a lack of it has a wider effect on the overall 
direction of UAS.  
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Figure 20: Addressing market failure from a public interest perspective 
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For example, adequate regulatory capacity will ensure that a regulatory authority has 
the sufficient and qualified staff to formulate robust policy for UAS, which, in turn, 
will address the issue of policy imitation and the narrow scope of USF identified in 
Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4. The regulator will also be empowered with the necessary 
skills to deploy USF in a timely manner, which will then allay the concerns raised by 
idle fund, corruption and fund diversion (Sections 5.2.5-5.2.7). Furthermore, the 
regulator will have the required capacity to monitor and enforce policy compliance, 
conduct and organise stakeholder engagement and, ultimately, reduce the complexity 
associated with UAS (Section 5.4) by drawing on the ideas and synergy of the 
industry.  
While the examples above help to illustrate the complexity and interaction 
between issues, a further analysis and triangulation with the literature and country 
examples indicate that addressing market failure from a public interest perspective is 
not that straight-forward. Figure 20 shows that the dynamic within the issue of 
regulatory capacity can be explained from three standpoints: the availability of people, 
in terms of access to qualified staff, funding and skills.  
8.2.1 People 
Evidence from Chapters 5, 6 and 7 indicates that the deployment of USF to address 
market failure in telecommunications requires qualified staff to administer and 
manage the process, who in some countries are in limited supply. Interviewees argued 
that since regulatory authorities generally offer lower salaries compared to private 
corporations, they find it difficult to compete, attract, and retain people with the 
relevant skills. This results in high labour turnover and staff shortages, which restricts 
the ability of the regulator to carry out its functions (Marcelle, 2004; Sacks & Levi, 
2010).  
The problem of low pay can be illustrated with the case of South Africa where 
the staff of ICASA accused the government of neglecting the agreement they reached 
following a strike action in 2016 to protest against ‘poor’ working conditions, 
including the inconsistencies in their salaries (Mzekandaba, 2016). The recently 
suspended CEO of USAASA156 has also been accused of reducing the salary of the 
                                                 
156 Mr Lumko Mtimde 
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company secretary with the aim of undermining her authority (Mcleod, 2018). 
Although pay packages are determined within the wider context of the civil service, it 
is somewhat surprising that staff working for regulators like ICASA are protesting 
against low salaries considering the contribution made by the telecommunications 
sector to the wider economy across Africa (Section 1.2), and the substantial amount 
of money generated from USF levies (Section 3.4.3). Such protest is also inconsistent 
with the argument that ‘reputable’ government departments contributing more to the 
economy tend to be better rewarded financially (Posner, 1974).   
Figure 20 indicates that if governments want to make the regulator attractive 
like the private sector, they should provide better salary to attract and retain relevant 
qualified staff that will enable the regulator to discharge its duties. Interviewees further 
added that better pay for regulatory authority would help to reduce corrupt tendencies 
in the sense that people are currently being paid little relative to the large amount of 
money they manage in USF. Furthermore, the literature highlighted that, the industry 
has large financial resources and, as such, can ‘capture’ the intervention process 
(Hantke-Domas, 2003; Hertog, 2010; Posner, 1974). Interviewees asserted that a well-
paid regulator can have a bit more clout and stand-up to ‘rent-seeking’ interests, resists 
being captured and ensure better monitoring and enforcement of USF to increase 
equitable access to telecommunications as highlighted in Figure 20.  
While interviewees have made such recommendations by drawing on their 
experience across Africa, it seems not to have accounted for the issue of political 
capture raised in the literature (Section 3.2.2). This is exemplified in the case of 
Rwanda where evidence indicates that although the qualification and experience of the 
Board of RURA appear exceptional compared to its peers in Eastern Africa, the 
Cabinet and the Ministry of Youth and ICT tend to override the decisions of the 
regulator (Section 2.2). For example, although RURA shortlisted four firms - 
Millicom, Zain, Larrycom, and Telecel Globe - in the process of issuing the third GSM 
licence in Rwanda in 2008, the final approval of Millicom for a 15-year GSM licence 
for $60M was done by the Cabinet (Balancing Act, 2008; ITNews Africa, 2008a). This 
appears to be inconsistent with Chapter III, Articles 5-14 of Law 44 of November 30, 
2001, which states that the regulator shall be ‘independent’ and empowered by law to 
award GSM licences (RURA, 2015). 
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The same pattern can be observed in South Africa where the 
Telecommunications Act of 2000 prescribes that ICASA is ‘independent’ but the 
sector ministry often interferes in its activities. One of the latest examples of this is the 
legal tussle between the Ministry and ICASA over auction and allocation of spectrum 
in bands 700MHz, 800MHz and 2600MHz (Telecompaper, 2017b). The reason behind 
this impasse is that the Minister wants the allocation done via Open Access Network 
while ICASA insists on allocation through auction (TeleGeography, 2017c). The 
impact of political capture is also reflective in the inability of ICASA to implement 
Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) along with the assignment of spectrum for the 
improvement of broadband in South Africa (Hawthorne, 2015). This is due to the 
action of the government in ‘protecting’ the state-owned Telkom from competition 
and, as such, broadband speed is not only slow in South Africa, there is also 
affordability problem (Hawthorne, 2015; 2018). In this case, it is not necessarily the 
lack of staff that is holding back the implementation of LLU in South Africa, but 
political interference.  
These examples suggest that whilst it is critical to provide attractive salary for 
a regulator to attract and retain qualified staff, such staff should also be allowed to act 
independently and bring their skills and experience to bear. Figure 20 indicates that 
this requires a great deal of political will on the part of the government to allow the 
professionals they have appointed/recruited to run the affairs of the regulator without 
political interference.   
8.2.2 Funding 
Chapter 5 highlighted that regulatory authorities are often under-resourced 
government departments with limited budgetary allocations to execute their regulatory 
functions. This is illustrated by the cases of Mauritania, Uganda and South Africa 
(Attenborough, Koch, Maiorano, & Miller, 2004). The study found that the regulators 
in these countries are faced with various budgetary constraints. For example, although 
the budgetary allocation approved by South Africa’s Parliament for ICASA has 
increased over the years, the enormity of their regulatory functions, including the costs 
of litigations, have placed a greater burden on its financial resources. In 2014, 
ICASA’s budget approval was R382 million compared to R461 million in 2015 
(ICASA, 2015). The figure for 2016/2017 shows that from a budget proposal of R1.4 
billion, the Parliament only approved R430 million (Mzekandaba, 2017b). While the 
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reason behind this reduction is not clear, it does illustrate that the budget of ICASA 
has been reduced by 6.7% between 2015 and 2016.   
In the case of Mauritania where they have adopted a multi-sector approach to 
UAS (Section 6.3.4), the personnel of APAUS is drawn into multiple projects in 
telecommunications, electricity and water. The implication of this is that the resources 
of APAUS are stretched beyond capacity and the country is largely reliant on funding 
from the World Bank’s Telecommunications Sector Project, which began in 1999 with 
$12 million (Attenborough, Koch, Maiorano, & Miller, 2004; World Bank, 2004). 
Lastly, in the case of Uganda, UCC has been required to contribute to the servicing of 
a loan originated by the Ministry of Finance, leaving UCC with limited funding to 
perform its regulatory functions (Attenborough, Koch, Maiorano, & Miller, 2004). 
Although these case studies were conducted over 10 years ago, the findings are 
consistent with current practice as highlighted in Section 5.2. Zambia has a more 
recent example where Mr. Edgar Lungu157 issued a directive to reduce funding for 
ZICTA (Malakata, 2017b). While Mr. Lungu argued that this is meant to ‘transform’ 
the regulator into a profitable institution that is capable of contributing more to the 
treasury, critics argued that such action leads to the defunding of ZICTA (Malakata, 
2017b). Others argued that this would limit the ability of ZICTA to formulate and 
implement policies aimed at increasing mobile coverage and adoption of ICT 
(Malakata, 2017b). 
Interviewees stated that in countries where this happens, there is very little the 
regulator can do and this can lead to a whole raft of problems as identified in Chapter 
5. For example, a regulator may be forced to curtail the process of allocating USF due 
to a lack of capacity, which then leads to the accumulation of funds (Section 5.2.5). 
The accumulation of funds encourages corruption and the disruption of USF as evident 
in South Africa (Section 5.2.6) and fund diversion (Section 5.2.7). Recent cases of 
fund diversion can be found in Kenya and Zimbabwe. The president of Kenya recently 
‘ordered’ CA to give around $10 million of USF money to support the police in their 
campaign against cyber-crime (Matinde, 2018a). A move that has been condemned by 
civil society who argued that this is not the purpose of USF (Matinde, 2018a). The 
government of Zimbabwe has also diverted $172.9M of USF money to fund the 
                                                 
157 Edgar Lungu is the current president of Zambia.  
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digitisation programme of the state TV station, including an additional $10 million to 
partly fund the $40 million acquisition of a 60% stake in Telecel from VimpelCom 
(Karombo, 2016; Telecompaper, 2016). Econet, the market leader in Zimbabwe, 
condemned this move saying that it erodes the accountability and outcome of USF 
(Telecompaper, 2016).  
This underlines the argument made by some interviewees that regulators are 
not getting enough support from governments in terms of empowering them with the 
financial resources they need to discharge their duties. Figure 20 thus indicates the 
need for policymakers to increase budget allocation to provide regulators with funding 
and empower them to discharge their duties. Although some interviewees called on 
governments to stop diverting USF money if meaningful progress is to be made in 
closing the digital divide, others also acknowledged that some governments might 
continue to do this, particularly during an economic downturn. Section 1.2 also 
highlighted that government across Africa are becoming heavily reliant on revenues 
from telecommunications sector to fund national budgets.  
8.2.3 Skills 
The last aspect of regulatory capacity is skills. It was highlighted in Section 5.2.1 that 
although it is critical for regulatory authorities to have personnel with the right skill 
sets, it appears that regulators in Africa are generally faced with skills shortages. This 
problem of skills shortage tends to mirror a wider government challenge in the sense 
that without personnel skilled in economics, legal, organising and technical issues, the 
whole process of UAS will be under threat. For example, the formulation and 
implementation of any form of intervention require a considerable level of information 
in order to help policymakers locate areas of market failure, determine the level of 
resources needed and execute an action plan (WTO, 2006). Having people with the 
relevant skills sets is critical to organising and sourcing such information. 
Furthermore, administrative and technical skills will be required to comprehend 
appropriate regulatory instrument, quickly identify projects and design solutions, 
improve policy over time and communicate with other stakeholders in the sector 
(Gillwald, 2005b; ITU, 2013b).  
More often than not, such skills are limited in developing countries (Sacks & 
Levi, 2010; WTO, 2006). For example, while the regulator in Uganda was found to be 
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adequately staffed, it particularly lacked personnel skilled in the matters of economics 
and negotiations (Attenborough, Koch, Maiorano, & Miller, 2004). For countries 
where such skills are lacking, the regulators run into different difficulties as identified 
in Section 5.2. This can also result in the deployment of a regulatory instrument that 
is not fit for purpose in terms of its suitability for a given market (Nzepa, 2005: 165). 
Hence, UAS may lack a clear direction and fail to meet the equity objective of 
promoting widespread access to telecommunications. 
Some countries have attempted to overcome this difficulty by enlisting the 
services of consultants. While some countries have benefited from this strategy, it 
appears not to have fully addressed the problem as UAS consultants suggested that 
their skills are bespoke and difficult to transfer within a short period. For example, an 
independent consultant was hired to conduct an access gap cluster model in Nigeria in 
2014, another was hired for access gap mapping and to update USF Operation Manual 
in Kenya in 2015 (Dymond & Oestmann, 2015; Iftikhar, 2014). South Africa has also 
adopted a similar approach in building the capacity of the regulator and whilst there 
has been some level of improvements, skills gaps persist in the areas of economic and 
legal analysis, interconnection and tariffing as well as engineering and technical 
capabilities (Marcelle, 2004: 151). This suggests that while consultants enable 
regulators to meet an immediate need, policymakers need to address the long-term 
skill gaps.  
To achieve this, interviewees suggested the need for training and reskilling 
regulatory personnel (as relevant skills will change over time) as well as having a 
transparent recruitment process as indicated in Figure 20. On training and reskilling 
issues, countries across Africa have the opportunity to do this through the various 
workshops offered by the Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisation 
(CTO)158. For example, countries such as Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa 
and Uganda were present at the Preparatory Meeting held in October 2015 at the CTO 
headquarters in London (CTO, 2015). This workshop provided the platform for 
member states and private players to brainstorm issues relating to spectrum allocation, 
identification of additional frequency bands for International Mobile 
                                                 
158 CTO is a multilateral body that supports member states with consultancy, training and capacity 
development for the advancement of ICT via conferences and workshops (Commonwealth, 2017; CTO, 
2017). 
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Telecommunications and resolution on the agenda for the World Radiocommunication 
Conference (WRC) held in Geneva later on in the same year. 
The ITU also organises various sections, including the Global Symposium for 
Regulators, which is held between June and July annually (ITU, 2017d). This 
gathering provides regulators and other key stakeholders with the platform to 
exchange learned-experience on how to deal with emerging digital transformation 
issues, including new technologies. Tanzania also trains and reskill its regulatory 
personnel through bilateral and international cooperation with, for example, the US 
Telecommunication Training Institute and the UK Department of Trade and Industry 
(Marcelle, 2004: 146). Whilst these countries are taking advantage of these 
opportunities, one may argue that since most of these events take place across the 
world, attendance and participation comes at a cost. This further raises the issue of 
how much funding is available to a regulator to execute its functions and attend such 
vital events. 
The issue of having a transparent recruitment process was borne out of the 
concern raised by interviewees that undue political interference can result in the 
appointment and/or recruitment of regulatory personnel with the implication of 
placing people with the wrong skill sets in the position of authority (Section 5.2.8). 
Consequently, vacant positions within regulatory authority may be filled along the 
lines of political interest instead of allowing a competitive and transparent process that 
would most likely result in the selection of persons with relevant skills. This links back 
to the issue of political capture that was raised in Sections 3.2.2 and 8.2.1. South Africa 
is a classic case where a lack of competency in ICASA is demonstrated through poor 
leadership and political interference. This is underlined by the frequent clashes 
between the sector minister, for example, Ms. Faith Muthambi and Mr. Lumko 
Mtimde versus a series of councillors at ICASA and USAASA board members on 
issues bordering on improper conducts, appointments and dismissals (Gedye, 2016; 
Mcleod, 2018; Steyn, 2014)  
The comments of interviewees suggested that in countries where this happens, 
politics would be allowed to take over a critical and technical sector such as 
telecommunications where experts ought to be running the affairs. They asserted that 
a transparent recruitment process will more likely lead to the appointment of high 
calibre personnel with the relevant skills to provide technical capacity and knowhow 
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to plan and deploy USF as shown in Figure 20. Interviewees concluded that such 
personnel will also put a transparent system in place that facilitates wider stakeholder 
engagement and help regulators to draw on the ideas and synergy of the industry and, 
ultimately, mitigate the complexity of UAS.    
8.2.4 Summary 
From the analysis present so far in this section, one cannot overlook the importance of 
having a well-resourced regulator. Figure 19 indicated that this would lead to better 
regulation and help policymakers to achieve more in terms of increasing widespread 
access to telecommunications. For example, 13 interviewees recognised that 
affordability is one of the major impediments to the adoption and diffusion of mobile 
telephony in Africa. This is particularly evident in the high cost of data in various 
countries as highlighted in Table 10 (Section 5.3.4.1). To achieve widespread mobile 
adoption, the problem of affordability needs to be addressed in light of the fact that 
this is one of the five underlying principles for achieving UAS as explained in Section 
3.3.1. This affordability problem has caught the attention of countries such as Kenya, 
South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe where the regulators have launched an 
investigation to assess the level of ‘fair’ and ‘competitive’ tariffs  (Englebrecht, 2017).  
 The analysis presented so far suggests that such an investigation can only yield 
the desired outcome if the regulators are staffed with personnel with the relevant skill 
sets. They will then be able to calculate costs correctly and then use such information 
to begin to challenge and engage with MNO on how to promote affordability. 
Interviewees suggested that such a regulator can better engage stakeholders and look 
for innovative ways to tackle affordability and help promote mobile adoption through, 
for example, the provision of subsidised (smart) mobile phones. In addition to this, the 
analysis of market failure in Section 3.2.1 showed market actors like MNO are often 
well-resourced and have people with better skills who can capture and confuse 
regulators. The analysis in this chapter counters that a better-paid regulator with 
adequate funding would be less likely influenced by powerful MNE MNO.   
 To this end, it is apparent that regulatory capacity is a fundamental 
underpinning issue when it comes to addressing market failure, particularly from the 
viewpoint of promoting equitable access to telecommunications as indicates in Figure 
20. Therefore, a regulator can only be as competent as its capacity permits. Whilst the 
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argument in this section is not trying to oversimplify the complexity of the problems 
associated with digital divide in Africa, the evidence presented suggests that 
regulatory capacity is an intractable long-term problem that needs to be sorted out. 
Having said that, it also worth re-emphasising that while the improvement of 
regulatory capacity is necessary for increasing mobile coverage, it is not sufficient. 
The reason being that while a well-resourced regulator is better positioned to perform 
its duties and resist the influence of rent-seeking interests in the market, they also need 
to be disentangled from political capture. Addressing one without the other will 
undermine the regulators and stifle their ability to address the market failure of uneven 
mobile coverage.  
8.3 Transaction costs 
While the discussion in Section 8.2 was largely anchored on the public interest 
perspective of market failure, the economic efficiency perspective will guide the 
discussion in this section (Dollery, 1999; Economides, 2004; Wenders, 1988; Wolf, 
1987). This is in light of the positioning of this thesis that, to correct market failure in 
a liberalised telecommunications sector as applicable across Africa, policymakers and 
other key players in the industry need to address both public interest and economic 
efficiency perspectives (Section 3.2). While the public interest perspective facilitates 
equitable/widespread access to telecommunications, economic efficiency promotes 
the commercial viability of network deployment and maintenance in order to attract 
investment and encourage operators to increase coverage as depicted in Figure 19. 
Contrary to the complexity of the model in Figure 19, Figure 21 provides a focused 
version from an economic efficiency perspective.     
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Figure 21: Addressing market failure from an economic efficiency perspective 
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Of the seven causes of market failure examined in Section 3.2.1, evidence from 
Section 5.3 indicates that transaction costs are the most fundamental factor that limits 
the economic efficiency of coverage expansion. Section 5.3 further highlighted that 
since the investment decision of MNO is typically influenced by the cost-benefit 
analysis of network deployment, MNO would naturally gravitate towards areas that 
have greater net (economic) benefit. Hence, prohibitive159 transaction costs can 
discourage MNO from investing beyond commercially viable areas, which then leads 
to market failure (Arndt, 1988; Gabel, 2007; Zerbe & McCurdy, 1999). The impact of 
transaction costs on the digital divide in Africa has also been acknowledged by the 
World Bank who has been working with policymakers to reduce the costs of deploying 
telecommunications across Africa. This includes a $70 million grant for Burkina Faso 
to support coverage expansion, including electricity and road construction in 2018 and 
$19.4 million to the West Africa Regional Communications Infrastructure Project in 
2011 to lower transaction costs and improve connectivity between countries like 
Burkina Faso and Ghana (World Bank, 2018a; 2018b). 
Therefore, evidence from the empirical data is consistent with the submission 
that since high transaction costs could result in market inefficiency, transaction costs 
are the root cause of market failure (Todorova, 2016; Williamson, 1968; 1972; 1985). 
When transaction costs become prohibitive and result in market failure, governments 
should intervene not only to guarantee equity, but to also promote competition 
(Todorova, 2016; Rob, Tausha, & Vilakazi; 2017). To this end, interviewees made 
various recommendations that can help to address the fundamental issue of reducing 
transaction costs and encourage the market to invest in coverage expansion as 
presented in Chapters 6 and 7. Figure 21 highlights the key issues within these 
recommendations. They include indirect market intervention via various incentives 
such as taxation, frequency spectrum and rights of way. In addition to this are 
collaboration and innovation through infrastructure sharing and the deployment of 
heterogeneous technologies. 
 
                                                 
159 This is a situation where the costs of network deployment outweigh the benefit derived, which can 
be variable depending on the circumstances and the political environment in a given country.  
 255 
 
8.3.1 Incentives  
 From the four recommendations presented in Section 6.3 on indirect market 
interventions, ten interviewees commented on the need for policymakers to provide 
MNO with various incentives such as tax breaks, affordable and timely access to (low) 
frequency spectrum and rights of way to help lower transaction costs as illustrated in 
Figure 21. The underlining argument here is that the cost savings that may result from 
the process would not only enable MNO to investment in coverage expansion but also 
offer lower tariffs and affordable mobile devices. This is significant in light of the fact 
that increase in costs is more or less transferred to end-users, which will further 
exacerbate the affordability problem.  
 While such an argument is supported by Bergman et al. (1998), who stated that 
policymakers could correct market failure by targeting widespread access to 
telecommunications through various incentives, the use of such regulatory instrument 
is not without its limitations as examined in Section 3.2.2. For example, the use of 
incentives can result in a free rider problem160 and since it is less coercive compared 
to the use of mandates, market actors can take up incentives without complying with 
its conditions (Gillingham & Sweeney, 2010; Grabosky, 1995). Furthermore, although 
cost savings may arise from enjoying incentives, as proposed by interviewees, there 
appears to be no guarantee that beneficiary market actors would then go ahead and 
invest such savings in coverage expansion. In other words, the cost savings that may 
accrue to market actors could be diverted to other uses that are not beneficial to the 
public (Adams, 2000). This can be illustrated by a recent report that market actors like 
the New Dawn Satellite and Intelsat have channelled a substantial amount of their tax 
savings from countries like South Africa and Tanzania to Mauritius – one of the 
continent’s tax havens (Fitzgibbon, 2018). Specifically, it is projected that, through 
this tax arrangement, the New Dawn Satellite would pay only 0.03% of tax - around 
$22,000 on $75 million revenue while Intelsat paid only 0.09% on its $31 million 
revenue in 2013 (Fitzgibbon, 2018). Although these satellite operators entered the 
market to ‘promote African development’ by helping to extend coverage, their tax 
strategy appears to negate this argument. 
                                                 
160 A situation where operators enjoy incentives without reflecting it in their operations and project 
execution (Section 3.2.2). 
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These limitations reinforce the need for monitoring and compliance without 
which the use of incentives will be susceptible to subversion and unscrupulous actions 
by market actors (Grabosky, 1995). This can then detract the goal of bringing 
connectivity to the unconnected. Thus, for the use of incentive be effective and 
efficient, regulators need to enforce compliance to ensure that beneficiaries are held 
accountable and provide what they ought to for enjoying such benefit. For example, 
following the negotiation of import duty reduction and VAT elimination on mobile 
devices in Ghana, the country’s Chamber of Telecommunications asserted that MNO 
and importers of mobile devices should ensure that such incentives reflect in their 
tariffs going forward (Adepoju, 2016a). Consequently, as with other regulatory 
instruments explored in Section 3.2.2, the successful deployment of incentive adds to 
the costs of monitoring and compliance and, by extension, reinforces the debate on 
regulatory capacity.  
8.3.1.1 Taxation 
Various studies (for example, Cave & Mfuh, 2013; Deloitte & GSMA, 2011; Desai, 
Foley, & Hines, 2014; Wentrup et al., 2016) have highlighted that it is not uncommon 
for market actors like MNO to complain about taxes. However, evidence from 
Sections 5.3.3 and 6.3.3 helps to underline the fact that tax rate for telecommunications 
varies across Africa with the existence of multiple taxations in some countries. For 
example, aside from the standard corporate tax, various sector-specific taxes, 
including SIM card tax, mobile money transaction, customs duties on 
handset/telecommunications equipment and VAT on voice and data services, are 
applicable across Africa. In addition to the evidence presented in Table 9 in Section 
5.3.3, the government of South Sudan has announced plans to increase the tax on 
telecommunication services from 10% to 30% in order to plug a hole in the $300 
million budget for 2017/2018 (TeleGeography, 2017g). Tunisia is introducing 20% 
customs duties on ICT devices like smartphones and computers from January 2018 
and Nigeria has proposed a 9% communication tax (Adepoju, 2016b). MNO in Nigeria 
have voiced their unease arguing that they were already subjected to multiple taxations 
and levies, and that this would have a negatively impact on end-users who are already 
spending between 7-18% of their monthly income on telecommunication services 
(Adepoju, 2016b; 2016c). This is in stark contrast to the 5% affordability target 
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recommended by the UN as well as the 2% suggested by Alliance for Affordable 
Internet – which has now been adopted by the UN (A4AI, 2017b; ITU, 2013a). 
 Section 2.3 highlighted that FDI flows were instrumental to the transformation 
of the telecommunications sector and the development of a burgeoning ICT 
ecosystem. Governments across Africa see the sector as a ‘cash-cow’ as MNO who 
attracted these FDI are becoming major contributors to national budgets, accounting 
for 5% to 15% of income tax in the continent (Xalam Analytics, 2018). While it is 
well within the right of governments to collect these taxes for the development of the 
overall economy, similar to Table 9, studies (for example, Frontier Economis & 
GSMA, 2008; World Economic Forum, 2014; Shenglin et al., 2017) also found that 
excessive taxes on the telecommunication sector in countries like Ghana, Nigeria, 
Kenya and Tanzania impinge on the ability of operators to close the digital divide. The 
impact of such taxes is significant considering recent drop in ARPU to an average of 
3% to 6% from double digits in 2014 coupled with the costs of network deployment, 
which is exacerbated by the lack of supporting infrastructure like electricity (ATU & 
Huawei, 2018; Xalam Analytics, 2018). This trend will lead operators to concentrate 
in commercially viable areas and result in the failure of the market in addressing the 
telecommunications needs of the wider society (Arndt, 1988; Gabel, 2007; Zerbe & 
McCurdy, 1999).  
Hence, interviewees asserted that the implication of imposing multiple taxes 
on a sector that is already capital intensive and critical like telecommunications can 
have far-reaching consequences. For example, the practice of imposing customs duties 
on telecommunications equipment161 can endanger investment in coverage expansion 
to disadvantaged areas owing to prohibitive transaction costs for MNO and equipment 
vendors. Taxes on handsets162 can also discourage mobile adoption due to a shift in 
the incidence of tax on mobile phones to end-users. This further worsens the 
affordability problem inherent in the industry as highlighted in Section 5.3.4. 
Therefore, evidence from the aforementioned literature and comments from 
interviewees suggest that multiple taxations on the telecommunications sector can be 
                                                 
161 For example, 14.2% is applicable in Benin Republic (WTO, n.d., p. 29). 
162 For example, 5% and 15% VAT is applicable in Angola and Egypt, respectively (see Table 11 in 
Section 5.3.3).  
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counterproductive. As this will increase the transaction costs of network deployment 
and maintenance, which will then restrict further investment in the sector. Since cost 
is interlinked with tariff, such a practice can also limit mobile penetration and adoption 
for end-users. The wider effect of this will mean an increasing lack of economic 
feasibility for the market to push coverage beyond big cities and towns. 
To mitigate/prevent market failure in this case, Section 3.2.2 suggested that 
government can offer tax breaks to encourage more investment (Chen, 2015; Mitchell, 
1995; Oman, 2000). This is consistent with the views of interviewees who 
recommended that government could incentivise the industry with a favourable tax 
regime in terms of reducing rates and eliminating multiple taxations through a 
harmonised163 system as shown in Figure 21. Evidence from the country analysis 
indicates that some countries are beginning to acknowledge that multiple taxes are an 
impediment to the expansion of coverage. For example, the NCC has identified 
multiple taxation as one of the hindrances to the development of the 
telecommunications sector in the country as several government agencies threaten to 
shut down BTS belonging to MNO for their refusal to pay state and local government 
taxes in addition to the ones being paid at the federal level (Adepoju, 2016c). NCC 
admitted that this would put more pressure on an already ‘overburdened’ industry, 
which can discourage further investment in the sector (Goodie, 2017). The NCC is 
now advocating for a harmonised system of taxation to reduce the costs burden on the 
industry (Adepoju, 2016c; Goodie, 2017). This is also evident in South Africa, where 
the treasury has announced a series of incentives for the telecommunications sector in 
2018 budget, including the harmonisation of its tax system to encourage more 
investment in the expansion of fibre optic (BusinessTech, 2018a; National Treasury 
RSA, 2018). This is supported by Afadhali (2016) who argues that the ‘good’ practice 
of taxation should support a harmonised and broad-based approach where various 
levels of government cooperate to reduce the burden on the telecommunications 
industry in Africa. 
 Governments need taxes to generate revenue, but in a continent like Africa 
where the proportion of tax to GDP generally averages around 17% compared to 35% 
                                                 
163 Harmonisation involves an integration of the tax rates by various levels of government within a 
country in order to ensure that the industry is taxed at a single rate contrary to multiple rates (World 
Economic Forum, 2014). 
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among OECD countries, governments tend to tax the telecommunications industry 
more (Cave & Mfuh, 2013; Economist, 2017). For example,  between 2016 and 2017, 
income tax from the sector averaged about $350 million, which is ten times the annual 
average before 2015 (Xalam Analytics, 2018). Curwen and Whalley (2018) state that 
the revenue that accrues to government from such tax is critical for the wider economy. 
However, overburdening the sector with multiple taxes can be a ‘short-sighted’ 
strategy as studies have shown that in the long-run, increase adoption is likely to 
contribute more to the economy (Deloitte & GSMA, 2011; Hudson, 2006). For 
instance, an increase in taxes levied on handsets may result in limited sales in the 
official market relative to the informal market where taxes are not applicable. 
Therefore, limiting and/or abolishing sales tax on mobile devices may discourage the 
spread of the informal market and encourage sales in the official market where it is 
more cost-effective for the government to collect taxes (Cave & Mfuh, 2013).  
While this reinforces the importance of the affordability principle of UAS 
(Section 3.3.1), it also underlines that the socio-economic benefits of affordable access 
to telecommunications are more likely to surpass the rather short-term gratification of 
charging multiple taxes (Afadhali, 2016). This can be illustrated with the case of 
Kenya where the abolition of VAT on mobile handsets in 2009 led to a 200% rise in 
handsets sales and 20% more in mobile penetration over three years (Deloitte & 
GSMA, 2011). Similarly, policymakers in Ghana lowered import duties from 20% to 
10% and eliminated VAT on mobile phones in 2016 to promote affordable access to 
telecommunications (Adepoju, 2016a). Drawing on Section 3.2.2, for tax reductions 
to be impactful on closing the digital divide, regulators need to monitor the activities 
of beneficiaries like MNO and handset vendors to ensure that prices are reduced to 
reflect such incentive.    
8.3.1.2 Spectrum 
Another area suggested by interviewees through which policymakers can incentivise 
MNO to close the digital divide is through a spectrum policy that encourages 
investment. Section 5.3.2 highlighted that spectrum administration in various African 
countries is acting as an impediment to widespread access to telecommunications in 
terms of insufficient allocation and bidding prices. Interviewees asserted that such 
practice restricts the capacity of MNO and other smaller players to extend their 
footprint as high bidding prices feed into the transaction costs of coverage expansion. 
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 Of particular interest from Section 5.3.2 is the availability of affordable low-
frequency spectrum, especially those within 700MHz-900MHz range (Bell, 2016; 
ITU, 2010). Majority of this frequency band can be found in TVWS – “…the portions 
of spectrum left unused by broadcasting… as promoted by the ITU (Doeven, et al., 
2012, p. 41; ITU, 2010). Since 2007 when TVWS was first identified at the WRC-07, 
it has become a hotly debated issue by stakeholders in the industry (GSMA, 2012a; 
ITU, 2010). Part of the reason for this is that although the reserve of spectrum in such 
frequency bands is vital to the proliferation of coverage due to the efficiency it offers 
for wider reception and better indoor penetration than higher band, TV broadcasters 
currently occupy these bands (Bell, 2016; Doeven, et al., 2012; ITU, 2010). Hence the 
need for digital migration to relocate TV broadcasters to the 470MHz-694MHz band, 
switching broadcasting from analogue to digital transmission and freeing up more 
spectrum in the 700MHz-900MHz range to facilitate digital inclusion (Bell, 2016; 
Borth, et al., 2008). 
 That being said, there are some concerns regarding the use of TVWS. These 
concerns include the difficulty associated with identification and monitoring of the 
relevant frequency bands and the technical capacity to manage the process to avoid 
interference between users (Borth, et al., 2008; Markendahl & Makitalo, 2011; Ofcom, 
2015). The emergence of such technology also has a wider implication for operators 
and policymakers in terms of establishing new business models and regulation as well 
as ensuring cooperation among existing and new stakeholders (Markendahl & 
Mäkitalo, 2011). Although interviewees stressed more on affordable and timely access 
to (low) frequency spectrum, the above concerns raised in the literature also appear to 
be as critical. Therefore, policymakers and operators need to consider these issues if 
the use of TVWS is to gain traction in helping to tackle the digital divide in Africa. 
To connect the unconnected, countries with large rural communities need to 
accelerate the release of low-frequency spectrum (Cui et al., 2017; GSMA, 2016a). 
According to the senior director and head of government affairs at Qualcomm Africa 
– Elizabeth Migwalla – although Africa is the most unconnected part in the world, it 
also has the most identified spectrum to drive connectivity to disadvantaged areas with 
700 and 800MHz band (Gilbert, 2016b). If this is the case, it then raises the question 
as to why such band of spectrum is not being released or accessed by MNO and smaller 
providers.  
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Evidence from Section 5.3.2 suggests that this is due to high bidding prices, 
delays and an insufficient allocation by policymakers, which combines to create 
scarcity. Popoola et al. (2016) have documented a similar observation in the case of 
Nigeria where they found that the current spectrum allocation policy is creating 
scarcity and under-utilisation of spectrum frequency. Section 5.3.2 also highlighted 
the case of South Africa where there is a delay in the allocation of low-frequency 
spectrum because of an impasse between the sector ministry and the regulator over the 
mode of allocation. According to South Africa’s Minister of Finance, Malusi Gigaba, 
such a delay is “…costing the industry and affecting much-needed growth, not only in 
ICT but also other sectors that are impacted by ICT” (Mzekandaba, 2017c). 
Furthermore, over 30 countries in Africa, including Nigeria, with the exception of a 
few such as Kenya, have failed to meet two Digital Switch-Over deadlines set by the 
ITU - June 7, 2012, and 2015 (Adepetun, 2017; El-Moghazi, Whalley, & Irvine, 2017). 
This further underlines the administrative difficulties facing the availability and 
release of low-frequency spectrum in Africa. 
Although some big players in the industry like MTN (as will be seen later on 
in this section) pay the bid price for spectrum, Section 5.3.2 highlights that such 
bidding price can also be prohibitive - particularly in relation to the market conditions 
such as the availability of supporting infrastructure, the share of subscribers and 
financial capacity of smaller operators. This can be explained with the case of South 
Africa where ICASA is asking for R3 billion164 as the minimum auction price to issue 
a 15-year licence for 600MHz, 700MHz and 800MHz spectrum bands (van Zyl, 2016). 
This does not include the non-refundable application fee of R3 million165, which all 
applicants must pay to participate in the bidding process (van Zyl, 2016). MNO in the 
country, particularly a small player like Cell C, have expressed concerns about the 
reserve price and the limited one-month period for which the offer is opened. This 
suggests that the bidding price and other conditions attached to the offer from ICASA 
did not reflect the capacity of all MNO to participate in the process. It is not just the 
interviewees in this study that have argued that bidding price of spectrum can become 
prohibitive and endanger the proliferation of coverage, evidence from Kuroda and 
                                                 
164 About $216 million 
165 About $215,000 
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Forero (2017) also supports this view. They argued that when the sale of spectrum is 
used as a vehicle for raising ‘public revenues’, the governments may get the income 
they want but this will also impact negatively on the wider industry. 
In formulating such market decision, interviewees asserted that policymakers 
need to ensure that such decision reflects the ability of all MNO to realise their 
economic objective. This is critical in the sense that without the participation of market 
actors like MNO, policymakers cannot realise the public interest objective of 
improving digital inclusion (Section 3.2). Anker (2017: 4) further added that “If as a 
result of considerations of profitability firms decide not to use the system as intended, 
the government fails in realising its objectives.” This is consistent with the key 
message of the model in Figure 19 - that UAS policy should be formulated in a manner 
that captures the public interest objective of widespread access and somewhat 
promotes the economic efficiency of network deployment to mitigate the market 
failure of even mobile coverage. To achieve this, interviewees suggested that when 
policymakers are fixing spectrum prices, they should factor in national conditions like 
infrastructure deficits - for example, the lack of electricity. Such deficit adds 
substantially to the transaction costs of MNO and impacts the amount of investment 
required to deploy network and services in a sustainable manner. 
Figure 21 indicates that lowering the bid price/application fee for spectrum, 
especially for operators willing to serve disadvantaged areas, can be a viable incentive 
for the market to lower their transaction costs. More significantly, since low-frequency 
spectrum has been proven to facilitate the digitisation of disadvantaged areas (Bell, 
2016; Borth, et al., 2008), there is the need for policymakers to promote cheaper and 
quick access to such frequency bands. Interviewees argued that this would help to 
lower transaction costs and incentivise big and small players to provide widespread 
coverage in a cost-effective manner. This would also encourage the proliferation of 
LCE like Zenzeleni Networks that is helping to close the digital divide in the remote 
Mankosi community in Eastern Cape Province of South Africa (Section 7.3.2). This 
has attracted the attention of the Deputy Minister of Telecommunications - Stella 
Ndabeni-Abrahams – who has pledged to collaborate with Zenzeleni to bring 
affordable connectivity to more people in Eastern Cape Province (APC, 2018). Ghana 
also appears to be offering similar support, albeit to MNO following the move by NCA 
to grant MNO with existing 2G licence the permission to deploy 3G using the 900MHz 
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band free of charge for disadvantaged areas (NCA, 2017; Ogundeji, 2017). This also 
includes the waiver of application and ‘authorisation’ fees with the intention of 
incentivising MNO to expand their mobile footprint with ‘minimum’ costs (NCA, 
2017). 
Although the action of Ghana appears to be consistent with the 
recommendation of interviewees, NCA needs to ensure that any MNO that gets this 
incentive is actually expanding 3G coverage in disadvantaged areas and not diverting 
it to commercially viable places. Such an enforcement does not only require technical 
and financial capacities, it also requires information such as the location of under-and-
unserved areas and their relevant telecommunication needs. Considering the private 
sector generally has access to market information than the public sector, information 
asymmetry166 could also be a challenge (Section 3.2.1). This underlines the fact that 
apart from transaction costs, an unequal availability of information to everyone in the 
market can also lead to market failure (Dassler, 2006; Gomez-Barroso & Perez-
Martinez, 2005; Weimer & Vining, 2010). Figure Error! Reference source not f
ound. indicates that this and other complexities could be mitigated by stakeholder 
engagement, particularly by engaging with and involving local communities. 
Information generated from this process can prove vital in unraveling the actual state 
of affairs in a given community instead of deploying funds ‘blindly’ (Section 6.2.2). 
8.3.1.3 Rights of way 
The last incentive that can help to economise the transaction costs of coverage 
expansion, as suggested by interviewees, is to help MNO secure affordable and quick 
access to rights of way. Section 5.3.1 has established the critical role of rights of way 
in infrastructure deployment. For example, without a piece of land, MNO and Infraco 
cannot construct BTS or deploy cables, without passage right, they cannot deploy 
undersea fibre optics. Without this critical infrastructure, services cannot be 
transmitted to end-users. Despite the unassailable role played by rights of way, Section 
5.3.1 shows that operators encounter various difficulties when it comes to securing 
such rights, especially in terms of administrative bureaucracies and fees. Interviewees 
contended that these difficulties are more significant in areas where the state, local 
                                                 
166 See Section 3.2.1 for explanation.  
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governments and host communities, demand different fees from operators before 
allowing them access to land for constructing physical infrastructure as illustrated with 
the case of Nigeria in Section 5.3.3. 
Interviewees more or less agreed that this is one area where policymakers can 
indirectly intervene to encourage operators to expand into areas lacking coverage 
(Section 6.3.3). Evidence from the country analysis illustrates that some countries 
have started the implementation of this recommendation. For example, the NCC has 
echoed a similar sentiment that one of the challenges facing MNO in Nigeria is the 
demands placed to the issuance of rights of way by state and local governments across 
the country (Adepoju, 2016c). Consequently, the Executive Vice-Chairman of the 
NCC, Professor Umar Danbatta, used his influence to secure a ‘permit fee’ waiver of 
N221 million167 for MTN Nigeria (Adepetun, 2017; ITNews Africa, 2017). The 
waiver was to facilitate the rights of passage for the deployment of fibre infrastructure 
in Kano, one of the northern states in Nigeria. GIFEC is also helping MTN and Ericson 
to secure rights of way for the construction of 40 BTS in Ghana as part of a $12 million 
Rural Telephony Project (Adepoju, 2017a). 
Apart from the actions of NCC and GIFEC, interviewees suggested that 
policymakers could further accelerate the process of obtaining rights of way through 
the provision of a clear and rapid application procedure to eliminate unnecessary 
bureaucracies. For example, Interviewee18168 revealed the sector regulator in 
Tanzania is currently working on refining the process of issuing rights of way by 
engaging with the Ministry of Environment to reduce the turnaround time of issuing 
approvals. This comes on the heels of MNO complaining that access to rights of way 
is the “major” reason that hinders them from executing USF projects even after the 
funds have been released to them. 
8.3.1.4 Summary 
The analysis in this section suggests that the use of incentives such as tax breaks, 
affordable and timely access to (low) frequency spectrum and rights of way is a 
promising regulatory instrument for correcting market failure linked to transaction 
                                                 
167 About $700, 000. 
168 A regulatory specialist with an international lending organisation who is working with countries in 
Eastern Africa to improve coverage. 
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costs. This is significant in light of the fact that in a capital-intensive sector such as 
telecommunications, prohibitive costs of network deployment and maintenance can 
deter MNO from extending mobile coverage beyond commercially viable areas, thus 
enabling digital divide to persist (Arndt, 1988; Gabel, 2007; Zerbe & McCurdy, 1999). 
Figure 21 indicates that the deployment of incentives can help to lower transaction 
costs, promote the economic efficiency of network deployment and encourage MNO 
to increase coverage. Apart from improving the economic feasibility of network 
deployment, offering incentives like the elimination of VAT on smartphones can help 
to improve affordability for end-users, which is one of the fundamental principles of 
achieving UAS (Section 3.3.1). Furthermore, reducing or eliminating the tax on 
mobile money transaction can help to improve digital financial inclusion in light of 
the fact that two-thirds of the over 1 billion people in Africa do not have access to 
traditional financial services (World Bank, 2015 & 2017). 
 While the use of incentives offers promising benefits to the industry, it comes 
at a cost to the governments who rely on the taxes and (spectrum) licence fees from 
the sector to fund their national budgets (Curwen & Whalley, 2018; Xalam Analytics, 
2018). Curwen and Whalley (2018) thus argue that governments may be unwilling to 
give tax incentives. This was echoed by Interviewee26169 who stated that… with a 
multitude of needs competing for limited budget, which is mainly funded by taxes, the 
implementation of tax incentives may be very difficult… While this raises the question 
of who pays for such incentives, governments also need to consider the wider 
implication of the digital divide that would persist if MNO keep concentrating on 
commercially viable areas while over half of the continent’s population residing across 
disadvantaged areas are left behind (World Bank, 2015).  
Section 3.2.1 highlighted that telecommunications is a mixed good that can 
facilitate positive externality in terms of a wider socio-economic benefit such as 
education, banking, health, jobs and governance. This was also highlighted in a recent 
meeting of the Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development where industry 
leaders from different backgrounds, including heads of states like Paul Kagame170, 
argued that such socio-economic benefit are even more significant for people living in 
                                                 
169 A senior employee within one of the Ministry of Transport and Communications in Africa 
170 Paul Kagame is the President of Rwanda  
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deprived areas (ITU, 2018). To this end, UAS to telecommunications should be seen 
as an indispensable tool that drives the functioning of modern society without which 
there would be a severe level of social disparity and lack of opportunities (Batura, 
2017; Haftu, 2018; Shenglin et al., 2017; Souter, 2018b; Szeles, 2018). World Bank 
(2016) called this effect the’digital impact divide’. As such, even if it may cost the 
governments to support UAS through incentives in the short-term, the long-term 
benefit and wider impact of closing the digital divide of uneven mobile coverage 
appears to be greater (Ali, 2016; Bergman et al., 1998; Gomez-Barroso & Perez-
Martinez, 2005; Levine & Taylor, 2018). Moreover, governments cannot promote 
widespread access to telecommunications without building a business environment 
that encourages competition (which was critical to the transformation of the sector in 
Africa as indicated in Chapter 2), as this could result to the excessive concentration of 
market actors in economically viable areas (Dasgupta, Lall, & Wheeler, 2001; 
Shenglin et al., 2017). 
Aside from the cost debate, it is worth emphasising that the use of incentives 
has its shortcomings. Section 3.2.2 has dealt with this in detail, one of which is a free 
rider problem – a situation where benefiting market actors may take an incentive and 
fail to reflect this in their business model. For example, failing to plough-back the 
resulting cost-savings into coverage expansion in disadvantaged areas, offering 
affordable mobile tariffs as a result of receiving tax breaks and low-frequency 
spectrum free of charge or at a reduced rate. This raises the issue of monitoring and 
enforcement, the efficacy of which is partly dependent on reliable information 
(Section 3.2.1) and the level of resources available to a regulator (Section 8.2). 
8.3.2 Infrastructure sharing as a make or buy decision 
Section 7.2 recounted various means of collaboration, which relevant stakeholders can 
employ to improve coverage expansion. From the four issues presented in Section 7.2, 
infrastructure sharing was particularly significant in light of the fact that it drew 
comments from 24 interviewees. The concept of infrastructure sharing can be 
explained by the transaction cost theory, which states that a firm will internalise certain 
business operations, especially those that it can execute at a lower cost, and outsource 
other operations that  an external party can execute with a cost advantage (Anderson 
& Gatignon, 1999; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Pan & Tse, 2000; Williamson, 1986; 
1979). The phenomenon of outsourcing the management and operation of 
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telecommunications network to an Infraco and then enter into a sharing arrangement 
with rivals is akin to a make or buy decision (Sako, Chondrakis, & Vaaller, 2016). 
Although make or buy decisions have been historically linked with manufacturing 
firms (Jauch & Wilson, 1979), the emergence of infrastructure sharing suggests it has 
extended to telecommunications. The need to reduce costs and improve returns in 
order to remain competitive has ignited the debate of whether to keep certain business 
operation in-house or to outsource them (Schwarting & Weissbarth, 2011). The 
possibility of lowering the transaction costs of business operation appears to be a 
critical factor when it comes to such decision (Li, Lee, & Walker, 2015; Sako, 
Chondrakis, & Vaaller, 2016; Schwarting & Weissbarth, 2011). 
 As indicated in Figure 21, interviewees broadly agreed that infrastructure 
sharing could result in the pooling of resources and a reduction in the overall costs of 
network deployment and maintenance, particularly through co-location of servers, 
sharing BTS and generator sets. However, , there was a lack of consensus on whether 
infrastructure sharing among MNO would translate into the improvement of coverage 
in disadvantaged areas. Section 7.2.1 highlighted that while interviewees agreed that 
more costs-savings can accrue to MNO from sharing infrastructure with rivals, 
opinions were split on the idea that MNO would then reinvest such money in areas 
lacking coverage, thereby shifting the burden to other parties who do so. The literature 
refers to this as the ‘transfer of risk’ to others within a sharing agreement (Bing et al., 
2005; IMF, 2004; Kargol & Sokol, 2008). One of the ways of dealing with the issue 
of risk shifting is through public disclosure so that stakeholders such as civil society 
can then use such information to demand accountability from the various parties 
involved in infrastructure sharing (IMF, 2004). This helps to justify why stakeholder 
engagement has been linked to infrastructure sharing in Figure 21. 
 Secondly, interviewees in Section 7.2.1 also argued that while infrastructure 
sharing can prevent duplication of resources and protect the environment from the 
impact of multiple BTS located close to each other, it does not on its own provide a 
mechanism to change the prevailing circumstances of non-commercially viable areas. 
For example, the vast majority of the circa ‘22 million’ under-and-unserved people in 
South Africa live in non-commercially viable areas and mostly like cannot afford 
smartphones and data tariff (Zollner,  2017). In such case, infrastructure sharing cannot 
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address the missing market171 that results from the lack of smartphone affordability 
due to low-income levels, neither can it address the incomplete market172 that arises 
from low demand that stems from the spare population density associated with some 
disadvantaged locations. 
 Under such circumstances, Section 3.2.1 makes a case for natural monopoly 
arguing that for a country that has geographical challenges such as large distances and 
isolated areas, a limited competition that guarantees increasing returns to scale may 
better serve such market. As such, Interviewees18173 and 21174 suggested that 
allocating such areas among big and small players, and then issuing them with a non-
competing licence to be the sole provider for their allotted locations might be more 
interesting than infrastructure sharing (Section 6.3.2). The reason behind such 
argument is that if operators are permitted to serve such areas without competition and 
keep improving things over time, returns may gradually surpass the costs of 
deployment and allow for business sustainability even without USF intervention. 
South Africa has attempted a similar strategy through its under-serviced area 
licencing initiative (Gillwald, 2002; 2005a). Section 6.3.2 highlighted that its 
implementation has been hampered by delays in licence issuance and a lack of political 
will to release funding for the operators as stipulated in the licence conditions. 
Interviewee26175 revealed that Zambia also began issuing underserviced area licence 
to MNO in mid-2017 to help achieve UAS. Since its implementation is still underway, 
it remains to be seen how successful it would be. However, interviewees stressed that 
to forestall abuse in the issuance of such a licence, the process should follow a 
transparent and open auction system that permits equal participation by all players in 
the market. It was further suggested that policymakers could also allocate areas based 
on the capacity of operators, allow them to decide which disadvantaged locations they 
want to serve and/or offer such licence free to small players to encourage their 
participation. 
                                                 
171 See Section 3.2.1  
172 See Section 3.2.1 
173 A regulatory specialist for an international lender who funds rural telecommunications in Africa 
174 A former director of public policy for a multinational MNO 
175 A senior employee within the Ministry of Transport and Communications 
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The third issue that led to the split of opinions on infrastructure sharing is that 
the first MNO that extend its footprint into a location typically enjoys the first-mover 
advantage by getting most of the customers and keep them through low On-Net tariffs. 
Such a suggestion by the interviewees is consistent with the studies (Armstrong, 1998; 
Hawthrone, 2018), which found that a network operator could use ‘high’ mobile 
termination rate (MTR)176 to leverage and increase its market position. Interviewees 
then argued that if late arrivals have the opportunity to enter a disadvantaged location 
by sharing existing local infrastructure, they might not be interested as the majority of 
the customers may have been captured. The comment from Interviewee12177, 
corroborated by Interviewee9178, highlighted this lack of interest from MNO. It was 
gathered from Interviewee9 that NCC built towers in selected unserved villages and 
asked MNO to come and put their equipment. MNO did not go there as they argued 
that there was no business case to invest in such locations. This is somewhat 
paradoxical considering that NCC (2017) projects that Nigeria needs around 80,000 
BTS, compared to the current 50,000 in operation (Adepoju, 2017c), to meet the 
growing demand for telecommunications, yet there are some BTS lying idle. Figure 
21 indicates that Nigeria, and other countries in Africa, can avoid such resource 
wastage through wider stakeholder consultation as this can help to address the 
concerns and dynamics inherent in infrastructure sharing.    
To address the lack of interest from MNO, interviewees further suggested that 
policymakers should consider mandating the elimination of MTR between operators 
for serving disadvantaged areas. This will not only allow smaller players to 
interconnect to the networks of the bigger players at little or no cost in serving sparsely 
populated areas, but also encourage wider participation in infrastructure sharing since 
late arrivals will be reassured that if they can offer competitive tariff, they can win 
over some customers from the first-mover. This is particularly significant in light of 
the fact that MNO with a low subscriber base might not see the need to participate in 
infrastructure sharing due to the high margins of MTR. This is consistent with the 
argument in Section 3.2.2 that the regulation of MTR is particularly useful for 
                                                 
176 MTR is the fee that MNO charge one another to interconnect customers across rival networks 
(Hawthorne, 2016). 
177 An access specialist 
178 A key regulatory figure in Nigeria 
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preventing large MNO from charging high access price (Off-Net tariff) that could 
stymie the expansion and operation of smaller players and limit them from benefiting 
from network externality.  
Furthermore, mandating MTR can contribute to addressing the problem of 
affordability, which is viewed as one of the major factors limiting mobile adoption 
and usage across Africa (Section 5.3.4). This is supported by Stork (2012) who found 
that a reduction in MTR in Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria and South Africa led 
to a decrease in retail prices, lower tariff and increase in mobile adoption. Specifically, 
a reduction of MTR in Kenya in 2010 led to a fall in retail prices between MNO and 
allowed smaller players to adopt different pricing strategy to compete with the big 
players. In the case of Namibia, it led to an expansion in the mobile market, increased 
investment and ARPU, especially for the big players. Elsewhere in South Africa, 
Hawthorne (2016) found that the regulation of MTR by ICASA has resulted in a 90% 
reduction in interconnection charges between 2009 and 2016. The elimination of MTR 
is also part of the newly commissioned USF programme in Gabon, which is being 
targeted at over 3,000 unconnected villages with the aim of ensuring maximum 
coverage and affordability (TeleGeography, 2017b). In addition, MACRA has 
announced plans to regulate wholesale and retail prices of services in Malawi with the 
intention of reducing MTR from $4 to $2 per minute following the public concern of 
high voice tariff (TeleGeography, 2018d). Hawthorne (2018) thus concluded that if 
policymakers want to encourage the expansion of new entrants and address the 
margins between On-Net and Off-Net tariffs, they should implement the reduction of 
MTR.  
While the issue of mandating MTR is supported in the literature under price 
intervention, it is important to note that, as with other mandatory regulatory 
instruments, price intervention could result in unintended consequences as highlighted 
in Section 3.2.2. For example, it may result in a lack of cooperation, especially from 
the big players and, as such, detract the achievement of widespread coverage 
(Sherman, 1993). Furthermore, although price intervention can be used as a tool for 
redistributing economic gains to deprived areas and attract smaller players to expand 
their networks by directing big players to lower interconnection charges, this tool can 
also be considered as ‘discriminatory’ in a liberalised market (Mitchell, 1995). This 
can be illustrated with the case of South Africa. When ICASA first proposed to 
 271 
 
regulate MTR in 2014, MTN and Vodafone teamed up against the idea in a lawsuit 
(Lith, 2014). MTN, in particular, argued that the proposal was discriminatory and, at 
best, a tax on its subscribers to fund smaller players and their users (Bulbulia, 2014). 
A similar position has been taken by Safaricom, the market leader in Kenya, arguing 
that the proposal by CA to regulate MTR should be on commercial terms, otherwise, 
it will only favour players that have not taken the risk to invest in infrastructure 
(Matinde, 2018b; Miriri, 2018). Mascom Wirless, Botswana's largest MNO, also 
challenged the decision of BOCRA179 to cut MTR by 41% but lost the case as the court 
ruled in favour of the regulator (TeleGeography, 2018c). 
 Section 7.2.1 further highlighted other dynamics as to why infrastructure 
sharing has failed to gain traction, especially when it comes to active infrastructure. 
They include the issue of trust and the fear that sharing core networks may reduce QoS 
because of shared capacity. It also raises the question of how to calculate and 
appropriate the costs of network maintenance and upgrade. Zimbabwe is one example 
of where the market leader, Econet, has refused to share its infrastructure with Telecel 
and NetOne on the grounds that all MNO have to contribute equally to network 
maintenance (Mhlanga, 2017). Countries such as Rwanda and South Africa are also 
trying to promote other forms of sharing such as the single wholesale network to 
address the shortages of BTS. However, its implementation has also proven to be 
problematic (Section 7.2.1). Zimbabwe is amongst the latest country to approve such 
proposition by allocating $250 million from USF for the construction of 600 BTS for 
the improvement of ‘connectivity in rural areas’ (TeleGeography, 2017i). It is yet to 
be seen if MNO would use these BTS when the construction is completed as evident 
in the case of Nigeria. 
Generally speaking, the analysis in this section portrays that infrastructure 
sharing can be a vital tool in tackling market failure that results from high transaction 
costs. However, there is a lack of consensus on what impact it has on coverage 
expansion in disadvantaged areas. Furthermore, although this section also highlights 
the effort of various governments in closing the digital divide in Africa through 
infrastructure sharing, there no evidence to suggest that such effort reflect the various 
dynamics presented in this section. Similarly, various studies (for example, Cramton 
                                                 
179 Botswana Communications Regulatory Authority 
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& Doyle, 2017; Deloitte & APC, 2015; Ovando, Perez, & Moral, 2015) also support 
infrastructure sharing without recourse to the aforementioned concerns. This goes to 
suggest that there is a gap in the debate on infrastructure sharing in Africa and, as such, 
there is a lack of wider implementation. The analysis in this section indicates that for 
infrastructure sharing to gain traction and become more popular, issues such as lack 
of trust, first-mover advantaged, On-and-Off Net tariffs and QoS needs to be critically 
addressed to have a robust and successful sharing arrangement. This could also help 
to revolutionise infrastructure sharing and move it beyond the fringes of passive to 
active sharing of core networks. 
8.3.3 Heterogeneous technologies 
Section 7.3.1 argued that the deployment of heterogeneous technologies can provide 
innovative solutions for UAS to flourish in a manner that promotes effectiveness and 
low-cost access to network deployment. In the sense that solely relying on either 2G180, 
3G181 or 4G182 in extending mobile telecommunications might not be an economically 
viable option in all cases considering that different locations may have different 
dynamics in terms of population density, topography, telecommunications need and 
income level. Since the decision of market actors to deploy network is a function of 
transactions costs and returns on investment, both policymakers and operators need to 
consider a cheaper and effective way to bring connectivity to disadvantaged areas, 
which could mean a mix of various mobile technologies. 
 Typically, mobile technologies are classified with reference to ‘generation’ 
such as 2G, 3G, 4G, etc. (Curwen, 2010). A respective generation comes with its 
unique characteristics such as costs of deployment, capacity, service offering and data 
transfer speed. The higher the generation, the higher the costs of deployment, service 
offering and speed, but a lesser generation deployed with CDMA provides greater 
capacity (Curwen & Whalley, 2010). Furthermore, while lesser generation technology 
                                                 
180 2G stands for second-generation technology, which is used to deploy mobile technology such as 
global system for mobile (GSM) and code division multiple access (CDMA) (Ahsan et al., 2007; 
Curwen and Whalley, 2010; 2016).  
181 3G stands for third-generation technology. This is used to deploy universal mobile 
telecommunications system (UMTS) (Curwen, 2010; Curwen and Whalley, 2016). 
182 4G refers to fourth-generation technology, which is used to deploy long-term evolution (LTE) 
(Clarke, 2014; Curwen and Whalley, 2010). 
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provides better voice quality and minimal power consumption equipment, higher 
generation183 is more suitable for deploying high-speed networks, but at a higher 
transaction cost in terms of equipment and obtaining new spectrum licence (Ali-
Yahiye, 2011; Clarke, 2014; Curwen, 2010; Giaglis, Kourouthanassis, & Tsamakos, 
2003; Olla, 2005).  
 It thus follows from the above that the deployment of various mobile 
technologies has a wider implication on the proliferation of coverage. For example, 
since it costs more to deploy higher generation networks that guarantee better data 
transfer speed and higher audio-visual experience, such network will only make 
economic sense if there is a higher demand for advanced telecommunication services. 
In the absence of such demand, MNO may struggle to obtain an ARPU that reflect the 
transaction costs incurred in installing such network (Olla, 2005). Moreover, end-users 
need high-end smartphones/devices to access these services, the affordability of which 
is a problem for low-income earners in Africa (Section 5.3.4.2). The provision of such 
networks in the absence of high-end smartphones will result in market failure caused 
by a missing market (Section 3.2.1). In contrast, lower generation networks guarantee 
more capacity and resilience when it comes to the delivery of basic data, voice, SMS 
services as well as being relatively cheaper to deploy (Olla, 2005; Curwen & Whalley, 
2010). As such, the use of feature phones that mostly operate on 2G (and some on 3G) 
is still widespread in Africa (GSMA, 2015a; Song, 2017). Lower generation networks 
thus provide operators with the opportunity of serving a larger part of African 
population still using feature phones (Reuters, 2017a; Song, 2017; World Bank, 2017).   
Following the argument presented above, interviewees voiced their doubts as 
to whether solely focusing on higher generation networks would be able to deliver 
cost-effective connectivity to disadvantaged areas. Since different dynamics exist 
within countries and between regions, Figure 21 suggests that policymakers should 
talk with stakeholders and collectively decide the ‘suitability’184 of mobile 
technologies. This raises the question of whether to prioritise speed over widespread 
coverage, basic data and voice over high-end services such as multimedia, machine-
to-machine and the trending internet of things (Olla, 2005; Sudtasan & Mitomo, 2017). 
                                                 
183 3G upwards (Curwen, 2010) 
184 Suitability in terms of costs of deployment, service offering, data speed and capacity. 
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Section 3.3.4 provides the theoretical argument on whether it is feasible to include 
advanced services as part of UAS and the need to consider their trade-offs with basic 
data and voice services.    
Interviewees responded to question of trade-offs by asserting that, considering 
the stage of development of the sector, which is different across Africa, it will be more 
feasible to first ensure widespread access to coverage over speed and basic services 
over advanced services. For example, Interviewee25185 asserted that with the current 
development of the industry, it appears “a little bit early” to be talking about the 
provision of advanced services ‘everywhere’. Interviewee17186 also shared this 
sentiment by arguing that it is better for a government to focus effort and scarce 
resources on increasing coverage, as there is arguably a more social benefit in doing 
so than focusing on speed. Interviewees concluded that once there is universal 
coverage of basic voice and data services, then we can start focusing on speed because 
going from zero to anything is much better.  
Although one may argue that this may lead to another form of digital divide in 
terms of institutionalising limited access to advanced services, James (2007, p. 285) 
asserted that in developing countries, it may be more effective to focus on “…closing 
the one divide rather than the other (if, for instance, the capabilities required for use 
are less stringent than those demanded by actual production).” Furthermore, although 
a lower generation network may not allow users to access advanced services, it does 
allow for communication and access to online information and services (Lyons, 2017). 
This indicates that the proliferation of coverage is not all about speed rather, it is also 
critical to consider other market dynamics when formulating policies and deploying 
technologies (Stocker & Whalley, 2017). This argument appears to be consistent with 
Section 3.3.3, which puts forward a case for the earlier stages of UAS to focus on 
wider geographical reach while the later stages can then focus on the advancement of 
technology and narrowing such a divide over time. 
To this end, interviewees recommended that policymakers and MNO should 
adopt a pragmatic approach in terms of deploying a mix of technologies that reflect 
                                                 
185 One UAS director in Africa 
186 A former group director of public policy for a multinational MNO, who is now an independent policy 
adviser and researcher 
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different dynamics within a market. For example, there is a general lack of terrestrial 
networks in Africa and in some cases, the territorial size of countries like DRC is very 
large, making it more difficult to extend coverage in a cost-effective way (Petit, 2017; 
Southwood, 2017). Interviewees suggested that a microwave technology might be 
more suitable for extending network for flat and valley topography while satellite may 
be preferred for mountainous geographies. Apart from a country like DRC, Lesotho 
can also benefit from the deployment of microwave and satellite technologies 
considering the patches of sparsely populated rural settlements, lowlands and 
mountains within the country (LCA, 2016). However, the use of satellite has certain 
limitations in Africa, including the issues of standardisation, speed and high costs of 
bandwidth (Southwood, 2017; Tredger, 2017). Although the costs of bandwidth have 
decreased over the years from $3000 a month per MHz to around $600, the Deputy 
Minister of Telecommunications in South Africa is advocating further reductions to 
promote wider usage (Southwood, 2017; Tredger, 2017). 
Interviewees also suggested that more needs to be done to promote the use of 
Wi-Fi technology as this can help to provide inexpensive wireless local area networks 
with the capacity of covering an entire village, depending on the size. South Africa is 
one of the countries in Africa where the government is championing the rollout of free 
Wi-Fi hotspots in public places (Project Isizwe, n.d.). Although this initiative is 
targeted at people in disadvantaged areas with low-income, available evidence appears 
to suggest its implementation tends to concentrate more in the cities and not in rural 
areas. For example, the government of South Africa has collaborated with an NGO, 
Project Isizwe, to deploy free Wi-Fi for the city of Tshwane and over 1,000 free 
Internet Zones have emerged within this city (Moyo, 2017; Project Isizwe, n.d.). 
Typically, consumers are allowed up to a daily quota of 500MB with a speed of around 
15Mbps (Moyo, 2017). The NGO has also rolled out 408 Wi-Fi hotspots in 
Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni. While it is not possible to ascertain the reason for not 
extending such initiatives to rural areas from these secondary sources, it illustrates that 
the introduction of this initiative is to promote wider access to telecommunications 
using low-cost technology (Project Isizwe, n.d.). 
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Furthermore, Konnect Africa187 is combining Wi-Fi and satellite technologies to close 
the digital divide in Africa through its SmartWIFI initiatives, which provides hotspot 
connectivity to end-users using Wi-Fi repeaters linked to its satellite broadband 
(Letsebe, 2017; Telecompaper, 2017c). This technology is being rolled out in 
Cameroon, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania and Ugandan in partnership with MNO and 
local ISP (Letsebe, 2017; Telecompaper, 2017c). The combination of various 
technologies provides a more cost-effective solution than sole relying on mobile 
technologies such as 3G, 4G, etc., Wi-Fi technology has a vital role in complementing 
other technologies and scaling-up coverage (Donner, 2015; Graham, 2016).  
Figure Error! Reference source not found. also indicates that the deployment o
f heterogeneous technologies encourages the proliferation of innovative solutions such 
as those championed by OTT. For example, it emerged as part of the findings in this 
thesis that Google is using fibre network and Wi-Fi technology to promote affordable 
Internet connectivity in Kampala, Uganda, Microsoft 4Afrika is using TVWS 
technology to expand coverage in Limpopo, South Africa, and Facebook has launched 
its ‘Express Wi-Fi’ initiative across 150 locations in Africa including in Kenya and 
Nigeria. Regardless of the benefits of such OTT initiatives, other interviewees 
expressed some concerns. For instance, critics of OTT argued that they are creating 
and driving value to end-users over the infrastructure that they neither invest in nor 
pay taxes for.  
In addition, there is a whole raft of controversy surrounding the practice of 
zero-rating such as the violation of net neutrality188 following the restriction of 
services to preselected content, the ‘actual’ costs to end-users and privacy issues. 
Furthermore, although MNO in Africa allow zero-rating on their networks with some 
restrictions on voice and video calling, it appears that they face a dilemma as such 
practice reduce their ARPU due to data free charges and VoIP to transmit 
telecommunication services. Considering that, zero-rated services are popular with 
end-users and as a result, act as a catalyst for growing subscriber base, denying access 
                                                 
187 The owner of Eutelsat, a satellite broadband provider (Economist, 2016). 
188 Net neutrality principle asserts that operators, government and other internet providers treat data 
access on the internet equitably and without discrimination (Wu, 2003). This is critical to mitigating 
the abuse of dominant players from using their market positions in gaining undue advantaged, for 
example, throttling the content of small players (Bauer & Knieps, 2018). 
 277 
 
to their networks may result in the loss of customers to rivals. Concerns also lie in the 
seeming lack of clarity and transparency with regard to OTT business models and 
resource requirements. This is the reason why one of the policymakers interviewed for 
this study refused to allocate TVWS to OTT to serve uncovered areas in their country 
as highlighted in Section 7.3.4. 
8.4 Conclusion 
The analysis outlined in this chapter has drawn on the public interest and economic 
efficiency perspectives of market failure as well as the interaction between the data in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 to develop a model for closing the digital divide in Africa. This 
model is grounded on two key underpinning issues of regulatory capacity and 
transaction costs as indicated in Figure 19. The decision to focus on these two 
fundamental issues was informed by the depth of their interactions with the overall 
findings and their linkages with the country analysis and literature review presented 
in Chapters 2 and 3. While Chapter 8 is not exhaustive of all the issues raised in the 
findings, Figure 19 suggests that addressing these two fundamental issues would go a 
long way in mitigating the persistent low levels of mobile coverage in disadvantaged 
areas and push the whole agenda of building a more digital inclusive society. 
Following the definition proposed for market failure (Section 3.2) and the 
classification of telecommunications as a mixed good (Section 3.2.1), the regulation 
of telecommunications should not solely focus on setting the rules of the game, but 
also promote competition. By doing so, regulation will reflect equity in terms of 
promoting widespread access to telecommunications and economic efficiency in terms 
of encouraging and stimulating competition to make it feasible for MNO to 
economically provide infrastructure and services. To this end, while regulatory 
capacity addresses the public interest part of the equation of market failure in terms of 
promoting widespread access to telecommunication, transaction costs underline the 
economic efficiency aspect to make it feasible for MNO to provide services 
economically as indicated in Figure 19.  
Chapter 3 indicated that there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency, 
especially in terms of the disparities between social benefit and private cost (Lindsey 
& Teles, 2017; Todorova, 2016). As difficult as it may be to square these two issues, 
policymakers need to work with other stakeholders like MNO, civil society and local 
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communities to find a balance, not least because the public policy objective of 
widespread coverage in a liberalised market will be better achieved with the 
cooperation and participation of market actors (Anker, 2017). On the other hand, 
market actors also need policymakers to help ease the burden of transaction costs of 
extending access to telecommunications. This is particularly significant as many 
countries in Africa lack supporting infrastructure with low-income and large rural 
population, which combine to exacerbate the lack of economic feasibility (Section 
5.3). This goes to highlight the need for a balance and cooperation between 
policymakers and market actors. 
Section 8.2 examines the public interest perspective of market failure through 
regulatory capacity without which a regulator cannot function effectively and 
efficiently to guarantee equitable access to telecommunications. From policy 
formulation to its implementation, engaging with wider stakeholders and policing 
compliance require a considerable level of human and financial resources. Despite 
this, it is often the case that regulators in various parts of Africa are faced with 
inadequate regulatory capacity in terms of access to high calibre pool of staff, 
attracting and retaining people with relevant skills and access to funding. In a country 
where this happens, it becomes very difficult for the regulator to cope with the 
complexity that comes with UAS and the industry at large. It then follows that for 
UAS to address the equity aspect of market failure, it is critical that African regulators 
are empowered with adequate capacity. Figure 20 indicates that this requires political 
will on the part of governments to increase the budget allocation of regulatory 
authorities. Interviewees asserted that the having a well-resourced regulator is a 
critical success factor in closing the digital divides in Africa, as such, governments 
should give high priority to regulatory authorities, not least as accorded the collection 
of USF levy and sector-specific taxes. 
On the other hand, Section 8.3 addresses the economic efficiency part of 
market failure through the lens of transaction costs of network deployment and 
maintenance. Of all the causes of market failure outlined in Section 3.2.1, the empirical 
evidence in Chapter 5 suggested that transaction costs are the most significant factor 
and interlinked with other issues limiting the economic feasibility of coverage 
expansion. Section 5.3 specifically showed that a lack of economic efficiency, arising 
from the imbalance between the costs and benefits of coverage expansion, is a major 
 279 
 
reason why MNO concentrate in big cities and towns. Interviewees further suggested 
that aside discouraging MNO from investing in coverage expansion, prohibitive 
transaction costs also contribute to fuelling the affordability problem via mobile tariff 
and costs of smartphones. This, in turn, hinders mobile adoption and ICT diffusion. 
The analysis above suggests that transaction costs are a fundamental issue 
when it comes to coverage expansion. This is consistent with the literature (for 
example, Arrow, 1969; Todorova, 2016; Williams, 1985) that stated that transaction 
costs are a ‘root’ cause of market failure. Therefore, transaction costs should not be 
overlooked when it comes to addressing market failure (Toumanoff, 1984). 
Interviewees thus asserted that there is the need for policymakers to look for ways to 
minimise transaction costs in order to encourage MNO and other smaller players to 
invest more in coverage expansion. To this end, a series of recommendations were 
outlined in Chapters 6 and 7. However, Figure 21 indicates that the key issues that 
drew the most comments from interviewees centred on incentives, infrastructure 
sharing and heterogeneous technologies. 
Section 3.2.2 highlighted that one way to correct market failure linked to 
transaction costs is by offering market actors various incentives in order to encourage 
them to fill market gaps. Figure 19 indicates that this can be done through a 
harmonised and reduced system of taxation. This comes on the back of the findings in 
Section 5.3.3 that the practice of imposing multiple taxes on the sector is fuelling the 
increase in transaction costs, which then impinge on the ability of MNO to extend their 
footprint. This also feeds into the affordability problem in terms of the costs of mobile 
tariffs and smartphones in relation to income levels. Interviewees suggested that 
policymakers could ease the burden on the industry by offering tax breaks. This can 
promote more investment in network expansion and encourage the availability of 
affordable smartphones. It was also suggested that the tax policy in the sector should 
be structured in a way that reflects local conditions in terms of compensating the 
market for providing supporting infrastructure like electricity, which contributes 
significantly to transaction costs.  
However, for the use of incentive be effective and efficient, regulators need to 
enforce compliance to ensure that beneficiaries are held accountable and provide what 
they ought to for enjoying such benefit (Section 3.2.2). Furthermore, incentivising the 
industry with benefits like tax breaks comes at a cost. This is illustrated in Niger 
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Republic’s decision to scrap its international traffic tax under the Finance Act 2018 
with MNO committing to invest in coverage expansion and the improvement of QoS 
(TeleGeography, 2017d). Although this decision will cost the treasury around $36.2 
million a year, interviewees and studies (for example, Deloitte & GSMA, 2011; 
Hudson, 2006) asserted that offering such incentive can have a long-term positive 
impact that trickles down on the wider society. Particularly, considering that end-users 
can now access a plethora of telecommunication services through mobile telephony, 
which is fast becoming a useful socio-economic enabler for many across Africa 
(Collett, 2016; Jagun, Heeks, & Whalley, 2008). 
 Other costs reduction strategies suggested by interviewees include affordable 
and timely access to frequency spectrum, infrastructure sharing and the deployment 
of heterogeneous technologies. Sections 8.3.2 and 8.3.3 have outlined the various 
dynamics associated with these issues. Altogether, the analysis in Section 8.3 indicates 
that the issue of transaction costs is critical when it comes to tackling market failure 
from the viewpoint of economic efficiency. Since the telecommunications market is 
driven by competition, policymakers need to work with the industry to look for ways 
to lower transaction costs to encourage operators to invest in coverage expansion 
because if they are not on board, very little could be achieved. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
Prior to the introduction of liberalisation at the turn of the millennium, the 
telecommunications sector in Africa was run by state monopolies largely providing 
fixed network and services (Chavula, 2013; ITU, 2009).  The performance of state 
monopolies left much to be desired in terms of closing the digital divide beyond their 
capital cities as demonstrated in the low levels of fixed-line penetration across the 
continent, albeit in varying degrees (see Figure 2 in Section 2.2). This was mainly due 
to a general lack of investment and technical capacities between countries and regions 
in Africa (ITU, 1999; Okonjo-Iweala, 2012; Williams & Kwofie, 2014). This resulted 
in many years of poorly developed infrastructure and a considerable level of unmet 
demand for telecommunications. With growing pressure to extend coverage on one 
hand, and a general lack of investment on the other hand, African governments turned 
to the World Bank and its associated bodies for support (Irwin & Brook, 2003; 
Sutherland, 2014; Williams & Kwofie, 2014). Prime among the conditions for 
obtaining such support was the need to introduce wider sector reforms to attract private 
investment and change governments’ participation from ownership to regulation 
(Ndukwe, 2005; Williams & Kwofie, 2014). It is within this context that the 
liberalisation of the industry began in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Ojo, 2016; WTO, 
1997). 
  Governments across Africa gradually introduced liberalisation and embraced 
mobile telecommunications with the understanding that it is more cost-effective to 
rollout and operate vis-à-vis fixed networks (Deloitte & GSMA, 2012; Souter, 2018a). 
What has emerged from this process is a complex and dynamic market populated with 
a mix of local and international MNO (see Table 1 in Section 2.3) whose activities 
have contributed to an unprecedented level of investment and, by extension, the spread 
of mobile coverage and diffusion across Africa. With a continental average of 50% 
mobile penetration between 2016 and 2017, millions of people now have 
unprecedented access to telecommunications (GSMA, 2016a; 2017b). In addition, 
mobile penetration and diffusion have created a whole raft of ICT ecosystem so much 
so that apart from communication, mobile telephony is fast becoming a critical socio-
economic enabler across different sectors like agriculture, banking, education, health 
and politics (Donner, 2004; ITU, 2017a). The implication of this is that access to 
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telecommunications is no longer considered a luxury but a necessity in light of its 
enabling capacity and the opportunities it creates (ITU, 2017c; Jagun, Heeks, & 
Whalley, 2008).    
 It is, therefore, incontestable that the opening up of the telecommunications 
market has played a critical role in boosting investment and mobile coverage across 
Africa compared to the lacklustre performance of state monopolies. Nonetheless, 
studies have found that while market liberalisation has drastically reduced the 
coverage gaps in densely populated urban areas, the same cannot be said of 
disadvantaged areas189 where a significant number of people lack access to mobile 
telecommunications (Foster & Briceno-Garmendia, 2010; Manimohan, 2013; GSMA, 
2016b). The effort of various governments to address this market failure of uneven 
mobile coverage gave rise to UAS policy – a move that resulted in the establishment 
of USF in over 30 countries as the regulatory tool to bridge the digital divide in the 
continent. However, attaining widespread access with USF has also proven to be 
difficult following the projection that over 500 million people across Africa still lack 
access to telecommunications, allowing digital divide of uneven mobile coverage to 
persist (Collins, 2015; Foster & Briceno-Garmendia, 2010; GSMA, 2016b; 2017b; 
Manimohan, 2013; Manson, 2013; UNCTAD, 2017). This point to a research gap, 
which this study investigated by raising two critical questions re-echoed in Section 
9.2. While Chapters 5, 6 and 7 extensively presented the findings for these questions, 
Chapter 8 discussed the fundamental underpinning issues that cut across the findings 
chapters. Section 9.2 will provide the key summary of these findings while Section 
9.3 outlines the contribution of this study. Section 9.4 highlights the study limitations 
and Section 9.5 draws attention to areas for further research.  
9.2 Key findings 
Chapters 2 and 3 outlined that whilst the liberalisation of the telecommunications 
sector and the subsequent establishment of UAS policy have led to more mobile 
subscribers than ever before, over 500 million people remain unconnected across 
Africa (Collins, 2015; GSMA, 2016b; Manson, 2013). This prompted two critical 
research questions:    
                                                 
189 Under and unserved rural and sub-urban locations (Section 1.1). 
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RQ1 - with the introduction of market liberalisation and the establishment of UAS 
strategy like USF, why does the digital divide of uneven mobile coverage persists 
areas across Africa? 
RQ2 - how can the digital divide of uneven mobile coverage be mitigated? 
The study adopts a multiple case-study approach to answer these questions with 
examples drawn from across Africa and other parts of the world, including Latin 
America where the deployment of USF was pioneered (Hudson, 2010; Stern & 
Townsend, 2006). This was supplemented by 28 interviews with various stakeholders 
who have hands-on experience and play key roles in the telecommunications sector 
across Africa as well as other jurisdictions. Sections 9.2.1 and 9.2.2 highlight the key 
findings of RQ1 and RQ2 respectively. 
9.2.1 Key findings for RQ1 
RQ1 explored the reasons why low mobile coverage persists in disadvantaged areas 
across Africa despite market liberalisation and the establishment of USF. Drawing on 
the analysis of the theory of market failure outlined in Chapter 3, it is apparent from 
RQ1 that USF was established to promote public interest since market liberalisation 
and competition are driven by economic efficiency190. The investigation under RQ1 
revealed that since not all areas within a country are actually or perceived as 
commercially viable, governments across Africa resorted to the regulatory instrument 
of USF to promote public interest and ensure widespread access to 
telecommunications. However, the poor implementation of USF due to the interaction 
of complex issues outlined in Chapter 5 has resulted in the failure of USF to facilitate 
connectivity for the unconnected. 
Figure 12 in Chapter 5 indicated that a lack of regulatory capacity is one 
fundamental issue at the heart of the complex issues responsible for the poor 
implementation of USF. This is in terms of regulatory authorities having access to 
qualified staff, funding and skills to formulate robust UAS policies, implement and 
effectively monitor the operation of USF. Hence, the ability of USF to close the digital 
divide is limited, causing disadvantaged areas to lag behind. While Figure Error! R
eference source not found. in Chapter 8 highlighted that the problem of regulatory 
capacity can be linked to a lack of political will on the part of the government to 
                                                 
190 That is, profit maximisation, a lack of which would result in market failure. 
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allocate more resources to a regulator via budgeting, Figure 12 also showed that 
factors like corruption and fund diversion contribute to depleting regulatory capacity. 
This is evident in countries where policymakers either divert USF for their personal 
use or reallocate funds to non-coverage related projects as illustrated in the cases of 
Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe in section 8.2.2. This puts disadvantaged areas in 
the state of a double whammy: if they are not neglected due to the poor implementation 
of USF arising from a lack of regulatory capacity fuelled by corruption and fund 
diversion, they are overlooked by MNO who, unsurprisingly, are driven by profit. 
With regards to profitability, Chapter 5 indicated that MNO will typically base 
their decision to invest in network expansion on cost-benefit analysis, making the 
transaction costs of network deployment and maintenance the second fundamental 
issue that helps to explain why low mobile penetration persist areas across Africa. 
More often than not, areas where costs are perceived to outweigh returns will get little 
or no attention from the market as MNO are keener on commercially viable locations. 
Although the deployment of telecommunications is generally considered capital 
intensive, Chapter 5 identified various reasons that tend to exacerbate the costs burden 
in Africa, which then limits the feasibility of providing services economically. These 
include, for example, the costs and difficulty of securing rights of way (Section 5.3.1) 
and spectrum frequency (Section 5.3.2) coupled with a great degree of lack of 
supporting infrastructure like electricity. Apart from the effect of making the costs of 
network deployment prohibitive, such practice also feeds into affordability issues as 
market actors like MNO and handset vendors shift the costs burden to subscribers, 
which then limits mobile adoption and usage (Section 5.3.4).         
9.2.2 Key findings for RQ2 
In an effort to mitigate the issues identified under RQ1, Chapters 6 and 7 explored 
RQ2, which resulted in a series of recommendations by interviewees, including a 
model that could be executed by policymakers to amend and improve how USF are 
managed and operationalised (Section 6.2). Recommendations were also made in 
Chapters 6 and 7 on how the transaction costs of network deployment and maintenance 
could be lowered so that it becomes feasible for MNO to provide services 
economically. The purpose of which is to attract more investment in the sector 
because… the digital economy in Africa will not happen without capital (investment) 
(Johnson, 2018).   
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Overall, Chapter 8 argued that a good starting point to begin addressing the 
complex and interconnected issues that emerged from RQ1 and RQ2 is by focusing 
on the two key fundamental issues of regulatory capacity and transaction costs. The 
decision to focus on these two key issues was informed by the depth of their 
interactions with the overall data and their linkages with the literature review in 
Chapters 2 and 3. More specifically, the analysis in Chapter 8 draws on the public 
interest and economic efficiency perspectives of market failure to develop a model 
that argues that - UAS policy should be formulated in a manner that empowers 
regulatory authorities with adequate resources to promote widespread access to 
telecommunications and, at the same time, facilitates economic efficiency to make it 
feasible for MNO to provide infrastructure and services economically.  
For example, a regulator that is well-resourced191 with adequate regulatory 
capacity stands a better chance of managing and deploying USF successfully to ensure 
the proliferation of mobile coverage to disadvantaged areas. Such a regulator is also 
more likely to have the competence to engage with MNO and equipment/mobile 
devices vendors in addressing the problem of affordability - which is acting as a major 
impediment to mobile adoption and usage in Africa (see Section 5.3.4). For this to 
happen, governments need to see the empowerment of regulators as a necessary 
condition not only for advancing UAS, but also for the overall success of the industry. 
In a dynamic industry like telecommunications with all the complexity that it entails, 
a poorly resourced regulator stands little or no chance of exerting itself on the industry. 
For instance, while Section 7.3.4 highlighted that OTT activities are emerging in 
dealing with UAS and the wider digital divide, evidence from the data also suggests 
that OTT have their own agenda.  
It then raises the question of how regulators across Africa, who are largely 
faced with limited capacity, can cope with OTT like Facebook and Google. It is 
difficult enough that regulators are dealing with powerful MNE like MTN and Airtel, 
but now they also need to deal with OTT including the technological changes and 
services they are introducing to the market. This brings different sets of dynamics in 
terms of agenda, drivers, and magnitude, as such, adds to the complexity the regulator 
has to deal with. One could then argue that a lack of regulatory capacity would not 
                                                 
191 That is, having access to financial resources, qualified staff and skills.  
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only impinge on the ability of a regulator to set the rules of the game, but may also 
erode public interest as market actors may usurp their market positions to gain undue 
advantage.  
From the economic efficiency perspective of market failure, the need to 
address the concerns raised about the transaction costs of network deployment and 
maintenance emerged as a fundamental underpinning issue. The reason being that 
policymakers may say they want to close the digital divide, but how would they 
achieve this without the cooperation and participation of MNO whose investment and 
technical expertise are critical for coverage expansion? Essentially, no matter how 
well policymakers plan for USF, if operators are not on board, very little can be 
achieved. It was argued in Chapters 3 and Chapter 5 that the deployment of 
telecommunications is highly capital intensive. However, the costs burden is far more 
significant in Africa where there is a legacy problem of a lack of supporting 
infrastructure like electricity, significantly in disadvantaged areas. On top of that, a 
one-time allocation of USF, as applicable across Africa (Section 3.4.4), might not be 
enough to sustain the business model of MNO. Hence, interviewees recommended the 
need to consider various alternatives to complement USF. Although Chapters 6 and 7 
outlined these recommendations in details, Chapter 8 highlighted key aspects of these 
recommendations.  
Firstly, there is the provision of incentives through tax breaks, access to 
affordable (low) frequency spectrum and rights of way. It came to the fore that these 
are the main issues exacerbating the costs burden on the industry and, by extension, 
impinges on the ability of MNO to deploy networks beyond big cities and towns. If 
policymakers were to address these issues, it would help in reducing the costs burden 
and encourage further investment in the sector. However, for such initiative to gain 
traction, regulators need to monitor market activities to ensure that operators are 
delivering what they promised for benefiting from such incentives. In order words, 
policymakers should be aware that while the use of incentive as a tool for correcting 
market failure may be promising, it is not in itself sufficient. This further underscores 
the fundamental role that regulatory capacity plays in the grand scheme of things as 
human and financial resources would be needed to execute checks and balances and 
hold MNO to account.  
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Secondly, infrastructure sharing was considered as a potential cost reduction 
strategy that should be promoted by the policymakers and embraced by the industry. 
There was a consensus among interviewees that collaboration via infrastructure 
sharing generally reduces the costs of network deployment. However, there was 
contention as to whether infrastructure sharing is a viable option for deploying 
coverage in disadvantaged areas as sharing does not necessarily alter unfavourable 
market conditions like sparse population density and low income. Interviewees argued 
that the debate becomes promising if other dimensions are considered. For example, 
the elimination of MTR between operators for serving disadvantaged areas. This will 
allow smaller players, including LCE to interconnect to the networks of the bigger 
players at little or no cost and connect disadvantaged areas to the wider information 
society. It will also encourage wider participation in infrastructure sharing since late 
arrivals will be reassured that if they can offer competitive tariff, they can win over 
some customers from the first-mover. Particularly in light of the fact that MNO with 
a low subscriber base might not see the need to participate in any sharing arrangement 
due to the high margins of MTR. 
Thirdly, the deployment of heterogeneous technologies was seen as one of the 
innovative ways of lowering the costs of network deployment following the argument 
that a ‘blanket’ decision to deploy mobile technologies like 3G, 4G, etc. in all areas 
may not be a cost-effective solution to coverage. Policymakers and operators were 
advised to consider a mix of technologies to improve coverage expansion, for 
example, satellite technology, Wi-Fi, TVWS and solar-powered BTS. Deploying a 
mix of these technologies on a case-by-case basis with recourse to the needs and 
conditions of various locations can lead to more cost-effective and innovative 
solutions for closing the digital divide. 
Part of such innovation is the role of OTT in advancing UAS. As with 
infrastructure sharing, this was another divisive issue among interviewees. While 
some agreed that OTT activities contribute to the advancement of UAS, others had 
their reservations. Advocates pointed to infrastructure projects like Google’s Project 
Link in Kampala, Uganda as well as other initiatives like zero-rated WhatsApp and 
Facebook to support their argument for OTT. Critics, on the other hand, argued that 
such infrastructure projects are geographically limited to a few countries and 
concentration in the cities, not in disadvantaged areas where UAS is most needed.  
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Overall, the thesis argues that the two fundamental issues of regulatory 
capacity and transaction costs should not be treated by policymakers as discrete but 
complementary issues. This is in line with the conceptualisation of market failure in 
this study, which asserts that: government intervention is not only for the benefit of 
the public (equity), but also to stimulate competition (economic efficiency). Although 
the purpose for UAS is to guarantee widespread access, for policymakers to achieve 
this, they need the cooperation of market actors like operators and vendors whose 
activities are vital for the realisation of any public interest objective. As such, 
policymakers need to be pragmatic in formulating policies that would not only account 
for public interest, but also ensure economic efficiency in terms of reducing the costs 
burden on the industry to encourage more investment in coverage expansion. This is 
arguably a difficult task for the regulator to manage not least because of the divergence 
between social benefits and private costs of telecommunications (Section 3.2). 
However, Chapter 8 argued that this difficulty could be mitigated with strong 
leadership and political will from policymakers and their willingness to conduct wider 
stakeholder engagement. 
9.2.3 Summary 
Considering the highlights in Sections 9.2.1 and 9.2.2, it could be argued that 
regulatory capacity and transaction costs are two key fundamental issues when it 
comes to addressing the digital divide in Africa. Since the gaps in digital divide could 
be widened or narrowed by the interaction of these two key issues as indicative of 
Chapter 8, one could argue that they play a mediator role. Mediator factors help to 
explain the relationship between a dependent variable (DV), that is, the object of study, 
and an independent variable (IV), which are factors influencing the object of study 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986; Saeidi et al., 2015; Umar, Derashid, Ibrahim, & Bidin, 2018). 
For example, consider a situation where salary (IV) has a positive influence on 
education (mediator variable) and education, in turn, has a positive impact on health-
screening expenses (DV). If the effect of education is removed, the relationship 
between salary and health-screening expenses becomes invisible (Fung, 2013). 
Mediator factors thus help to explain the process whereby one event leads to another 
(MacKinnon, Coxe, & Baraldi, 2012). 
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In the same vein, regulatory capacity and transaction costs are two key 
mediators in this study in the sense that they, by and large, help to explain the 
relationship between digital divide (which is the dependent variable in this case) and 
the supply-side barriers (which together with the demand-side barriers are independent 
variables) as indicated in Figure 22.
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Figure 22: Key mediating factors for closing digital divide 
Closing Digital Divide = Addressing Supply-side barriers + Addressing Demand-side barriers
This includes a series of complex related factors 
broadly explained by lack of strong ICT leadership 
and commitment, lack of economic feasibility and 
UAS complexity
These include factors such as lack of digital 
awareness and education, affordability of mobile 
devices and tariffs, lack of local and relevant content, 
gender restriction, privacy and surveillance concerns
These issues were identified and addressed in this 
study
These barriers were identified by, for example,  
Chair & De Lannoy, 2018; Gillwald, 2017; Gillwald, 
Mothobi, & Rademan, 2018, which drew on data 
from 2017 RIA After Access survey
This study proposed that these barriers can 
mitigated by focusing on two key mediating  factors:
Since the demand-side is equally important and 
complementary to the supply-side, the demand-side 
issues could be further explored in a separate 
complementary study.  
 Regulatory capacity
People, Funding and Skills
Incentives, Infrastructure sharing 
and Heterogeneous technologies
Close Digital Divide
 Transaction costs
Empower regulators with the capacity 
to implement and promote UAS
Facilitate the economic feasibility for MNO 
to provide infrastructure and services
Can be lowered throughCan be improved through
Areas for further research
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Figure 22 indicates that when issues relating to regulatory capacity and 
transaction costs are not tackled, barriers (particularly from the supply-side) could 
increase and digital divide would persist. On the other hand, if efforts are made to 
tackle these issues, barriers would decrease and the gaps in digital divide would 
narrow. Figure 22, therefore, highlights an indirect relationship between regulatory 
capacity, transaction costs and digital divide. For example, when regulatory capacity 
like skills and funding are increased, this would enable regulators to better monitor 
and enforce USF commitment with the implication that barriers to improving UAS 
would reduce and gaps in digital divide would close (Section 5.2.2). Conversely, when 
regulatory skills and resources do not keep up with changes, this leads to poor USF 
monitoring and enforcement, which would then increase the barriers to UAS and, by 
extension, widen the gaps in digital divide (Section 8.2). In terms of transaction costs, 
when, for example, incentives like taxes and affordable access to (low) frequency 
spectrum are offered to MNO, this would facilitate economic efficiency and make 
network deployment more economically feasible (Sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.1.2). This, in 
turn, would encourage MNO to increase network expansion and close the digital 
divide (section 8.4). 
It then follows that an increase in regulatory capacity and a decrease in 
transaction costs would result in narrowing the gaps in digital divide and vice-versa. 
Figure 22 thus suggests that addressing these two mediating factors would go a long 
way in mitigating the persistent low levels of mobile coverage in disadvantaged areas 
and push the whole agenda of building a more digital inclusive society. Furthermore, 
Figure 22 further echoes the caveat in Section 1.1 that although closing the digital 
divide is a function of both demand-and supply-sides, this study has largely focused 
on the supply-side. However, studies (for example, Chair & De Lannoy, 2018; 
Gillwald, 2017; Gillwald, Mothobi, & Rademan, 2018) have drawn on the 2017 RIA 
After Access survey data to highlight that demand-side barriers like unaffordability of 
smartphones and/or mobile (data) tariff (also highlighted in this study), gender 
restriction, privacy and surveillance concerns can also cause digital divide to persist. 
As such, Figure 22 indicates that there is a need for a separate complementary study 
to address, in-depth, the demand-side issues without which the infrastructure supplied 
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would be redundant, ultimately stymie further investment in coverage expansion and 
allow digital divide to persist.       
9.3 Contribution to knowledge 
When we compare the body of literature that has explored the development and 
liberalisation of telecommunications industry in the advanced economies (for 
example,  Boylaud & Nicoletti, 2000; Cabanda, 2001; Clegg & Kamall, 1998; Clifton, 
Comin, & Diaz-Fuentes, 2011; Crandall, 2000; Curwen & Whalley, 2006; Gerpott & 
Jakopin, 2005; Henten, 2007; Jakopin & Klein, 2012; Sarkar, Cavusgil, & Aulakh, 
1999; Ure & Vivorakij, 1997; Whalley, 1999) and Africa (Aker & Mbiti, 2010; 
Chavula, 2013; Curwen & Whalley, 2014; Dike & Rose, 2018; Gebreab, 2002), it is 
obvious that the liberalisation that has occurred within Africa is under-investigated. 
This study, therefore, contributes to populating a gap in the literature with respect to 
the liberalisation of mobile telecommunications in Africa.  
Firstly, this study revealed that following the liberalisation of the sector, FDI 
flows emerged as a key driver that has helped to shape the development of the industry 
with over $200 billion worth of FDI attracted by MNO between 1999 and 2015 
(GSMA, 2016a; van-Huyssteen, 2012). At the end of 2016, this study finds that over 
186 MNO were doing business across the 55 countries in Africa, 70% of which were 
either jointly or wholly owned by MNE. As a result of the activities of these MNE, the 
continent now has varying levels of mobile penetration with countries in Northern and 
Southern Africa recording rates above 100% while the interior countries, particularly 
those located in Eastern Africa, are struggling to achieve the same levels as illustrated 
in Figure 4 (Section 2.2). Drawing on several studies on digital divide (for example, 
Gillwald, 2010; ITU, 2017a; ITU & UNCTAD, 2007; James, 2009; Pick & Sarkar, 
2015; van Dijk, 2005), Section 2.5 found that, for example, socio-economic issues like 
civil war and political instability are some of the pull factors that have limited 
widespread mobile coverage in Eastern African countries such as Rwanda and 
Somalia.  
Furthermore, geographical conditions such as the proportion of urban-rural 
population, can help to explain the digital divide in a country like Burundi, which has 
over 90% rural population compared to a continental average of 50% (World Bank, 
2016). Considering that MNO typically concentrate on commercially viable areas, the 
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majority of rural areas are often left behind (GSMA, 2013b; World Bank, 2017). The 
disproportionate level of digital divide in Eastern Africa can also be linked to the 
nature of telecommunications policy and regulation acting as a hindrance to sector 
reform and competition because while over 50 countries have introduced competition 
across Africa, four countries still operate a monopoly, three of which are in Eastern 
Africa as shown in Table 2 in Section 2.5. This includes Ethiopia with over 100 million 
people - the second largest population in Africa behind Nigeria – over half of which 
are unconnected as evident in its 42% mobile penetration rate as shown in Table 2.    
Although Section 2.2 argued that the headline figures for mobile penetration 
in Africa are somewhat misleading and overstated due to multiple SIM usage, Figure 
4 suggests that digital divide also persists in other regions, albeit disproportionate to 
Eastern Africa. This is also evident in the comments of interviewees as they reflected 
on their experience across Africa. In light of the inaccuracy that comes with multiple 
SIM usage, this study proposed a rather more nuanced term – ‘SIM card connection’. 
This appears to be more useful when it comes to emerging markets like those in Africa 
where the wide duplication of SIM cards tend to underestimate the issue of digital 
divide as the headline figures of mobile penetration appear to be overstated. This 
would help in differentiating subscribers from subscriptions as one subscriber may 
have more than one subscription or one subscription being used by several people. 
This may be a starting point for policymakers, academics, researchers and 
practitioners to begin to address the misleading figures currently being reported and 
contribute to the gathering of reliable data for planning and executing UAS. 
Regardless of the distortion caused by multiple SIM usage, Chapter 2 indicated 
that market liberalisation has brought an unprecedented level of transformation to the 
telecommunications sector compared to the state monopolies regime. This has led to 
a dynamic market dominated by telecommunications MNE who have increased their 
footprint across the continent by adopting GI and JV in the earlier stage of market 
liberalisation, but as the market evolved, M&A appears to be the most preferred FDI 
strategy (see Table 1 in Section 2.3). Section 2.3 argued that this is due to the 
opportunities presented by M&A, which includes entering and integrating into a new 
market quicker, costs reduction in terms of network deployment and market entry, 
access to affordable spectrum/GSM licence and existing subscribers. From all 
indications, M&A would most likely continue to dominate the scene as the industry 
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continues to evolve and tilt towards consolidation as illustrated with the cases of Airtel 
and Tigo in Ghana, Airtel and Telkom in Kenya driven by an effort to reduce 
transaction costs and stem losses (TeleGeography, 2017a; Wafula & Miyungu, 2018). 
Although Airtel’s mobile footprint is down to 14 countries from 17 at the end of 2016, 
the Indian MNO is currently planning to sell 25% of its total African operation for 
over $1 billion (TeleGeography, 2018a). Backer McKenzie (2017) thus projected that 
M&A activities will ‘quadruple’ in 2018 to $5.9 billion across Africa and the Middle 
East compared to the $1.2 billion recorded for 2017.    
The projection that consolidation will continue to be an emerging trend within 
the industry in Africa is further strengthened by the fact that having more MNO in the 
market does not necessarily result in more coverage as indicated in Chapter 2. For 
example, most countries in Northern Africa, including Algeria, Egypt and Morocco 
with three MNO have recorded over a 100% mobile penetration rate. A similar trend 
can be observed in Eastern African countries where higher mobile penetration markets 
like Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique and Rwanda also have fewer MNO. This is in stark 
contrast to countries likes of Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda with four, seven, and 
eight MNO respectively and a lower mobile penetration rate (see Table 2 in Section 
2.5). Although the country analysis in this study found that, on the average, there are 
3.4 MNO per country in Africa, the evidence from Eastern Africa suggested that more 
MNO have not necessarily translated into better mobile penetration. This is 
inconsistent with the argument of policymakers in countries like Tanzania and Uganda 
who are of the view that the presence of more MNO in the market allows for better 
competition and mobile diffusion (Biryabarema, 2014; TeleGeography, 2014). This 
study challenges such practice and argues that policymakers need to reconsider their 
licence issuing policy by conducting proper consultation and market analysis to find 
other ways of promoting competition as market growth does not necessarily resonate 
with having more MNO.  
Moving away from market liberalisation, the second part of the research 
contribution is illustrated in market failure and UAS policy. In light of the fact that 
digital divide persists across Africa despite market liberalisation, governments in over 
30 countries resorted to the use of USF as their preferred UAS strategy to close the 
gaps of uneven mobile coverage. Since government intervention in the market is 
justified by the need to correct market failure (Ortiz, 2016; Stiglitz, 2010), Chapter 3 
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began with the analysis of market failure and found that some studies (for example, 
Christensen, 2010; Picot & Wernick, 2007; Pigou, 1932) argued for government 
intervention through the lens of public interest - the need to address market failure 
from the standpoint of promoting equity in terms of widespread mobile coverage for 
the society. On the other hand, some scholars (for example, Arndt, 1998; Wallis & 
Dollery, 1999) examined market failure from the perspective of promoting economic 
interest. Yet, others (for example, McChesney, 1997; Stigler, 1971; Wolf, 1987) 
support the need to address market failure from a pragmatic viewpoint of promoting 
both public interest and economic interest. 
Drawing on the public interest and economic efficiency perspectives of market 
failure and the depth of the interaction between issues in the overall data, Chapter 8 
identifies two key underpinning issues – regulatory capacity and transaction costs – to 
develop a model for closing the digital divide in Africa. The model reflected that to 
address market failure in a dynamic sector like telecommunications, a pragmatic 
approach that encompasses both public and economic interests is more suitable. The 
reason being that since telecommunications is a mixed good as established in Section 
3.2, it shares both the attribute of a public good and a merit good – a good that is of 
immense benefit to the wider society but may underprovided by the market due to, for 
example, incomplete and missing markets. Furthermore, policymakers may say they 
want to close the digital divide to promote public interest, but how would they achieve 
this without the cooperation and participation of market actors like MNO whose 
investment (including USF contribution) and technical expertise are critical for 
coverage expansion? Therefore, no matter how well policymakers plan to achieve 
UAS either through USF and/or other strategies, if operators are not on board, very 
little can be achieved. This highlights the need for a UAS policy that promotes equity 
and reflects some level of economic efficiency to make it feasible for operators to 
build networks and provide services economically.  
 When formulating and reviewing UAS policy, policymakers and other 
stakeholders like UAS consultants that contribute to policy development should, 
therefore, execute this task with the understanding that public interest and economic 
efficiency are more complementary than discrete when it comes to promoting 
widespread access to telecommunications. In the sense that policymakers cannot 
achieve UAS alone and operators may find it difficult to attain desirable outcomes on 
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their own, especially in areas that not commercially viable (Economides, 2004; 
Wenders, 1998). This indicates the need for a balance and cooperation between 
policymakers and market actors in building a more inclusive digital society. 
Considering that this could be a difficult balancing act as policymakers try to account 
for both social cohesion and economic interest within UAS policy (Bergman et al., 
1998), Chapter 8 indicated that this could be mitigated with strong leadership and 
political will from policymakers and their willingness to conduct wider stakeholder 
engagement. Overall, Appendix G highlights how this empirical model complements 
the conceptual framework of the current study to address a critical research gap on 
closing the digital divide in Africa. 
 When a comparison is made between the literature available in the area of UAS 
policy between the advanced markets192 and an emerging market like Africa193, it is 
apparent that there is a lack of academic empirical research on UAS in African 
countries. Although one may argue that this reflects the history of the sector and the 
interests of academics, it also somewhat ironic considering that Africa is among the 
continents of the world where the market has failed to address widespread access to 
telecommunications (ITU, 2015; 2016). This study addresses a gap in the literature 
and more specifically, among the first to produce an academic piece on UAS in Africa 
compared to the existing studies, which are more or less consultancy based sponsored 
by the ITU and World Bank. The thesis thus provides a different perspective on the 
policy debate of UAS in Africa. Firstly, although there is a general poor level of 
performance by USF in Africa (GSMA, 2014; ITU, 2011; 2013; Sepulveda, 2010), the 
thesis indicates that there are also encouraging signs in some countries from which 
lessons could be drawn as illustrated by Appendix B, which highlights some examples 
of active USF in Africa. 
Secondly, following a critical review of the literature on UAS and drawing on 
the responses of interviewees, this thesis argues for the extension of the traditional 
conceptualisation of UAS to include assessment and awareness (Sections 3.3.1, 
5.3.5.2 and 6.2.1). This is borne out of the fact that when the three traditional principles 
                                                 
192 For example, Batura, 2014; Blackman, 1995; Clarke & Wallsten, 2002; Dordick, 1990; Feijoo & 
Karniti, 2007; Feijoo & Milne, 2008; Hasbi, 2015; Hatta 2008; Longstaff, 1996; Wirzenius, 2008; 
Xavier, 2008. 
193 For example, GSMA, 2014; ITU, 2011; 2013; Sepulveda, 2010. 
 297 
 
(availability, accessibility and affordability) of UAS was first conceived in 1907 
(Mueller, 1993), mobile telephony did not exist. Moreover, technologies and services 
are now constantly and rapidly evolving so much so that the telecommunications needs 
and the skills to use mobile devices are a moving target. Thus, for UAS policy to be 
effective and relevant, the existing UAS principles need to be extended to include 
assessment and awareness – while the former is critical to gauge and reflect the 
information needs of the society, the latter will enable people to be more 
knowledgeable about the wider benefit of being connected and to promote digital 
literacy to facilitate the use technology as it evolves. 
Thirdly, since the process of formulating, planning and implementing UAS 
policy can be a very complex and difficult task, this thesis proposed a series of steps 
for policymakers to follow in order to achieve the implementation of an effective and 
efficient USF model. At the heart of this model is the need for policymakers to 
formulate clear, realisable and measurable UAS objectives in order to mitigate the 
complexity and ambiguity currently associated with USF across Africa (Arakpogun, 
Wanjiru &, Whalley, 2017; 2018). Having established clear UAS objectives, 
policymakers can then set out to collect relevant data, which is critical for planning, 
resource allocation and implementation (Arakpogun, Wanjiru &, Whalley, 2018). This 
would also help policymakers to actually measure who lacks what and where the most 
needs are instead of allocating resources ‘blindly’ as indicated in Section 6.2.2. These 
steps are extensively outlined in Section 6.2.  
Fourthly, the thesis extends beyond the mere fact that idle fund impinges on 
USF performance in Africa to unravelling the reasons behind this phenomenon. This 
includes a lack of regulatory capacity in terms of human and financial resources to 
deploy funds, a time lag between fund collection and disbursement for projects and 
arbitrary USF levies, which leads to over-collection of funds (see Section 5.2.5). 
Previous studies also argued that there is low ICT/mobile usage in disadvantaged areas 
and that this act as a disincentive for MNO to invest in such locations. This thesis 
extends the debate and reveals that a series of issues feeds into this argument. For 
example, low digital literacy, lack of awareness, lack of needs assessments, lack of 
relevant local content and SIM registration requirements (Section 5.3.5). Therefore, if 
policymakers and MNO want to address low ICT usage, attention and resources 
should be channelled into these areas. 
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The final contributions made by this study are evident in the areas of 
infrastructure sharing and the role of OTT in extending UAS. Various studies (for 
example, Cramton & Doyle, 2017; Deloitte & APC, 2015; Opeke, 2017; Ovando, 
Perez, & Moral, 2015) support infrastructure sharing on the basis that it helps to lower 
the costs of network deployment, reduce environmental degradation and promote 
coverage expansion. Opeke (2017, p. 7) notably argued that “…with continued erosion 
of profit margins, as well as ARPU shrinking year on year, and encroaching freemium 
services, network sharing appears increasingly inevitable if African operators are 
going to survive.” Although the findings in this study are consistent with the 
arguments that infrastructure sharing could generally help to lower the transaction 
costs of network deployment and reduce environmental degradation, it differs when it 
comes to acting as a catalyst to coverage expansion in disadvantaged areas. In the 
sense that sharing does not necessarily address unfavourable market conditions such 
as sparse population density, low digital literacy and low income in disadvantaged 
areas. Furthermore, the thesis finds that infrastructure sharing, especially active 
sharing and single wholesale network, has failed to gain wider implementation and 
impact in Africa. This is due to the neglect of critical issues such as a lack of trust, 
first-mover advantage, On-and-Off Net tariffs, and QoS in terms of costs of network 
maintenance/upgrade (Section 7.2.1). This thesis argues that a robust policy 
framework needs to address and reflect these underlying dynamics to help to 
revolutionise infrastructure sharing and move it beyond the fringes of passive to active 
sharing of core networks. 
Following the announcement in 2015 by OTT such as Facebook, Google and 
Microsoft to contribute to UAS in emerging markets like Africa (Gillwald et al., 2016; 
Riaz, 2015), this thesis highlights the role of OTT in coverage expansion. Although 
OTT argue that they are using zero-rating and other initiatives to bring connectivity to 
the unconnected, this claim has sparked a divisive debate between the proponents and 
opponents of zero-rating (Gillwald et al., 2016; Lyons, 2016). Interviewees were also 
split on this issue with both sides of the debate putting forward their arguments in 
Sections 7.2.4 and 8.3.3. Since this topic is still unfolding, there is a limited number 
of empirical academic evidence in general and more specifically with respect to 
Africa. This thesis, therefore, makes a valuable contribution to a hotly debated issue 
by adding to the small base of literature on OTT and UAS. This helps to contribute to 
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the growing body of literature and raises vital issues to be considered by practitioners 
as they grapple with this emerging and converging trend of digital disruption. 
9.4 Limitations 
According to Matthews and Kostelis (2011), there is no research without limitations, 
a researcher needs to acknowledge this and state how the associated shortcomings 
were addressed. Therefore, regardless of the insights provided by this thesis, the 
researcher acknowledges that there are certain limitations within this study. Firstly, 
there is the limitation associated with the method and methodology, which has been 
highlighted and addressed in Chapter 4. For example, while Section 4.4 addresses the 
limitations of the qualitative research approach adopted in this study, Section 4.5.3 
tackles the shortcomings of the various data gathering techniques employed.  
Furthermore, the researcher acknowledges that a limited number of country 
examples were used for triangulation due to a variety of reasons. One of which is the 
general lack of consistent and public available data on the telecommunications 
industry in Africa. Although the data for this thesis was tracked and generated over a 
three year period from multiple sources, the information for some countries was either 
difficult to get or not available at all. Several attempts were made at contacting relevant 
regulatory and MNO figures, albeit with a limited level of success. This is particularly 
notable among the regulators whose websites were not accessible, hence difficult to 
get their contacts. This also meant that a few of them were available and willing to 
participate in the study compared to other stakeholder groups. For example, out of the 
over 60 correspondence from which 28 interviewees became participants, active 
regulators were only seven. Even at that, it took well over six months, on the average, 
to conclude the interview process with key regulatory figures across seven countries 
compared to one month with MNO, UAS consultants and other stakeholders. 
Therefore, one may argue that the difficulty of the researcher to secure a more 
balanced category of interviewees as highlighted in Appendix D may have skewed the 
data towards academics, independent researchers, industry experts and UAS 
consultants who accounted for up to 50% of the interviews.   
There was also a language barrier as some regulatory documents and websites 
were not available in English, for example, Mozambique has theirs in Portuguese. 
Countries in Northern Africa have theirs in Arabic and French with a limited access if 
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you choose the English version embedded within the websites. The researcher tried to 
overcome this by using Google Chrome to translate web pages and documents as well 
as tracking country and regional activities via online sources like ITWeb Africa and 
TeleGeography. 
In addition, although interviewees included key decision makers across various 
stakeholder groups, the researcher acknowledges that the sample size of 28 
participants could be considered a limited number given the enormity of the various 
issues that emerged from the process. Having more participants across a more 
balanced spread of stakeholder representation could have helped to improve on the 
quality of triangulation and further mitigate the risk of bias as previously highlighted 
in Section 4.5.1.        
 Consequently, the results of the analysis, to some extent, may have been 
obscured by these limitations making the study non-exhaustive in terms of 
geographical limitations and covering more stakeholder groups. However, since most 
of the interviewees had cross-border experience from dealing with multiple countries 
across Africa as indicated in Section 4.5.1, the researcher tried to corroborate the 
information gathered from various sources during the interview process. For example, 
most of the MNO figures have a footprint across Africa and most UAS consultants 
recounted their experiences with various regulatory authorities when prodded. Such 
information was also triangulated with past studies conducted by GSMA, ITU and 
World Bank. 
 Finally, it is also interesting to note that when it came to topical issues like the 
role of OTT and zero-rating, not all interviewees was knowledgeable enough to 
comment on this as related events were still unfolding. While this is understandable, 
it was particularly surprising when some key regulatory figures said they did not know 
what this meant even though there was evidence to suggest that various zero-rated 
services were being offered in such countries. Hence, the responses received from this 
question were somewhat limited.   
9.5 Future research 
The thesis identifies some areas where the contribution and value of this research could 
be extended. The first is in the area of OTT activities. One of the issues raised by 
interviewees is the need to regulate OTT because they are deriving value from 
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infrastructure they neither invest in nor pay taxes for. In view of the issued raised in 
Section 8.4 where some key regulatory figures have limited or no knowledge of such 
an emerging topic, it raises the question of how they would regulate what they do not 
understand.  
Secondly, OTT argue that they are contributing to promoting UAS through 
zero-rating and other initiatives, a position which is contested by many. Furthermore, 
contrary to the views of critics, OTT argue that the practice of zero-rating does not 
harm competition and users. Doubt has been cast on such an argument in light of the 
series of controversies associated with OTT as illustrated by, not least, the recent row 
of Facebook and Cambridge Analytical data misuse (Kuchler, 2018). Interestingly, 
this incident coincides with the release of a new data protection law by the European 
Commission called the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)194 to protect the 
data of EU citizens collected by small and large companies, including OTT (Espiner, 
2018; European Commission, 2018). Some of the key highlights with GDPR include 
high privacy default by internet platforms, users must now give consent, which can be 
withdrawn at any time, users can ask companies to wipe their data, users now have the 
right to access their data, know who and how their data is shared and companies have 
72 hours to report data breach (European Commission, 2018). The fine for default can 
be up to 20 million euros or 4% of the annual global turnover of defaulters (European 
Commission, 2018). While the impact of GDPR remains to be seen as various national 
data protection agency like the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) grapple 
with its implementation (Espiner, 2018), there is no evidence to suggest that African 
regulators are collectively planning anything like GDPR. 
That being said, given the operation of various OTT initiatives across Africa, 
it would be interesting to see further research in this area. For example, how and what 
would be the implication of regulating OTT considering the open and international 
nature of the internet? Another study could explore the cost-benefit analysis of various 
parties in order to ascertain who is worse-off, end-users or providers? It could also be 
beneficial to examine the role of OTT in the advancement of UAS of 
                                                 
194 GDPR came into effect by May 25, 2018. 
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telecommunications in order to determine if zero-rating and other OTT activities 
contribute to UAS? 
 Another area that lacked clarity in this study is infrastructure sharing. On a 
general note, interviewees agreed that the sharing of telecommunications 
infrastructure by MNO could reduce the overall costs of network deployment. 
However, opinions were split on whether it could facilitate coverage in disadvantaged 
areas. Consequently, a possible area for further research could focus on the ‘where’, 
‘what’, and ‘how’ of infrastructure sharing. This would help to unravel where is the 
right location to share in terms of rural, urban, both or in-between, what part of the 
sharing should be promoted – active and/or passive, and how should the sharing be 
done in terms of process, procedures and regulations. 
 Furthermore, in the light of the continuous evolution of technology, which, in 
turn, impacts the service preference of mobile users (AfDB, 2013; Goggin, 2008), 
what services should be covered by UAS? There was a general consensus among 
interviewees in Section 5.2.4 that the performance of USF is undermined in many 
African countries195 who have narrowly defined the scope for UAS. The reason being 
that since mobile telephony now includes voice and data, targeting USF on voice alone 
may be counterproductive, as people are now increasingly in need of data almost as 
much as voice. Although interviewees agreed that USF should be extended to cover 
emerging services like data, there was a lack of consensus on what form of data should 
be considered. For example, Interviewee20196 was of the opinion that for USF to really 
address digital gaps, the scope has to be extended to the provision of advanced services 
like broadband. In contrast, Interviewee25197 disagreed arguing that it is a bit too early 
for African countries to include broadband within the scope of UAS, as it may not be 
economically viable at this stage of their telecommunications development. 
Although Section 3.5 indicated that a few countries (for example, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Rwanda and Ghana) have expanded the scope of USF to include broadband 
connectivity through public institutions like schools, the majority of countries in 
Africa are yet to do so. Thereby institutionalising another form of digital divide in 
                                                 
195 See Appendix A for a detailed result of the analysis of 34 USF in Africa 
196 A former head of an intergovernmental ICT body, now an independent consultant and researcher 
197 One UAS director 
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terms of uneven distribution of advanced services. Such practice raises series of 
questions. For example, if it is not economically viable at this stage to include 
broadband services in the scope of USF in Africa partly due to issues associated with 
demand side barriers such as affordability and adoption of advance services, at what 
stage of the development of telecommunications should this be considered? How ‘big’ 
should the gap be before such consideration is made? Should the gap remain constant 
or narrow over time? Is the practice of connecting public institutions like schools and 
public libraries to broadband a more cost-effective way to go about this? 
These unanswered questions further echo the argument in Section 1.1 that there 
are two sides to addressing digital divide – the supply side and the demand side. While 
this thesis largely reflects a supply-side view, the economic viability of including, for 
example, the provision of broadband in UAS raises the criticality of demand-side 
barriers like affordability, digital awareness and literacy, lack of local content, gender 
restriction, etc., as identified by 2017 RIA After Access survey (Research ICT Africa. 
2017). For example, it was discovered that the lack of access to affordable mobile 
device limited internet adoption for over 80% of 15-24 year old in Rwanda and 4% in 
Tanzania, the lack of digital literacy resulted to limited internet usage for over 25% of 
15-24 year old Nigeria and 8% in Rwanda, while the lack of local content restricted 
over 30% of 15 - 24 years old from using the internet in Rwanda compared to over 
10% in Tanzania (Chair & De Lannoy, 2018).  
When it comes to gender divide, women across Africa were generally found to 
have limited access to the internet compared to men with varying degrees across 
countries. For example, while South Africa had a gender internet gap of 12%, Ghana 
and Kenya had over 30% while Mozambique and Rwanda had over 50% (Gillwald, 
2018). However, Section 2.4 briefly highlighted that the digital gender divide appears 
to be a consequence of a larger societal problem that can be partly explained within 
the family context where males are more favourable to access, for example, education, 
social interaction and higher income jobs relative to females. 
Therefore, the demand-side perspective has a varied degree of issues, including 
digital gender divide, which could be explored by future complementary research as 
indicated in Figure 22, not least, because such research would be useful in unravelling 
the dynamics within the demand-side barriers. It would also help to promote the 
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adoption of mobile services without which infrastructure would be redundant, and 
ultimately stymie further investment in coverage expansion. 
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Appendix A: Summary of the performances of USF across Africa 
Country Criteria 
 policy 
formulation  
scope 
 
selection of 
providers 
selection of 
targets 
 
stakeholder 
engagement 
accountability 
and 
transparency  
performance 
monitoring and 
enforcement 
remarks 
Algeria - - - - - - - - 
Benin - - - - - - - - 
Burkina Faso H H H H H M L Non-operational 
Cameroon L L H L L L L Operational, mainly 
telecentres 
Chad L L - - - L - Operational 
Cote d’Ivoire H L H - - M - Operational  
DRC L L - - - M L Non-operational, funds 
deposited directly to 
treasury 
Egypt H H H H - - - Operational 
Gabon L L H L L L L Non-operational,  
Ghana H H H H H M H Operational 
Guinea H H - - - L - Operational 
Kenya - - - - - - - Still at the process of 
establishment 
Lesotho H H H H H M H Operational 
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Country Criteria 
Madagascar H L H H - M - Operational 
Mali - - - - - - - Non-operational 
Mauritania - - - - - M - Non-operational 
Mauritius H H H L H L - Operational, some 
operators have refused to 
continue their contributions 
due to the nature of its 
operations 
Morocco H - H H - L - Operational 
Mozambique L L H - - L - Operational 
Niger - - - - - - - Non-operational 
Nigeria H H H H H M H Operational 
Rwanda H H H H H M H Operational 
Senegal - - - - - - - Non-operational 
Seychelles - - - - - - - - 
Sierra Leone - - - - - - - Non-operational 
South Africa H H H H M L - Operational, but 
temporarily suspended in 
2011 when Board members 
were suspended due to an 
allegation of corruption, 
funds are deposited in the 
National Treasury even 
when an independent body 
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Country Criteria 
is responsible for managing 
the funds 
Sudan H H - - - L L Operational 
Swaziland H H - - - L - Disbursed $6M to MTN in 
2009 and became non-
operational 
Tanzania H H H H H M H Operational 
Togo H L H H L L - Operational 
Tunisia - - - - - - - Non-operational 
Uganda H H H H H H H Operational 
Zambia H L L - - L - Non-operational 
Zimbabwe L L H L L L L Non-operational 
Source: Arakpogun, Wanjiru, and Whalley (2017, p. 627). 
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Appendix B: Examples of active and performing USF in Africa  
Country Highlights of USF 
Ghana 
 USF in Ghana (GIFEC) was created in 2004 under the 2001 Ghana ICT Policy 
for Accelerated Development 
 to facilitate the provision of services such as basic telephony, internet and 
multimedia services, other ICT services including broadcasting to unserved and 
underserved locations 
 funded by 1% levy on MNO annual gross revenue 
 contract awarded on a competitive basis – least subsidy tender 
 the collection began in 2005 but started disbursement in 2007 
 cumulative balance of about $20.9M from 2005-2009 year-end 
 last (public) available balance was estimated at $10.5M in 2011 
 examples of projects executed include over 30 sites of rural telephony 
constructed and activated, over 60 common telecom towers deployed in rural 
areas, school connectivity for over 200 educational institutions with ICT 
laboratories and internet connection, etc. 
Lesotho 
 USF in Lesotho (USF) was first created in 2009 under The Communications 
Authority Act 2000 and Universal Access Rules of 2009, but later reviewed with 
the introduction of The Communications Act 2012, following changes in 
telecoms technology and services 
 to ensure universal access to communication services such as voice telephony, 
internet access and broadcasting for social and economic benefits of all Basotho 
 funded by 1.5% levy on MNO annual gross revenue and government 
subventions 
 contract awarded on a competitive basis – least subsidy tender 
 cumulative income of about 75M Maloti was collected from 2010-2014 and an 
estimation of about 12M Maloti, year-on-year, is projected for 2015 and 2016 
 some examples of planned projects include 10 mobile telephone masts and 
broadband rollout from 2015/2016 including school connectivity, all across 
unserved and underserved locations in Lesotho 
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Country Highlights of USF 
Nigeria 
 USF in Nigeria (USPF)198 was established in 2007 under The Nigerian 
Communications Act No. 19 of 2003, Part IV 
 to promote the widespread availability and usage of network and application 
services such as individual and public mobile telephony, broadband, telecentres, 
health centres, etc. in unserved and underserved areas 
 funded by 1% levy, which is part of the licence condition of MNO 
  contract awarded on a competitive basis – least subsidy tender 
 Collection began in 2004, well before the establishment of the fund and 
disbursement commenced in 2008 
 cumulative balance around $146M from 2004-2009 year-end 
 last (public) available balance was 1.6B naira for 2012 year-end 
 examples of projects executed include the construction of over 120 BTS across 
various regions to facilitate mobile telephony access in rural and semi-urban 
areas, over 1300 schools have been connected under the School Access Project, 
74 libraries have been connected across the country under the E-Library Project, 
etc. 
                                                 
198 Universal Service Provision Fund 
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Country Highlights of USF 
Rwanda 
 Rwanda operates a cross-sector universal access under RURA199 - Water, 
Transport, Energy and ICT 
 Specifically, USF in Rwanda (UAF)200 was created by Presidential Order 05/01 
of 15/03/2004 under the Government Law No. 44/2001 
 to facilitate the provision of telecoms services in remote and underserved areas 
 such telecoms services include fixed and mobile public payphone, broadband, 
telecentres, school connectivity, etc. 
 funding based on 2% of operators’ gross revenue, less interconnection charges 
 contract awarded on a competitive basis – least subsidy tender 
 Collection and disbursement began in the same year – 2004 
 cumulative balance around $18.7M from 2004-2009 year-end 
 from 2011-2015-year-end, UAF received over 11B and disbursed over 5.2B 
Rwandan Franc 
 Examples of projects executed include partial funding for the sustenance of one 
laptop per child (OLPC) initiative launched by international donors in 2007 (see 
D’Amico, 2011 for more details),  deployment of over 30 telecentres across the 
country with fibre connections, rural telephony projects across different 
provinces and districts in the country  
                                                 
199 Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority 
200 Universal Access Fund 
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Country Highlights of USF 
Tanzania 
 USF Tanzania (UCSAF)201 was created in 2009 under the Universal 
Communications Service Access Act, Cap 422 of 2006 
 to facilitate access to communication services in economically unviable areas 
including rural, urban and underserved locations 
 such communication services include fixed and mobile public telephony, 
broadband, school connectivity, etc. 
 funded by 0.3 % levy of gross annual revenue from MNO, ISPs and courier 
service providers 
 a cumulative balance of $3M for year-end 2010 is the only financial record we 
could get on income 
 however, from March 2013-May 2015, a total of about $36.8M has been 
disbursed from USF for projects across 1939 villages 
 a report of ‘current project’ – December 2015 -  from the official website 
contains a total budget of $36.8M for the execution of planned projects across 
various locations in the country, but no evidence seems to exist for funds 
collected or allocated  
Uganda 
 USF in Uganda (RCDF) was established in 2003 under the Communications 
Instrument of 2002 
 to provide access to communication services in the rural and underserved area, 
e.g., fixed and mobile public payphones, fixed private residential connection, 
broadband, telecentres, etc.  
 funded by 1% levy of gross annual revenue from MNO, less interconnection 
charges. ISPs and couriers service providers also contribute the 1% as well 
 From 2001/2002 when the fund was operationalised until 2014/2015 year-end, 
a cumulative income of 128B Ugandan Shilling have been collected and 126.9B 
Ugandan Shilling have been disbursed on various projects 
 Over 7000 projects have been executed by USF in Uganda from 2001/2002-
2014/2015 including the deployment of over 24000 public payphones, 880 GSM 
sites, 622 broadband sites, and other 18000 projects including telecentres and 
school connections across the country 
 32B Ugandan Shilling has been budgeted for project execution in 2015/2016 
with an estimated income of 22B Ugandan Shilling including 2B Ugandan 
Shilling donation from Ministry of ICT 
Data sources: Compiled by the author from a variety of sources such as regulatory and industry 
reports, GSMA and ITU databases, etc. 
                                                 
201 Universal Communications Service Access Fund 
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Appendix C: Case study protocol 
Conceptual framework and Overall research questions 
The conceptual framework for the current study is predicated on the interaction 
between market liberalisation, market failure and UAS policy in Africa in order to 
explore and address the following research questions: 
RQ1 - with the introduction of market liberalisation and the establishment of UAS 
strategy like USF, why does the digital divide of uneven mobile coverage persists 
areas across Africa? 
RQ2 - how can the digital divide of uneven mobile coverage be mitigated?  
The primary unit of analysis adopted for this study is ‘country’, delineated by time – 
from 1999/2000 (the starting point of liberalisation in the sector) until 2016. Although 
a multiple case study was adopted in this study with country examples drawn from 
across Africa, a more in-depth analysis was conducted for Eastern Africa as countries 
in this region have the lowest mobile penetration rate, despite having, on the average, 
more MNO. Comparisons were also drawn from other regions in Africa (as well as 
other parts of the world) to illustrate and triangulate the comments of interviewees.  
Interview guide and a sample of semi-structured interview questions with probes 
Opening - “Thank you for your willingness to participate and contribute to this study. 
I assure you that all the information disclosed will be strictly confidential in line with 
the ethical consent form you completed. May I switch on the tape recorder, please…?”  
The re-introduction of both the participant and the researcher then follows before the 
actual interview begins. 
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Time of Interview:  
Date:   
Medium: via  
Interviewer: Researcher 
Interviewee: 
ID Code: 
Category of Interviewee: Civil Society/Industry Expert 
Q1. What are your views on the level of mobile penetration across Africa?  
 What would you consider as high level of penetration?  
 Do you agree with the assertion that there is low mobile penetration in 
suburban and rural areas across Africa and if so, 
 What do you think is responsible for this? 
Q2.  What are your views on the operation of universal service funds (USF) across 
Africa? 
 What do you think is responsible for the poor management of these funds in 
Africa? 
 Could you please identify some of the challenges facing the implementation 
and management of USF in some of the countries you have worked for? 
 What is responsible for the idle fund in some countries? 
 What would you suggest is needed for an effective and efficient USF?  
Q3. Studies have suggested that network and infrastructure sharing among operators 
may help in addressing the issue of uneven mobile coverage. What is your opinion on 
this issue? 
 Why do you think operators don’t do this more often? 
 Should or should it not be mandated? 
 How can the issue of trust be addressed? 
 What role do you think regulations can play here? 
Q4. What other ways do you think mobile network operators can be encouraged and/or 
mandated to do more in terms of expanding and improving mobile coverage? 
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 Would you suggest other initiatives apart from USF? 
 What role can regulation play here? 
 Can you please give examples where such mechanism is in use? 
Q5. Could you please give insights on how you think multi-stakeholders like 
regulators, operators, and the civil society can work together to improve coverage in 
unserved and underserved locations in Africa?  
 Any country example? 
Q6. What about Zero Rating? Does this contribute to universal access and service 
(UAS) in any way? 
 What about its criticisms (net neutrality violation, anti-competition…?) 
Q7. Advocates of universal service are now arguing for the need to rethink the scope 
of UAS to include new telecom services such as mobile and broadband into the 
framework as technology is increasingly converging. What is your take on this? 
 Since many services are now available, which services should be included in 
the scope of universal services? 
Q8. Are there any other comments you would like to make on the issue of uneven 
mobile coverage and UAS which you feel my questions have not covered or you wish 
to reemphasise? 
Closing – Thank participants for their time and cooperation, assure them once again 
of their data protection and confidentiality, ask if they would be willing to review the 
transcripts of their conversation so as to ensure proper representation of their thoughts, 
ask for other possible interview contacts, etc. 
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Appendix D: List of interviewees 
ID Code Stakeholder category and 
areas of experience 
Medium of 
interview 
Date and time Duration 
(hrs: min: sec) 
Interviewee 1 Access specialist, civil 
society representative and 
ICT researcher 
Skype without 
video 
6-10-2015 
13:00 GMT 
1:20:31 
Interviewee 2  Deputy director general of a 
regulatory authority 
Face-to-face 
with notes (no 
recording) 
09-10-2015 
13:30 GMT 
NA 
Interviewee 3 Africa director for 
government and regulatory 
affairs of a major OTT 
Skype with 
video 
16-10-2015 
09:00 GMT 
0:24:34 
Interviewee 4 Head of access policy for 
Africa of a major body 
representing the association 
of MNO 
Google Hangout 
with video call 
06-11-2015 
12:18 GMT 
0:39:16 
Interviewee 5 A long-term UAS consultant 
and researcher 
Face-to-face 
with a tape 
recorder 
12-11-2015 
10:50 GMT 
1:21:15 
Interviewee 6 Independent 
telecommunications policy 
analyst with expertise in 
Africa and other parts of the 
world 
Phone and 
Skype without 
video 
02-12-2015 
10:01 GMT 
0:44:37 
Interviewee 7 UAS consultant  Skype without 
video 
17:12:2015 
19:02 GMT 
1:01:44 
Interviewee 8 Access specialist and 
managing director of a niche 
provider 
Skype without 
video 
19-01-2016 
08:58 GMT 
0:45:46 
Interviewee 9  Head of spectrum 
administration of a 
regulatory authority  
Email 19-01-2016 NA 
Interviewee 10 Director of UAS of a 
regulatory authority   
Email 21-01-2016 NA 
Interviewee 11 UAS consultant and 
researcher 
Skype with 
video 
22-01-2016 
09:57 GMT 
0:52:42 
Interviewee 12 Access specialist and the 
director for business 
development of a niche 
provider 
Skype without 
video 
22-01-2016 
17:07 GMT  
 
0:47:01 
Interviewee 13 
A key multinational MNO 
employee in charge of 
Skype with 
video 
29-01-2016 
07:59 GMT 
1:16:16 
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ID Code Stakeholder category and 
areas of experience 
Medium of 
interview 
Date and time Duration 
(hrs: min: sec) 
regulatory policy across 
Africa 
 
 
Interviewee 14 Head of UAS division of a 
regulatory authority  
Email 11-03-2016 NA 
Interviewee 15 Chief information officer of 
a pan-African MNO 
Phone 16-03-2016 
14:28 GMT 
 
0:34:09 
Interviewee 16 Civil society and ICT 
researcher 
Email 30-03-2016 NA 
Interviewee 17 A former multinational 
MNO executive, now a 
senior international policy 
adviser 
Face-to-face 
with a tape 
recorder 
13-04-2016 
13:15 GMT 
 
1:02:58 
Interviewee 18 Regulatory specialist of an 
international lending 
organisation  
Phone 19-04-2016 
14:03 GMT 
0:43:10 
Interviewee 19 Senior Director and 
independent ICT researcher 
Skype without 
video 
19-04-2016 
15:19 GMT 
0:43:19 
Interviewee 20 The former head of an 
international ICT body, now 
an independent consultant 
for the ITU and World Bank 
Skype without 
video 
22-04-2016 
10:07 GMT 
0:41:56 
Interviewee 21 A former public policy 
director for a multinational 
MNO 
Skype with 
video 
28-04-2016 
10:03 GMT 
0:44:35 
Interviewee 22 Academic in ICT policy and 
UAS expert  
Phone 11-05-2016 
7:30 GMT 
0:14:33 
Interviewee 23 Former USF CEO, now 
consulting for the ITU and 
some countries in Africa 
Face-to-face 
with a tape 
recorder 
20-05-2016 
13:00 GMT 
1:08:32 
Interviewee 24 Academic and UAS 
consultant  
Skype without 
video 
26-07-2016 
11:00 BST 
0:46:12 
Interviewee 25 UAS director of a regulatory 
authority  
Email 16-11-2016 NA 
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ID Code Stakeholder category and 
areas of experience 
Medium of 
interview 
Date and time Duration 
(hrs: min: sec) 
Interviewee 26 Permanent Secretary for 
Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 
Face-to-face 
with a tape 
recorder 
15-03-2018 0:35:16 
Interviewee27 ICT academic and rural 
community network expert 
Email 19-04-2018 NA 
Interviewee28 A former regulatory head Face-to-face 
with a tape 
recorder 
15-03-2018 0:35:16 
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Appendix E: Sample of transcribed interview 
Time of Interview: 07:59 GMT (1:16:16)  
Date: 29-01-2016 
Medium: via Skype  
Interviewer: Researcher 
Interviewee: A key multinational MNO employee in charge of regulatory policy 
across Africa 
Category of Interviewee: Operator 
ID Code: Interviewee13 
Opening… 
Interviewee13: It is very good that you are looking into telecoms. Everything is about 
connectivity today. In Africa more people are connect to mobile phones than pipe-
borne water. This tells you about how important mobile phone is today. In Africa, as 
you know since you’ve worked with the bank, the financial inclusion has failed as less 
than 10% of the population of Africa have access to formal banking system but when 
you put the penetration rate of mobile operators together, it is now averaging around 
60% and this tells you that we can actually give banking to 60% of the population and 
it is even easier for us because our distribution model is much more advanced, it is 
much more practical. You guys can put ATM in wherever you want but it is CAPEX 
heavy etc. So the banks have failed the African people in general and the mobile 
businesses are taking over. When I went through your questionnaire, I think that your 
key question is around: in spite these investments that we have across the continent, 
do Africa people still have access to these services efficiently? If not, why not? What 
are the challenges and how can we make it work? I think you’ve got it right because 
at the end of the day, yes we are partners of ICT for governments as these are public 
services and we just get licenses, depending on what you call it. The bottom line is 
that we just get authorisation to use scarce resources to be able to deploy these public 
services like banking, just because government cannot do it efficiently. So the 
governments set up terms and conditions etc. Now when you look at the terms and 
conditions they come with financial liabilities which mean the business needs to 
viable. So, you rollout your networks and put the business plan based on areas that are 
developed. Now when you look at the structures of our countries you only have few 
cities that represent three quarter of the economy of the country and then the rest of 
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the country is still very poor and, therefore, there is no incentive for us to go and roll 
out in those places because you don’t get the returns. You can’t spend $6000 or $7000 
a month on a site that gives you only $200. Now the question is: is there a model that 
we can use on one hand while we are trying to make sure that we get this business at 
a level where we can consider it as viable as possible, and at the same time make sure 
that we cover the rest of the country? So there is the notion of universal service which 
basically was designed to sort of provide answer to this question where we have to put 
money aside as part of our contribution in addition to the licensing fees and all sort of 
taxes. These funds need to be managed to serve as investment for the purpose of 
deploying networks and providing access to communications services in underserved 
areas. But the problem with our countries giving the weakness from the government 
perspectives, people see opportunities with those funds and basically the selection 
process of the government in managing these funds are not that objective. So we find 
people managing these funds in a very subjective manner, therefore, corruption get 
involved and the purpose is not met. So if you do an assessment of liberalisation of 
telecoms sector across countries say 10 or 15 years ago from the monopolies from 
which they were liberalised, you will realise that these funds were created but it has 
not been a success simply because of governance. Now we still, as mobile operators, 
feel uncomfortable with the fact that our people are not as connected as possible and 
we are saying that perhaps the answer is in the cooperation between operators which 
can translate into, for instance, infrastructure sharing. This needs to be further explored 
because it has different level of complexities. From an infrastructure perspective you 
have passive and active infrastructure sharing. Passive infrastructure sharing is your 
tower, buildings, where antennas are placed etc. That is why this form of sharing is 
easy because there is no point in building it separately, there is no incentive for this 
because when we have one antenna and we collocate, we would spend less, it would 
have less impact on our environment and since we spend less there is more incentives 
to cover more areas that are not viable. But this is still an ongoing discussion because 
even in areas that are not underserviced, it is something that can help the bottom-line 
of businesses in general. Now from the active perspective, I mean from the core 
network itself, this is where the question lies as different companies have different 
positions. Some have great networks as a result of their level of investment may be to 
use this as a way of differentiating between themselves and their role in the market. 
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So some operators are good in some markets and not so good in some markets. In the 
markets where their network is powerful, they don’t want to share because they want 
to keep their market leader advantage but in markets where they are weak, they want 
to request sharing. So there is still not enough trust, people are saying this is our bread 
and butter; we cannot share it with you. So there are different school of thoughts in 
terms of infrastructure sharing but definitely it is the way to go as it will help us spend 
less and reach the most remote areas and fulfil that obligation from a rural coverage 
perspective. More cooperation is required. There is a pilot project we started in *** 
(name of a country) where we decided *** (name of operators) (interruption by PA) 
…One thing that does not really help is the long-term focus of politicians. I deal with 
different Ministers, Presidents, and Governors across the continent both here and my 
previous job, I have a concern from a vision perspective. Today I am not sure if our 
approach as government gives enough incentives for foreign investor to feel 
comfortable to invest sufficiently. The tax pressure is extremely high and increasing 
by the day. You have the general tax, the income tax, and then you have what we call 
telecoms-specific tax, inbound tax, SIM cards import, handsets, tax on literally 
everything. Now, what that does is that it puts pressure on the viability of the business 
and as a business, since we are not NGOs, we can only pass that on to the customers 
and this makes the service a bit more expensive and it does challenge the affordability. 
What that does it that it reduces the basis on which tax needs to be paid and ultimately 
it reduces our contribution to government. Although we try to explain these scenarios 
but government do not seem to think about the long-term, they see short term and this 
is linked to political situations where people think only in terms of their tenure in 
office. So they want to collect now, there is no long-term views. This also does not 
help in terms of incentivising operators to invest enough. You also have the regulatory 
framework in general where cost of spectrum is priced beyond any business plan. We 
had an instance in *** (name of a country) where we have 5 operators, which is 
already too much, and they wanted to sell 4G LTE spectrum on auction and the reserve 
price was around $62 million. Now when you do a business plan, you realise quickly 
that you cannot get that money back as it is simply too expensive. Actually if they can 
give us spectrum for free, we would serve the service and the data freely and ultimately 
we would make more money and contribute more to government. So there is an issue 
regarding the regulatory intervention. In some countries every month you have new 
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regulations which translate to cost in terms of compliance. The regulatory pressure 
across the continent is increasing and this is also due to the fact that the economic 
situations are not heading in the right direction, price of oil has dropped and 
government is struggling to get revenues. Just to summarise these points, on one hand 
operators need to make efforts to be more efficient through infrastructure sharing etc. 
and find solutions that can help underserved areas and on the other hand, governments 
need to create an environment that is conducive to investment and create enough 
incentives for operators to cover every area that is not properly covered.            
R: What are your views on the level of mobile penetration across Africa? 
Interviewee13: Numbers speak louder but I lack them. There is a lot of potential in 
the continent and today the average penetration rate is about 60% across countries 
which simply suggests that there is still more work to be done and there is a lot of 
opportunities for operators. There needs to be a lot of effort…the 60%, by the way, is 
just voice penetration but data penetration is around 12% which is still very, very low. 
So there is a lot of work to be done not only from an operator’s perspective but the 
government needs to create an environment that will lessen the burden on operators 
and create enough incentives to invest but there is a point regarding manufacturers. 
We need to see handsets that are affordable…the affordability of handsets is a very 
critical issue because today data is becoming more important than it was a few years 
ago with the advent of social networks etc. So smart handsets affordability becomes a 
big question hence the manufacturers also have to come into play in this instance. So 
for everybody, there are still a lot of opportunities going forward. When the other 
markets in the US and Europe are looking at us, they feel that we are at a better place 
because those markets are saturated with over 100% penetration and now, they are 
working on data. So we still agree with the fact that there are a lot of opportunities, 
there is a need for efficiency for the government, for operators, and the manufacturers 
of handsets who are going to play a big role. I am stressing manufacturer of handsets 
here because the issue of affordability in Africa is still a big issue. So it is important 
to think of creating handsets that are both smart and affordable given the growing 
needs to consume data. So this is really the position I would give.     
R:  What are your views on the operation and management of universal service 
funds (USF) across Africa? 
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Interviewee13: I think the idea of USF was a great idea and it is still a great idea but 
the challenge comes from the governance side of it, the model, and structure that is 
needed to manage the fund. Maybe the fund needs to be managed by a joint venture 
that the operators can create with enough scrutiny in terms of managing the investment 
because it just has to be managed at the same level with any other business with strong 
internal policies that any commercial business has. From this perspective, not only 
would the fund benefit from the expertise of the operators but also from their way of 
doing business, which from my view, I think we are good at what we are doing so we 
can manage the fund better, but when it is politicised, it becomes an issue. That is 
where the challenges come in. So to answer your question: I think it is still good but 
we require improvement on how the funds should be managed. The government needs 
to consult a bit more, take leadership in accordance with submissions made by 
operators, which seems to be a challenge so far. This issue is not whether or not to 
have the fund but how it is managed. That is the key issue.    
R: What are your views on the policy formulation and implementation of 
USF/UAS across Africa? 
Interviewee13: To come up with efficient policies you have to consult the industry as 
they have the expertise. Unfortunately, the different countries across the continent do 
not operate at the same level and this translates into consultation problems. Ideally, 
consultation process needs to be transparent; it needs to be prescribed in a way that is 
above all the stakeholders and by involving all the stakeholders, it would be fair and 
would fulfil the public interest. This is so because telecom services need to be provided 
in the public interest. So in drafting these policies, governments need to have one 
priority in their minds: public interest. In drafting licences, public interest needs to be 
the ultimate target. Public interest simply means the interest of the consumer and 
enough incentives for investors. If you have these objectives in mind, you would make 
sure that all the stakeholders are involved because they play a great role. I just gave an 
example of handset manufacturers. Why would you, in a place where service is so 
expensive and penetration is so low, impose tax on handsets importation? Not only 
would that lead to unaffordability, it does not create incentives for manufacturers. So 
if you take off that tax on handsets importation, it means less cost to a consumer that 
is already poor. Putting all these tax pressures on operators and manufacturers would 
translate into high cost of telecom services. Is this in the public interest? When you 
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are making the lives of investors miserable to the point where they are not sure if they 
should stay in the country or not simply because they are being harassed daily, is that 
in the public interest? When all these costs of regulation make the lives of operators 
so difficult that even the profitability becomes a big question because there is a big 
question on profitability today. You cannot have a situation when the penetration rate 
is still low at 10% or 12% on the data side and 50% or 60% on the voice side but the 
businesses are not making money, there is a problem. So these are the questions we 
still have. So in terms of consultation processes, you should make sure that politics 
does not take over in such a technical environment. Let me explain to you what politics 
does. Politics make sure that you appoint a minister who has no clue of what telecoms 
services mean and the applications of these services. Such political agenda will 
undermine the citizenry as it would not be in the public interest but if a minister who 
has enough experience comes into the country with an objective that is linked directly 
to public interest, he would put a transparent system in place, he would consult all the 
parties, he would put in place laws that encourage investment, create incentives for 
innovation and ensure that consumers have the best products. This is what I mean by 
public interest but where we are today suggests that politics is taking over a critical 
and technical sector such as telecoms environment which needs to be run by experts. 
We have a problem in Africa in terms of best practises that encourages government to 
have independent regulators…just like in the banks you have an institution that is 
independent whose position is not politically affected without fear or favour and that 
would drive the public interest. If you look at the US-FCC, if you look at the UK-
Ofcom, if you look at other developed countries, the effort is made. Obviously you 
cannot have an institution that is separate from government but independent comes 
from the fact that the process that has been put in place to create that institution, 
appoint people to run that institution does not allow government to give them direct 
instructions in terms of how they should run the sector. So you would see, for instance, 
that the funding model does not directly depend on government, specifically the 
ministry of telecoms. You would find that the appointments of the board of directors 
including the DG, depending on the model, are people nominated by government but 
appointed by a diverse institution such as the parliament. Therefore, the president does 
not have the right, for instance, to pick and choose but he or she can either appoint or 
reject a nomination by sending back the nominees list for further consideration but he 
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cannot specifically pick the nominee. What this does is that the parliament looks across 
the sector, select the best people and recommend. When these people are in office, 
they don’t have a relationship with any department that would tell them what to do. 
They answer to parliament and they don’t depend on other institutions in terms of 
funding which makes them independent in terms of the context in which they operate 
and from this perspective, it means they will run the sector effectively. But what we 
find in Africa in most of the cases is that they put together a legal framework that 
makes the regulator basically a division of the department of telecoms or an office in 
the presidency. This means they will take any political decision; they will be subjected 
to any form of political interference and put in question, the objectivity of the sector.                
R: What are your views on network and infrastructure sharing among 
operators? 
Interviewee13: I think as operators we have increased our level of engagement 
because we feel that we would provide more value to the sector by looking at 
efficiency and one of the ways of doing it is by sharing infrastructure. This is a very 
interesting area to look at. The principle, when it comes to infrastructure sharing, is 
something that we align but the question is: in practice, what does it mean? So there 
are different views in terms of how we do it even when you look at the active 
infrastructure, there are different levels. Some people feel that you don’t have to go as 
far as sharing spectrum, for instance. Some people feel that depending on the deepness, 
there are certain limits. So these are issues that need to be aligned but in general terms, 
infrastructure sharing is the way to go and this is really positive in many ways 
including the fact that we actually need to care about the environment. We need to 
start making sure that whatever decision we make is environmentally friendly. So from 
this perspective as well, infrastructure sharing is definitely the way forward.    
R: Studies have suggested that although UAS may be an obligation at the 
beginning but with time, it may become an opportunity due to network 
externalities considering factors like urban-rural communication. What is your 
take on this? 
Interviewee13: If I may put your question differently, do you mean: can we look at 
underserved areas as an opportunity?  
R: Exactly.  
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Interviewee13: Yes, I see it as an opportunity. We have done something in this area 
in *** (name of a country) by looking at how to stimulate data consumption for last-
service-mile (LSM: low income earning people in remote areas) customers and 
actually make profit out of it. This was a very interesting exercise. We took smart 
handsets with a lot of data and gave it to a group of people in some villages and after 
a month, we realised that they did not use the data, they only used probably a tenth of 
the data. Why? Because they did not know what to do with all the data we gave them. 
I am sure if I were to give it to you, you would access content, you would access 
movies, you would do research because you have the knowledge to use the data. So 
we realised that given them handsets with data is not the solution. There were 
dimensions that needed to be added: relevant content and education. So this is to say 
that rolling out network in these areas and giving people smart handsets to drive data 
usage was not the complete answer, there was a dimension that needed to be added. 
Today you access this content because it is in a language you understand but there are 
a lot of people that do not understand English, for example. That is one, but secondly, 
you know how to read. We still have people in our remote areas who can’t read. Now, 
what are they going to look for? So giving such to people who don’t know how to read 
simply means the people would not access such content, hence, the issue of relevant 
content where people create their own stories. In *** *** (name of a country) they 
call it local content. Local content in ****** (name of a country) means something 
else since they are contributions made by locals. Take DSTV as an example. DSTV in 
the past was a rich people channel and they aired content from the US, from the UK 
and they realise over time that we need to make the content in our bouquet relevant 
and affordable. So when they started putting African Magic and other African 
Channels and other local content, it became relevant for the locals and they reviewed 
the price. The channels that were providing local contents made a lot of money as they 
started covering a larger base. So they created a model to access LSM people with 
relevant content and lower rates. I am sure that in the Nigeria of today, DSTV is not 
as a luxury as it used to be ten years ago as nearly everyone now has access to DSTV 
even people in the shops can afford it but when you look at the revenue they are 
making out of it, it is massive. So the issue about remote areas profitability is just 
about the business model. So to answer your question: we have to think about a 
number of things including relevant content and education to stimulate usage in remote 
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areas because the perception today is that those places are not viable but when you 
fine-tune your business model, you can make it viable - you have to give them a 
product that they understand. If you look at in Nestle, they started making small 
chocolate instead of only the big ones they used to. You will also see Coca-Cola 
making small bottles of coke; you will see even soap companies making small ones 
etc. These things are bought by the masses bit-by-bit but the scale gradually become 
massive. So you just have to find the business models that address their need. So in 
the telecoms sector, there is need to create what people understand and in their 
language as well and they also need to be educated on how to use it. A megabyte does 
not mean anything to my mother, but if you tell her that ‘with a megabyte you can 
watch a movie, you can watch a film from your village, and it can last for x number 
of days, you can call your son on skype for 30 minutes a day for a week etc.,’ then it 
begins to make sense to her. In order words, when you list the things she can do with 
a megabyte, then a megabyte makes sense to her. It is linked to education. So yes it is 
viable but there must be a more specific business model to address specific needs of 
the underserved people.             
R: What other initiatives would you recommend for the improvement of mobile 
coverage across Africa? 
Interviewee13: I think the current ideas are not fully tested and alternatives are 
actually difficult to imagine at this stage because if you implement such alternatives 
you run the risk of having academic alternatives (not tested), which would be an 
exercise that does not translate to a practical way of implementation. So I think we 
just have to be a bit more committed, we just have to consult more and think about the 
implementation of the existing models because I believe that the idea of cooperation 
is good. It just needs to translate into practice and the operators can pull it out. On the 
other hand, we need a bit more incentives from governments in terms of doing 
businesses i.e. incentivise the operators to invest more.   
R: What about Zero Rating? Does this contribute to UAS and the improvement 
of mobile coverage in any way? 
Interviewee13: I am happy that you have done your research so you have a good feel 
of some of the challenges the sector is facing. I will give you my perspective and the 
perspective of the business. So you are talking about OTT players, your Facebook, 
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your Skype, all these content that are created by institutions that God knows where 
they sit but they are delivering values that answers to customers specific needs. They 
are products that consumers love. It is a good example of what innovation can do. 
What they do is basically allow us to exchange experience, which is a natural need. 
Today you can even put me in your classroom, you can broadcast this conversation 
without me knowing, people can see what you do, when you do it, and where you are. 
This is really great and consumers like that. This is looking at it from consumers and 
innovation perspectives. When you look at it from a telecom landscape, there is a 
problem. We have operators like us who are spending millions of dollars to invest in 
infrastructures, on importation of handsets, to make sure that we have networks that 
are able to convey broadband signals; we work in acquiring customers and so on. Then 
you just have these applications that by-pass your systems and suddenly it is 
contributing to you losing revenues. By the way, let me just explain something to you. 
All these applications cannot work if there are no proper infrastructures like 
broadband. It is basically the combination of internet, broadband, smartphones 
penetrations, and other infrastructures that makes these applications work. Without 
these structures, such applications would never work. So, if now we have a situation 
where revenues that are already under pressure is even in the process of decreasing as 
a result of people using alternatives that do not give us the revenue that we are 
expecting, who is going to invest in the infrastructure? We are sitting in a position 
where we have ‘operators’ that are operating from an offshore perspective by 
providing the same services for which we paying license fees. We are sitting with a 
number of things that expects our obligations such as privacy, QoS, customer care etc. 
So we have a lot of obligation in our license conditions for which they are not subjected 
to. Another issue is that government today grant licenses in relation to certain ICT 
objectives like the creation of jobs, revenue generation for the country’s budget, 
deployment of infrastructure to ensure accessibility across the country etc. Now when 
you have operators that you cannot even touch, it means government is losing as well 
as operators. Another element that is extremely important is security. Security today 
becomes a big issue and we have obligation in terms of ensuring that we provide 
security in partnership with governments like SIM card registration and Nigeria is a 
good example where a SIM card can be used by terrorist to blow-up a city. Now we 
need to know who that person is but those that are allowing phone calls to be made 
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from Moscow to London without traceability, how do we deal with that? If you look 
at terrorists today, they are using networks, they are using ICT platforms, they are 
using internet etc. to drive their propaganda, their hate speech. Who should be 
responsible for this? Now one of the purposes of licensing in general is to hold 
somebody accountable for the purpose of providing public services like telecoms. 
Now when you look at the challenges that the state face, we face as operators in losing 
revenues and the fact that consumers love the product, the question becomes: how do 
you make sure that government get its due, operators remain profitable and keep 
investing in infrastructure without which OTTs cannot operate and also drive 
innovation because you don’t want to kill innovation and also look at issues 
surrounding security. There is a lot of thing that can go wrong even from the 
consumer’s perspective in terms of privacy especially with the use of various apps. 
When you log on to say Facebook, do you know where your information is going? Do 
you really know what they are doing with all these information? And these OTTs are 
probably registered in tax havens where they do not pay taxes. Therefore, the business 
model is smartly designed but does it help the countries and the people in terms of the 
risk they facing. So the question is actually extremely complex and it is one that is yet 
to be resolved but we are saying as mobile operators: if you are going to provide the 
same services, you need to be subjected to the same obligations. Same services same 
obligations is our keywords. It seems to be a juicy situation for customers but they are 
exposed big time.             
Now we effectively have a partnership with *** (an OTT player) but it does not mean 
that we agree on everything because social media drives usage and it increases data 
revenue. So from this perspective, we have an arrangement where without data you 
can access *** (an OTT player) and a lighter conversation but if you start 
downloading, then you have to pay for it. So it is an incentive for us to create value 
for customers but that does not mean that we are going to agree on the fact that we are 
going to allow people make phone calls for free on our networks? No. So we believe 
that the innovation is great but for many reasons including public interest reasons that 
are linked to lack of investments, tax, and security, OTTs would need to be regulated. 
The question becomes how do we do it? Do you push the government to make sure 
that OTTs create permanent establishments in countries so you can leverage and get 
tax from them? Do you block them like they have done in Dubai and other countries? 
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In the US there is what they call net neutrality and probably in Europe as well. Net 
neutrality is just a principle that enables freedom of expression in the context of 
telecoms. They are saying if you give a person data, it is an infringement on his 
freedom of expression to tell him how to use the data. That is effectively what net 
neutrality does. So the basis of net neutrality is freedom of expression because the 
word also in telecoms comes from the freedom of expression which includes freedom 
to impart information, which implies the means that you use to consume information, 
which is simply now done through broadcasting, telecoms services, infrastructures, 
and platforms. So regulation is basically, in an ideal democratic society, the limitations 
you have in that freedom of expression which needs to be guided by the principle of 
being reasonable and justifiable in a democratic society. So these are what this 
discussion should entail. Now the comment that I have for people who are pushing for 
net neutrality to stop Zero rating is that in every country you have freedom like a 
limitation to the extent that the limitation is justifiable, then in this case specifically, 
to the extent that OTTs should be regulated, I believe it is justifiable.      
R: Are there any other comments you would like to make on the issue of uneven 
mobile coverage and UAS which you feel my questions have not covered or you 
wish to reemphasise? 
Interviewee13: I think you are touching a very key issue and I like the fact that you 
have a banking background because banking is a highly regulated environment. So 
you have a regulated mind already and I think the issue that the issue you are touching 
is very important simply because connectivity is at the centre of development across 
the world. So your research would be extremely relevant. You just have to make sure 
that you are not all over the place and be much focused. I think the sector still needs 
skill because it has a lot of skills shortage issue. You are at the right place and I will 
encourage you to be really focused and produce a piece of work that would be directly 
consumed or used in the sector. Your research is very relevant as it is talking to the 
need of the market.      
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Appendix F: Informed consent form 
Faculty of Business and Law 
Informed Consent Form for research participants 
Title of Study: 
 
Closing the digital divide in Africa: The role of 
mobile telecommunications and universal access 
and service policies 
 
Person(s) conducting the research: 
 
Arakpogun Ogiemwonyi Emmanuel 
 Programme of study: 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Address of the researcher for correspondence: 
 
 
 
Room 415 
Newcastle Business School 
Northumbria University 
City Campus East 
Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE1 8ST 
United Kingdom 
Telephone: 
 
+447831705877 
E-mail: 
 
emmanuel.arakpogun@northumbria.ac.uk 
Description of the broad nature of the research: 
 
 
 
The study sets out to examine the liberalisation of 
the mobile telecommunications industry in Africa.  
From literature and the country analysis that has 
been carried out, it has been observed that despite 
the liberalisation and the existence of multiple GSM 
operators, mobile penetration in rural areas remains 
elusive. The problem is even more palpable in 
Eastern Africa. 
This study will attempt to investigate and 
understand the reasons behind this trend with a view 
to providing a stakeholder-based solution for 
improving mobile coverage in under-served 
locations in Africa. 
The researcher hopes to achieve this through 
qualitative research based on semi-structured 
interviews with top industry stakeholders (e.g. 
regulators, operators, civil society/industry 
commentators). 
Description of the involvement expected of 
participants including the broad nature of 
questions to be answered or events to be 
observed or activities to be undertaken, and the 
expected time commitment: 
Participants will be engaged with semi-structured 
interview questions which will be largely based on 
issues from literature and country-by-country 
analysis. Participants will be allowed to freely 
express themselves first within the boundaries of 
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these questions and also share their experiences as it 
relates to the research problem.  
The anonymity of participants and organisations 
will be masked by using pseudo names except 
expressly stated otherwise by participants.  
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary and 
the participant may withdraw at any time. 
Time commitment: within 60 minutes. 
Description of how the data you provide will be 
securely stored and/or destroyed upon 
completion of the project. 
 
The data collected will be downloaded and stored 
unto the university software and secured with a 
password. Hard copies of transcripts generated in 
case of voice recorded interview will be locked in 
the university’s cupboard. 
 
At the end of the study, the data will then be 
destroyed according to Newcastle Business School 
guidelines 
 
Information obtained in this study, including this consent form, will be kept strictly 
confidential (i.e. will not be passed to others) and anonymous (i.e. individuals and 
organisations will not be identified unless this is expressly excluded in the details given 
above). 
Data obtained through this research may be reproduced and published in a variety of 
forms and for a variety of audiences related to the broad nature of the research detailed 
above. It will not be used for purposes other than those outlined above without your 
permission. 
Participation is entirely voluntary and participants may withdraw at any time. 
By signing this consent form, you are indicating that you fully understand the 
above information and agree to participate in this study on the basis of the above 
information. 
 
Participant’s signature:     Date: 
 
Student’s signature:      Date:  
 
Please keep one copy of this form for your own records 
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Appendix G: Conceptual and empirical model combined 
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Appendix H: Examples of the regional classification of Eastern Africa 
GSMA Blycroft African Union UNICEF 
Burundi   Burundi 
  Comoros Comoros 
 Djibouti Djibouti Djibouti 
Eritrea Eritrea Eritrea Eritrea 
Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia 
Kenya Kenya Kenya Kenya 
 Madagascar Madagascar Madagascar 
Malawi   Malawi 
  Mauritius Mauritius 
 Mozambique  Mozambique 
Rwanda  Rwanda Rwanda 
 Seychelles Seychelles Seychelles 
 Somalia Somalia Somalia 
South Sudan  South Sudan South Sudan – since Sudan was 
split into [‘North’] Sudan and 
South Sudan in 2011 
Tanzania Tanzania Tanzania Tanzania 
Uganda Uganda Uganda Uganda 
 Zambia   
 Zimbabwe   
 
9 countries 12 countries 13 countries 16 countries 
Data sources: (AU, 2018; Blycroft, 2016; GSMA, 2017; UNICEF, 2008).   
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